Showing posts with label geopolitical risk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label geopolitical risk. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 8, 2026

Ukraine Beseeches the NATO Alliance

On 7 July, 2026, speaking at NATO’s Summit Defense Industry Forum in Turkey, Ukrainian President Zelensky made the case that Ukraine should be in the NATO military alliance even though that country was still being invaded by Russia, so the activation of the alliance’s article 5’s mutual-defense mandate would be dicey to say the least. Accepting an existing “hot spot” into the alliance would be risky not least because of any immediate expectations of having to join a fight already in progress, but also because of what Russia’s President Putin’s reaction might be. Zelensky’s remarks can thus be regarded as partial, or one-sided, from the standpoint of a full geo-political and military-strategic analysis.


The full essay is at "Ukraine Beseeches the NATO Alliance."

Tuesday, January 27, 2026

E.U.-India Free Trade

Early in 2026, “(a)fter months of intense negotiations,” the E.U. concluded “a free-trade deal with India,” which, if ratified by the E.U.’s upper and lower chambers (the European Council and the European Parliament), would sharply reduce “tariffs on E.U. products from cars to wine as the world looks for alternative markets following President Donald Trump’s tariffs.”[1] Signaling that something more than trade was involved in the treaty, “(b)oth countries hailed a ‘new chapter in strategic relations’ as both sides” sought “alternatives to the US market.”[2] The E.U. had just engineered a free-trade treaty with four South American countries. Competition for better, cheaper, trade was reducing Trump’s bargaining power by means of tariffs. Using them to inflict geopolitical harm on other countries, including the E.U., would become less effective as free-trade deals excluding the U.S. materialized. The implications, and even the motive in the free-trade negotiations between the E.U. and India, extend beyond economics.


The full essay is at "E.U.-India Trade."



1. Peggy Corlin and Maria Tadeo, “EU Inks ‘Mother of All Deals’ with India Trade Agreement Amid Global Turmoil,” Euronews.com, January 27, 2026.
2. Ibid., italics added.

Monday, August 25, 2025

The E.U.’s Hungary Overreaching on Sovereignty: International Trade

Sovereignty is not a word to be casually used, especially if in overreaching. In both the E.U. and U.S., state governments have overreached at the expense of the delegated competencies or enumerated powers of the respective Unions of states. The Nullification Crisis in the U.S. and de facto unilateral refusal of the E.U. state of Hungary to observe E.U. law both demonstrate how the overreaching by state governments can compromise a federal system.[1] In the E.U. the refusal to do away with the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. enable and even invite such overreaches at the expense of the E.U. itself, and its distinctly federal officials. Even a state government’s pursuit of it’s state’s economic interests does not justify holding the E.U. hostage. The case of supporting Ukraine in the midst of the invasion by Russia is a case in point.


The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Hungary Overreaching on Sovereignty."


[1] In 1832-1833, the government of South Carolina held that the U.S. tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were null and void within the state. “The resolution of the Nullification Crisis in favor of the federal government helped to undermine the nullification doctrine,” which holds that states have the right “to nullify federal acts within their boundaries.” Britannica.com (accessed August 25, 2025). I submit that the European Court of Justice could do worse than declare the same with regard to state laws, including the refusal of a governor or state legislature to implement federal directives, that are in violation of E.U. law and regulations. Monetary sanctions by the European Commission have not been a sufficient deterrent. If either de facto or de jure nullification becomes the norm, then it would only be a matter of time before the Union dissolves and the states could once again take up arms against each other.

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Anticipating a Recession: Economic and Political Indicators in the E.U.

Anticipation in August, 2019, at least among bond purchasers on Wall Street, of an impending recession in 2020 had at least in part to do with the E.U. In particular, a large state, Germany, had a disappointing second quarter in terms of contracting economic output, and the increasing prospect of Britain seceding from the Union was thought to result in the E.U. economy turning recessionary. I contend that both of these baleful indicators were over-emphasized. Additionally, adding the increasing political polarization in the E.U. as another contributor to an upcoming recession would be too much.

The full essay is at "Anticipating a Recession."

Friday, December 1, 2017

Political Risk Exaggerated on Catexit

On the day the Catalan parliament voted in favor of “Catexit” from Spain, the IBEX-35 stock-market index dropped 1.4 percent while the Stoxx Europe 600 gained 0.3 percent.[1] The IBEX-35 is an stock-index of companies based in Spain. Investors also sold state bonds; yields on 10-year bonds rose to 1.574% from 1.558. Even though these changes were hardly earth-shattering in magnitude, their directionality points to investor-anxiety. I submit that it was overblown, which suggests that investors generally tend to over-react to political events.

The full essay is at "Catexit: Political Risk."

[1] Jon Sindreu, “Stocks, Bonds Hit by Political Unrest,” The Wall Street Journal, October 28-29, 2017.

Friday, December 2, 2016

Business CEO’s Overstating Political Uncertainty in the United States


The impact on business of political uncertainty in countries that are seized by revolution can be substantial—so much so in fact that CEO’s and board directors are motivated to avoid the uncertainty itself. I submit that business analysts of political risk tend unwittingly to routinely overstate the uncertainty arising from incoming U.S. presidential administrations. If I am correct in this claim, CEO’s and board directors pay too much heed to political uncertainty itself in the making of major strategic decisions involving operations in the American context.

Monday, October 3, 2016

Americans Can Sue Saudi Arabia over 9/11 and the Saudis Accept Lower Oil Production by OPEC: The Unraveling of a Deal?

On Wednesday, September 28, 2016, the U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly—97-1 in the Senate and 348-77 in the House of Representatives—to override President Obama’s veto of a bill that allows the families of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center bombings.[1] As a result, American courts can seize Saudi assets to pay for any judgment obtained by the families. Saudi officials in turn warned that their government might need to sell off hundreds of billions of dollars in holdings in the United States to avoid such an outcome. In another place in the world, Saudi officials were dropping their resistance to OPEC—an oil cartel—cutting production. Even though positive correlation does not in itself indicate causation, the timing may point to the impact of political calculations by Obama. That is to say, the timing may suggest a political deal gone bad.

The full essay is at "Unraveling of a Deal?"


1. Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti, and Julie H. Davis, ,“Congress Allows Saudis to Be Sued Over 9/11 Attacks,“ The New York Times, September 29, 2016.

Thursday, August 25, 2016

Global Markets and London Overreact to the British Vote to Secede from the E.U.: Missing the Bright Spots

The world’s financial sector may be excessively sensitive to increasing uncertainty associated with major changes—that is, changes that impact how large institutions, including governments, relate to each other. In such cases, so much is at stake that forces (i.e., the major powers) tend to manage the large-scale change with a minimum of disturbance. In short, the status quo has too much at stake for the market’s feared uncertainty to actualize. The British referendum on whether the E.U. state should secede is a case in point.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.



Tuesday, August 12, 2014

Global Geopolitical Risks: Is Wall Street Hypersensitive and Reductionistic?

The Dow dropped 140 points in August 5, 2014 on a rumor that the Russian military is about to invade eastern Ukraine. Three days later, amid hints of de-escalation and the end of troop “exercises” on the Ukraine border, the Dow gained 186 points. Three days later, as Russia’s president approves a deal wherein the Russian OAO Rosneft and the American ExxonMobil can begin drilling a $700 million well in the Arctic Ocean, the Dow gains 16 points.[1] Are stock analysts and Wall Street investors really so hypersensitive to day-to-day changes in geopolitical risk? It may be simply that such news sells.

The entire essay is at “Global Geopolitical Risks”





[1] All quotes are from Adam Shell, “If Russia Sneezes, Wall St. Gets a Cold,” USA Today, August 12, 2014.