Unnecessary Systemic Risk: Banks' Price-Fixing and Racketeering in Side Businesses

A lawsuit filed in a Florida district-court in 2013 alleged that JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and the London Metal Exchange (LME) artificially inflated aluminum prices.  The plaintiffs accused the companies of anti-trust practices and racketeering, including the “manipulation of the aluminum market through supply price fixing.”[1] This sounds like what had led to the forced break-up of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, though in that case exactly a century before, the restraint of trade had to do with the company’s main line of business (i.e., oil). In the case of the banks, however, owning commodity assets such as storage facilities and trading in raw materials do not constitute banking. This point triggers a larger question involving the repeal of the Glass-Steagal Act.

Should we allow banks to expand even beyond these functions to owning commodities and related real-estate? What does this do to the banks' systemic risk?    Image Source: salisburyareafoundation.org. 

The full essay is at "Unnecessary Systemic Risk in Banking."

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[1] Melanie Burton, “Glencore, JPMorgan Sued Over Warehouse Aluminium Prices,” Reuters, August 7, 2013.

Conflicting Business Models at Singapore’s Airport

Singapore’s Changi may have been “the world’s most fabulous airport” in 2011, according to Scott McCartney of the Wall Street Journal. To be sure, the airport’s amenities were amazing. How they are were being operated, however, detracted in certain respects with the goal. “We wanted to transform the way travel is done and create a stress-free experience,” Foo Sek Min of the airport’s management said. This goal dovetailed with the airport being “a key economic development element” for Singapore. Accordingly, the state-owned company that ran the airport received “plenty of government support.” In line with these goals was there a business model that was long-term oriented? Rather than trying to “nickel and dime” customers so as to minimize the funding from airlines and the government while maximizing revenue on a daily basis, resisting such urges in order to provide a truly stress-free experience would, I contend, be more consistent with the goals. 

The full essay is at "Conflicting Business Models." 

Über “Surge-Pricing”: There’s a Mobile App for Price-Gouging!

A week into 2012, The New York Times ran a piece on Ubur (as in Übermench?), a taxi and livery company founded in 2009. As Curtis Lanoue aptly describes in his essay on the company, its novelty consists of a unique mobile app that passengers, drivers and the company’s managers use to bring demand and supply into equilibrium by means of differential pricing including “surge pricing.”[1] The price of a taxi or livery depends on temporal and geographic demand and supply levels. That is to say, the pricing increases as more people request rides. Theoretically, the pricing should go back down even in situations in which the demand is high as drivers are enticed to continue driving a few more hours. Hence, the wait time for an Uber cab after a concert or sporting event should be reduced even if the first people out have to wait until the price goes down or pay more than they expected. In this essay, I suggest that such “stickiness” in even such a small-scale market mechanism as a mobile app can give rise to some formidable ethical problems.

Price-gouging primped up as a mobile app?  (Image Source: thevirge.com)

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

“The Great Gatsby” in 3D

It is difficult for us mere mortals to take a step back and view the wider trajectory that we are on. It is much easier to relate today’s innovation back to the status quo and pat ourselves on the back amid all the excitement over the new toy. I content that this is the case in cinema.

The full essay is at "The Great Gatsby"