Showing posts with label foreclosures. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreclosures. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 4, 2020

Tension between Wall Street and Main Street: A Case beyond the Reach of Corporate Social Responsibility

In October 2011, Gerald Seib wrote that political and economic pressures in the wake of the financial crisis were “pushing business leaders into the public cross hairs.”[1] I submit that the very existence of the largest American banks was becoming an issue. In such a case in which a gulf between business and society is so fundamental or deep, corporate social responsibility programs do not suffice and may even backfire. While it is normal for the norms and values of a business sector to differ from those of the wider whole (i.e., society), it is uncommon for a rupture to be so deep that corporate marketing and CSR are not sufficient business responses. I submit that in such cases and where corporations have a lot of power over government officials, CEOs extend their toolset to government to fill in the trench. The "Occupy Wall Street" protests is a case in point. 

The full essay is at "Wall Street and Society Diverge at the 'Occupy Wall Street' Protests." 

1. Gerald F. Seib, “Populist Anger Over Economy Carries Risks for Big Business,” The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2011. More generally, see Skip Worden, Essays on the Financial Crisis.


Sunday, November 25, 2018

The Banks’ Consultants: Guarding the Hen House

Leaving it to consultants hired by mortgage servicers to right the wrongs that the services inflicted on foreclosed homeowners was the unhappy consequence of bank regulators giving ambiguous guidance and failing to install viable oversight mechanisms. According to the Government Accounting Office, “regulators risked not achieving the intended goals of identifying as many harmed borrowers as possible.” Even if the reviews had been completed, there was on guarantee that wronged mortgage borrowers would have received any compensation. On the other side of the ledger, the banks had received billions from the U.S. Treasury with no strings attached. Whether intentional or not, the banking regulators put too much stock in the consultants, who, after all, had been hired by the mortgage servicers."
The full essay is at "The Banks' Consultants: A Conflict of Interest." For other cases, see my book, Institutional Conflicts of Interest: Business & Public Policy, available at Amazon.
Sources:
Ben Hallman and Eleazar Melendez, “GAO Foreclosure Report Finds Bank Regulators Failed to Provide ‘Key Oversight’,” The Huffington Post, April 3, 2013.
Dan Fitzpatrick, "'A Dose of Healthy Competition' For Banking Regulators," The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2013.


Wednesday, March 14, 2018

On the Presumptuousness of Power: Does Wall Street Own Congress?

At the end of April, 2009, U.S. Senator Richard Durbin blamed the powerful banking lobby for the defeat of legislation that would have allowed bankruptcy judges to modify some troubled mortgages.  Even as mortgage servers were claiming to be overwhelmed with requests from distressed borrowers for readjustments to the adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM), the banks and mortgage companies felt the need to stop the US Senate from enabling judges to relieve the backlog. Durban later said in an interview, “And the banks — hard to believe in a time when we’re facing a banking crisis that many of the banks created — are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place,” he said on WJJG 1530 AM radio's  “Mornings with Ray Hanania.” On October 30, 2009,  James K. Galbraith spoke on the Bill Moyers Journal on the bank lobby changing the financial system regulation reforms now being discussed in Congress.  That that lobby feels itself to be in a position to advise the Congress on a matter in which the banks were part of the problem is something that blows Galbraith away.   They should realize among themselves, or at the very least BE TOLD that their involvement is not helpful or appropriate.   Galbraith pointed out that we have a pretty good idea of what needs to be done governmentally to stave off another financial crisis—such as separating the commerical banking and investment trading (on the bank’s equity even!) functions and reducing the scale of the banks too big to fail.  However, there are a hundred reasons why the governing class will not follow through. 

Friday, December 1, 2017

TARP Paid Off: But What about the Foreclosures?

TARP, the "bailout" for banks rather than mortgage borrowers, was the first big issue facing the Obama administration before the roughly $800 billion stimulus plan and the health insurance overhaul that stoked the rise of the Tea Party movement. After supporting TARP, several Republicans lost in the elections of 2010 largely because of their votes. For many Americans, TARP is a symbol of big government at its worst, intervening in private markets with taxpayers’ billions to save Wall Street plutocrats while average Americans continued to struggle to make mortgage payments or lost their houses outright.  “This is the best federal program of any real size to be despised by the public like this,” said Douglas J. Elliott, a former investment banker now associated with the Brookings Institution. “It was probably the only effective method available to us to keep from having a financial meltdown much worse than we actually had. Had that happened, unemployment would be substantially higher than it is now, the deficit would have gone up even more than it has,” Mr. Elliott added. “But it really cuts against the grain for a public that is so angry at banks to think that something that so plainly helped the banks could also be good for the public.” TARP was good for the public not in that the funds enabled Wall Street bonuses; rather, the good was solely on the macro level, as the frozen credit markets eventually thawed such that the financial system meltdown was averted.  However, this does not mean that it was "the only effective method available."

The full essay is at "TARP and Foreclosures."

Friday, November 24, 2017

Fannie and Freddie: A Lavish Corporate Lifestyle after the Financial Crisis

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac spent more than $640,000 to send 100 employees to a mortgage-industry conference in Chicago in the fall of 2011. According to a letter from the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie and Freddie, the spending included nearly $342,000 for travel, food, hotel and meeting-room space. Incredibly, $74,000 was spent on four invitation-only dinners for mortgage-lending companies that are regular customers of Fannie and Freddie. Because Fannie and Freddie at the time dominated the U.S. mortgage market, "purchasing and guaranteeing about 70% of new loans from mortgage lenders,” who in turn thus had few alternative potential buyers, managers at Fannie and Freddie still felt the need to wine and dine their customers under the subterfuge of valuing “face-to-face meetings with customers as a way to understand their needs,” according to the Wall Street Journal. Apparently the folks at Fannie and Freddie were not familiar with customer surveys or even the telephone. Instead, Freddie spokesman Doug Duvall bragged, “[We were able to meet] with our lender customers in a cost-efficient way. In just two days we held approximately 200 meetings.” Undoubtedly some of those “meetings” were held at the dinners, each of which cost the taxpayers $18, 500.

The full essay is at "Fannie and Freddie."


Sunday, October 8, 2017

Dubai Bankers and Responsibility: A Question of Presumed Complicity

Reacting to the debt troubles of Dubai World (which was carrying $59 billion in debt in 2009), the director general of the Dubai Department of Finance, Abdulrahman al-Saleh, said  “Creditors need to take part of the responsibility for their decision to lend to the companies. They think Dubai World is part of the government, which is not correct.”  This sentence strikes me as odd.  Al-Saleh was suggesting that in deciding to make a loan to a company, a banker takes a risk, which entails the possibility of working with the company if it comes up short in cash.  Is such flexibility in the vocabulary of the typical loan officer, much less in the culture of major banks?  I doubt it.

The full essay is at "Dubai Bankers."

Saturday, August 5, 2017

The Banking Lobby: Writing Its Own Ticket in Washington

The Huffington Post observed in 2012: “Wall Street's campaign spending and lobbying power is so intimidating that banks have repeatedly stuck the public with the tab for their losses and no one in Washington stops them.” This was a significant change to be sure from President Jackson depriving the Second National Bank of the U.S. of funding in 1832.

The full essay is at "The Banking Lobby."

Source:

Loren Berlin and D. Levine, “Robo-Signing Settlement Might Not Provide Homeowners With Needed Help,” The Huffington Post, February 2, 2012.

Monday, November 17, 2014

Homelessness in the U.S.: A Reflection of American Values

According to a report by the National Center on Family Homelessness in 2014, nearly 2.5 million American children were homeless at some point in 2013.[1] The U.S. Department of Education had reported that 1.3 million homeless children were going to school. California, which accounted for one-eighth of the U.S. population at the time, had one-fifth of the 2.5 million, which comes out to nearly 527,000. The relatively high cost of living and shortage of low-income housing, along with a largely stagnant minimum wage, are the more visible factors behind the gap.

The full essay is at "Homelessness in the U.S."





1. David Crary and Lisa Leff, “Number of Homeless Children in America Surges to All-Time High: Report,” The Associated Press, November 17, 2014.

Monday, February 4, 2013

Fixing the Foreclosing Banks: A Hidden Conflict of Interest in Regulatory Compliance

After the financial crisis of 2008, regulators in the U.S. ordered banks to hire consultants to implement more than 130 “enforcement actions,” which represent 15% of the cases. In 2011 alone, regulators mandated that eleven banks hire consultants to determine whether mortgage borrowers had been wrongfully evicted. The consultants collected about $2 billion in fees, which amount to more than half of what homeowners were to receive under the $8.5 billion settlement that ended the consultants’ work. According to regulators, the consultants’ work was plagued with inefficiencies. This is probably the least of it, for virtually any expectations for “an industry that is paid billions of dollars by the same banks it is expected to police” are bound to be chimerical in nature.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

Sunday, July 15, 2012

Eminent Domain and Sanctity of Contract: Mortgage-Relief as “Dangerous”


With about half of the mortgages “under water” (i.e., being more than the houses are worth in terms of market value), government officials in San Bernardino County floated a proposal in 2012 to use California’s sovereign power of eminent domain to buy up the mortgages, cut them to the current value of the homes, and resell the mortgages to a private investment firm, which would allow the homeowners to lower their monthly payments and stay in their homes. The New York Times labels this a “drastic option,” coming from a government that was “(d)esperate for a way out of a housing collapse that has crippled the region.” This characterization of the proposal as “radical” fits with the bankers’ financial interest and perspective. In actuality, eminent domain is typically understood to be a basic power of government.

Doubtless the amounts that the government would pay as it exercises its right of eminent domain would not be satisfactory to the bankers holding the mortgages, for the “mere idea . . . rankled” the bankers, whose leaders claimed that it would set “a dangerous precedent of allowing a government entity to act as a lender and would discourage banks from loans in the area.” The danger may be in the eye of the beholder, particularly if he or she is accustomed to exacting the sanctity of contract as if not even a government could touch it. In other words, the exaggerated response may reflect the mistaken belief that eminent domain is somehow illegitimate for a government. This belief is reflected in the expectation of Ken Bentsen, an official of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, that the proposal would almost certainly be challenged in court.

“If the government has the ability to abrogate the contract at will and at the expense of the bond holder, the investor is going to do one of two things: require a tremendous premium for the risk they are incurring, or just not invest at all,” Ken Bentsen said. “It would be a risk factor that would be impossible to underwrite.” Government does have the right to abrogate or nullify a contract “at will.” It is not as though government were merely a business; governmental sovereignty does not apply to the private sector, yet this does not detract from government’s distinctive role in society. Furthermore, the claim that lending would dry up without a huge risk premium assumes that other governments would not follow suit and that the banks would otherwise be able to enforce the sanctity of the contracts against borrowers under water.

In fact, the bankers’ insistence to have it all their way may have set them up to get far less. Greg Devereaux, San Bernardino County’s chief executive, expressed frustration with the level of the bankers’ opposition to the plan. “If they want to come and talk and propose other solutions, great, but that’s not what is happening. Instead they are just trying to kill it because they have nothing but their own interest in mind.” He has hit on the crux of the problem. Having nothing but their own financial interest in mind, the bankers had opposed even an amendment submitted by Dick Durbin of Illinois that would have permitted bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages.

Under the mistaken belief that sanctity of contract transcends even governmental sovereignty as if under natural law (but not that which prohibits usury!), the bankers applied “drastic” and “dangerous” to the “usurpation at will” by eminent domain, as if it were suspect or at the very least sordid in nature. In actuality, it is the bankers’ insistence on having it all their way that is squalid and ultimately self-defeating. The government’s invoking of eminent domain can be viewed as a reaction to the bankers’ self-defeating rigidity or stubborn selfishness.

Preferring foreclosure to adjusting mortgages that are under water (i.e., remaining book value over the market value of the property), the bankers were sitting ducks for any government official aware of the nature of governmental sovereignty as not being constrained by sanctity of contract. While excessive use of such sovereignty would doubtless detract from parties otherwise willing to enter into a contract, San Bernardino’s plan was hardly over-encompassing or capricious. Indeed, the limitation that the mortgage borrower must be current on payments is a self-defeating and unnecessary limitation imposed by the government on its own plan. Borrowers most in need should not be eliminated at the outset; rather, they should be encouraged to take part, and this would not cause future lending to somehow collapse without customers having to be gauged by banks under the pretense of a “risk premium.”

In short, government’s use of eminent domain is fitting and proper in protecting bank customers from unreasonable bankers in line with the public interest that people not be thrown out of their houses. It is not as if a government were somehow a peer or even a rival of a bank. Rather, government is tasked with providing a floor such that no one faction in society extracts too much from another segment, even if in line with a contract. Government can so act “at will.” The permission of banks is not required, or frankly even helpful, in the workings of governmental sovereignty.

The bankers seem to have been presuming that they themselves, as guardians of the sanctity of contract, are sovereign or at least just as sovereign as governments are. If so, the danger lies in permitting those self-interested associations a role in their capacities as entities distinct from their members in lobbying government officials or regulators even and especially on matters touching on the entities’ respective financial interests. The danger includes distortion and hyperbole rather than greater insight for policy-makers.

It would be sad indeed were the plan of the government of San Bernardino county (i.e., the sovereignty of that government, which is ultimately that of the Republic of California) finally dependent on the financial/political power of the investment company participating as a “middle man” in the plan, specifically in countering the financial/lobbying power of the banks. That is to say, the sovereignty of governments being used in the public good should not have to depend on a particular result of the “invisible hand” of private self-interests as if sovereignty were a market-based outcome of lobbying.

Source:

Jennifer Medina, “California County Weighs Drastic Plan to Aid Homeowners,” The New York Times, July 14, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/us/a-county-considers-rescue-of-underwater-homes.html?pagewanted=1&ref=business

See: Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Property Taxes: Property at Risk


Thirty years after Californians shrank their property taxes by passing Proposition 13, the same question faced the people of North Dakota as they voted on whether to eliminate their property taxes entirely. In an interesting twist, the debate on the tax incorporated a human-rights dimension that is rarely brought into debates in the American republics.

In addition to pointing to the budget surplus enjoyed by the Government of North Dakota at the time as well as to the unpredictableness of the tax and its inconsistencies, the proponents of a constitutional amendment to prohibit a property tax argued that it is contrary to the concept of property ownership. Beyond property rights, however, the advocates pointed to a human right to shelter irrespective of wealth or income. “I would like to be able to know that my home, no matter what happens to my income or my life, is not going to be taken away from me because I can’t pay a tax,” said Susan Beehler, a member of the group that was pushing for the amendment. The American republics are as it were joined at the hip, so it is no surprise that, Jim Cox, a representative in the Pennsylvania legislature’s lower chamber chimed in by declaring, “No tax should have the power to leave you homeless.” The implication is that having a home is a human right that even a government ought not be able to take away.

There is reason for concern as long as one’s house is subject to one’s wealth. For one thing, a large part of one’s net worth is in the equity-value of one’s house—such value being subject to the wax and wane of the market. According to the Federal Reserve, the medium amount of home equity dropped to $75,000 from $110,000 in 2007 (adjusted for inflation). More generally, the economic crisis of 2008 left the medium American family in 2010 with no more wealth than in the early 1990s. Medium family income fell to $45,800 in 2010 from $49,600 in 2007 (adjusted for inflation). With less of a cushion, should a homeowner lose his or her job, less home equity would translate into more difficulty in getting a loan (or being cut off from even being able to borrow to survive a brief period of unemployment). 

Therefore, housing viewed as not just a property-right, but moreover as a human right (i.e., not to be homeless), is incompatible with the precariousness that goes with treating one’s house as not only a commodity subject to market forces, but also a significant part of one’s wealth. A vicious circle can be engaged that leaves one as though drowning in a whirlpool without a life-preserver.  If nothing should have the power to leave one homeless, our concept of housing must go even beyond our concept of private property to be based in a doctrine of human rights—a concept rather foreign in North America. Paradoxically, a constitutional amendment that would remove one’s house from the government’s (as well as any private company’s or bank’s) grasp would proffer citizens more security (and thus happiness) than even a full-fledged notion of private property (rights), for the right of property—unlike a constitutional amendment—depends on government and is thus subject to eminent domain. To be sure, a competitive market is well-suited to distributing non-necessity commodities, but human rights trumps even economic efficiency (or its ideology). I find it odd that this notion is so foreign in the American states, while it is almost taken for granted in the European states.

Sources:

Monica Davey, “North Dakota Considers Eliminating Property Tax,” The New York Times, June 11, 2012. 

Binyamin Appelbaum, “Family Net Worth Drops to Level of Early ‘90s, Fed Says,” The New York Times, June 11, 2012. 

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

The Federal Reserve’s Housing Bubble

During one of his lectures to a class at George Washington University in March of 2012, Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, claimed that the central bank’s lower interest rates did not trigger the housing bubble that began in the late 1990s and ended in 2006. For one thing, the Fed did not start cutting interest rates until a few years into the twenty-first century. Also, home prices rose after the Fed later began raising interest rates. Bernanke also cited Europe, where housing booms have not been associated with either tight or loose monetary policy.


The full essay is at "Essays on the Financial Crisis".

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Fraudulent Foreclosures

Looking at foreclosures from 2008 to 2010 of federally-backed mortgages serviced by five major banks, federal investigators at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) found that bank managers “ignored widespread errors in the foreclosure process, in some cases instructing employees to adopt make-believe titles and speed documents through the system despite internal objections.” Generally, the banks engaged “in a pattern of unfair and deceptive practices.”[1] This finding contradicts the self-serving statements by managers at the banks that blamed low-level employees. The investigation found that the managers had actually been the active agents. That is, the shortcuts were in many cases formulated and directed by managers. The inspector general at HUD pointed to “simple greed” to explain how so many people could have participated in the misconduct.[2] Considering that millions of Americans were tossed out of their homes as a result, I would sociopathic indifference or even callousness to the mix. Additionally, the rush to sign documents may have undercut the banks’ own positions with respect to both the foreclosure process and the homeowners—adding incompetence to the mix.


The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  


1. Nelson Schwartz and J.B. Silver-Greenberg, “Bank Officials Cited in Churn of Foreclosures,” The New York Times, March 13, 2012.
2. Ibid.

Sunday, February 26, 2012

Moral Hazard in Mortgages

“The cherished American ideal of self-reliance has a flip side”[1]  Before getting to the implications, or flip side, I want to fill out what informs this ideal. One could add to it the ideological stance that came into its own in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan, who declared that government is the problem. This implies that government should be minimized, and otherwise corrected as much as possible. Government is hardly to be viewed as the solution. This is the legacy of the Kennedy assassinations of the 1960s, the Vietnam War, and Watergate as well as Ford’s pathetic “WIN” buttons and Carter’s micromanagement and failure in regard to the hostages in Iran. I was not old enough for the Kennedys’ truncated optimism (and that of Martin Luther King) to resonate; I knew the political (and economic) pessimism of the 1970s and the energizing “fix it” mentality of the early 1980s. Of course, Reagan’s “new federalism” failed, as did his aim to balance the federal budget, and the jury is still out on whether “peace through strength” pushed the USSR off the cliff.


The full essay is at "Moral Hazard in Mortgages."

1. Shaila Dewan, “Moral Hazard: A Tempest-Tossed Idea,” The New York Times, February 26, 2012. 

Thursday, February 16, 2012

Sanctity of Contract Breached on Mortgages

An audit in 2012 by San Francisco county officials of about 400 foreclosures “determined that almost all involved either legal violations or suspicious documentation. . . .  The improprieties range from the basic — a failure to warn borrowers that they were in default on their loans as required by law — to the arcane. For example, transfers of many loans in the foreclosure files were made by entities that had no right to assign them and institutions took back properties in auctions even though they had not proved ownership. . . . About 84 percent of the files contained what appear to be clear violations of law, it said, and fully two-thirds had at least four violations or irregularities.”[1] The problem seems to be systemic, suggesting that judges should be able to modify mortgages on the basis of nullified contract.


The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  

1. Gretchen Morgenson, “Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures,” The New York Times, February 16, 2012.

Friday, October 21, 2011

Conflicts of Interest at the Federal Reserve

In 2011, “(m)ore than a dozen members of the regional Federal Reserve boards have had ties to banks or companies that received emergency funds during the [2008 financial] crisis, according to [a GAO report]. The report highlights a close relationship between the Fed's regional banks and many of the institutions they were lending to, adding credence to concerns that the financial sector enjoyed a largely consequence-free rescue in the wake of the crisis, thanks to its connections with the federal government.”[1] Meanwhile, mortgage borrowers with houses “under water” got hammered. From the crisis to the release of the GAO report in October 2011, there were millions foreclosures in the United States, with very little in the way of mortgage modifications or refinancing for those homeowners who needed relief. In other words, the bankers had connections in the banking regulatory agency while Congress left the troubled homeowners—constituents—at the mercy of the bankers. Their agency having their backs, the bankers could afford to take a hard line on the mortgages. The playing field, in other words, is not at all level. 


Material from this essay has been incorporated into "The Federal Reserve" in  Institutional Conflicts of Interest, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.  


1. Alexander Eichler, “Conflicts of Interest Abound at the Federal Reserve, Report Finds,” The Huffington Post, October 19, 2011.

Thursday, October 6, 2011

Foreclosing on Freddie and Fannie

Three years after the financial crisis of 2008, nearly half of the people in Arizona with mortgages owed more than their homes were worth; those people were “underwater.” Only three homeowners had been approved for debt reduction since the debt-reduction program in Arizona began in September 2010. “It is extremely difficult for the principal reduction program to be successful” when Fannie and Freddie opt out, according to Shaun Rieve of the Arizona Department of Housing.[1] Even though Arizona would pay up to half of the principal reduction, up to $50,000 of a $100,000 principal reduction, the two housing entities that were taken over by the U.S. Government have been obstructing taxpayers from re-emerging from “underwater.”

The full essay is at "Essays on the Financial Crisis."


1. Shaila Dewan, “Freddie and Fannie Reject Debt Relief,” The New York Times, October 6, 2011. 

Wednesday, August 31, 2011

Nietzsche on Bank of America

The positive correlation between incompetence and unethical conduct at companies is striking, for, theoretically at least, a person can be talented or smart and of questionable character. Of course, it could be that cutting corners is a survival strategy of people who are not competent. However, shirking seems to reflect a sordid character, which, like personality, is relatively constant throughout one’s life—though character flaws could manifest more when times are tough (as in when incompetence has eventuated in a dire balance sheet). One might investigate, moreover, whether a firm’s culture can become more tolerant of unethical conduct when the finances are going south—or do unethical cultures tend to be like fixtures in organizations irrespective of financial condition?


The full essay has been incorporated into On the Arrogance of False Entitlement: A Nietzschean Critique of Business Ethics and Management, available at Amazon.