The E.U. without Enlargement: An Oxymoron?

The political debates concerning the accession of candidate states such as Texas, California, Alaska and even Hawaii into the U.S. were long past when the issue of enlargement became salient for the E.U. due to Russia’s unilateral, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. In the American case, surely no one was arguing that the U.S. without being enlarged would cease to be credible, yet in 2025, a government official of the candidate state of Montenegro said as much of the European Union. Even if Filip Ivanovic was merely using rhetoric during an interview on October 4, 2025, even that should at least make sense. Making matters worse, his comments can be interpreted as ultimatums for the E.U. even though nothing binds the E.U. to annexing any future state. In fact, given the veto-power of state officials at the federal level in the E.U., enlargement should arguably come only after internal reform of the E.U.’s basic law concerning the power of the states at the federal level.

The full essay is at "The E.U. without Enlargement."

E.U. Defense: The State Governments Exploit a Conflict of Interest

Sometimes lemons can make use of political gravity to become lemonade. Of course, behind the lemons are human beings, who are of course innately economizers, political actors and moral agents. When accosted by proposals that additional governmental sovereignty be delegated from state governments to the federal level, state-government officials feeling the gravitas of narrow self-interest are inclined to resist even if the transfer is in the political and economic interest of the union as well as all of its states. I am of course describing a drawback that goes with state governments having too much power in a federal system, whose interests are not always identical with those of a particular state or even those that pertain to the state level as distinct from the federal level. I submit that a federal system in which such dynamics are ignored in favor of focusing on particular issues, such as the E.U.’s increased need for defense given Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, can gradually slip “off the rails” toward dissolution or consolidation. By ceding the E.U. itself (i.e., the federal level) additional authority, including for revenues and expenditures, the European Council, which is composed of the state governors, could “kill two birds with one stone,” as that saying goes. Those birds would be unbalanced state power in the E.U. at the expense of a common purpose, and Russian President Putin’s military adventurism in Eastern Europe.

The full essay is at "E.U. Defense."

American Federalism Eclipsed by an Ideal of Democracy: Education Over Immigration as a Constitutional Problem

The U.S. Constitution includes immigration as one of the listed (i.e., enumerated) powers of the federal government. Education is not such a power; hence it resides with the States. Historically, the accumulation of power by the federal government has involved taking areas from the States even though those areas are not listed as federal powers. As a result, American federalism has shifted increasingly toward a consolidation of power at the federal level. Among other means, Congresses and U.S. presidents have used the power of the purse to gain control from the States. Education is a case in point, whether elementary, secondary, or higher education. That the U.S. Government has had trouble controlling the country's southern border with Mexico suggests that maybe adding education has come at the expense of the added attention and effort that could have been put on immigration. In business terms, an opportunity cost (i.e., the cost of foregone benefits) comes with each additional federalized area. U.S. President Obama on education presents us with a case in point. 

The full essay is at "Federalism Eclipsed by Consolidation."

American Federalism: The Case of Coronavirus

On March 22, 2020, during a press conference on the coronavirus, U.S. Vice President Pence claimed that the United States is unique in that it has a federal system of public governance. He overlooked the equivalent case of the European Union even as he stressed an idea that is the European federal principle of subsidiarity, which means that decisions and actions that can be taken locally are to be done locally. The state level is next, followed by the federal level. The theory behind this principle is that cultural, political, economic, and social diversity that exists from state to state, especially in an empire-scale federal system such as the E.U. and U.S., means that one-size-fits-all federal-level decisions may not be effective everywhere. Pence’s point was that the federal government would be playing a supportive role so the States get what they need, rather than playing a pivotal role with the States and localities as instruments of implementation. I contend that relative to the European Union, the United States was at the time much less equipped to apply the principle of subsidiarity to the coronavirus pandemic.

The full essay is at "Federalism and the Coronavirus."

The Impact of Federalism on Corporate Power in American Legislatures: The Case of Health-Insurance Reform

Florida, like about a dozen other states, debated in 2009 a proposed amendment to its state constitution that would have blocked, at least symbolically, much of the federal health-care insurance overhaul on the grounds that it tramples individual liberty. Behind the amendments was an industry with a vested interest—an industry that made substantial campaign contributions to the supporters of the amendment. An ethical conflict of interest lurks here, even if it is constitutional (assuming that wealth constitutes free speech, which itself is a problematic assumption), but the main issue here is how the blockage of federal law applying in Florida (and other states) would have affected federalism. What would have been better for the American federal system: federal or state legislation, or perhaps a combination? 

The full essay is at "Federalism, Corporate Power, and Legislation."

On U.S.Senators Being Elected

According to David Firestone of The New York Times, a “surprising number” of the Tea Party members were calling for the repeal of the 17th Amendment of the US Constitution during the election campaign season of 2010. That amendment, which was ratified in 1913, provides for direct election by the people of each state of US senators. According to Firestone, “allowing Americans to choose their own senators seems so obvious that it is hard to remember that the nation’s founders didn’t really trust voters with the job. The people were given the right to elect House members. But senators were supposed to be a check on popular rowdiness and factionalism. They were appointed by state legislatures.” That it may seem so obvious to us does not mean that we have it right. Yet Firestone presumes so in writing, “a  modern appreciation of democracy — not to mention a clear-eyed appraisal of today’s dysfunctional state legislatures — should make the idea unthinkable.” Should it really?  Firestone seems biased in his dogmatism.

The full essay is at "U.S. Senators: Elected by the People."

Britain Challenges the E.U.’s Financial Transactions Tax

In April 2013, the state of Britain mounted a legal challenge at the European Court of Justice against E.U. financial transactions tax (FTT) going into effect in eleven other states. The way in which the challenge was depicted by state officials in Britain suggests that the real challenge was not just to more European integration, but also to the E.U. itself.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon. 

States Move Beyond Congress on Gun Control

On April 4, 2013, the government of Connecticut passed “a sweeping new set of gun control reforms.” Colorado and New York had already passed their respective versions of “sweeping gun legislation,” all in the wake of the Sandy Hook school shooting in Connecticut the previous December. 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

The Visible Hand: Markets Forging a Stronger E.U.

Joschka Fischer, a former foreign minister of the state of Germany, said the agreement under which 17 state governments accept more oversight and control of their budgets by the European Union “was a big step, which was pushed on the Europeans by the markets.”[1] Such pressure was necessary, given the conflict of interest bearing on state officials working at the federal level on a deal that would add a new competency to the E.U. “(I)n the end,” Fischer added, “the markets have limited the options of the political leaders, especially of Merkel, and pushed her into giving more support for the euro.”[2] Giving more support for the euro meant giving more power to the E.U. at the expense of the state-level where Merkel has most of her power. From this vantage point (i.e., the power that state officials have at the E.U. level), it is amazing that the E.U. has been able to acquire any additional competencies.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Steven Erlanger and Liz Alderman, “Chronic Pain for the Euro,” The New York Times, December 12, 2011; Landon Thomas, “A Stark Step Away From Europe,” The New York Times, December 11, 2011. 

2. Ibid.

A Dilemma for the E.U.: A Convention or an Amendment?

In November 2011, European leaders began to talk about amendments to the E.U. that would “change the fundamental structure of the union.”[1] Complicating the talks was ambiguity concerning the nature of the E.U. itself at the time. Foremost among the changes being discussed was the idea of a form of centralized oversight of the budgets of the state governments, with “sanctions for the profligate.”[2] The existing E.U., while more than the American Articles of Confederation, was at the time found to be insufficient in keeping the debt crisis from spreading from state to state and engulfing the union itself and its currency. “The survival of the euro zone is in play,” one senior European official said, “So far it’s been too little, too late.”[3] In this respect, the pressure for “ever closer union” was like that facing the Americans in the mid-1780s. Because the nature of the union was itself an issue, a convention composed of delegates—not state officials—directly elected by the people for the purpose might seem best suited. However, I contend that while rethinking the E.U. was not without merit at the time, the specificity of the planned amendment argues against the idea.

1. Steven Erlanger, "Leaders Struggle for a Deal to Keep Euro Intact," The New York Times, December 4, 2011.

2, Ibid.

3. Ibid.

The Debt Crisis: A Conflict of Interest Hampers the E.U.’s Response

“As the European Union enters a financial crisis in slow motion,” a Huffington Post reporter avers, “the fragile American economic recovery hangs in the balance. With Greece almost certain to default on its debt, European political leaders need to take decisive action to prevent a resultant string of bank runs and government defaults, which could precipitate double-dip recessions in Europe and the United States.”[1] If Greece suddenly defaults, Kavoussi reasons, other E.U. states “could leave the European Union to flee higher interest rates and to enable themselves to pay down their debt more easily by devaluing their currencies.”[2] Such an outcome, she claims, “would almost certainly plunge Europe into a recession.”[3] She observes, moreover, that “European politicians may lack the political will necessary to prevent the sovereign debt crisis from mushrooming into a global economic slowdown.”[4]

 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

1. Bonnie Kavoussi, “European Sovereign Debt CrisisThreatens American Economy,” The Huffington Post, September 27, 2011.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

Fiscal Training-Wheels for the E.U.

The government of the E.U. state of Greece announced on September 11, 2011 that its cabinet had decided to impose a new property tax to cover a 2 billion euro ($2.7 billion) projected revenue shortfall for the year. The government expected the state to meet its deficit goals of 17.1 billion euros (8.2% of GDP) in 2011 and 14.9 billion in 2012.[1] Earlier in September, talks between the state government and the E.U. Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund had broken down in a dispute over whether Greece had done enough to meet its deficit targets. Pressure to assuage the “troika” amid popular protests in Greece apparently trumped questions on the legitimacy of a tax increase enacted by a cabinet without the approval of the state legislature.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Granitsas Alkman, “Greece Announces New Tax as Unrest Flares,” The Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2011; David Gauthier-Villars and Nathalie Boschat, “Woes at French Banks Signal a Broader Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2011; Ainsley Thomson and Marcus Walker, “Support Grows for New EU Treaty to Boost Fiscal Ties in Euro Zone,” The Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2011.

On the Perils of E.U. States Being In Charge

Wolfgang Schäuble, the finance minister of the state of Germany, does not mince words when it comes to the state of Greece sticking to its promise to reduce its deficit in order to receive aid from the E.U. through its Financial Stability Facility. Aid will be paid, he said on September 8, 2011 in a radio interview, “if Greece actually does what it agreed to do.”[1] If monitors do not sign off on Greece having fulfilled its promises, then “Greece has to see how it gets access to financial markets without help from [the E.U. facility].”[2] Ouch! Meanwhile, the state government of Finland was still insisting on collateral from Greece as a condition for contributing to the aid. Adding still additional pressure on the Greek government, Mark Rutte, prime minister of the Netherlands, had said on the previous day that states receiving aid should either cede control over their budgets or drop the euro. According to the New York Times, many economists believe that the ripple effects from Greece’s departure from the euro “could be catastrophic for the world economy.”[3]

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

---

 1.  Steven Erlanger, “Europe Steers Into a Zone ofUncertainty,” The New York Times, September 9, 2011; Jack Ewing, “In Europe, Greece Gets a Warning about Aid,” The New York Times, September 9, 2011.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

The German Court in the E.U.: Exasperating or Mitigating Germany's Veto in the E.U.?

Did Angela Merkel violate the property rights of residents in the state of Germany by agreeing to the initial bank bailout in the E.U.? Should she have gotten the approval of the Bundestag first? According to a German state court on September 7, 2011, “no and a qualified yes.” The court ruled that the approval of the Bundestag’s budget committee is necessary for significant increases in the European Financial Stability Facility. The question as put by The Wall Street Journal the day before the ruling can be viewed as whether parliamentary politics on the state level should be allowed to potentially slow or obstruct the E.U.’s crisis-response ability. That is, should the prerogatives of state officials be strengthened just when the E.U.’s monetary affairs require more rather than less fiscal coordination?  By requiring the approval of the budget committee in the lower house of the state legislature, the German state court ruling avoids the potentially aggravating effects of a wider circle of state legislators. Even so, other states could follow suit with respect to their committees, making it more difficult for state officials to function at the E.U. level.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

On the Health-Insurance Mandate: Nullification or Judicial Review?

A Republican U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to play a more active role in K-12 education under the rubric of “No Child Left Behind.” A Democratic U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to require residents to purchase health-insurance. Some of the same Republicans who cry foul on the insurance mandate insist that “marriage” be federalized through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. From whichever vantage-point one cares to assume, political consolidation at the expense of federalism seems to be the name of the game in American politics.

The full essay is at "On the Health-Insurance Mandate."

Nationalism in Europe: Forestalling Ever Closer Union

Ask a European if the E.U. government could ever consolidate power from the state governments and you would probably get, Nope, we identity with our respective countries. The problem is, such attachments can change. Indeed, they have changed. Europeans alive after fifty years of "ever closer union" would do well to look back at the U.S. after its first fifty (or one hundred) years to get a sense of how the E.U., too, could change. 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.