Goldman Sachs' Revolving Door: Regulatory Capture

In July 2012, Andrew Williams, a former spokesman for U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, announced plans to head over to Goldman Sachs at the end of that month.[1] Williams was the second of the Secretary’s spokesmen to head to theWall Street bank. Such moves may reflect a standing policy at the bank to have a revolving door. The previous U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, had been the CEO at Goldman. This suggests that the revolving door was to include populating high offices in government, presumably not out of a sense of civic duty, but, rather, to see that Goldman's interests would be protected and even promoted through public policy. Hence President Obama was said to have had a Wall Street government with respect to positions bearing on Wall Street. I submit that deconstructing such a revolving door would be very difficult. 

The full essay is at "Goldman Sachs' Revolving Door."

1. Bonnie Kavoussi, “Andrew Williams, Ex-Treasury Spokesman,Headed to Goldman Sachs,” The Huffington Post, July 12, 2012. 

Undermining the Dodd-Frank Act: An Incessant Desire for Profit

In the Dodd-Frank financial reform Act of 2010, financial firms in the U.S. are required to set aside higher reserves to cover losses on trades of securities, including those that “swap” the risk of default of a given security, such as bonds based on subprime mortgages. Almost immediately, the Wall Street bankers set about minimizing the new hindrance.  

The full essay is at "Undermining the Dodd-Frank Act."

Jack Lew at his confirmation hearing for U.S. Treasury Secretary. Lew had been the chief operating officer at units at Citibank.     NPR

Mass Foreclosures as Fallout from Regulatory Capture: Banks in a Conflict of Interest at Treasury

During the summer of 2010, the Obama administration unveiled a $1 billion program to offer loans to help the jobless pay their mortgages until they could find work again. Even as it was to take effect before the end of that year, by April of the next year the program had yet to accept one application. The New York Times avers that this “could be an epitaph for the administration’s broader foreclosure prevention effort, as tens of billions of dollars remain unspent and hundreds of thousands of homeowners have been rejected.” By April of 2011, the existence of the main program, the Home Assistance Modification Program, had become a target of the Republican-controlled U.S. House.  On March 29^th, the House voted to end the foreclosure relief program. Even though the Democratic-controlled U.S. Senate vowed to pursue a rescue, even the Democrats there considered the program to be badly flawed. To be sure, the administration had failed to stem the wave of foreclosures.

The full essay is at "Essays on the Financial Crisis," available at Amazon. 

See related essay: "Institutional Conflicts of Interest"

Wall Street Undercutting the U.S. Government When It Is Down

Irony can sting. During the week or so leading up October 17, 2013—“Armageddon” or “zero hour” for the default of the U.S. Government absent any increase in the debt-ceiling (even though the next big payment would not be due until October 21^st)—Wall Street banks were already bailing on short-term treasury bonds even as governments around the world were holding on. Patriotism and corporate citizenship apparently collapse when money due may be delayed. Meanwhile, foreign governments—even big creditors like Japan and China—were taking a long-term view. “There’s no other way than for the U.S. government itself and the U.S. Congress to sort it out,” Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso optimistically told Bloomberg Television.[1] Apparently Fidelity and JPMorgan Chase did not get the memo. In over-reacting out of an excessive desire to collect as stipulated, big American financial houses were not so subtly undercutting the U.S. Government’s waning credibility. It is ironic that Washington’s best supporters were foreign governments.

 The underlying debt-burden would again surpass 100% GDP in Obama's second term.  Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

Perhaps Wall Street’s bankers do not understand political theatrics whereas foreign government officials do. Maybe the bankers were privy to the real politics going on in Washington and the situation threw a beam of light on the bankers’ greed and selfish insistence that things go their way without exception. Either way, what is good for Wall Street is not necessarily good for America. Put another way, the Wall Street bankers who had been prospering so under the American hypertrophic value on economic freedom (e.g., no amount of wealth is too much) felt no gratitude or sense of obligation against even a chance that interest might be delayed a bit. In return, vast numbers of Americans strangely continued to defend the right of the super-rich bankers to pile on even more to their existing skyscrapers of wealth. If the bankers were merely being themselves in shedding short-term treasury bonds, the puzzling question may pertain not to them but to how a people could be so beguiled.  

---

[1] Mark Gongloff, “The Rest of The World Still Claims Faith In America (Even If Wall Street Doesn’t),” The Huffington Post, October 14, 2013.

Americans on the Impact of a Government Default: Everyone Is an Expert

Would default of the U.S. Government be catastrophic to the world economy? In searching for an answer, the discerning inquirer knows to avoid the incredulous reports. One problem is that the American media treats even such sources as just as valid as those that are backed up by expertise. It may even be that enough Americans presumptuously dismiss or discredit expertise out of sheer jealousy and resentment that the media have become accustomed to treating public surveys as equivalent to experts on matters requiring expertise. In Madison’s Notes on the Constitutional Convention, a fear of excess democracy can be found among some of the delegates who feared that expanding popular election in the U.S. Government beyond the U.S. House of Representatives would unbalance that government (i.e., in terms of “the one, the few, and the many” in favor of the many). The fear has been realized as the U.S. Senate turned to popular election and the Electoral College has been captured by the political parties (i.e., electors are forced or pressured to vote in line with the election results). I contend that excess democratization of presumed expertise is related to the expansion and the values (e.g., anti-elitism) behind it.

 

Regarding anticipations of the impact of a government default, the U.S. Treasury released a report in October 2013 with the following results: "A default would be unprecedented and has the potential to be catastrophic. . . . Credit markets could freeze, the value of the dollar could plummet, U.S. interest rates could skyrocket, the negative spillovers could reverberate around the world, and there might be a financial crisis and recession that could echo the events of 2008 or worse." This forecast came from experts on the topic at Treasury, whom I suspect made use of the expertise of economists. Hence, the report has high credibility.

 

At the same time, however, American news networks were reporting that, according to public-survey polls, a default would not be catastrophic. The media was also reporting poll results indicating that a quarter of the Americans believe that Obama was secretly working to on a third term. Doubtless the journalists give no credibility to such claims. In fact, the tone of the reporting suggests that the sheer madness of such a belief is what is really being reported. “Just where is such paranoia coming from?” one journalist asked after reporting the poll. Yet the tone used by journalists reporting that a default would not be catastrophic according to a significant percentage of Americans suggests that opinions—even those biased by political ideological agendas—can be treated as fact or at least as of equal value to the Treasury report or those of economists. The underlying assumption is deeply problematic, yet it has become a staple of the public discourse via the media.

 

Of the 21% who claim the U.S. dollar would no longer be a reserve currency around the world, how many people are just guessing? How is it that non-finance/economists know the market would not tank?  For my part, I don't know. I'm not an economist. Source: CFA Institute                                      

 

As an experiment of sorts, try paying extra attention to the claims that people make generally and you will soon come to the realization that many people go beyond their justifiable basis of knowledge or expertise in making clreaims with absolutely no caution that such would even be possible. The proclivity may be inversely related to the level of education, though the know-it-all graduate students and even professors is hardly a rarity. Even just after a few sentences from one, the arrogance-fueled over-reach is easily detected.

 

Try listening for the media basing findings requiring expertise as valid simply because a majority of Americans polled say so. Even though expertise renders a conclusion more credible (and accurate!), even experts can over-reach on their own territory. For example, an airline pilot who announces from the cockpit just after take-off, “We will arrive in Paris at 7:34am is overshooting. What if touch-down is at 7:35am due to a bit stronger headwind than anticipated? Would the passengers bail or storm the cockpit were the pilot to have said “around 7:30” instead?

 

Many Americans will leap to sue a professional (e.g. pharmacist, physician, surgeon, lawyer, CPA) who goes beyond his or her expertise such that people are harmed. So it is telling that we take at face value the economic conclusions of a political pundit whose expertise is in journalism or politics. The presumption that a majority of Americans saying X is not a problem can be taken as reason to conclude X really won’t be a problem makes it easy for the self-proclaimed “experts on the content” in the media to beguile an incredulous viewership.