Beyond Fixing the U.S. Government's Debt

After a number of failed attempts over decades to solve a problem, it is natural that the problem itself would barely get mentioned, let alone any cure. I submit that the U.S. federal debt is a case in point. President Reagan made it an issue in 1980, and Congress has tried to mandate for itself automatic spending cuts and tax increases, but to no avail. The desire for instant gratification outstripped self-discipline. This could perhaps be said of the society generally. 

The full essay is at "Beyond Fixing the Debt Problem."

Holding the U.S. Debt-Ceiling Hostage: A Case of Political Expediency over Statesmanship

In April of 2011, S & P lowered expectations on U.S. Government debt from “stable” to “negative.”  Astonishing, the $14.2 trillion U.S. debt was still rated as AAA. The shift in expectations did not trigger higher borrowing costs because the market presumed that a political deal lowering the deficit would be facilitated by the warning-call. At the same time, Congress and the U.S. president were grappling with the need to extend the federal debt ceiling. The federal government was projected at the time to reach its borrowing limit by May 16, 2011, though the Treasury secretary, Tim Geithner, said he could use accounting options to push the date back to July 8. He assured the public that Republicans in Congress had told President Obama that they would go along with a higher limit. “I want to make it perfectly clear that Congress will raise the debt ceiling,” the Geithner said.  He also said the Republican leaders had assured the president that they “couldn’t play around with the government’s credit rating. They recognize it, and they told the president that.”[1] Such a recognition and statement by the Republican leadership, if true, would evince statesmanship over political expediency, for Republican lawmakers could have leveraged their votes on raising the ceiling to get more in negotiations on the budget. This would be particularly notable considering that appropriations to keep the U.S. Government's non-essential operations going were pawns in a Congressional-presidential power-struggle during the Trump administration. 

The full essay is at "Political Expediency  vs. Statesmanship."

1, “Geithner Confident Congress Will Raise Borrowing Limit,” USA Today, April 18, 2011, p. 6A.

Public Accountants Betraying Clients: Insider-Trading on Client Information

There are two basic types of conflicts of interest: personal and institutional. In any conflict of interest, two roles conflict in such a way that one role can compromise the other. The role compromised is the more legitimate of the two. In this essay, I distinguish the two types and situate the public accountants involved in insider trading in the personal rather than institutional type. I discuss two specific cases, both of which resulted in the auditors being prosecuted, in order to distinguish that outcome from the failure of society to come to grips with some of the most important ongoing institutional conflicts of interest.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

The Financial Crisis of 2008: On the Role of Negligence Breaching Fiduciary Obligation

Roger Lowenstein laments that “New York Times columnist Joe Nocera lamented that ‘Wall Street bigwigs whose firms took unconscionable risks … aren't even on Justice's radar screen.’ A news story in the Times about a mortgage executive who was convicted of criminal fraud observed, ‘The Justice Dept. has yet to bring charges against an executive who ran a major Wall Street firm leading up to the disaster.’ In the same dispassionate tone, National Public Radio's All Things Considered chimed in, ‘Some of the most publicly reviled figures in the mortgage mess won't face any public accounting.’ New York magazine saw fit to print the estimable opinion of Bernie Madoff, who observed that the dearth of criminal convictions is ‘unbelievable.’ Rolling Stone, which has been beating this drum the longest and with the heaviest hand, reductively asked, ‘Why isn't Wall Street in jail?’”

Lowenstein interprets these sentiments as implying “that the financial crisis was caused by fraud; that people who take big risks should be subject to a criminal investigation; that executives of large financial firms should be criminal suspects after a crash; that public revulsion indicates likely culpability; that it is inconceivable (to Madoff, anyway) that people could lose so much money absent a conspiracy; and that Wall Street bears collective guilt for which a large part of it should be incarcerated.”

Lowenstein argues that “(t)hese assumptions do violence to our system of justice and hinder our understanding of the crisis. The claim that it was ‘caused by financial fraud’ is debatable, but the weight of the evidence is strongly against it. The financial crisis was accompanied by fraud, on the part of mortgage applicants as well as banks. It was caused, more nearly, by a speculative bubble in mortgages, in which bankers, applicants, investors, and regulators were all blind to risk. More broadly, the crash was the result of a tendency in our financial culture, especially after a period of buoyancy, to push leverage and risk-taking to the extreme.”

Lowenstein also ticks off a loose monetary policy (i.e., extremely low interest rates), unaccountability at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, weak financial regulation, and an overconfidence in “risk management” methods in arguing that we should not be reductionist in ascribing the crisis to fraud alone or even primarily.  

Analysis at "Negligence in the Financial Crisis of 2008."

Apollo Global Flew Too Close to the Sun: Personal and Institutional Conflicts of Interest

I submit that people tend to get more upset over the exploitation of personal conflicts of interest than the institutional sort. That is to say, our blood boils when we learn of another person contravening a duty in order to gain financially, yet we don’t mind when a CPA firm falsely gives a qualified opinion on an audit so the company being audited will continue with that audit firm the following year. Logically, as the money involved is more in the case of the CPA firm and individuals within the firm stand to benefit personally as the firm is enriched by the continued business, yet even so, we cannot stand direct personal enrichment resulting from a conflict of interest. In August, 2016, Apollo Global, a large private equity firm, settled with the SEC. Both personal and institutional conflicts of interest brought on the $53 million fine. Hence, this case is useful in comparing the two sorts of conflicts of interest.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

BuzzFeed’s Internal Firewall Falls to a Conflict of Interest

In spite of the fact that public-accounting firms rely on their respective audit clients’ decisions to be retained to perform the next year’s audit, society deems an unqualified audit-opinion to be independent. The assumption is that the audit firms can police themselves, keeping their financial pressures from influencing the audit opinions. The ongoing temptation is of course to produce a clean opinion so as to be retained as the client’s public accountants. Unfortunately, someone at a given CPA firm must have authority requiring attention both to audit opinions and the firm’s own financial performance; internal policies separating pressure from the latter from reaching the former can thus be easily overcome from the vantage point of that authority. This vulnerability was on display in 2015 in the “dot-com” industry in BuzzFeed.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Standard & Poors: Internal Controls Enabling a Conflict of Interest

After the financial crisis of 2008, rating agencies reassured the public that additional “internal safeguards” would prevent the sort of over-stated ratings that had contributed to the crisis. Congress did not deconstruct the structural conflict of interest wherein a rating agency is tempted to overstate the rating on financial security such as a corporate bond because the agency’s revenue would be higher if more of the bonds are sold. I contend that reliance on a company’s internal “fire walls” is naïve, given the strong, sustained temptation that exists as long as an institutional or structural conflict of interest is in place. To obviate the problem, the conflict itself must be deconstructed.

The full essay is in “Essays on the Financial Crisis and
Institutional Conflicts of Interest, both available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

The Financial Crisis: A Systemic and Ethical Analysis

According to a study by the Dallas Federal Reserve, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 “was associated with a huge loss of economic output and financial wealth, psychological consequences and skill atrophy from extended unemployment, an increase in government intervention, and other significant costs.”[1] The study’s abstract goes on to “conservatively estimate that 40 to 90 percent of one year’s output ($6 trillion to $14 trillion, the equivalent of $50,000 to $120,000 for every U.S. household) was foregone due to the 2007-09 [sic] recession.”[2]

 

Interestingly, the Huffington Post “reports” the study’s finding in the following terms:  “a ‘conservative’ estimate of the damage is $14 trillion, or roughly one year’s U.S. gross domestic product. This is based on how much output was lost during the crisis and Great Recession, along with all the damage done to potential future economic growth.”[3] In fact, the article’s title claims that the crisis cost more than $14 trillion! Lest it be thought that the reporter and editor suffer from a learning or reading disability, the gilding here is notably in the direction of “selling more papers.”

 

Ironically, the Huffington Post also published an article pointing to the lack of accountability in that “the executives that [sic] were in charge of Bear’s headlong dive into the cesspool of subprime mortgage lending hold similar jobs at the most powerful banks on Wall Street: JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and Deutsche Bank."[4]

 

The upshot is that those stakeholders who played a role in the crisis, most significantly the people running the government, the media, and the banks, have gone on, relatively unscathed, while the systemic risk remained or has actually become even greater.  As a first step toward recovery, a systemic map depicting the interrelated parts in the systemic failure and a related ethical analysis can provide a basis for reforms sufficient to thwart another major financial crisis.

 

 The systemic and ethical analysis

 

                                                         

1. Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell, and Harvey Rosenblum, “How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007-09 Financial Crisis,” Staff Paper No. 20, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, July 2013.

2. Ibid.
3. Mark Gongloff, “The Financial Crisis Cost More Than $14 Trillion: Dallas Fed Study,” The Huffington Post, July 30, 2013.

4. Lauren Kyger and Alison Fitzgerald, “Former Bear Stearns Executives Seemingly Unscathed by Financial Crisis They Helped Trigger,” The Huffington Post, July 31, 2013. The article was originally published by the Center for Public Integrity.

 

S. & P. Sued for $5 Billion: Breaking a Conflict of Interest?

In sending a message to S & P as well as Wall Street more generally regarding the excesses in the securitization of subprime mortgages that contributed materially to the financial crisis of 2008, the U.S. Government and several state governments announced in early 2013 that they would sue S & P for $5 billion as a penalty and to cover damages to state pension funds and federally-insured banks and credit unions.  The operative assumption was that such a monetary figure would have considerable force as a disincentive to profit by means of fraud.  Would $5 billion be sufficient for the message to be delivered not only S. & P. but also to Wall Street? 

The full essay is at Essays on the Financial Crisis, and
 Institutional Conflicts of Interest, both available at Amazon.

Facebook’s IPO: Morgan Stanley’s Conflict of Interest

Morgan Stanley’s underwriting of Facebook’s IPO has been thought by some of the bank’s rivals to be incompetently managed.  According to the New York Times, “(r)ival bankers and big investors have complained that Morgan Stanley botched the I.P.O., setting the price too high and selling too many shares to the public.”[1] Interestingly, the incompetence is positively correlated with unethical policy decisions at the bank. Even as the bankers as underwriters were eager to sell lots of shares, they may have given some of their institutional customers—albeit only the most preferred, as per the bank’s other services—some privileged information. If this charge is true, the conflict of interest at the bank should be closely examined by Congress and any relevant regulators.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Evelyn Rusli and Michael De La Merced, “Facebook I.P.O. Raises Regulatory Concerns,” The New York Times, May 22, 2012.

Credit Downgrades in the E.U.: Blaming the Messenger?

On January 13, 2012, “S&P stripped France and Austria of their prized triple-A credit ratings and reduced the ratings of seven other [states in the euro-zone], including Italy, Spain and Portugal. Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were spared, along with Belgium, Estonia and Ireland.”[1] Italy was downgraded from single-A to triple-B-plus. "We think there are elements missing in their analysis … when it comes to the growth strategy … there is no space for maneuver for fiscal impetus but we believe that a growth strategy will have to rely mainly on structural reforms," Olivier Bailly, an E.U. Government spokesman, told reporters.[2] “Bailly also called the timing of the S&P decisions ‘very odd’ citing fiscal policies adopted to weather the crisis in the downgraded countries as well as the two successful debt auctions in Spain and Italy last week. ‘We think that there is a strange timing in this announcement considering the signals from the markets,’ Mr. Bailly said.”[3] The “very odd” and “strange timing” reference a tacit political motive behind S&P, which the European officials point out is an American company.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Christopher Emsden, Matina Stevis, and Bernd Radowitz, “E.U. Leaders Focuson ‘Progress’,” The Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Fraud at S&P: A Conflict of Interest

By the summer of 2011, the U.S. Government had brought relatively few cases against large financial institutions for their roles in the financial crisis of 2008. For instance, the government investigated Washington Mutual and Countrywide without taking any further action in spite of reports of “liars’ loans.” In the case of the three major ratings agencies, the business model “is riddled with conflicts of interest, since rating agencies might make their grades more positive to please their customers. Before the financial crisis,“banks shopped around to make sure rating agencies would award favorable ratings before agreeing to work with [one of the agencies].”[1] In spite of accounts of the agencies’ mixing of business and ratings, the Dodd-Frank law of 2010 retained the issuer-pays business model while putting the agencies on the same legal liability level as accounting firms. 


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1.  Louise Story, “Justice Inquiry Is Said to Focus on S&P Ratings,” The New York Times, August 18, 2011. 

European Banks Ignoring the E.U.

As banks based in the empire-scale E.U.'s state of the United Kingdom decided to pull back their operations around the world in mid 2011, the bankers may have overlooked key distinctions between their banks’ operations within the E.U. and internationally. Besides ignoring the converging impact of E.U. financial regulation within the E.U., the bankers were discounting the proposal of European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet for a European rating agency. The proposal implies that certain advantages can be had for the E.U. as a whole—benefits that Lloyds, for example, implicitly discounted to the extent that the bank treated pulling back in the states of Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain similar to pulling back in Dubai, which is not an E.U. state.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Paper Tigers: Firewalls Forestalling Institutional Conflicts of Interest

Structural, or institutional, conflicts of interest are of great significance in applied ethics, even though they often play second fiddle to the conflicts centered on a person’s particular interests. An organizational or institutional conflict of interest, whether within one organization or in the arrangements between organizations, is not any less unethical than a personal conflict of interest.  Therefore, when we take the claims of vested organizational interests that their internal firewalls are more than just paper tigers at face value, our foolhardiness can really be at our detriment. I present a few cases to suggest that “firewalls” in an organization to prevent it from a conflict of interest are, in general, insufficient and thus ought not be relied on. Instead, the public (or government regulatory agencies) should insist that one of the two interests in an institutional conflict of interest be given up.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon. 

Rating Moody’s and S & P: A Structural Conflict of Interest

For years, banks and other issuers have paid rating agencies to rate their securities. This is a bit like restaurants paying food critics to write on their food.  In the wake of the SEC’s charge that  people at Goldman Sachs built the Abacus investment to fall apart so a hedge fund manager, John A. Paulson, could bet against it, the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations questioned representatives from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s about how they rate risky securities. Carl M. Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the Senate panel, said in a statement: “A conveyor belt of high-risk securities, backed by toxic mortgages, got AAA ratings that turned out not to be worth the paper they were printed on.” Throughout the testimony, the institutional conflict of interest was salient whereby credit-rating agencies put market-share considerations foremost in rating securities presented by the banks that are paying the agencies.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon. 

Conflicts of Interest: A Kantian Explanation

In a conflict of interest, either two duties conflict or a duty conflicts with self-interest—whether the “self” be an individual or an association of individuals (e.g., a department or an organization). Where two duties conflict, that which corresponds with the wider “constituency” is presumed to be ethically superior to that which is relatively narrow. For instance, a duty to society is typically thought (admittedly by the public) to ethically supersede a fiduciary duty to stockholders. This assumption is problematic because property rights are not charged with putting society first. Therefore the question of which duty is superior ethically-speaking may come down to one’s vantage-point. To be sure, the duty that is further from one’s self-interest can be said to be superior in most ethical theories with the notable exception of egoism. That theory defeats the typical ethical take on conflicts of interest even where a duty is pitted against self-interest itself.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.