Showing posts with label monetary policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label monetary policy. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Independent U.S. Regulatory Agencies: Undermining the Chief Executive

On June 29, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal president has the authority to terminate the employment of heads of independent federal agencies at will, rather than only for cause. The latter requirement (i.e., due cause) would still hold for the Federal Reserve, which raises the question of whether a central bank should be distinguished from regulatory agencies. The value in buffering monetary policy from political pressure is why the Federal Reserve is not part of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the U.S. government, but is instead an independent central bank within that government. As a consequence, monetary policy does not require approval from either the U.S. president or the Congress. Hence, the “for cause” requirement for removing someone from the Fed’s board of governors cannot be disagreement with the person’s preferences or decisions regarding monetary policy. As for independent regulatory agencies in the executive branch, their independence undermines the unitary executive as well as the president’s role in implementing existing law.


The full essay is at "Independent U.S. Regulatory Agencies."

Friday, January 2, 2026

Bulgaria: From the Lion to the Euro

Just weeks after the government of the E.U. state of Bulgaria resigned amid protests against the rampant corruption, the state traded in its currency, the levs, which means lion, for the federal currency, the euro. In the new year, 2026, Bulgaria stood to relieve holders of the state’s debt and to tame the endemic inflation that has plagued the state’s economy. In November, 2025, for example, food prices had risen by 5% year-on-year, “more than double the eurozone average.”[1] The term “eurozone” is actually problematic, as it, like the application of the jargon, “bloc,” to the E.U. itself is meant to obfuscate readers regarding the genre of the political, federal union. To claim that Bulgaria joined a currency zone is inferior stating that the state adopted the federal currency. Stated properly, the currencies in the E.U. can be compared with those that were in the early U.S., and all of those combinations of state and federal currencies can be held to be compatible with federalism.


The full essay is at "Bulgaria." 


1. Aleksandar Brezar, “Bulgaria Switches to the Euro Amid Mixed Reactions from Its Citizens,” Euronews.com, 1 January, 2026.


Sunday, August 4, 2024

Adding Anti-Trust to Monetary Policy: The Case of Groceries

Monetary inflation is a complex phenomenon. Not only can its causes be several; it can make it more difficult to distinguish immediate and medium-term economic conditions from more long term, or structural changes impacting our species economically.  Of the former, the relationship between inflation and whether the markets are competitive or oligarchic (or even monopolies) can be better understood, and this in term can put us in a better position to assess the impact of longer-term changes, such as those stemming from the huge increase in the population of human beings since before the industrial age. The price of food (i.e., groceries) is a case in point. Specifically, the impact from presumably temporary shocks during the Covid pandemic should be distinguished from the impact of oligopolistic markets in keeping prices high, and of the increase in human mouths more generally (and longer term) representing increased demand for foodstuff in on a relatively fixed planet.


The full essay is at "Anti-Trust and Monetary Policy."

Thursday, August 22, 2019

Limits to Overused Fiscal and Monetary Policy Can Result in Self-Induced Governmental Impotence

“The [U.S.] federal budget deficit is growing faster than expected as President Trump’s spending and tax cut policies force the United States to borrow increasing sums of money.”[1] This observation was made just after the Federal Reserve Bank relented under pressure from the White House to lower interest rates because bond investors had been investing with a possible future recession in mind. With the U.S. Government’s accumulated debt standing at $22.4 trillion and interest rates already low, the limits to both fiscal and monetary policy were apparent even if most Americans in the political and business elite were focused on avoiding a possible recession in 2020.

The full essay is at "Overused Fiscal and Monetary Tools."

See also: Skip Worden, Essays on Two Federal Empires. Available at Amazon.


1. Jim Tankersley and Emily Cochrane, “Budget Deficit Is Set to Surge Past $1 Trillion,” The New York Times, August 22, 2019.

Sunday, March 24, 2019

Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Structural Reform: Each Had a Role to Play after the Financial Crisis

With fiscal policy hamstrung by public debt in both the E.U. and U.S., monetary policy was a major beneficiary of the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing state-debt crisis that stammered on at least until 2013 in Europe. Lest it be concluded that central bank policy had reached an unassailable peak of salvation, the expanded role actually made its limitations transparent, at least in financial circles.

The full essay is at "Post Financial Crisis Coordinated Action."

Saturday, March 23, 2019

Structural Reform and Economic Sustenance in European Austerity

Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 25, 2013, Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank(ECB), said the bank’s program to buy the bonds of heavily indebted E.U. states had been “very helpful” in reducing the perception that the euro was on the verge of collapse. He also pointed to the structural reforms that heavily indebted states had enacted as “now bearing fruit.”[1] He urged those governments to continue to implement structural reforms so those states could take advantage of the ECB’s low interest rates and easy credit to banks. In short, the strategy of the ECB was to use monetary policy as leverage for long-term-oriented structural reforms at the state level. Political risk analysts listening to the central bank official likely came away with a more optimistic stance on the long term prospects for the E.U. economy.

The full essay is at "Structural Reform and Economic Sustenance."
 1. “Davos: ECB’s Draghi Says ‘Real’ Economy Still Stagnant,” Deutsche Welle, January 25, 2013.

                                                                                                       

Monday, February 11, 2019

Is Modest Growth vs. Full Employment a False Dichotomy?

As Summer slid into Autumn in 2012, the Chinese government was giving no hint of any ensuing economic stimulus program. This was more than slightly unnerving for some, as a recent manufacturing survey had slumped more than expected, to 49.2 in August. A score of 50 separated expansion from contraction. A similar survey, by HSBC, came in at 47.6, down from 49.3 the previous month. Bloomberg suggested that China might face a recession in the third quarter. So why no stimulus announcement?  Was the Chinese government really just one giant tease? I submit that the false dichotomy of moderate economic growth and full employment was in play. In short, the Chinese government did not want to over-heat even a stagnant economy even though the assumption was that full employment would thus not be realizable.

Sunday, November 25, 2018

Larry Summers Bowed Out of the Race for Fed Chair: “Advise and Consent” Triumphant

On September 15, 2013, the White House announced that Larry Summers, Barak Obama’s prior chief economic advisor and a Secretary of the U.S. Treasury during the Clinton administration, no longer wanted to be considered to fill the upcoming vacancy as chairman of the Federal Reserve. In the announcement, Obama (or an advisor) wrote, “Larry was a critical member of my team as we faced down the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, and it was in no small part because of his expertise, wisdom and leadership that we wrestled the economy back to growth and made the kind of progress we are seeing today.”[1] Unfortunately, this statement suffers from a sin of omission, which admittedly had been minimized by the media as well. Accordingly, the Democrats in the U.S. Senate who had just come out against a Summers nomination can be regarded as done the nation a vital service. Moreover, the “check” of the “check-and-balance” feature of the U.S. Senate’s confirmation power worked.
The Full Essay is at "Why Summers Bowed Out."


1.Annie Lowrey and Michael D. Shear, “Summers Pulls Name from Consideration for Fed Chief,” The New York Times, September 15, 2013.

Friday, September 21, 2018

Exaggeration on the U.S. Economy “Going Over the Cliff” after the Financial Crisis of 2008

As the U.S. Government faced down its own deadline in 2012 before the Bush tax cuts would expire and across-the-board budget cuts would commence, the Federal Reserve, which had been struggling to prop up the economy by buying bonds and keeping interest rates low, would, according to the Chairman, Ben Bernanke, be largely powerless to do more in the face of a recessionary policy on taxes and spending. "We cannot offset the full impact of the fiscal cliff," he said of the Fed. "It's just too big." That he had written a doctoral dissertation on the Great Depression and had specialized on it as a professor at Princeton lends a lot of weight to his judgment on the matter. However, he had also managed to be re-appointed to the Fed and thus knew how to play the game. In the case of the automatic budget cuts, major power-brokers, specifically in the military industrial complex, had a lot riding on Congress and the White House making a deal that would obviate the cuts in defense spending. The chairman of the Fed could have been carrying their water.
Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, in front of the lights.   Reuters

Wednesday, May 23, 2018

The U.S. Federal Reserve as a Regulatory Agency

According to the Wall Street Journal, the Federal Reserve “has operated almost entirely behind closed doors as it rewrites the rule book governing the U.S. financial system.” The paper notes that this has been in sharp contrast to the trend at the Fed toward greater transparency in its interest-rate policies and emergency-lending programs. The complaint of a dearth of public meetings misses, however, not only the scripted nature of such displays, but also the more fundamental question of whether a central bank buffered from political pressure should play such a salient role as regulator. At the very least, the democratic deficit and a lack of accountability may be exacerbated by the Fed’s greater role as a regulator of banks—particularly after the major investment banks become commercial banks, and thus subject to the Fed’s regulations.

The full essay is at "The Federal Reserve as a Regulator of Banks: An Institutional Conflict of Interest."

Related books: 

Essays on the Financial Crisis

Institutional Conflicts of Interest


Sunday, February 11, 2018

On the Danger to the United States of Living off Government Debt: The Case of the Dollar as World Reserve in 2010

Given the $13 trillion of U.S. Government debt in 2010, the dollar was losing out at the time in percentage terms to other currencies as the global reserve currency. To be sure, in absolute terms, there were still more dollars being held abroad than twenty or thirty years earlier, but as a report from Emma Lawson of Morgan Stanley showed, other currencies were taking on more of a relative presence. The lesson concerning excessive public debt was not grasped at least through the 2010's, as the debt continued to increase trillions of dollars more.


Thursday, March 9, 2017

The E.U.’s Central Bank: Beholden to State-Level Politics

Faced with the rise of anti-euro candidates for state offices throughout the E.U., Mario Draghi, the president of the E.U.’s central bank deemed it politically prudent to depart from the light world of cool economic data to mount a spirited defense of the euro and even free trade in March, 2017. With the UK having voted to secede from the Union, he could not assume that the state of the Union would continue to be inherently viable. Indeed, some political candidates at the state level were “questioning the whole idea of a united Europe and the European Central Bank’s fundamental reason for being.”[1] 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.


[1] Jack Ewing, “As E.C.B. Charts Economic Course, Politics Complicate the Picture,” The New York Times, March 9, 2017.

Wednesday, March 8, 2017

Disentangling a Worsening Trade Deficit: Sector-Specific Industrial and Macro Economic Policy


The U.S. trade deficit rose 9.6% in January, 2017, to the highest level since 2012. The gap of $48.5 billion of exports exceeding imports looks daunting, yet the story is more complex at the sector level.[1] According to Neil Irwin of The New York Times, “What really matters is not whether the trade deficit is rising or falling. What matters is why?”[2] Distinguishing macro factors such as a strengthening dollar from sectoral strengths and weaknesses is thus necessary.
The full essay is at "Disentangling a Worsening Trade Deficit."


1. Neil Irwin, “The Huge January Trade Deficit Shows Trump’s Hard Job Ahead,” The New York Times, March 7, 2017.
2. Ibid.




The Port of Oakland (Source: Jim Wilson/NYT)

Thursday, September 8, 2016

Going to Extremes for Economic Growth: Low Interest-Rates as Unfair and Unwise

Is moderate monetary policy better than going to the extremes? The same can be asked of fiscal policy. Moreover, is a hypertrophic urge to prompt economic growth as if it were an end in itself better than seeking an economic equilibrium? Generally speaking, systems in equilibrium are more stable than those that include a schizogenic, or limitlessly maximizing, variable. An example of the latter is the population growth of our species relative to the equilibria otherwise established by the ecosystems in which we live. A desire for economic growth is a maximizing variable in a political economy. So too is the related practice of taking monetary (and fiscal) policy to an extreme. If the desire is great enough and the related policies extreme enough, the equilibrium of a political economy can be punctured with systemic risk increasing as does the instability of the system. I contend, therefore, that moderate government and central bank policies are preferable to going to the extremes. Here, I address monetary policy.

The full essay is at "Going to Extremes."

Saturday, September 12, 2015

Corbyn as Labour Party Leader in Britain: Are Increased Deficits Implied or Avoidable?

The notion that a political party oriented to redressing the widening economic inequality during the years following the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent debt-crisis in the E.U. necessarily must increase government deficits to do so is, I submit, faulty. That is to say, being especially oriented to the plight of the poor, with the goal being the elimination of extreme poverty, can be consistent with fiscal responsibility. The election of a socialist as leader of Britain’s Labour party presents us with an interesting case of assumed fiscal irresponsibility.

The complete essay is at "Anti-Poverty and Budget Deficits."

Jeremy Corbyn upon being elected as leader of the British Labour Party (Jeff Mitchell/Getty)


Friday, October 31, 2014

The Bank of Japan’s Quantitative Easing: An Unnatural Imbalance

On October 31, 2014, the Bank of Japan made public its policy of buying larger amounts of government debt—80 trillion yen ($734 billion) a year—so as to stimulate the economy.[1] The Nikkei 225-stock index average rose almost 5 percent that day, while the yen fell to its lowest level against the dollar since the preceding month. In effect, investors and analysts were factoring in the likely stimulatory impact on the economy and the inflationary implication of more yen relative even to the expanded output, respectively. Put another way, the lower yen suggests that any strengthening of the currency from higher economic output would be more than countered by the weakening impact of inflation. Interestingly, not even the likely boost to exports from the cheaper yen was expected by the market participants to give the stimulus the edge in pushing the currency higher rather than lower.
 




1. Jonathan Soble, “Japan’s Central Bank Unexpectedly Moves to Stimulate Economy,” The New York Times, October 31, 2014.

 

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

Global Geopolitical Risks: Is Wall Street Hypersensitive and Reductionistic?

The Dow dropped 140 points in August 5, 2014 on a rumor that the Russian military is about to invade eastern Ukraine. Three days later, amid hints of de-escalation and the end of troop “exercises” on the Ukraine border, the Dow gained 186 points. Three days later, as Russia’s president approves a deal wherein the Russian OAO Rosneft and the American ExxonMobil can begin drilling a $700 million well in the Arctic Ocean, the Dow gains 16 points.[1] Are stock analysts and Wall Street investors really so hypersensitive to day-to-day changes in geopolitical risk? It may be simply that such news sells.

The entire essay is at “Global Geopolitical Risks”





[1] All quotes are from Adam Shell, “If Russia Sneezes, Wall St. Gets a Cold,” USA Today, August 12, 2014.

Sunday, June 9, 2013

Should the ECB Spend an Unlimited Amount on Bonds?

The European Central Bank did not place any limit on its program in which the bank purchases bonds of heavily indebted states so as to keep their borrowing costs (i.e., the bonds’ interest rates) from increasing. The program, called Outright Monetary Transactions, had already accomplished that even before spending a euro. Anticipation that the ECB would enter a state bond market if its interest rate rose high enough was enough to keep the rates from skyrocketing.  So, the announcement that the ECB would spend what “would be adequate to meet [the] objectives” is perhaps more important than how much the central bank actually spends.[1]  According to Joerg Asmussen, an executive board member of the ECB, the OMT was “economically necessary, legally permissible and effective.”[2]  He made the comment as a court in the state of Germany was preparing to consider whether the OMT “infringes on the constitution’s insistence on sovereign parliamentary control over budget matters.”[3]  Hence, a tension between “legally permissible” and “infringes on . . . sovereign parliamentary control” threatened to kill a program that had already succeeded before buying one bond. Fortunately, legal experts were saying that the German court might defer to the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court.

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available at Amazon.

Sunday, April 14, 2013

European Central Bank As Supervisor: Conflicts of Interest

Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, raised additional concerns in April 2013 about a proposal to create a single banking supervisor for the European Union. About 150 large banks would be under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank, which would also have the power to intervene to oversee smaller lenders. This proposal had been set as a precondition for states to draw on the E.U.’s bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, to recapitalize struggling lenders directly. To analyze Schäuble’s potential stumbling blocks, it is necessary to understand the conflicts of interest that are involved.
                                                                                 Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, active at the E.U. level. Source: The Telegraph.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy." Available at Amazon.

Saturday, February 9, 2013

ECB’s Draghi Resists Pressure to Devalue Euro and Stimulate Growth

Despite pressures from the appreciation of the euro, which had hit a 15-month peak of $1.3711 on February 1, 2013, Mario Draghi of the European Central Bank announced four days later that the benchmark financing rate would be on hold at the record-low 0.75 percent. In making the announcement, he stressed that the worst was over for the Eurozone and that the uncertainties would be gone by midyear. “The economic weakness in the euro area is expected to prevail in the early part of this year. But later in 2013, economic activity should gradually recover, supported by our accommodative monetary policy stance and the improvement in financial market confidence.” Draghi was tacitly undercutting Francois Hollande’s earlier statement that the euro should depreciate so as not to hurt economic competitiveness. A higher euro means more expensive euro-based exports abroad. The relationships between monetary policy, a currency, and economic growth are complex. It would thus be worthwhile to unpack the scenario facing Draghi and Hollande in early 2013.
                         Mario Draghi addressing the World Economic Forum. In resisting pressure to lower the benchmark rate, he increased his financial stature abroad. 
The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. PoliticalEconomy, available at Amazon.