Corporate Federalism: Did AOL Miss an Opportunity?

Citing twelve past and present AOL employees, The Wall Street Journal characterized AOL in 2011 as a “culture of clashing fiefs and personalities created by a rapid series of acquisitions that haven’t jelled.”[1] Just in managing the likes of Michael Arrington and Arianna Huffington, Tim Armstrong had his hands full as CEO. Both Arrington and Huffington were strong defenders of editorial independence in their respective units. Arrington started a venture capital firm partly financed by AOL to invest in tech firms even as Arrington’s division at AOL, TechCrunch, wrote on technology firms. The problems for AOL went well beyond acquiescing in a structural conflict of interest of TechCrunch writing on particular tech companies while investing in some of them but not others. A person familiar with AOL said that Armstrong “had a macro vision that was right but didn’t have the right plan to implement it.”[2] That is to say, his visionary leadership was good but his strategic management was bad. Strategic leadership demands better. AOL may have been a good candidate for a federal system of governance because the publishing units needed some autonomy even at the cost of foregone corporate cooperation. 

The full essay is at "Corporate Federalism and AOL."

1. Jessica E. Vascellaro and Emily Steel, “Culture Clashes Tear at AOL,” Wall Street Journal, September 10-11, 2011. 

2. Ibid.

CSR and Corporate Governance Reform: An Opporunity for BlackRock as an Activist Shareholder

In 2019, BlackRock’s management and board publically fired two executives in the Hong Kong office for breaching company rules on dating subordinates. The firings demonstrated to employees that the company would enforce its employee policies and sent the message that employees would be “free to point out problems in the workplace.”[1] This would not be so extraordinarily significant but for the fact that BlackRock is the “world’s largest money manager with $7.4 trillion under management,” which enables the company, through the funds it runs, to be “one of the five largest shareholders in nearly every corporation in the S&P 500.”[2] So BlackRock “can cast votes and pressure boardrooms to effect change.”[3] The company would be hypocritical in using its power as a major stockholder to get managements to have and enforce good workplace policies if the company were not doing so itself. From the standpoint of self-regulatory capitalism in society, BlackRock could make a significant contribution far beyond improving workplace policies.

The full essay is at "CSR and Corporate Governance Reform."

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[1] Dawn Lim, Steven Russolillo, and Jing Yang, “At BlackRock, Public Firings, Overseas Probe Send Message About Office Misbehavior,” The Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2020.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg: Power beyond Corporate Governance

Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg did not attend a committee hearing at Canada’s Parliament on May 28, 2019 in spite of having received summons from Bob Zimmer MP, the committee’s chair. Instead, Facebook sent its director of public policy and its head of public policy for Facebook Canada. “Shame on Mark Zuckerberg and shame on Sheryl Sandberg for not showing up today,” Zimmer said toward the end of the hearing.[1] For sending two representatives rather than themselves, Zuckerberg and Sandberg faced the possibility of being held in contempt. They had testified before the U.S. Congress, so by sending two representatives the two leaders of Facebook may have acted rather dismissively concerning Canada’s federal legislature. At the time, Zuckerberg had virtually unchecked power at Facebook, including over the other stockholders. From his perch, the power may have been going to his head; even after two years of user-privacy scandals, Facebook’s CEO and Chairman of the Board may have determined that summons from legislatures where the company was operating were beneath him. Such a mentality is dangerous for a person with autocratic control of such a large company.

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1. Donie O’Sullivan and Paula Newton, “Zuckerberg and Sandberg Ignore Canadian Subpoena, Face Possible Contempt Vote,” CNN.com, May 28, 2019.

Executive Compensation Tied to Firm Performance: A Critique

With robust economies in America boosting companies’ sales, corporate tax cuts, and an increase in stock buybacks lifting stock prices in 2018, the default mantra in executive compensation circles that high CEO pay is justified if it is tied to firm performance could be questioned. Similarly, the typical assumption that high pay would have to get higher for a CEO to be motivated to do the basics of the job, including overseeing mergers and acquisitions, (or that doing the basics warrants a raise) could be questioned. Particularly in 2018, the comfortable, self-serving ways of the business elite in the U.S. were ripe for critique.

The full essay is at "Executive Compensation Tied to Company Performance."

An Institutional Conflict of Interest in Corporate Governance: The Case of Goldman Sachs

In September 2011, a pension fund representing U.S. government employees filed a shareholder proposal to strip Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein of his other post as chairman of the board. According to Reuters, “The pension plan of the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees said on Wednesday an independent chairman would provide checks and balances in the power structure at the largest U.S. investment bank. AFSCME said splitting the roles of CEO and chairman might have prevented Goldman from getting into trouble for its actions leading up to the financial crisis and will improve its stock performance going forward. ‘A strong, independent Board chair would focus Goldman on generating long-term value for its shareholders,’ AFSCME President Gerald McEntee said in a statement.” Goldman spokesman Stephen Cohen responded, “We think we have a robust governance structure in place, with a very effective independent lead director. We always listen to our shareholders, so it is disappointing that AFSCME decided to go to the media before raising the issue with us.”[1]

Analysis is at "An Institutional Conflict of Interest in Corporate Governance: The Case of Goldman Sachs."

1. “Goldman Should Strip Blankfein of Chairmanship, Pension Fund Says,” Reuters, September 14, 2011. 

Getting More For Doing Less: Bank Board Directors

Executive compensation is an art rather than a science. It is not as if numbers are fed into a computer and the correct compensation pops out. More discretion is involved than meets the eye. “Since the financial crisis,” The New York Times reported in 2013, “compensation for the directors of [America’s] biggest banks has continued to rise even as the banks themselves, facing difficult markets and regulatory pressures, are reining in bonuses and pay.” [1] Just five years after the financial crisis, it is interesting how the banks' respective managements decided to spend the TARP money from Congress and even more money from the Federal Reserve Bank. Also of note, board and upper management compensations seemed to be going in different directions in spite of both being presumably tied to the same firm performance. Even a performance-incentive approach tied to firm-performance can accommodate a lot of latitude, such that banks differ in how much they pay their respective boards. The discretion permits inside collusion and even outlandish demands by "celebrity" members whose advice does not necessarily come up to celebrity status. 

The full essay is at "Bank Boards Getting More for Doing Less."

1. Susanne Craig, “At Banks, Board Pay Soars Amid Cutbacks,” The New York Times, April 1, 2013.

Weak Corporate Governance at UBS Amid a $2.3 Billion Trading Loss in 2011

UBS chief executive Oswald Gruebel resigned on September 24, 2011 over the $2.3 billion trading loss by one of the Swiss bank’s traders, Kweku Adoboli. Kaspar Villiger, UBS's president, said the board regretted Gruebel's decision but had decided to accept it. "Oswald Gruebel feels that it is his duty to assume responsibility for the recent unauthorized trading incident," Villiger was quoted as saying in the statement. "It is testimony to his uncompromising principles and integrity."[1] In presumably not pushing for the CEO’s resignation because of the magnitude in the lapse of risk management in the system, the bank’s board of directors did not take the initiative in holding the management accountable. Accordingly, shareholders have reason to be concerned about the protection of their owner’s equity, at least in terms of corporate governance providing accountability on the management. The culprit may be corporate governance itself, which as structured may proffer too much power to the CEO.

The full essay is at "Weak Governance at UBS."

1. “UBS CEO Oswald Gruebel Resigns Over Rogue Trading Loss,” The Huffington Post, September 24, 2011. 

Protecting Minority Stockholder Rights: On a Conflict of Interest at Revlon

The principle of majority rule is a staple of democratic theory. Typically the victor of a close election is quick to proclaim that “the people” have spoken. That “the people” corresponds to 51% of those who voted is beside the point. What about the 49% who voted against the victor? What about the minority’s rights? In the U.S. Senate, the fact that it takes 60 out of 100 votes to end a filibuster means that a large minority can halt a majority’s bill. In the European Council, the qualified majority rule means that for a bill to pass, the states in the majority must be at least 55% of the total number of states and must have at least 55% of the E.U.’s population between them.  A large minority can therefore stop a small majority. In both of these “intergovernmental” bodies, the implication is that 51% of a vote is not as significant as the principle of majority rule suggests. What about the rights of a minority of shares of stock in corporate governance? When a majority stockholder has control of management, the interests of the minority stockholders can be shirked. This is particularly true when a majority stockholder proposes a going-private transaction with the aid of management.

The full essay is at "Protecting Minority Stockholders."

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1. Peter Lattman, “To Perelman’s Failed Revlon Deal, Add Rebuke From S.E.C.,” The New York Times, June 14, 2013.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

Managing and Presiding: Leading as CEO and President

A manager does not preside. To manage is to be actively engaged in the operations of an organization; it is not to “sit before,” as in representing the organization itself externally and intervening in it only as needed in serving as guardian of its “constitutional” order. For example, if a company’s corporate governance system is about to implode, the President is there to preside as the board (and major stockholders) come to terms. In other words, the President would be oriented to maintaining the meeting foremost—intervening in the discussion only if a key juncture is likely to result in an implosion of the governance system.

Material from this essay has been incorporated into The Essence of Leadership: A Cross-Cultural Foundation, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon. 

Saving the Fisheries: Greenpeace Praised Safeway for its Ethical and Stately Leadership

In April 2011, Greenpeace gave fifteen supermarket chains a passing grade; five others failed. Surprisingly, Safeway came out on top, above even Whole Foods. Safeway pledged to stop selling Chilean sea bass (Patagonian toothfish) because current fishing levels are unsustainable. Furthermore, the grocer called on governing bodies to declare the area in the southern Antarctic where the bass is fished a marine reserve. According to Casson Trenor of Greenpeace, such an act of “corporate marine activism” had “never been done before.” Safeway also discontinued the sale of orange mughy, which is unsustainably being fished in the deep sea off New Zealand.  In fact, the company stopped adding red-list species to its inventory.


The full essay is at "GreenpeacePraised Safeway."

Executives and Directors Planning to Unload Shares: A Front for Insider-Trading?

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated preset-trading arrangements known as 10b5-1 plans in 2000 so corporate executives and nonexecutive directors would have a way to announce their plans to sell shares. According to John Nester, a spokesman for the SEC, the 10b5-1 plan was devised “to give executives a way to sell some shares of their own companies despite being exposed to nonpublic information.” Therefore, the plans would have to be set up when the executive or director does not possess inside information, so as to obviate any potential charges of insider trading. The question I address here is whether the plans were subject to abuse by non-executive directors. By abuse, I mean the exploitation of a conflict of interest.

The full essay is in Institutional Conflicts of Interest, a book that is available at Amazon.

Is Corporate Governance Anti-Democratic?

Assuming all the votes cast in an election are accurately tallied, the pronouncement of the winner would seem to be straight-forward. What it means to have won, however, is considerably more complex. Specifically, is winning getting over 50% of the vote, or should a mere plurality of, say, 38% suffice? It could be argued that a super-majority of 60% or two-thirds is necessary for there to be a discernible will of the people behind the winner. To claim that 51% represents the will of the people seems a bit of a stretch, since almost half of the voters cannot be considered to be of that will. Typically, much is read (or projected) into the 1% over the 50% in terms of a mandate. All of a sudden, 51% of the voters become “the people.”  Certainly a winning plurality of 38% cannot be said to stand for or represent the will of the people, for 38% is a minority in the total votes cast. Yet in Delaware’s corporate law, which is binding for most American corporations, a mere plurality is sufficient for a candidate to be elected to a board of directors. While this arrangement is not ideal, it is a legitimate basis even if some stockholder activists beg to differ.

The full essay is at "Corporate Governance as Anti-Democratic?"

Upside-Down Corporate Governance at AIG

I contend that Robert Benmosche, CEO of AIG, had an incorrect understanding of corporate governance when he told Harvey Golub, then-chairman of the board, on July 14, 2010, “One of us should stay and one of us should go.” He should have, “Please let me know if the board would like me to go.” Put bluntly, the CEO works for the board, not vice versa. The previous May, Benmosche told Golub, “We can’t work together. I need a partner who I can bounce ideas off and give me advice.” However,a CEO and a chairman do not work together as partners. Rather, the chairman—and the board more generally—act on behalf of the stockholders to oversee the management, which the board has hired. In other words, a CEO is an employee whereas a chairman is not. Benmosche’s comment is actually rather presumptuous.

The full essay is at "Corporate Governance at AIG."

Executive Compensation (Part II): Paying Failure

In late September 2011, Léo Apotheker was fired after 11 months as CEO at Hewlett-Packard. As a reward, he walked with $13.2 million in cash and stock, in addition to a sign-on package worth about $10 million, according to the New York Times. A month earlier, Robert P. Kelly received severance worth $17.2 in cash and stock when he was fired as CEO of Bank of New York Mellon. Even his clashing with board members and senior managers did not obstruct his nice severance package. A few days later, Carol Bartz was let go as CEO of Yahoo with nearly $10 million in spite of the company’s poor performance. Back in April 2011, John Chidsey, the CEO of Burger King, had departed with a severance package worth almost $20 million in the fact that McDonalds had been outcompeting Burger King. Baxter Phillips, the CEO of Massey Energy, got a package worth over $34 million in spite of “presiding over a company barraged with accusations of reckless conduct and with legal claims stemming from one of the deadliest mining disasters in memory,” according to the New York Times. Unfortunately, the list goes on and on. Is this a system of pay-for-failure? Moreover, do chief executives, who seem to outward appearances to be almost exclusively motivated by what they can get in additional compensation, have too much leverage over boards, and thus over even the owners as well? If so, is corporate governance itself severely broken? I answer in the affirmative.

The full essay is at "Executive Compensation: Paying Failure."

Eric Dash, “The Lucrative Fall from Grace,” New York Times, September 30, 2011. 

When Corporate Governance Gets Cozy: Chair/CEO Combo as a Structural Conflict of Interest

Eric Jackson, an activist investor and hedge fund manager, charged Goldman’s board as being too cozy and too lacking in financial know-how to diligently oversee the top management. He claimed the board was packed with honchos who led companies that had paid large fees to Goldman. Allowing clients representation on a board is itself a structural conflict of interest because the client role is not in line with acting in the stockholders’ interest on the board. The hedge fund manager pointed to Indian steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal and former Fannie Mae chief James Johnson as cases in point. Related to the client orientation is an affinity to the management, whose managerial decisions bear on the clients. Indeed, Jackson noted that “these people seem to be favorably disposed to senior management’s way of thinking,” and are therefore unlikely to act as a check on CEO Lloyd Blankfein and his team.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

On the Unfairness of the Bonus System on Wall Street

Craig A. Dubow, Gannett’s former chief executive, had a short six-year tenure that was, by most accounts according to The New York Times, “a disaster.” David Carr reports: “Gannett’s stock price declined to about $10 a share from a high of $75 the day after [Dubow] took over; the number of employees at Gannett plummeted to 32,000 from about 52,000, resulting in a remarkable diminution in journalistic boots on the ground at the 82 newspapers the company owns. . . .  the company strip-mined its newspapers in search of earnings, leaving many communities with far less original, serious reporting. . . . Not only did Mr. Dubow retire under his own power because of health reasons, he got a mash note from Marjorie Magner, a member of Gannett’s board, who said without irony that ‘Craig championed our consumers and their ever-changing needs for news and information.’ But the board gave him far more than undeserved plaudits. Mr. Dubow walked out the door with just under $37.1 million in retirement, health and disability benefits. That comes on top of a combined $16 million in salary and bonuses in the last two years.”

Besides the inherent unfairness in an incompetent manager getting millions of dollars in compensation (for championing incompetence?), it is morally problematic when, as Carr puts it, “the consequences of bad decisions land on everyone except those who made them.” 

The full essay is at "Unfair Bonuses on Wall St."

Source:

 David Carr, “Why Not Occupy Newsrooms?” The New York Times, October 24, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/business/media/why-not-occupy-newsrooms.html

Jamie Dimon Wins Stockholder Vote: Exploiting Conflicts of Interest Undercuts Fairness

Chairman of JPMorgan since 2006 and CEO a year longer, Jamie Dimon faced down a daunting stockholder vote on May 21, 2013 on whether he should be allowed to retain both roles. Despite the bank’s $6.2 billion trading loss, deeply flawed risk-management oversight, and “credibility issues” with regulators, only about 32% of the votes cast were in favor of the nonbinding resolution that the chair and CEO jobs be separated. Interestingly, not only does the chair/CEO duality have an inherent conflict of interest because part of what a board (including its chair) does is hold management (including the CE) accountable, the means by which the pro-duality side campaigned also included conflicts of interest. I cannot help but wonder whether Jamie Dimon, his immediate subordinates, the bank’s board directors and even the stockholders who altogether voted a supermajority of shares in support of Dimon’s two roles were negligent ethically in failing to even recognize the institutional conflicts of interest involving Dimon and the board. To the extent that recognition existed, permitting the conflicts to exist and in some cases knowingly exploiting more than one at a time are even more squalid than merely being oblivious to them. To the extent that structural conflicts of interest were enabled through the campaign and in the election results, JPMorgan Chase can be likened to a house of cards. This does not bode well for the financial system and broader economy to the extent that the largest American bank holds systemic risk (i.e., “too big to fail”). I look at the campaigning first, as doing so will lead us directly to the main conflict of interest that is at issue here.

 Jamie Dimon, CEO and Chair of JPMorgan Chase.  The duality of roles can benefit him both personally and institutionally. NYT

The full essay is at "JPMorgan: An Unethical Monstrosity?" and at
Institutional Conflicts of Interest, both available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Bad Directors at HP: Like Guests Who Overstay?

Lest it be thought that Congress ignoring the business lobby would result in laws capable of reforming corporate governance in the U.S. in the interest of stockholders, even putting the “objectionable” stuff back into legislation may not be sufficient. In this essay, I look at the proposed elimination of plurality voting in the original Dodd-Frank bill from the perspective of the case of HP. Put simply, the question is whether it would have made any difference had the proposal been retained in the bill.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

JPMorgan Management Evades Stockholders

After the $6 billion trading loss at JP Morgan, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a report raising the prospect of wider problems than that of a rogue lower-level trader. Specifically, the report suggests that executives at the bank “ignored warning signs and failed to alert investors about changes to its method for detecting risk,” according to the New York Times.  That is, the bank had not been publically disclosing its risky trading, thereby misleading stockholders and regulators. Banks such as JP Morgan had been urging regulators to weaken the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to allow banks to continue to engage in some risky proprietary trades.

The full essay is at "JPMorgan: An Unethical Monstrosity?"

Women on Corporate Boards: Britain vs. the E.U. Justice Commissioner

In 2012, women made up 13.7% of board positions in large listed companies in the E.U., and 15% for nonexecutive board positions, according to The Wall Street Journal. In the U.S., according to Kay Koplovitz of USA Network, the number of women on corporate boards had been stalled at more or less 15 percent for over ten years. Whereas in the U.S., people would look at Congress to enact a uniform inter-state standard or else leave the matter to individual corporations, the E.U. has other alternative means, such as the directive. That device relies on the state governments to decide on the penalties as well as enforcement against violators of the E.U. law. Even though the Commission could take a state refusing to implement a directive to the European Court of Justice, the “cost” of the flexibility in the state-based implementation is a possible dilution in the law’s aims being achieved throughout the E.U. rather than just in a few states. Put another way, even as the ideological diversity within the empire-scale union is accommodated, advocates of more female representation on corporate boards may be disappointed as some states give non-complying companies only a slap on the wrist.

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available at Amazon.