Bottom-Heavy Federalism: The E.U. Stability and Growth Pact

With Russia still in Ukraine in 2025, the E.U. faced pressure to enact more laws and regulations at the federal, yes, federal level to reap the benefits of collective, coordinated action. Although the fear that Russia might invade one or more of the eastern E.U. states was probably unrealistic, given that Russia was still mired in Ukraine, the crisis of an invasion so close to the E.U. could legitimately serve as a “wake-up call” for the federal and state officials in the E.U. to get their federal system of dual sovereignty in order. The ability of state governments to successfully evade the state deficit and debt limits in the federal Stability and Growth Pact and the flipside of the Commission’s weakness can be read as indicative that more work is needed to get to a viable federal system. The states have been able to weaken the limitations successively over years, including by leveraging the fear of invasion by Russia as a call for more defense spending at the state rather than at the federal level.

The full essay is at "Bottom-Heavy Federalism."

The European Union Is Not a Trading Bloc

The European Union can be distinguished fundamentally from the previous European Economic Community in several ways, just as the Articles of Confederation can be distinguished on a fundamental level politically from the U.S. Constitution. Both Europe and America have made a qualitative jump, rather than merely as a matter of degree or further extent. In both cases, politically speaking, governmental sovereignty has been split between a union and state governments. Furthermore, in both cases, the domains of power being handled at the federal level have increased. In the case of the U.S., the coverage of the federal level has expanded well beyond Washington’s Continental Army. In the case of the E.U. even by 2024, the coverage had come to extend well beyond a common market and trade policy to include non-economic domains of power, or competencies, too. In this regard, the E.U.'s federal level resembles a government.

The full essay is at "The E.U.: Not a Trading Bloc."

The E.U. Says No to Hungarian Asylum Detention Camps: A Test for E.U. Federalism

On May 11, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the E.U.’s highest court, ruled against the state of Hungary on its detention camp near the Serbian border. The state had denied the asylum requests because the immigrants had come through Serbia, and the latter refused to allow them to reverse course. The immigrants were thus stuck, essentially detained in “prison-like conditions.”[1] The high court ruled that the “conditions prevailing in the Roszke transit zone amount to a deprivation of liberty.”[2] ECJ Advocate General Priit Pikamae had argued that the “unlawful detention” was due to the “high degree of restriction of the freedom of movement.”[3] The state of Hungary had argued that the immigrants could have stayed in Servia, as it was a safe-country of transit, and thus were not eligible for asylum in Hungary. Unlike Hungary, Serbia was not an E.U. state, which may be why the asylum-seekers did not want to remain in Serbia. Hence being a border state added to Hungary’s woes. Therefore, the E.U. had some responsibility to alleviate the pressure on Hungary. Yet the Union did not do so, showing its weakness, and yet the state government bowed to the ECJ’s ruling. To the extent that the E.U. relies on such self-subordination in the want of federal help, the E.U. could be said to be on borrowed time during which basic adjustments to the federal system could be made.

The full essay is at "Hungarian Asylum Detention Centers."

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1. Deutsche Welle, “Hungary Illegally Held Asylum-Seekers, ECJ Rules,” DW.com, May 14, 2020 (accessed May 22, 2020).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

An E.U. Economic Recovery Fund: A Federal Problem

On May 18, 2020, with the E.U. Commission having been no match for the states’ own interests in their own health and economic crises, the governors of France and Germany announced that they would support a recovery fund to help the states most in need. The €500 billion fund of grants (not loans) would be raised on the capital markets and guaranteed by the state governments. It would be part of the federal budget.[1] I submit that the imbalance in that federal system is evident; here again, the power of the state governments relative to the federal Commission shows the weakness of the latter.

The full essay is at "E.U. Economic Recovery Fund."

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[1] Katya Adler, “Politics and PR: Behind the Scenes of Franco-German Recovery Fund,” BBC.com, May 18, 2020.