Showing posts with label executive compensation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label executive compensation. Show all posts

Saturday, August 24, 2024

Beyond Climate Change: Starbucks Awash in Cash

While it may be tempting to go after companies for hypocrisy on corporate social responsibility, even deeper criticism may be closer to the bottom line, financially. Even though social media castigated Starbucks for its impact on carbon emissions in agreeing to fly its Southern Californian CEO Brian Niccol to Seattle on a company plane each week, I submit that the amount of spending entailed raises questions about cost-containment and even cast some doubt on whether the company’s price increases in 2024 were wholly justified, and thus even on whether the industry was competitive or an oligarchy.


The full essay is at "Beyond Climate Change: Starbucks Awash in Cash."

Thursday, June 27, 2019

Ownership and Compensation Conflated: The Case of Bill Gates and Paul Allen at Microsoft

Paul Allen claims in his memoir that Bill Gates tried on more than one occasion to reduce Allen’s relative ownership interest in Microsoft. Of course, the veracity of Allen’s explanation can be questioned even if the ownership changes in percentage terms are a matter of public record. Whereas The Wall Street Journal focused on Allen's credibility in making his claim, I see a case study on the difference between ownership and compensation for labor.

The full essay is at "Ownership and Compensation."

Saturday, May 25, 2019

Executive Compensation Tied to Firm Performance: A Critique

With robust economies in America boosting companies’ sales, corporate tax cuts, and an increase in stock buybacks lifting stock prices in 2018, the default mantra in executive compensation circles that high CEO pay is justified if it is tied to firm performance could be questioned. Similarly, the typical assumption that high pay would have to get higher for a CEO to be motivated to do the basics of the job, including overseeing mergers and acquisitions, (or that doing the basics warrants a raise) could be questioned. Particularly in 2018, the comfortable, self-serving ways of the business elite in the U.S. were ripe for critique.

Friday, April 26, 2019

Getting More For Doing Less: Bank Board Directors

Executive compensation is an art rather than a science. It is not as if numbers are fed into a computer and the correct compensation pops out. More discretion is involved than meets the eye. “Since the financial crisis,” The New York Times reported in 2013, “compensation for the directors of [America’s] biggest banks has continued to rise even as the banks themselves, facing difficult markets and regulatory pressures, are reining in bonuses and pay.” [1] Just five years after the financial crisis, it is interesting how the banks' respective managements decided to spend the TARP money from Congress and even more money from the Federal Reserve Bank. Also of note, board and upper management compensations seemed to be going in different directions in spite of both being presumably tied to the same firm performance. Even a performance-incentive approach tied to firm-performance can accommodate a lot of latitude, such that banks differ in how much they pay their respective boards. The discretion permits inside collusion and even outlandish demands by "celebrity" members whose advice does not necessarily come up to celebrity status. 

The full essay is at "Bank Boards Getting More for Doing Less."

1. Susanne Craig, “At Banks, Board Pay Soars Amid Cutbacks,” The New York Times, April 1, 2013.

Friday, February 8, 2019

Increasing Income Inequality in the U.S.: Deregulation to Blame?

Most Americans have no idea how unequal wealth as well as income is in the United States. This is the thesis of Les Leopold, who wrote How to Make a Million Dollars an Hour. In an essay, he points out that the inequality had increased through the twentieth century. His explanation hinges on financial deregulation. I submit that reducing the answer to deregulation does not go far enough.

The full essay is at "Increasing Income Inequality."

Les Leopold, “Inequality Is Much Worse Than You Think,” The Huffington Post, February 7, 2013.

Monday, December 31, 2018

Enabling Non-Empathetic Leaders: The Case of Paterno at Penn State University

In January 2011, the illustrious football coach at Penn State University, Joe Paterno, learned that prosecutors were investigating his longstanding assistant coach, Jerry Sandusky, for sexually assaulting young boys in the football team’s locker room. Paterno even testified before a grand jury on the matter that month. He had been informed of the rapes back in 1998, yet he had kept the pedophile on even though additional boys would be at risk in doing so. 
That same month—January 2011—Paterno also began negotiating to amend his contract that would not expire until the end of 2012. By August 2011, Paterno and the president of Penn State reached an agreement in spite of the fact that both were by then embroiled in the Sandusky investigation. “Paterno was to be paid $3 million at the end of the 2011 season if he agreed it would be his last. Interest-free loans totaling $350,000 that the university had made to Mr. Paterno over the years would be forgiven as part of the retirement package. He would also have the use of the university’s private plane and a luxury box at Beaver Stadium for him and his family to use over the next 25 years.” 
The university’s board was kept in the dark. Directors who raised questions were “quickly shut down.” In the end, the board gave the family virtually everything it wanted. The board even threw in free use of specialized hydrotherapy message equipment at the university for Paterno’s wife. In other words, Paterno (and his surviving family, following his death in January 2012) got an even better deal as the scandal came to include Paterno himself.

 Joe Paterno, head football coach at Penn State, viewed by a student as "Pa" in PA        Matt Rourke/AP

The full essay is at "Enabling Non-Empathetic Leaders."

Nissan's CEO Caught in the Crosshairs of Business and Society in Japan

Ordinarily, courses that include business & society (with business & government, and business ethics material also included as if the three fields were somehow one) have been relegated to the periphery in American business schools. Perhaps the business sector and its sycophantic deans have simply assumed that little actual cost comes from business managements deviating from societal norms and values. Admittedly, such a schism decreases reputational capital, a long-term intangible asset. Even so, the long-term-oriented and intangible can manifest as immediate jolts to such capital, with actual, measurable financial costs kicking in. They are triggered by news-worthy incidents in which a company or even one high-level manager, such as a CEO, are perceived societally as being in the wrong. The general perception of wrongness in turn depends on how far a company or manager have deviated from societal norms and values. Crucially but typically ignored, even though societal norms and values can absorb certain ethical principles or theories, business ethics is a distinct field because reasoning from or to ethical principles or theories lies at the core there. That is, no philosophical reasoning is involved in business & society; rather, the norms/values of a business sector, industry, or company are compared or contrasted with relevant societal norms and values. In this essay, I analyze the case of Carlos Ghosn, who was CEO of Nissan, Renault, and Mitsubishi on November 19, 2018 when he was arrested “on allegations that for years he had withheld millions of dollars in income from Nissan’s financial filings.”[1]

The full essay is at "Nissan's CEO in Japan."



1. Amy Chozick and Motoko Rich, “The Rise and Fall of Carlos Ghosn,” The New York Times, December 30, 2018.

Thursday, December 6, 2018

CEO Compensation: How Much Is Too Much?

From the previous year, the medium value of salaries, bonuses and long-term-incentive awards for the CEOs of 350 major American companies increased by 11% in 2010 to $9.3 million, according to the Hay Group.  Corporate net income increased by a medium of 17% and shareholders medium returns, including dividends, increased by 18 percent. Share prices also increased more than the CEO compensation. However, bonuses increased 19.7%, which is just barely more than the percentage increases in corporate profit and shareholder returns.


The full essay is at "CEO Compensation."

Thursday, January 11, 2018

Executive Compensation (Part II): Paying Failure

In late September 2011, Léo Apotheker was fired after 11 months as CEO at Hewlett-Packard. As a reward, he walked with $13.2 million in cash and stock, in addition to a sign-on package worth about $10 million, according to the New York Times. A month earlier, Robert P. Kelly received severance worth $17.2 in cash and stock when he was fired as CEO of Bank of New York Mellon. Even his clashing with board members and senior managers did not obstruct his nice severance package. A few days later, Carol Bartz was let go as CEO of Yahoo with nearly $10 million in spite of the company’s poor performance. Back in April 2011, John Chidsey, the CEO of Burger King, had departed with a severance package worth almost $20 million in the fact that McDonalds had been outcompeting Burger King. Baxter Phillips, the CEO of Massey Energy, got a package worth over $34 million in spite of “presiding over a company barraged with accusations of reckless conduct and with legal claims stemming from one of the deadliest mining disasters in memory,” according to the New York Times. Unfortunately, the list goes on and on. Is this a system of pay-for-failure? Moreover, do chief executives, who seem to outward appearances to be almost exclusively motivated by what they can get in additional compensation, have too much leverage over boards, and thus over even the owners as well? If so, is corporate governance itself severely broken? I answer in the affirmative.




Eric Dash, “The Lucrative Fall from Grace,” New York Times, September 30, 2011. 

Executive Compensation (Part I): Systemic Risk

In the wake of the financial crisis, according to the Huffington Post, “a number of the nation's largest banks were excused from the government's rescue program before they had returned to a position of complete financial security -- in part because they wanted to avoid restrictions on how much their executives would get paid, according to a new report from the program's government overseer. Citigroup, Wells Fargo, PNC and Bank of America successfully lobbied to leave the federal bailout program early in 2009, even though the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had recommended they take additional steps to shore up their assets, according to a new report from the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Relief Asset Program, a government watchdog office. Regulators, including the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, eventually ‘relaxed’ their criteria for letting the banks out of the program, the report says, leaving questions about whether the banks had strengthened their holdings enough to be able to withstand another systemic crisis.”[1]

The full essay is at "Executive Compensation: Systemic Risk."

1. Alexander Eichler, “BofA, Wells Fargo, Citigroup Left TARP Early to Avoid Restrictions on Executive Pay,” The Huffington Post, September 30, 2011. 

Thursday, January 4, 2018

CEO Pay: American and European Values

To what extent do inequalities in wealth accrue based on structural elements, such as tax deductions that only wealthy people can use, as distinct from factors pertaining to individuals, such as talent, sacrifice, and effort? The two clusters can build on each other, as people who have become rich primarily by exercising a talent and working hard use some of their accrued power to “reform” the system to their advantage at the expense of the poor and middle class. Such structural reforms in turn can make it easier for wealthy people to become even richer. In the context of a society in progress, structural and idiosyncratic factors doubtlessly interact—the trend being of an increasing chasm between the rich and poor. 
 
 

The full essay is at "CEO Pay in Europe and America."



Monday, October 23, 2017

On the Unfairness of the Bonus System on Wall Street

Craig A. Dubow, Gannett’s former chief executive, had a short six-year tenure that was, by most accounts according to The New York Times, “a disaster.” David Carr reports: “Gannett’s stock price declined to about $10 a share from a high of $75 the day after [Dubow] took over; the number of employees at Gannett plummeted to 32,000 from about 52,000, resulting in a remarkable diminution in journalistic boots on the ground at the 82 newspapers the company owns. . . .  the company strip-mined its newspapers in search of earnings, leaving many communities with far less original, serious reporting. . . . Not only did Mr. Dubow retire under his own power because of health reasons, he got a mash note from Marjorie Magner, a member of Gannett’s board, who said without irony that ‘Craig championed our consumers and their ever-changing needs for news and information.’ But the board gave him far more than undeserved plaudits. Mr. Dubow walked out the door with just under $37.1 million in retirement, health and disability benefits. That comes on top of a combined $16 million in salary and bonuses in the last two years.”

Besides the inherent unfairness in an incompetent manager getting millions of dollars in compensation (for championing incompetence?), it is morally problematic when, as Carr puts it, “the consequences of bad decisions land on everyone except those who made them.” 

The full essay is at "Unfair Bonuses on Wall St."


Source:

 David Carr, “Why Not Occupy Newsrooms?” The New York Times, October 24, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/business/media/why-not-occupy-newsrooms.html

Tuesday, August 8, 2017

Problems in American Executive Compensation: The Ethical Dimension

According to The New York Post, 66% of the income growth in the United States between 2001 and 2007 went to the top 1% of all Americans. In 1950, the ratio of the average executive’s paycheck to the average worker’s paycheck was about 30 to 1. By the year 2000, that ratio had exploded to between 300 to 500 to one. Because American executives tend to be paid more in total compensation than do their European colleagues, the ratios are lower in in the E.U. Hence one might ask what is behind the trajectory in the United States. 

Saturday, March 18, 2017

A Religious Stockholder-Test for Wells Fargo: Confronting Mediocre Accountability

Orienting executive compensation to accountability is easier said than done. For example, it might be supposed that the cause of accountability was aptly served by John Stumpf’s forfeit of $41 million in unvested stock when he resigned under pressure as Wells Fargo’s CEO because of the bank’s systemic overzealousness in signing customers up for unwanted services. Unfortunately, he “realized pretax earnings of more than $83 million by exercising vested stock options, amassed over his 34 years at the bank, and receiving payouts on certain stock awards.”[1] In other words, the man who presided over unethical business practices at the expense of customers received double that which he was forfeiting. How can accountability have any meaning against $83 million? This figure connotes reward rather than punishment. Tim Sloan, who succeeded Stumpf as the bank’s CEO, received compensation in 2016 of $13, up from the $11 million in 2015. Interestingly, it may have been religion to the rescue.

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  





[1] Stacy Cowley, “Wells Fargo Leaders Reaped Lavish Pay Even as Account Scandal Unfolded,” The New York Times, March 16, 2017.

Saturday, January 14, 2017

The Age of the Imperial CEO: The Case of Fred R. Johnson at RJR Nabisco

Frederick Ross Johnson, as CEO of RJR Nabisco, was known “for the fleet of corporate jets that ferried him to celebrity golf events and other luxurious perks he awarded himself.”[1] The key words here being awarded himself, for Johnson epitomized the sort of imperial CEO that made an oxymoron out of the notion that the corporate board is to serve as an overseer of corporate management in corporate governance. Awarded himself should be the oxymoron, for such a conflict of interest runs against the logic of any viable business calculus.

The full essay is at "The Imperial CEO."




1. James R. Hagerty, “F. Ross Johnson,” The Wall Street Journal, January 7-8, 2017.


Wednesday, December 7, 2016

A Business Surtax on Income Inequality: Target the Proceeds


The medium compensation in 2015 for the 200 highest-paid executives at publicly-held companies in the U.S. was $19.3 million; five years earlier, the figure was $9.6 million.[1] CEO pay compared with the earnings of average workers surged from a multiple of 20 in 1965 to almost 300 in 2013.[2] “Income inequality is real, it is a national problem and the federal government isn’t doing anything about it,” said Charlie Hales, the mayor of Portland, Oregon in 2016 when that city passed a surtax on companies whose CEO’s earn more than 100 times the medium pay of their rank-and-file workers.[3] According to the law, set to take effect in 2017, companies whose ratios are between 100 and 249 would pay an additional 10 percent in taxes; companies with higher ratios would face a 25 percent surtax on the city’s business-license tax. Whether the new law would make a dent in reversing the increasing income-inequality was less than clear.



1. Gretchen Morgenson, “Portland Adopts Surcharge on C.E.O. Pay in Move vs. Income Inequality,” The New York Times, December 7, 2016.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Monday, April 6, 2015

Wall Street CEOs Suffering with Lower Pay: Self-Preservation or Greed?

As much as the titans on Wall Street pull in during a year, they still want more. It must be human nature. If so, nature may be at odds with narrowing economic inequality. Even as 2014's compensation figures show such a narrowing, I suspect that such a case is an exception rather than being indicative of a fundamental shift.


The complete essay is at “Wall Street CEOs” 

Friday, May 30, 2014

Opportunity and Income Inequality at McDonalds

In his text, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty claims that economic inequality increases societally when the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate in national income or GNP. Rather than being an aberration, this condition tends to be the case, the economist contends. To be sure, expanding opportunity can mitigate the increasing inequality, but the “floorboard” is slanted and thus is bound to favor capital over labor. Whereas Marx thought the tendency is unlimited in extent, Piketty argues that at some point the inequality of wealth will stop worsening. This idea seems like Einstein’s thesis that nothing can go faster than the speed of light.  In the light of Piketty’s theory, we can perhaps read more into Don Thompson’s response as workers were protesting the company’s shareholder meeting on May 22, 2014. In short, the CEO illustrates not only a preference for capital over labor in line with ROI>income-increase, but also the weakness in increased opportunity as a mitigating factor.

The full essay is at "McDonalds and Income Inequality: The Role of Opportunity"

Thursday, May 22, 2014

Rousseau on Economic Inequality

In his Discourse on Inequalities, Rousseau distinguishes two types of inequality among people: natural and moral. Natural inequalities, which exist in the state of nature as well as society, result in difference outcomes owing to innate differences in “genius, beauty, strength or address, merit or talents.” Such differences—both in sources and outcomes—pale in comparison with those from “moral” inequalities, such as exist between rich and poor, professionals and the unskilled, and the powerful and the subjugated.

The full essay is at "Rousseau on Economic Inequalities: Natural vs. Artificial"

Thursday, January 16, 2014

Dissecting Best Buy’s Ethic: Where There's Smoke, There's Fire


In 2010, Best Buy’s management adopted executive compensation principles that included a provision that “pay is clearly tied to . . . performance.” Frank Trestman, then chairman of the company’s compensation and human resources committee, made this statement with rose-colored glasses. After just two years, Target's board and upper management abandoned the provision amid poor numbers. Even as the management laid off 2,400 employees (1.4% of the total), the board's compensation committee approved cash bonuses of $500,000 and $2 million in restricted stock for four executives. The interim CEO, Mike Mikan, was at the time hauling in $3.3 million in annual total compensation. In the analysis that follows, I subject this "dual strategy" to two criteria: institutional conflicts-of-interest and distributive justice.


The full essay is in The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.