Showing posts with label mergers and acquisitions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mergers and acquisitions. Show all posts

Monday, July 13, 2026

California and the Eleven Dwarfs Take on the Paramount-Warner Bros Merger

In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith foresees that capitalist industrialists could collude with government at the expense of labor. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche argues that keeping laborers to a subsistence wage is necessary for capitalists to have enough wealth accumulated to invest in culture. Rather than being immoral, exploitation is simply part of life and thus the resulting economic inequality cannot be removed at its source. Low wages may simply be a feature of how labor supply typically relates to business demand for workers, whereas highly educated professionals are not so numerous and can demand higher compensation. Meanwhile, what about consumers as capitalist industrialists continue to accumulate capital in part by being able to pay large workforces subsistence wages and engage in mergers and acquisitions, such that competitive markets are turned into oligopolies and even, as in the case of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil in the 1870s, monopolies capable of extracting “monopoly rents”? In the U.S., the Sherman and Clayton Acts in the early 1900s were oriented to safeguarding competitive markets from being undermined by business titans, but enforcing those federal laws would seem to fly in the face of collusion between capitalists and their respective governments. As a case in point, the U.S. Justice Department gave the green light to Paramount’s take-over of Warner Brothers/Discovery even as President Trump had a financial interest in the deal going through. In the American federal system, the state governments could act as a check, and on July 13, 2026, the announcement came that California plus eleven other states, led by their respective attorneys general, filed a lawsuit challenging the merger on the basis that it would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. American consumers had reason to be thankful that they were still in a federal republic of republics, even though the growth of power at the federal level had nearly eclipsed the federalism, at least as it was originally intended—as enabling checks by the feds on the states and vice versa.


The full essay is at "California and the Eleven Dwarfs Take on the Paramount-Warner Bros Merger."


Monday, November 11, 2019

Perception-Based Healthy Reputational Capital as a Strategic Competitive Advantage: The Case of CVS Health

In 2014, CVS drug-stores stopped selling tobacco products. The strategic choice rendered CVS Health more internally consistent on wellness. To be sure, the company continued to sell alcohol products, such as wine and hard liquor, which are harmful to human health. Yet the incremental correction was significant both in regard to the short-term hits to the bottom-line and the salubrious contribution to the health of customers. If the share of revenue (and profit) from the sale of alcohol increased in the meantime to make up the difference, the net effect on the bottom-line could have been zero or even positive, and the net impact on the health of customers and the company’s healthy image could also have been nugatory or even negative. Writing in 2019, however, Larry Merlo, President and CEO of CVS Health, saw a perfect convergence of the long-term bottom-line and making a contribution to society even at the expense of short-term revenue.

The full essay is at "Perception-Based Healthy Reputational Capital."

Wednesday, June 26, 2019

On the United Technologies-Raytheon Merger: The Macro Level of Analysis

In analyzing a merger, incorporating the macro context is vital. For very large mergers, for instance, public policy concerns inevitably surface even if they are typically ignored not only in merger analyses, but also by in societal and even governmental public discourse. Analysis at this level takes a societal standpoint, including on the relationship of business and government. This does not diminish the salience of firm-level analysis, for even how the respective organizational cultures would mesh is very important to a functional merged company. This is even true regarding the respective business-ethics climates, for it is not a given that a healthy organizational culture dominates an unethical one.

Tuesday, May 28, 2019

On Fiat-Chrysler’s Merger Proposal to Renault: Too Broad?

As Renault was considering Fiat Chrysler’s proposal to merge, industry executives and analysts believed “that car makers must link up to share the cost of a transition from internal combustion engines to avoid being run over by fast-moving tech industry challengers like Tesla or Uber.”[1] To be sure, (b)y purchasing parts together, combining their manufacturing operations and sharing the cost of research and development,” the merger could “eventually save 5 billion euros per year,” according to Fiat.[2] The R & D would include funds spent on developing new models as well as on high tech oriented to the future. Although significant efficiency could be achieved due to under-used factories and all the money going into product development, the basic problem was one of insufficient scale (i.e., revenue) to support (i.e., finance) the very costly research and development needed on electric and/or self-diving cars. In its statement, Fiat Chrysler pointed to “the need to take bold decisions to capture at scale the opportunities created by the transformation of the auto industry in areas like connectivity, electrification, and autonomous driving.”[3] The insufficient scale was particularly troubling given the declining E.U. auto market at a time when Tesla, Google and Uber were making progress on electric and self-driving cars. Fiat Chrysler could really use the expertise at Renault and Nissan on electric cars. However, I'm not sure a merger was the optimal route forward.

The full essay is at "Fiat-Chrysler's Merger Proposal."



[1] Jack Ewing et al, “Renault Considering Fiat’s Offer to Merge Into a New Auto Giant,” The New York Times, May 27, 2019
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Bank of America: Downsizing From Smallness

Three years after the near-meltdown of Wall Street in September 2008, Bank of America announced that 30,000 jobs would be eliminated. That amounts to nearly 10% of the bank’s total work force. Over all, BOA was planning to cut $5 billion in annual expenses. The reason is transparent: continued losses stemming from the bank’s acquisition of Countrywide in January 2008 in spite of the fall of the U.S. real estate market and the related losses on sub-prime mortgage-backed CDOs. What could Ken Lewis have been thinking? At least in the case of his acquisition of Merrill Lynch, which was agreed to in principle in September 2008, the investment bank had already sold its $30 billion of toxic assets for over $7 billion in July 2008.

The full essay is at "Bank of America."  

Saturday, February 24, 2018

Upside-Down Corporate Governance at AIG

I contend that Robert Benmosche, CEO of AIG, had an incorrect understanding of corporate governance when he told Harvey Golub, then-chairman of the board, on July 14, 2010, “One of us should stay and one of us should go.” He should have, “Please let me know if the board would like me to go.” Put bluntly, the CEO works for the board, not vice versa. The previous May, Benmosche told Golub, “We can’t work together. I need a partner who I can bounce ideas off and give me advice.” However,a CEO and a chairman do not work together as partners. Rather, the chairman—and the board more generally—act on behalf of the stockholders to oversee the management, which the board has hired. In other words, a CEO is an employee whereas a chairman is not. Benmosche’s comment is actually rather presumptuous.

The full essay is at "Corporate Governance at AIG."

Wednesday, October 4, 2017

Vertical and Horizontal M&A: A Bias in Antitrust Policy?

The Obama Justice Department developed a track record in challenging horizontal mergers and acquisitions—those in which a company buys a direct competitor—in industries that are already highly concentrated. In deals that are not between direct rivals, such as those that occur in vertical integration, the Obama Administration approved the deals, albeit with the imposition of legally binding restrictions on the acquirer’s ability to use its “in house” supplier to engage in unfair competition.

The full essay is at "A Bias in Obama's Antitrust Policy?" 


Thursday, August 3, 2017

Vertical and Horizontal M&A: A Bias in Antitrust Policy?

The Obama Justice Department developed a track record in challenging horizontal mergers and acquisitions—those in which a company buys a direct competitor—in industries that are already highly concentrated. In deals that are not between direct rivals, such as those that occur in vertical integration, the Obama Administration approved the deals, albeit with the imposition of legally binding restrictions on the acquirer’s ability to use its “in house” supplier to engage in unfair competition.

Saturday, January 14, 2017

The Age of the Imperial CEO: The Case of Fred R. Johnson at RJR Nabisco

Frederick Ross Johnson, as CEO of RJR Nabisco, was known “for the fleet of corporate jets that ferried him to celebrity golf events and other luxurious perks he awarded himself.”[1] The key words here being awarded himself, for Johnson epitomized the sort of imperial CEO that made an oxymoron out of the notion that the corporate board is to serve as an overseer of corporate management in corporate governance. Awarded himself should be the oxymoron, for such a conflict of interest runs against the logic of any viable business calculus.

The full essay is at "The Imperial CEO."




1. James R. Hagerty, “F. Ross Johnson,” The Wall Street Journal, January 7-8, 2017.


Wednesday, October 26, 2016

AT&T Buys Time Warner: An Expansive Strategy Amid Industry Uncertainty

After Comcast’s $30 billion takeover of NBCUniversal and Verizon’s acquisitions of the Huffington Post and Yahoo, AT&T agreed on October 22, 2016 to buy Time Warner for $85.4 billion. The ability to produce content and deliver it to millions of viewers “with wireless phones, broadband subscriptions and satellite TV connections was not lost on either board.[1] At the time, AT&T sold “wireless service in a saturated market, while Time Warner [was] a content company whose primary assets, networks like CNN and HBO, [faced] tougher times in a cord-cutting world.”[2] Although AT&T’s board could be accused of empire-building wherein bigger is better (i.e., more powerful), the stabilizing impact of combining wireless service and content could hardly be ignored in a business-environment so full of change and uncertainty. In other words, with the traditional television industry facing such dire threats to its revenue-structure due to the proliferation of high-tech substitutes, having the wherewithal to formulate and experiment with different distribution means and even content was at the time a fitting strategy.

The full essay is at "AT&T Buys Time Warner."


1. Michael J. de la Merced, “AT&T Pledges $85 Billion To Acquire Time Warner,” The New York Times, October 23, 2016.
2. Farhad Manjoo, “AT&T-Time Warner Deal Is a Strike in the Dark,” The New York Times, October 24, 2016.

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

Business Implications of Power in Mergers: The Case of the New United Airlines

Ideally, a merger combines the best features of one company with those of another company such that the whole is of greater value than the sum of the two parts. Optimal combination as such may imply or at least depend on a rough power-balance between the two adjoining companies, for otherwise distended dominance could translate into the worst of one company (i.e., the dominate one) being foisted onto the merged entity. The opportunity cost, or benefit lost in going with the worst of the dominant company, could be measured by the extent to which the same function in the other company is better than that of the dominant company. Put another way, it would make no sense to go into a merger planning to let each company continue to do what it does worse than the other. Sadly, power can eclipse economic criteria even in a company. The merger of Continental Airlines and United Airlines provides a case in point.



United's "Love in the Air" promotion highlighting couples who met in the air. The case of the winning couple pictured here just happens to involve an "upgrade." The love in the air does not refer here to the employees on board or at the gate, even though the impression intended may be that flying United is a loving experience. (United Airlines)

Tuesday, May 12, 2015

Taking the Face off Facebook

In testing out its search feature as a mobile app, Facebook's priority was still on mobile-ad revenue even in 2015. The stress on that revenue stream in turn resulted due to pressure from Wall Street analysts during Facebook's IPO. Was this simply a quarterly vs. long-term difference in perspective? Did Facebook cave too much, leaving its users with a sense of being exploited? In Taking the Face off Facebook, a collection of my essays, I analyze Facebook's strategic and ethical choices in the wake of the company's initian public-stock offering (IPO).


Wednesday, April 22, 2015

Democracy as an Anti-Trust Criterion: The Comcast Time-Warner Merger

As the U.S. Department of Justice and the SEC were reviewing the proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner in April 2015, six U.S. senators signed a joint letter opposing the $45 billion deal. Comcast would control about 30 percent of the pay-television subscribers in the U.S. and an estimated 35 to 50 percent of the American broadband internet service.[1] That more senators had not signed on is telling with respect to how business-oriented American society had become.

The full essay is at “Democracy and Anti-Trust Law.”



[1] Emily Steel, “6 Senators Urge Rejection of Comcast-Time Warner Cable Deal,” The New York Times, April 21, 2015.

Sunday, August 17, 2014

Mergers and Acquisitions: What about the Stockholders?

Why do companies merge and acquire other companies? Synergy is the textbook answer. Typically, the stockholders of the target company see an appreciation in the value of their stock, while stockholders in the initiating firm see a downtick. The reason why is simple: corporations typically overpay. The value-added of the anticipated synergy must be greater than not only any overpayment, but also the intangible costs in aligning the corporate cultures. Yet another factor—an opportunity cost, really—is frequently overlooked: that of whether the extra cash on hand should be returned to the stockholders as dividends.


The complete essay is at “Mergers and Acquisitions” 

Friday, August 23, 2013

U.S. Justice Department Opposes American-US Air Merger: Justice as Fairness?

After a decade of “rapid consolidation” in the U.S. airline industry, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in mid-2013 to block the proposed merger between American Airlines and US Airlines. The question I investigate here is whether the government’s opposition to this merger is fair to the stockholders and employees (including managers) of the two airlines. Given the undoubted proliferation of empirical studies on the probable impacts of the merger on the industry (e.g., competition), the ethical question of justice as fairness may have slipped between the cracks.

At the time, the merger was expected to create the world’s largest airline, not to mention the largest American (or US) airline. Even though the government had blocked the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile two years earlier and forced Anheuser-Busch InBev to significantly change the terms of its takeover of the brewer of Corona earlier in 2013, the New York Times characterized the antitrust division of the U.S. Justice Department as having “a newly aggressive approach.”[1] The division had allowed a “nearly unfettered run of mergers in recent years.”2] Even the regulators were on board.
 
                                                  Should these two airlines merge?   Image Source: NYT
Beginning in 2008—the year of the financial crisis—the Justice department approved the mergers of Delta and Northwest, United and Continental, and Southwest and AirTran. “While those mergers helped the industry return to profitability and brought more stability, they also led to higher fares, regulators said. A union between American and US Airways would take the consolidation too far, . . . hurting consumers and leading to substantially less competition and higher airfares and fees, and to less service to many airports.”[3] Eric Holder, the U.S. Attorney General, said his department was determined to ensure “robust competition in the marketplace.”[4]
According to the Justice Department, the merger would result in four airlines controlling more than 80 percent of the U.S. market for commercial air travel. Whether there has been much real competition in what may actually be oligarchic markets in the U.S. is a question for another day. Here, the question is whether being the last in line, reaching the counter just after closing, is fair. Of course, the analogy breaks down in part because American and US Airways did not have to wait for the other mergers to have been approved. The question, better stated, is whether being the merger likely to reduce competition below a threshold is fair to the owners and employees of the two airlines, given the fact that the Justice Department had approved other mergers in the industry in the preceding five years.
That the “vast majority of domestic airline routes were already highly concentrated” suggests that maybe the Justice Department should not have gone on a sort of spending spree in allowing all of the preceding mergers.[5] Put another way, if the overwhelming number of existing routes were already highly consolidated, why all of a sudden was another merger too much due to its impact on competition? Is there much competition in a highly concentrated market? If not, then why didn’t the government draw the line earlier, opposing one or two of the earlier mergers? Robert Mann, a former airline executive, has characterized the Justice Department as “late to the game with concerns over airline industry consolidation.”[6] Given that American sought the merger to avoid bankruptcy, should the stockholders and employees of American as well as US Airways suffer from the government hitting the brakes because it had been speeding?
On the other hand, consequentially speaking, the proposed merger was expected to harm consumers, perhaps even more than the previous mergers had. The consequences of the last guy putting a card on top of a house of cards are very different than the preceding consequences—hence the last guy. In this sense, having a threshold of risk makes sense. The risk to competition had become too great, even if this was due to the preceding mergers. That the government should probably have raised the hurdles higher for those mergers does not mean that government should stand aside as consumers have to pay “hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars” more as a result of the proposed merger, according to William Baer, the assistant U.S. attorney general in charge of the anti-trust division.[7]
Who should pay—the consumers or the stockholders and employees of American and US Airways? Is there a third option that is not averse to the financial interests of any of these groups? If not, who should pay? If the airline industry was already heavily consolidated, presumably at the expense of competition, implementing Holder’s aim would entail going beyond disapproving the proposed merger to pro-actively break up all of the existing major airlines based in the United States. The airlines coming out of such an act would have different ownerships as well as managements and boards of directors. All of the mega-airlines would be treated the same in being broken into two or three airlines each.


1.  Jad Mouawad, “U.S., Filing Suit, Moves to Block Airline Merger,” The New York Times, August 13, 2013.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

Thursday, April 12, 2012

Facebook Devours Instagram: Buying a Product

Reporters can easily get carried away in characterizing mergers and acquisitions in business.Regarding eBay buying PayPal in 2002 for $1.5 billion, Google purchasing YouTube in 2006 for $1.65 billion, and Facebook acquiring Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion, expanding in the technology sector can be viewed as buying technology as a product rather than acquiring another company. Accordingly, the fact that Instagram had not earned any revenue is irrelevant. 


The full essay is at "Taking the Face Off Facebook."