On the Reputational Capital of a Business Leader on a Societal Stage

Is it better that companies be publicly or privately held? Such a question is of such magnitude that glossy, simplistic answers should be eschewed. This is not to say that the answer is situational in nature. Rather, it is more likely that each comes with pluses and minuses from the perspective of an economic system as a whole. As business “leaders” give their advice, it is important to keep in mind whether any personal or institutional conflicts of interest exist and thus could warp the space itself of the advice. Yes, I am intimating Einstein’s theory of general relativity here. Rather than provide an answer without having studied the matter sufficiently, I will provide a way to look at the advice given by Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase.

The full essay is at "Reputational Capital of a Business Leader."

Is Modern Banking Fundamentally Flawed?

Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase and board member of the New York Federal Reserve (a banking regulatory body), advocates not only that financial regulation reform is not necessary, but also that deregulation is the best course for the American financial sector. Meanwhile, JP Morgan lost $2 billion in an effort to reduce risk. President Obama quickly pointed out that if one of the smartest bankers in the room can preside over such a massive loss, then a deregulated financial sector would likely present us with an unacceptably high level of risk to the entire financial system (and economy). Elizabeth Warren suggested that relying on bankers to regulate themselves would not reduce the systemic risk. The alternative would seem to be strengthening financial regulation, even though—according to Sen. Dick Durbin—“the banks own Congress.”

The full essay is at " Banking as Flawed."

Investment Bank Dinners with Corporate Executives and Hedge Fund Managers: The General Public Not Admitted

“One day in early March [2011], the phone lines of hedge-fund traders around London and New York suddenly lit up. A stock that many of them had placed hefty bets on—Pride International Inc., an energy company in the process of being sold to a rival—was falling. The traders had no idea why. They soon figured it out: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. had hosted a meeting that day between a handful of hedge-fund traders and executives from a company that was considered a prime candidate to start a bidding war for Pride. One of those executives had indicated they weren't likely to make a bid.”

“The prospect of a bidding war had lifted Pride's shares above where they likely would have traded in the absence of a potential interloper. . . . At the March 8 lunch, though, as the traders munched on scallops and fish, Seadrill vice president and board member Tor Olav Trøim splashed cold water on the idea of a bid. He recalls telling traders that the company's Feb. 24 statement was ‘not normally what you would say if you were interested in bidding yourself. His intended message, according to one person familiar with the matter, is that Seadrill was "very unlikely’ to launch a competing offer for Pride. The information was market-moving, traders say. In the hours after the lunch, some traders wagered that the odds of a bidding war had declined. Seadrill's shares rose more than 1% as it was viewed as less likely to pursue a costly acquisition. Pride's shares fell by about 0.5% in the minutes before markets closed.”

“The moves may seem small, but they were significant for ‘merger arbitrage’ traders, who make short-term bets on deal stocks. In the case of the Ensco-Pride deal, the movements translated into a sudden 64% spike in the deal's ‘spread.’ That arcane measure reflects the difference between a target company's stock price and the per-share value of the acquirer's offer. The spread is closely watched by hedge funds that focus on merger arbitrage, which stand to gain or lose large sums based on the spread's movement. As the shares moved, anxious investors bombarded Seadrill's investor-relations office with phone calls, trying to figure out whether the company had issued new guidance about its appetite for bidding on Pride, according to a person familiar with the matter. Company officials responded that they hadn't released any new information. . . . Trøim says Seadrill executives regularly meet with large and small investors and that it is appropriate to help them understand the company's strategy. ‘We cannot see that we in any way have crossed any lines for giving privileged information,’ he says.”

The full essay is at "Investment Bank Dinners."

Source:

David Enrich and Dana Cimilluca, “Banks Woo Funds with Private Peeks,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2011.

Political Risk in Systemic Risk: Finnish Pensions Err in Debt Crisis

Finland became a state in the European Union in 1995 and adopted the euro at its birth in 1999. In terms of population, the state is between Wisconsin and Minnesota, both of which are states in the United States. The Finnish culture prizes saving as well as paying-off debt on time. As the Wall Street Journal put it, the Finns are more German in this sense than are the Germans themselves. It is easy to understand, therefore, why the Finns would not have been excited about the write-offs in Greek government in 2012. The Finnish cultural attribute here is an ideological proclivity. Such a value-system so deeply held can even eclipse or interfere with an otherwise unfettered risk-return trade-off presumed to be part of the market mechanism. Just as the risk-return investment-pricing froze rather than adjusted upward with the leap in risk in CDOs and the related insurance swaps that occurred on Wall Street in 2007 and 2008, the decisions of Finnish pension fund officers in the wake of the European debt crisis to pull out of Greek and Spanish bonds rather than simply to demand a higher rate of return, given the higher risk, likely means that the market mechanism itself freezes rather than functions at levels of high risk (or when risk is increasing dramatically). In other words, the theory of the laissez-faire market, which Adam Smith never advocated, has a serious flaw that is reflected in the mechanism in operation when there is a spike in risk. Un prix ne marche pas quand il y a beaucoup du risque. The free market mechanism in the investment market tends to freeze up rather than re-price instruments whose risk is quickly increasing to a significant degree.

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available at Amazon. 

JP Morgan: Conflict of Interest in Mutual Funds

As JPMorgan Chase was increasingly getting into the managing function of mutual funds, the bank also created and sold its own funds. I submit that these two tasks being done by the same firm constitutes a structural conflict of interest, regardless of any purported “Chinese wall.” In other words, a certain tension exists when the two functions are performed by the same business entity because the incentives in one of the two tasks (i.e., selling one’s own funds) inherently shirk the viability of the other task (i.e., being a financial advisor). In particular, the objectivity implied and even advertised in the latter is apt to be relegated as the sales function kicks in. The “answer” to this ethical problem is that a given bank should do one or the other, but not both tasks. Put another way, only a fool tries to do everything—only a greedy fool.

Geoffrey Tomes admits to having favored the bank's own funds in "advising" clients

The full essay is at "JPMorgan: An Unethical Monstrosity? and
Institutional Conflicts of Interest, both available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Leadership at Lehman: On the Failure of Richard Fuld

The failure of Lehman Brother suggests that too much power may go with formal position while non-positional leadership in organizations is not given enough of a chance to check the excesses of office. Richard Fuld could take advantage of much having to do with his formal position so he would not have to lead. In contrast, a competent subordinate, Mike Gelband, faced a considerable headwind in trying to lead through persuasion without the benefit of a position trumping Fuld’s own.

The full essay is in Essays on the Financial Crisis, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Related Essays:

 "Fuld's Arrogance at Lehmen: Systemic Risk"

"Lehman's Dick Fuld as the Antagonist in the film, 'Too Big to Fail'"

"Fraud as Fair: Lehman as Beneficiary of Society's Pro-Business Cultural Values"

"Executive Stature: Glimpses of the Man Behind the Curtain"

"Lehman Bros: Insufficient Accountability in Corporate Governance"