E.U. President Von der Leyen Survives A No-Confidence Vote

Falling short of the two-thirds majority needed to pass on July 10, 2025, the no-confidence vote on President Von der Leyen of the Commission in the E.U.’s parliament mustered only 175 representatives in favor while 360 voted against the motion and 18 abstained. Although commentators discussed whether the president was weakened anyway, a more important matter relates to the politics of the vote as distinct from the Parliament’s institutional interests as they relate to the Commission and the European Council. I contend that the Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, has a vital interest that is vital to the E.U. itself in maintaining a balance between the collective power of the representatives of the citizenry and the power the state governments at the federal level. Parties making deals with Von der Leyen on policy positions undercut the vote as a means of holding the Commission to maintaining that balance.

The full essay is at "E.U. President Von der Leyen Survives A No-Confidence Vote."

The E.U.’s Parliament and the U.S.’s House of Representatives in Dialogue

On November 1, 2024, “All Saints Day” in Roman Catholic Christianity, the E.U. announced that a peaceful delegation of the elected representatives of the EU’s Parliament would be travelling to Texas during the following week to “meet American counterparts,” which is to say, a delegation of the elected representatives of the US’s House of Representatives.[1] The key word here is counterparts, for the European Parliament is indeed of the same type of legislative body and at the same level in its federal system as is the American House of Representatives.

The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Parliament and the U.S.'s House."

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1, Peggy Corlin, “MEPs Seek First Contact with Trump or Harris Regimes in Texas Next Week,” Euronews.com, November 1, 2024.

On the E.U.’s Principle of Unanimity: The Case of Hungary

As of 2024, enlargement policy, foreign affairs, taxation, and the budget was “bound by the principle of unanimity,” which means that each state government has a veto in the European Council.[1] With 27 states, the E.U. could in effect be held hostage quite easily. Even in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the state of Hungary was blocking €55 billion in E.U. aid to Ukraine as of June 24, 2024, although revenue from frozen Russian financial assets in the E.U. could be used (because Hungary had not participated in the G7 decision) and Hungary had just reversed its veto against further sanctions against Russia. However, the €1.4 billion from the investment revenue pales in comparison and sanctions do not deliver desperately needed military hardware to the besieged country.

The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Principle of Unanimity."

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Heading for Accession Impasse during Hungary’s EU Council Presidency,” Euronews, June 18, 2024.

The Visible Hand: Markets Forging a Stronger E.U.

Joschka Fischer, a former foreign minister of the state of Germany, said the agreement under which 17 state governments accept more oversight and control of their budgets by the European Union “was a big step, which was pushed on the Europeans by the markets.”[1] Such pressure was necessary, given the conflict of interest bearing on state officials working at the federal level on a deal that would add a new competency to the E.U. “(I)n the end,” Fischer added, “the markets have limited the options of the political leaders, especially of Merkel, and pushed her into giving more support for the euro.”[2] Giving more support for the euro meant giving more power to the E.U. at the expense of the state-level where Merkel has most of her power. From this vantage point (i.e., the power that state officials have at the E.U. level), it is amazing that the E.U. has been able to acquire any additional competencies.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Steven Erlanger and Liz Alderman, “Chronic Pain for the Euro,” The New York Times, December 12, 2011; Landon Thomas, “A Stark Step Away From Europe,” The New York Times, December 11, 2011. 

2. Ibid.

Greece & Italy: Undercutting Market Confidence in the E.U.

As a federal system, the E.U. can be expected to contain a certain amount of economic disparity. The state bond yields in October 2011, for example, were—one could say—“diversified.” Investors relishing high risk-return could partake in Greek bonds while retired investors could safely stick to the German variety. A healthy federal system proffers something for nearly every taste, while constraining the outliers for the sake of unity. It does not require uniformity. However, too much diversity can cause a federal system to come apart due to divergent pressures seeking more expression. Also, if the high-risk “end” is sufficiently risky, the ensuing atmosphere of uncertainty can undo the federation’s financial system. Uncertainty, like anxiety, can subtly eat away at a system to the point that it cannot pull itself out of its funk.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Angela Merkel: Leading Germany in the E.U.

In the E.U. state of Germany, Angela Merkel had her work cut out for her in getting her coalition to carry the German House, or Bundestag. In vesting the debt bailout fund with powers had been at the state level. Conservatives feared the deal would “open to the door to relinquishing more sovereignty to the European Union.”[1] Also, the legislators in her Free/Christian Democrat coalition were having trouble justifying the increased cost to their constituents of the expanded fund even though it is geared to keeping the E.U. debt-loads at the state level from spinning out of control—meaning at the expense of the German economy. Economically, it can be argued that expanding the E.U.’s bailout fun is in the economic interest of the state of Germany and its residents.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Vanessa Fuhrmans, “Merkel Faces Test OverBailout Fund,” The Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2011.

Political Ideology in a U.S. Federal Healthcare Budget: Disentangling Redistribution, Government and Federalism

A shift in power from the U.S. Governments to those of the states is distinct from a redution in the size of government. These are distinct, albeit not disparate, unrelated, goals. Shifting power does not in itself imply or mandate a reduction in the size of government. For example, in shifting public health-care policy, an expansion of government could result if enough states develop programs further-reaching than what Congress had enacted.  Of course, as per the nature of federalism, particularly in an empire-scale instance, the resulting health-care programs would differ from republic to republic, given the innate heterogeneity that exists at such a scale.

The full essay is at "Political Ideology in a U.S. Government Budget."