On June 29, 2026, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the federal president has the authority to terminate
the employment of heads of independent federal agencies at will, rather than only
for cause. The latter requirement (i.e., due cause) would still hold for the
Federal Reserve, which raises the question of whether a central bank should be
distinguished from regulatory agencies. The value in buffering monetary policy
from political pressure is why the Federal Reserve is not part of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the U.S. government, but is instead
an independent central bank within that government. As a consequence, monetary
policy does not require approval from either the U.S. president or the
Congress. Hence, the “for cause” requirement for removing someone from the Fed’s
board of governors cannot be disagreement with the person’s preferences or
decisions regarding monetary policy. As for independent regulatory agencies in
the executive branch, their independence undermines the unitary executive as
well as the president’s role in implementing existing law.
The full essay is at "Independent U.S. Regulatory Agencies."
