In a republic, which is
characterized by representative rather than direct democracy and includes
checks on even the elected representatives, private interests, such as corporations
that manufacture weapons purchased by the government, undue the very legitimacy
and public good of a republic when the elected (and appointed) public officials
capitulate to those interests because those interests are of a part rather than
the whole. The profit calculus of a defense contractor is not necessarily in
line with the national interests of the country in which the corporation operates.
Furthermore, acquiescing to the relatively narrow private benefit of corporations
places an elected official in the position of possibly betraying one’s constituents
and even the national security—the public good—of the whole, the country. It is
in the political (and even financial) interests of such officials to hide or
obscure their motives in voting on a defense budget by using “real threats
abroad” as a subterfuge to increase defense spending going to contractors in
payment for more weapons. The threats may be real or not. How would an
electorate possibly know without access to classified information? Adam Smith wrote
of his concern that governments and capitalists would collude to shortchange
labor. The collusion can also be at the expense of an electorate and even a
republic itself. In response to Elizabeth Willing Powel’s question on what sort
of government the U.S. Constitutional Convention had just proposed, Ben Franklin
is said to have replied, “A republic, if you can keep it.” The People may be at
a considerable disadvantage without realizing it if distant collusion is financially
and politically sufficiently concentrated and furtive under subterfuges of
public-policy ideals.
The full essay is at "U.S. Defense Contractors under Pressure."
