The ECJ Castigates the Commission for Paying Off Hungary

In an opinion submitted to the European Court of Justice, which tends to follow the legal opinions the 11 Advocates General, Tamara Capeta recommended in February, 2026 to the Court that it “should annul the European Commission’s 2023 decision to disburse €10.2 billion” to the E.U. state of Hungary.[1] Capeta found that the state government had not sufficiently addressed “concerns over systemic corruption and rule of law violations” to qualify for the payment.[2] That the Commission released the payment nonetheless points to corruption at the federal level—in its executive branch in particular—and this charge against the Von der Leyen administration renders the charge against the Hungarian government rather ironic. Rule of law should apply (and be respected!) at both the federal and state levels for the E.U. to continue to be viable. This applies especially to the Commission, as it is tasked with enforcing E.U. laws, directives, and regulations as well as treaty obligations that the EU, including its state governments, have to other countries, whether they are federal unions (e.g., the U.S.) or independent states.  

The full essay is at "The ECJ Castigates the Commission for Paying Off Hungary."

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “E.U. Court Challenges Controversial €10.2bn Payment to Hungary,” Euronews.com, February 12, 2026.
2. Ibid.

Immobilizing E.U. Holdings of Russian Assets

By invoking Article 122 of the E.U.’s basic law, a clause that had been used most significantly during the Coronavirus pandemic and in the 2022 energy crisis, the E.U. in December, 2025 finally circumvented the twice-threatened veto by the state of Hungary and indefinitely froze €210 billion of assets of the Russian Central Bank that had been within the E.U.’s territory since Russia began its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine nearly four years earlier. I contend that the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court, could apply a rational basis in a judicial review of the triggering of the emergency-conditioned article, especially because the Commission invoked the article in order to obviate Hungary’s threatened veto. Because every E.U. state except for Belgium and Hungary were for freezing the assets until Russia such time as Russia ends its militaristic aggression and compensates Ukraine financially for damages the Belgian and Hungarian state governments were violating the informal norm of consensus in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Like the U.S. Senate, the European Council, which also represents the states, is like a club of sorts. The problem facing the Commission is that violating a norm is not a legal basis for obviating a threatened state-veto by invoking an emergency clause of the E.U.’s basic law, especially if no emergency actually exists after nearly four years of the invasion. Even though I am personally in favor of the E.U. obviating Hungary’s serial obstructionism that may be, at least in part, retaliation against President Von der Leyen’s Commission for having penalized the Hungarian government financially for having violated E.U. law, legal reasoning should not succumb to the gravity of the “black hole” of personal opinion.  There may be nothing so much like a god as a general on a battlefield, with power over life and death, but neither the European Commission nor myself is a general. In short, the Commission’s legal justification in invoking Article 122 is tenuous at best, even though countering Hungary’s Viktor Orbán’s abuse of his state’s veto-power in the European Council and the Council of Ministers was needed for the E.U. to be able to function within its enumerated competencies (i.e., powers).

The full essay is at "Immobilizing E.U. Holdings of Russian Assets."

The E.U. on Anti-Trust Enforcement: The Case of Google

On June 19, 2025, when the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court, received a nonbinding opinion from the advocate general, Juliane Kokott, recommending that Google’s appeal against an anti-trust fine of €4 billion be dismissed by the court. The E.U.’s executive branch, the Commission, had found in 2018 that the company had “used the dominance of its mobile Android operating system to throttle competition and reduce consumer choice.”[1] I contend that the company’s written statement in response can be characterized as “stone-deaf” or oblivious to the issue at hand. Such is not an effective way of managing threats in the environment of business. Moreover, the response itself illustrates why governmental action on anti-trust on behalf of market competition is valid and necessary. I contend that the invisible-hand mechanism of a restored competitive market is more reliable than depending on managerial intentions even if they are to be based on motivation that is social-engineered from fines.

The full essay is at "The E.U. on Anti-Trust Enforcement."

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1. “Google Hits Setback in Bid to Overturn Multibillion EU Antitrust Fine in Android Case,” APnews.com, June 19, 2025.

Hungary’s Delusion of Sovereignty

On October 3, 2024, The European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, filed a legal complaint against the E.U. state of Hungary with the E.U.’s judicial branch—the high court of which being the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Commission had won a case against the state and recently subtracted the amount of fine issued by the court from the federal money set to go to the state because the Hungarian government was refusing to recognize the verdict. Like Britain before it had seceded from the Union, Hungary was operating under the incorrect premise that it still enjoyed full sovereignty even though every state delegates some of its governmental sovereignty to the Union in becoming a state thereof. In the case of Hungary, the state law at issue in 2024 had in its very name the fundamental problem out of which the state’s disputes with the E.U. were emanating.

The full essay is at "Hungary's Delusion of Soveriegnty."

The European Court of Justice Slaps Down Hungary: A Defense of Modern Federalism

The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the E.U.’s supreme court, which like the U.S. counterpart can overrule state courts, ordered the E.U. state of Hungary to pay a lump sum of €200 million and €1 million per day of delay from June 12, 2024 because the state government had disregarded “the principle of sincere cooperation” between states in taking in their fair share of foreign asylum-seekers and “deliberately” evaded implementing the federal law that directs the states how to treat those people who enter the E.U. through the state seeking political asylum.[1] The state government had made it “virtually impossible” for asylum seekers to file applications.[2] Similar to the Nullification Acts passed by the state government of South Carolina in the U.S. when that union was between 30 and 40 years old, the decision of Hungary to ignore the ECJ’s ruling on the matter in 2020 could not be tolerated by federal authorities, for a federal system of dual sovereignty (i.e., some held at the federal level and the rest at the state level) cannot survive if state governments can unilaterally decide to nullify, or ignore federal law. That federal directives in the E.U. reply on implementation into law at the state level just makes the E.U. more vulnerable should a state government so easily dismiss federal law. Why even be in a union if its law is deemed not worthy of respect?

The full essay is at "The ECJ Slaps Down Hungary."

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “ECJ Finds Hungary with €200 Million over ‘Extremely Serious’ Breach of E.U. Asylum Law,” Euronews.com, June 12, 2024 (accessed June 13, 2024).
2. Ibid.

On the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court in Safeguarding the Peaceful Transfer of Power

In the E.U., the state governments and federal institutions can ask the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) for an opinion on a legal matter. This is rare in the U.S., though waiting for a dispute to winds its way formally through district and appellate courts may be unduly bureaucratic, not to mention lengthy. On December 11, 2023, Special Counsel Jack Smith asked the U.S. Supreme Court the ECJ’s counterpart, to decide whether the former U.S. president Donald Trump had any immunity from criminal prosecution of his involvement in the riot at the U.S. Capitol that interrupted the formal counting by a joint session of Congress of the Electoral College presidential ballots. The trial was set to begin the following March, and the question of the former president’s immunity had to be decided before the trial could begin. Hence the “extraordinary request,” which I contend should not be extraordinary given the time frame and the important role of the highest court in safeguarding American democracy from domestic threats.

The full essay is at "On the U.S. Supreme Court."

The E.U. Says No to Hungarian Asylum Detention Camps: A Test for E.U. Federalism

On May 11, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the E.U.’s highest court, ruled against the state of Hungary on its detention camp near the Serbian border. The state had denied the asylum requests because the immigrants had come through Serbia, and the latter refused to allow them to reverse course. The immigrants were thus stuck, essentially detained in “prison-like conditions.”[1] The high court ruled that the “conditions prevailing in the Roszke transit zone amount to a deprivation of liberty.”[2] ECJ Advocate General Priit Pikamae had argued that the “unlawful detention” was due to the “high degree of restriction of the freedom of movement.”[3] The state of Hungary had argued that the immigrants could have stayed in Servia, as it was a safe-country of transit, and thus were not eligible for asylum in Hungary. Unlike Hungary, Serbia was not an E.U. state, which may be why the asylum-seekers did not want to remain in Serbia. Hence being a border state added to Hungary’s woes. Therefore, the E.U. had some responsibility to alleviate the pressure on Hungary. Yet the Union did not do so, showing its weakness, and yet the state government bowed to the ECJ’s ruling. To the extent that the E.U. relies on such self-subordination in the want of federal help, the E.U. could be said to be on borrowed time during which basic adjustments to the federal system could be made.

The full essay is at "Hungarian Asylum Detention Centers."

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1. Deutsche Welle, “Hungary Illegally Held Asylum-Seekers, ECJ Rules,” DW.com, May 14, 2020 (accessed May 22, 2020).

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

The European Union at Risk: The German High Court Undercuts the European Court of Justice on the Role of the European Central Bank

If a dispute between an E.U. state and the European Central Bank (ECB) on one of its programmes could come to challenge the European Court of Justice (ECJ) itself and the very sustainability of the E.U.’s federal system, then that system itself could be said to be severely impaired, and thus facing a high risk of being destroyed.  Yet in the Judgment of the Second Senate of May 5, 2020, the constitutional court of Germany did exactly that in throwing out an earlier ruling of the E.U.’s supreme court (ECJ) on the legality under E.U. law of an ECB programme.[1]

(Source: Politico)

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1. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020 – 2 BvR 859/15-, paras. (1-237).

Can an American Member-State Exit the Union?

A war was fought over it. In early 2013, the White House made it explicit in replying to a petition. Yet still there was a sense among at least some Texans that something was amiss. Following U.S. President Obama’s re-election in 2012, citizens of Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, and five other member-states in the U.S. signed petitions for the White House to allow their respective states to secede from the Union. At the time, few people other than the secessionists themselves took the petitions seriously. Yet the underlying contending principles deserve more serious reflection even if no "exit" is anticipated. Most importantly, the matter concerns how and whether the rights of member-states (and majorities of the people, therein) are to be circumscribed in a federal union that leaves said republics semi-sovereign and with residual sovereignty.

The full essay is at "Can an American Member-State Exit?"

Federalism 101: Does Power Naturally Consolidate?

Consolidated power seems, at least in theory, to be contrary to American political culture.   The financial consolidation even after the financial bailouts of 2008, can be deemed dangerous economically and even politically, given the unlimited campaign contributions made possible by the Citizens United case in 2010. Such consolidation complements the political consolidation at the federal level in the U.S.  Is the consolidation, which has occurred since 1865, and especially from FDR's New Deal onward, natural or contrived? That is to say, will the E.U., when it is over 200 years old, suffer the same plight? If so, federalism itself, which I submit must include a balance of power, given the checks and balances feature, between the federal level and that of the states, may be a temporary system inherently. 

The full essay is at "Does Power Naturally Consolidate?"

For more on this topic, see: Two Federal Empires and American and European Federalism

Google Finds an Obstacle in the E.U.: A Lesson for Americans?

The European Court of Justice, the E.U. Supreme Court, ruled on May 13, 2014 that Google must defer to the right of users to have links about themselves deleted. Google’s management had sought to obviate any obligation to act on such requests. The New York Times points out that the decision indicates “that such companies must operate in a fundamentally different way than they do in the United States.”[1] The ring of fundamentality has implications for the international strategies of internet companies and affords us a better look at how business plays out in society differently in different societies.

From: "Google in the E.U. and U.S."

Comparing the E.U. and U.S. in a Different Way

 The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Videos on YouTube: http://youtu.be/xinF5zjHV0Q and http://youtu.be/qqemCjiWZSM

My related very brief talk: http://www.blogtalkradio.com/thewordenreport/2013/07/08/the-eu-and-us

European Central Bank As Supervisor: Conflicts of Interest

Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, raised additional concerns in April 2013 about a proposal to create a single banking supervisor for the European Union. About 150 large banks would be under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank, which would also have the power to intervene to oversee smaller lenders. This proposal had been set as a precondition for states to draw on the E.U.’s bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, to recapitalize struggling lenders directly. To analyze Schäuble’s potential stumbling blocks, it is necessary to understand the conflicts of interest that are involved.

                                                                                 Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, active at the E.U. level. Source: The Telegraph.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy." Available at Amazon.

Bailouts, Bond-Buying: E.U. Plows Ahead!

On September 12, 2012, a psychological threshold was reached in the E.U. on the way toward “ever closer union.” That is to say, at the end of that day Europeans could feel an overdue sense that come what may, the euro would be protected. Moreover, the E.U. (at least for the states willing to sign up for greater E.U. enforcement of state deficit and debt limits) would proceed along with further incremental shifts of governmental sovereignty from the states to the union thereof. The sense of relief was palpable in Europe as state and federal officials as well as commentators and citizens breathed a collective sigh of relief.

Most pressingly, the constitutional court of the state of Germany announced that that state could in fact contribute to the fund to bailout indebted states. The court held that the state legislature would have to pass any increases because the further integration of the E.U. must not be allowed to proceed without commensurate democratic legitimacy and the rule of law. The President of the E.U. Parliament observed that this holds at the E.U. level as well.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Eurobonds for Stimulus Spending

Meeting on May 23, 2012, the E.U.’s European Council failed to come up with a plan to offset the recessionary aspect of Greece’s budget cuts. The pressure was on; the OECD had just warned that the E.U. go back into recession. Interest rates on state debt-namely that of Spain—had reached an unsustainable level the week before due to concern regarding banks based in the state. Besides the debt and banking vulnerabilities at the state level, the E.U. itself was struggling with its political weakness, which can be attributed to the states’ rights (or euro-skeptic) ideology that was not exactly going away in the context of the debt-contagion that had prompted the establishment of a permanent E.U. bailout fund for states in over their heads on debt. In this context, the European Council was at the intersection of debt, banking and political problems.

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

State Fiscal Governance in the E.U.: Toward Balanced Union

At the end of January 2012, 25 of the 27 E.U. states (all but Britain and the Czech Republic) indicated at a meeting of the European Council that they would accept in principle (i.e., subject to ratification) a new limit of 0.5% of gross economic output over a complete economic cycle for the states’ “structural budget deficits” and strengthen the E.U.’s enforcement mechanism on states that breach that limit on deficits and 60% of gross output for accumulated state debt. The Wall Street Journal reported at the time that the “0.5% deficit limit would, if obeyed, mark a revolution in [the states’] fiscal policies, ending more than 30 years of steadily rising [state] debt.” This statement is immediately undercut, however, as the Journal describes the extent of the loopholes in the amendment.  The reader is left wondering whether the E.U. will use the proposed enforcement mechanisms, such as the ECJ imposing fines on states already hard up for cash, as well as whether fining a state government would make any difference.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Marcus Walker, “BudgetTreaty: Neither Panacea Nor Poison,” The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2012. 

Scotland: From a Region to a New E.U. State?

In early May 2011, “the Scottish National Party (SNP) won 69 out of 129 seats in the Scottish Parliament, with about 45 percent of the vote, up by more than 12 percentage points. Their three main rival parties — Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats  — all lost ground."[1] Whether to shift was so the region might break off from the United Kingdom, an E.U. state, is doubtful. 

 David Cheskin (AP)

  

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

1. Ian MacKenzie, “Scottish Pro-Independence Party Wins Majority,” MSNBC.com, May 6, 2011.

The ECJ Decision on Gender-Based Insurance: Political, Philosophical and Business Implications

On March 1, 2011, the European Court of Justice, the EU's Supreme Court, declared illegal the widespread practice of charging men and women different rates for insurance, setting in motion an overhaul of how life, auto and health policies are written across Europe. Although tied to commerce, the ruling involves non-economic elements as per the high court's citation of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enumerates 14 categories on which discrimination is prohibited; sex is the first. A separate provision states that "equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas." Because fundamental rights go to the core of what a political domain stands for, at least in the case of a republic, an implication is that the EU is indeed a political federal state, rather than simply a WTO for Europe. The fact that the states of the EU must abide by the ECJ's ruling on the fundamental rights means that some governmental sovereignty has indeed shifted from the state governments (and their respective constitutions) to the EU.  Like the US, the EU is a federal system of governance characterized at its core by dual governmental sovereignty, which in turn is sourced in popular sovereignty.  Other, less fundamental, implications can also be drawn from an analysis of the ruling.

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available at Amazon. 

The European Union: Dissolution or Consolidation?

In its 1993 Maastricht decision, the German Constitutional Court ruled that national authorities are not bound to respect and apply Community law to the extent that it exceeds the outer boundaries of Germany’s transfer of sovereignty to the E.U.  The Court also ruled that no transfer of sovereignty is valid to the extent that it results in a violation of the fundamental individual rights guaranteed in the German Constitution.  Nevertheless, a subsequent ruling on this subject indicated a willingness to rely on the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the vindication of those fundamental rights.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.