Showing posts with label SEC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SEC. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 7, 2019

Stock Market Efficiency: Regulating Speed Trades

A flurry of international activity aimed at putting limitations on computer-based speed-trading was striking during the Fall of 2012 in the U.S. because regulators had been slow to act. Typically, the NYSE has been viewed by the world as the Mecca of efficient investment markets. Paradoxically, however, efficiency may be improved by restricting—meaning regulating—the masses of computer-enabled quick trades that take advantage of momentary microscopic arbitrage opportunities that are too quick for the human hand. The American conventional wisdom seems to be that regulation and market-efficiency are inversely related, rather than complementary. This assumption might be overly simplistic, coming from an inherited ideology. Fortunately, the rest of the world has not been following the SEC.

The full essay is at "Stock Market Efficiency."


Sunday, November 18, 2018

Executives and Directors Planning to Unload Shares: A Front for Insider-Trading?

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated preset-trading arrangements known as 10b5-1 plans in 2000 so corporate executives and nonexecutive directors would have a way to announce their plans to sell shares. According to John Nester, a spokesman for the SEC, the 10b5-1 plan was devised “to give executives a way to sell some shares of their own companies despite being exposed to nonpublic information.” Therefore, the plans would have to be set up when the executive or director does not possess inside information, so as to obviate any potential charges of insider trading. The question I address here is whether the plans were subject to abuse by non-executive directors. By abuse, I mean the exploitation of a conflict of interest.

The full essay is in Institutional Conflicts of Interest, a book that is available at Amazon.

Friday, December 1, 2017

Rolling the Dice: The E.U.’s Financial Regulatory Agency (the ESMA)

Even though the European financial sector integrated significantly during the first decade of the twenty-first century, the E.U. Government’s regulatory infrastructure and content did not keep up. As in the U.S. until 1933, state regulation carried the bulk of the weight. As the twenty-first century notably differs from the nineteenth, the relatively integrated financial sector in the E.U. means more risk is entailed in continuing to rely on state regulators. This is not good news for David Cameron, who in late 2011 tried and failed at a European Council meeting to hold strengthened enforcement of state-deficit limits hostage by demanding protection for state-level financial regulation over federal regulation. Like South Carolina was in the nineteenth century, United Kingdom was decidedly in the states’ rights camp as late as a decade into the twenty-first.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon. 

Thursday, October 19, 2017

The SEC and the Courts on Wall Street Settlements in 2011

The SEC enforcement staff, including its chief, Robert Khuzami, decided to kick a gift horse in the mouth rather than to “take a lesson” and perhaps come out stronger for it. At issue was the rejection by U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff of the SEC’s proposed $285 million settlement with Citigroup. In his ruling, Rakoff denounced the penalty as “pocket change” to the bank, which would not even have to admit to any wrongdoing. Investors duped into buying into a $1 billion deal called Class V Funding III had lost $700 million. Betting at the time of issue against half of the assets in the deal, Citigroup did not share knowledge of its hedge with the investors.

The reaction of the SEC staff in Khuzami’s department was simply to “put down their pencils” and wonder how they should go about arranging settlements with financial firms accused of misconduct before and during the financial crisis of 2008. The SEC “doesn’t know what to ask for anymore in the settlements,” one of the people familiar with the Citigroup settlement said. Rather than take the judge’s judgment to heart, Khuzami urged the five-person commission running the SEC to vote to approve an appeal, and they did so. Rather than take the less convenient course of insisting that the banks too big to fail that manipulated their own clients at least admit wrong-doing and reimburse the losses, Khuzami viewed the judge’s ruling as if it were a political obstacle to be obviated by asking an appellate court to ignore it. Given the political muscle that must surely go with Citigroup’s wealth, Khuzami could have been assuming that the bankers would see to it that sufficient pressure would plied on enough appellate judges to make the obstacle easily avoidable. In other words, Khuzami was likely assuming that Rakoff was a fluke, given Citi’s influence—perhaps even in the SEC itself.

The full essay is at "The SEC and the Courts."

Tuesday, August 8, 2017

Christianity and “Social Capitalism”

The SEC charged Ephren Taylor with a fraudulent $11 million Ponzi scheme in April 2012. According to Reuters, “Taylor fraudulently sold $7 million of notes said to bear 12 percent to 20 percent annual interest rates, to fund small businesses such as laundries, juice bars and gas stations.” He “had conducted a multi-city ‘Building Wealth Tour’ in which he spoke to congregations” on the importance of “giving back.” He called himself a “social capitalist.” In actuality, he used the money on himself and his wife’s attempt to become a singer.

The full essay is at "Christianity and 'Social Capitalism'."


Source:
Jonathan Stempel, “SEC Charges Ephren Taylor II ForAllegedly Bilking Churchgoers In $11 Million Ponzi Scheme,” The Huffington Post, April 12, 2012.

Thursday, September 29, 2016

Fraud in Selling Sub-Prime Mortgage-Based Bonds: Beyond Accountability

“In December 2011, the S.E.C. publicized its civil securities fraud charges against top executives from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for understating their exposure to subprime mortgages, which resulted in the government taking them over.”[1] Robert Khuzami, then the head of the S.E.C.’s enforcement division, said at the time that “all individuals, regardless of their rank or position, will be held accountable for perpetuating half-truths or misrepresentations about matters materially important to the interest of our country’s investors.”[2] Pursuing even senior ranks has the air of fairness economically as well as in terms of the dictum, no one is above the law. So much for words; how about the accompanying deeds?

The full essay is at "Fraud in Selling Sub-Prime Bonds."


1. Peter Henning, “Prosecution of Financial Crisis Fraud Ends With a Whimper,” The New York Times, August 29, 2016.
2. Ibid.

Wednesday, August 24, 2016

Apollo Global Flew Too Close to the Sun: Personal and Institutional Conflicts of Interest


I submit that people tend to get more upset over the exploitation of personal conflicts of interest than the institutional sort. That is to say, our blood boils when we learn of another person contravening a duty in order to gain financially, yet we don’t mind when a CPA firm falsely gives a qualified opinion on an audit so the company being audited will continue with that audit firm the following year. Logically, as the money involved is more in the case of the CPA firm and individuals within the firm stand to benefit personally as the firm is enriched by the continued business, yet even so, we cannot stand direct personal enrichment resulting from a conflict of interest. In August, 2016, Apollo Global, a large private equity firm, settled with the SEC. Both personal and institutional conflicts of interest brought on the $53 million fine. Hence, this case is useful in comparing the two sorts of conflicts of interest.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Saturday, March 19, 2016

SEC Investigating a Hedge-Fund Priest: Christianity’s Pro-Wealth Paradigm Lapsing into Greed?

It is against U.S. securities law to knowingly make false statements or publish false information about a company you are shorting (selling stock now and buying the shares later, hence betting the stock price will go down). In other words, you can’t try to drive the company’s stock price down you are shorting so you can profit from the trade. Besides being illegal, the practice is unethical. Just go to Kant for that! The guy was fanatical against lying.




The full essay is at "SEC Investigating a Hedge-Fund Priest ."

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

Breaking Up the Biggest Banks: The Impact on Moral Hazard

Citing the “slap on the wrist” culture at the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren called on Congress in April 2015 to break up the big banks such as Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs.[1] She coupled the ‘break-up” approach to reducing the systemic risk with limiting the Fed’s ability to bailout individual banks. The synergy in Warren’s approach is worthy of further analysis.

The full essay is at "Breaking Up the Biggest Banks."




1. Reuters, “Elizabeth Warren Calls on Congress to Break Up the Big Banks, Change Tax Rules,” The Huffington Post, April 15, 2015.

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Standard & Poors: Internal Controls Enabling a Conflict of Interest

After the financial crisis of 2008, rating agencies reassured the public that additional “internal safeguards” would prevent the sort of over-stated ratings that had contributed to the crisis. Congress did not deconstruct the structural conflict of interest wherein a rating agency is tempted to overstate the rating on financial security such as a corporate bond because the agency’s revenue would be higher if more of the bonds are sold. I contend that reliance on a company’s internal “fire walls” is naïve, given the strong, sustained temptation that exists as long as an institutional or structural conflict of interest is in place. To obviate the problem, the conflict itself must be deconstructed.




The full essay is in “Essays on the Financial Crisis and
Institutional Conflicts of Interest, both available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

SEC Goes After Chinese CPA Firms: Beyond Diplomacy

The Securities and Exchange Commission brought an administrative proceeding against the Chinese affiliates of five major CPA firms, including the “Big Four,” in 2012. Chinese companies had raised billions of dollars on American (and Canadian) exchanges only for the share prices of the companies to plummet due to questions about bookkeeping and disclosures. The SEC alleged that the CPA firms in China refused to hand over documents in connection with the investigation of alleged accounting frauds at nine Chinese companies. The SEC maintained that firms that audit U.S.-traded companies must follow U.S. law, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires foreign audit firms to hand over documents about U.S.-listed clients at the SEC’s request. SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar said that the investigations “have been hampered by the lack of access to relevant documents.” For their part, the CPA firms in China (affiliates of American-based CPA firms) pointed out that their audit papers are treated like state secrets in mercantilist China, and that the auditors could therefore be imprisoned for handing the material over a foreign government without permission from the Chinese state. 

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available at Amazon.com.  

Friday, April 27, 2012

Hollywood Bribes China

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, known as F.C.P.A., “forbids American companies from making illegal payments to government officials or others to ease the way for operations in foreign countries.”[1] The practical difficulty facing American companies doing business around the world is that in some cultures bribes are so ubiquitous they are simply a part of doing business.  For American companies to refuse to participate in what is generally expected can be a competitive disadvantage, particularly if substitutes exist and the practice is widespread.


The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.


1. Edward Wyatt, Michael Cieply, and Brooks Barnes, “S.E.C. Asks if Hollywood Paid Bribes in China,” The New York Times, April 25, 2012.

Tuesday, March 27, 2012

Efficiency and Ethics: On the Fairness of High-Speed Trading

Two months into 2012, the SEC announced that it had been examining the trading activities of high-frequency trading firms.  According to the Wall Street Journal, the SEC was “examining, among other things, whether high-frequency firms benefit from delays in the dissemination of prices from various corners of the markets. . . . High-speed firms use direct feeds from exchanges that can give them a leg up on slower traders.” High-frequency traders “can access prices a split second faster through their access to direct feeds.” This is accomplished by placing the trading computers in the same data center that houses the exchange’s computer servers. Just over a year later, the Wall Street Journal reported that high-speed traders were using “a hidden facet” of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s computer system “to trade on the direction of the futures market before other investors get the same information.” Even getting the confirmation of a high-speed trade just one to ten milliseconds faster can enable a computer to know the direction a commodity is going and trade on it. According to the Wall Street Journal, the “ability to exploit such small time-gaps raises questions about transparency and fairness amid the computer-driven, rapid-fire trading that increasingly grips Wall Street and confounds regulators.” Both the increasing use of high-speed trading and the problem of accountability from a regulatory point of view raise the stakes in determining the ethics of the practice. 


The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.  

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Rating Moody’s and S & P: A Structural Conflict of Interest

For years, banks and other issuers have paid rating agencies to rate their securities. This is a bit like restaurants paying food critics to write on their food.  In the wake of the SEC’s charge that  people at Goldman Sachs built the Abacus investment to fall apart so a hedge fund manager, John A. Paulson, could bet against it, the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations questioned representatives from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s about how they rate risky securities. Carl M. Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the Senate panel, said in a statement: “A conveyor belt of high-risk securities, backed by toxic mortgages, got AAA ratings that turned out not to be worth the paper they were printed on.” Throughout the testimony, the institutional conflict of interest was salient whereby credit-rating agencies put market-share considerations foremost in rating securities presented by the banks that are paying the agencies.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.