Regulatory Capture and the Public Interest: The FDA

The head of the Food and Drug Administration, Marty Makary, “resigned” in May, 2026 even though the decision had been made by U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert Kennedy “and then the White House signed off on it.”[1] Although Makary had been annoyance to drug-company executives, and to that extent his removal was due to pressure on President Trump by the CEOs, his “resignation” supports the theory of regulatory capture, wherein the regulated companies control the very regulatory agencies (and regulators therein) that regulate those companies, this case shows that it is possible for an industry’s interests to be aligned with the public (health) interest. Does the alignment regarding getting rid of a particular regulator lessen the unethical quality of the broader conflict of interest between business and government?

The full essay is at "Regulatory Capture and the Public Interest."

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1.  Matthew Perrone and Seung Min Kim, “Trump FDA Chief Is Leaving After Angering Pharma CEOs, Vaping Lobbyists and Anti-Abortion Groups,” APnews.com, May 12, 2026.

Musk vs. Trump: American Business and Government at Loggerheads?

When the wealthiest person in the world and the President of the United States cross swords, people are bound to notice. Such a very public clash between billionaires, one of whom is the most politically powerful person in the U.S., should not lead the rest of us to infer that the interests of large corporations and the U.S. Government, including the respective executives and elected representatives, typically conflict. Corporate and individual mega-donations to political campaigns, the proverbial “revolving door” between working in government and at a corporation, the reliance of regulatory agencies on information from the regulated companies invite the exploit of conflicts of interest such that legislation and regulations are even written by corporate lawyers for their respective companies’ financial interest. Furthermore, that many very large American-based corporations have interlocking boards of directors gives corporate America considerable unified force in seeing to it that Congress and the federal president remain friendly to business interests. That both benefit from the status quo and have de jure or de facto vetoes of reform proposals reinforces the staying power of the club. Even as U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders enjoyed considerable media attention and crowds in his speaking tour against oligopoly (i.e., consolidation within an industry such that companies can set prices at will and can thus extract extra profit beyond that which would accrue in a competitive market), it would be wildly optimistic to hope for an onslaught of anti-trust enforcement from a Republican or Democratic administration.

The complete essay is at "Musk vs. Trump."

Nature Credits in the E.U.

One of benefits of the market mechanism, by which, for example, economic goods are bought and sold, is that self-interest is relied on; people don’t have to be told to buy or sell a product because it can be in their self-interest to do so if the price is right. As an alternative to regulatory standards, a government can create units of pollution-allowance that businesses can purchase so to be lawfully able to pollute in so far as a purchased unit allows. In the E.U.’s emissions trading system, “operators of power plants and factories have to buy tradeable allowances to cover every tonne of carbon dioxide they emit.”[1] Business could buy and sell allowances so as to cover the amount of pollution that is anticipated. In this way, the market mechanism efficiently allocates pollution in line both with the interests of the companies and the public interest—the latter being made concrete in the decision on how much pollution per allowance and how many allowance units to create. Crucially, the company private interests are put within the purview of the public interest; the tail is not directing the dog. In political economies in which political-campaign contributions by businesses are high, especially if unlimited, the tail can indeed wag the dog, such that the public interest is determined by private interests. This is one reason why the Citizens United (2010) U.S. Supreme Court case is so significant. It allows corporations and labor unions to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns and directly on advertisements—both being beneficial to elected officials in positions to curry favor through legislation and regulations favorable to business (or labor). The informal exchanges of political donations and legislation or regulation comprise a market of sorts. So, the market mechanism, which is created or at least regulated by government, can serve for good or ill, from the standpoint of the public interest.  Using the mechanism, such as the E.U. president proposed in 2024, on behalf of ecosystems, is for good rather than ill, and thus using, in effect, the self-interest of farmers could be better than relying on regulatory requirements that farmers expend some money and effort to beef up their local ecosystems.

The full essay is at "Nature Credits in the E.U."

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1. Robert Hodgson, “Von der Leyen Moots ‘Nature Credits’ Market to Avert Ecosystem Collapse,” Euronews.com, September 13, 2024.

President Obama and Goldman Sachs: A Quid Pro Quo?

U.S. President Obama nominated Timothy Geithner to be Secretary of the Treasury. While president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, he had played a key role in forcing AIG to pay Goldman Sachs’ claims dollar for dollar. Put another way, Geithner, as well as Henry Paulson, Goldman’s ex-CEO serving as Secretary of the Treasury as the financial crisis unfolded, stopped AIG from using the leverage in its bankrupt condition to pay claimants much less than full value. At Treasury, Mark Patterson was Geithner’s chief of staff. Patterson had been a lobbyist for Goldman Sachs. It would seem that the "real change" president put together a Wall-Street administration.

The full essay is at "President Obama and Goldman Sachs."

Goldman Sachs' Revolving Door: Regulatory Capture

In July 2012, Andrew Williams, a former spokesman for U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, announced plans to head over to Goldman Sachs at the end of that month.[1] Williams was the second of the Secretary’s spokesmen to head to theWall Street bank. Such moves may reflect a standing policy at the bank to have a revolving door. The previous U.S. Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, had been the CEO at Goldman. This suggests that the revolving door was to include populating high offices in government, presumably not out of a sense of civic duty, but, rather, to see that Goldman's interests would be protected and even promoted through public policy. Hence President Obama was said to have had a Wall Street government with respect to positions bearing on Wall Street. I submit that deconstructing such a revolving door would be very difficult. 

The full essay is at "Goldman Sachs' Revolving Door."

1. Bonnie Kavoussi, “Andrew Williams, Ex-Treasury Spokesman,Headed to Goldman Sachs,” The Huffington Post, July 12, 2012. 

Members of Congress Secretly Lobbied the Fed

As of late September 2012, more than one hundred members of Congress had lobbied the Federal Reserve and other regulatory agencies on the Volcker Rule, the part of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act of 2010 that prohibits banks from operating like casinos (e.g., trading with proprietary funds, rather than those of customers).[1] The rule stems from the importance of banks in our financial system. In September 2008, the world nearly witnessed the collapse of that system when banks stopped trusting each other (e.g., via commercial paper market) because of the risks that some of the big ones had been taking with mortgage-backed derivative securities and the related insurance swap securities. Awash in healthy-seeming fees, the banks purchased risky subprime mortgages and bundled them into bond-like securities that could be sold to investors.

The full essay is at "Congress Secretly Lobbied the Fed."

1. Ben Protess, “Behind the Scenes, a Lawmaker Pushes to Curb the Volcker Rule,” The New York Times, September 21, 2012.

Is the U.S. Congress Too Beholden to the Financial Industry?

That financial deregulation had any traction at all following the financial crisis of 2008 in the U.S. is stunning, for the implication is that Wall Street money has tremendous influence in the U.S. Governent even after Wall Street banks have screwed up (even in triggering a financial crisis!). 

CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler staring down the big banks  

The full essay is at "Is Congress Owned by the Banks?"

Presidential Authority and Bureaucracy: Regulatory Agencies

Circulating in Congress in the fall of 2012 was a bill that would have allowed "the White House to second-guess major rules and mandate that agencies carefully study the economic effects of new regulation. The change could, in effect, delay a number of rules for the financial industry. Those who support preserving the status quo where Wall Street regulates itself will find much to like in this legislation," said Amit Narang, a regulatory policy advocate at Public Citizen, a nonprofit government watchdog group.[1] President Obama had received $1 million from Goldman Sachs as a campaign contribution in 2008. Yet of how much value to Wall Street is a mere delay in regulation? Some, surely, but not enough to make this the decisive issue here. Rather, I submit that the president's control as chief executive of the regulatory agencies and the added bureaucracy are more salient in this case study. 

The full essay is at "Presidential Authority and Bureaucracy." 

1. Ben Protess, “Lawmakers Push to Increase WhiteHouse Oversight of Financial Regulators,” The New York Times, September 10, 2012. 

President Obama and Goldman Sachs: A Quid Pro Quo?

Wall Street and the White House may be closer than the typical American thinks. One way this is accomplished is for a bank to contribute heavily to both presidential campaigns so as to be able to hedge political risk by getting ex-managers into strategic posts in the executive arm of the U.S. Government. This can be the case even when one of the candidates has campaigned on holding Wall Street accountable, such as after the financial crisis of 2008. There is the campaign slogan, and there is the political-economic reality underneath. 

The full essay is at "Obama and Wall Street."

Regulating Wall Street after a Financial Crisis

On Columbus Day 2011, The New York Times observed that the regulations known as the Volcker rule, “intended to limit trading when the bank's money is at risk, a sweet spot for banks, is seen as a centerpiece of the sprawling financial overhaul of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. In anticipation, the nation's biggest banks, like Goldman Sachs and Bank of America, have already shut down their stand-alone proprietary trading desks.”[1] Even so, the long and tortuous route by which any regulation is written was leaving its own mark in the sense that promising loopholes were finding their way into the rule. In other words, the regulated would have a disproportionate influence on the writing of the regulations. This conflict of interest is dangerous from the standpoint of not being vulnerable to another financial crisis in which the greed on Wall Street knows no bounds. 

The full essay is at "Regulating Wall Street after a Financial Crisis."

On the Gravitational Pull of Clearinghouses in Congress after the Financial Crisis

Lest it be assumed that the Dodd-Frank financial-reform Act, which became law in 2010, two years after the financial crisis, would render it less probable that taxpayers would again be faced with having to bail-out financial institutions even without strings attached in order to keep the financial system intact and the American economy from collapsing, Gretchen Morgenson of The New York Times wrote two years after the Act's passage that “failing to confront the too-big-to-fail question is a serious oversight.”[1] For one thing, disproportionately increasing the amount of money that the biggest banks must hold against a rainy day once again neglects the possibility that every bank is having such a day on the same day and so none of the banks will loan to other banks (i.e., the commercial paper market). When a financial system itself is sick to the extent that it cannot stand, all the heavy dominoes may topple, one after another, even though each has more support. Secondly, widening the too-big-to-fail category enables more financial institutions to engage in risky bets because the expanded net could limit any eventual downside. Sure enough, Morgenson points out that the legislation “actually widened the federal safety net for big institutions. Under the law, eight more giants were granted the right to tap the Federal Reserve for funding when the next crisis hits.”[2] Those institutions, including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Intercontinental Exchange, and the Options Clearing Corporation were even able to avoid the penalties for failure specified in the Act. The clearinghouses had successfully argued that even though only banks had been allowed to borrow from the Fed’s discount window, the clearinghouses are not financial institutions; rather, they are financial utilities. So, should they fail, they should not have to be “wound down” by regulators. This is essentially having it both ways and getting away with it. To explain this comfortable arrangement, we would need to look under the hood, so to speak, where I suspect we would find an exclusive world wherein vast private wealth is itself political power even apart from any attendant lobbying activity.

 The full essay is at "Clearinghouses in Congress."

1. Gretchen Morgenson, “One Safety Net That Needs to Shrink,” The New York Times, November 3, 2012.

A U.S. Senator Aiding a Contributor While Averting a "Fiscal Cliff": Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity

The law passed by Congress on January 3, 2013 to avert the across-the-board tax increases and “sequester” (i.e., across-the-board budget cuts) was “stuffed with special provisions helping specific companies and industries.” While many of the provisions would increase the U.S. Government’s debt, at least one would decrease it. Is the latter any more ethical because it is in line with the more general interest in reducing the federal debt? Put another way, does the end justify the means?  Do good consequences justify bad motives?  These are extremely difficult questions. The best I can do here is suggest how they can be approached by analysis of a particular case study.

The full essay is at "Aiding a Contributor."

Is God the Invisible Hand?

A Baylor University survey on religion and economics in 2011 revealed something that may be distinctly American, culturally speaking. The results indicated that about “one in five Americans combine a view of God as actively engaged in daily workings of the world with an economic conservative view that opposes government regulation and [advocates] the free market as a matter of faith.”[1] Specifically, those Americans believed that the “invisible hand” of a competitive market is actually God at work. Put another way, the assumption is that the economy “works” because God wills it to by intervening directly in the market mechanism itself. Government regulation, in diverting economic supply and demand from “the invisible hand,” is thus sinful. Regulating the economy challenges God’s omnipotence (i.e., power) by interfering with God’s intervention in our daily lives via the operation of the market mechanism. 

The full essay is at "Is God for Regulation?"

1. Cathy Lynn Grossman, “Religion Colors Money Views,” USA Today, September 20, 2011. 

Corporate Appointees in the West Wing: A Counter-Productive Way of Holding Business Accountable

Presidents in governments are called to be leaders, which means advocating a vision of change from the status quo. Otherwise, they are merely administrators. So it would be counter-productive for a U.S. president to fill his administration with people financially invested in the status quo. Yet President Obama did just that, in spite of the fact that his rhetoric envisioned radical change in health insurance and still regulations on Wall Street to prevent another financial crisis. In short, he not only let the regulatees in the room, but also gave them important roles with power that would affect their respective industries.


The full essay is at "Corporate Appointees in the West Wing: A Counter-Productive Way of Holding Business Accountable."

Mass Foreclosures as Fallout from Regulatory Capture: Banks in a Conflict of Interest at Treasury

During the summer of 2010, the Obama administration unveiled a $1 billion program to offer loans to help the jobless pay their mortgages until they could find work again. Even as it was to take effect before the end of that year, by April of the next year the program had yet to accept one application. The New York Times avers that this “could be an epitaph for the administration’s broader foreclosure prevention effort, as tens of billions of dollars remain unspent and hundreds of thousands of homeowners have been rejected.” By April of 2011, the existence of the main program, the Home Assistance Modification Program, had become a target of the Republican-controlled U.S. House.  On March 29^th, the House voted to end the foreclosure relief program. Even though the Democratic-controlled U.S. Senate vowed to pursue a rescue, even the Democrats there considered the program to be badly flawed. To be sure, the administration had failed to stem the wave of foreclosures.

The full essay is at "Essays on the Financial Crisis," available at Amazon. 

See related essay: "Institutional Conflicts of Interest"

The Market Mechanism: Complicit in E.U. Debt Crisis

According to The New York Times in late 2011, “How European sovereign debt became the new subprime is a story with many culprits, including governments that borrowed beyond their means, regulators who permitted banks to treat the bonds as risk-free and investors who for too long did not make much of a distinction between the bonds of troubled economies like Greece and Italy and those issued by the rock-solid Germany.” In going through these culprits and how they interrelated, it should not be lost that the market mechanism itself can be held as suspect, for at the very least it enabled the furtive games to be played for far too long. Indeed, the market itself did not do a good job for years in providing accurate risk-return relationships.

The full essay is in, "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon. 

The Banks’ Consultants: Guarding the Hen House

Leaving it to consultants hired by mortgage servicers to right the wrongs that the services inflicted on foreclosed homeowners was the unhappy consequence of bank regulators giving ambiguous guidance and failing to install viable oversight mechanisms. According to the Government Accounting Office, “regulators risked not achieving the intended goals of identifying as many harmed borrowers as possible.” Even if the reviews had been completed, there was on guarantee that wronged mortgage borrowers would have received any compensation. On the other side of the ledger, the banks had received billions from the U.S. Treasury with no strings attached. Whether intentional or not, the banking regulators put too much stock in the consultants, who, after all, had been hired by the mortgage servicers."

The full essay is at "The Banks' Consultants: A Conflict of Interest." For other cases, see my book, Institutional Conflicts of Interest: Business & Public Policy, available at Amazon.

Sources:

Ben Hallman and Eleazar Melendez, “GAO Foreclosure Report Finds Bank Regulators Failed to Provide ‘Key Oversight’,” The Huffington Post, April 3, 2013.

Dan Fitzpatrick, "'A Dose of Healthy Competition' For Banking Regulators," The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2013.

An Ethical Meltdown in Japan: On the Toxicity of Tepco's Nuclear Power

According to The Wall Street Journal, Japan’s largest power provider, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco), faced the biggest challenge of its 50-year-history in "recovering from the damage done to its nuclear facilities and power systems by a devastating earthquake and tsunami." The New York Times reported on March 17, 2011, that "foreign nuclear experts, the Japanese press and an increasingly angry and rattled Japanese public are frustrated by government and power company officials’ failure to communicate clearly and promptly about the nuclear crisis. Pointing to conflicting reports, ambiguous language and a constant refusal to confirm the most basic facts, they suspect officials of withholding or fudging crucial information about the risks posed by the ravaged Daiichi plant."

According to The Wall Street Journal, when Tepco said early in the morning of March 16th "that a fire had broken out at the Daiichi plant’s No. 4 reactor, a reporter naturally asked how the fire had begun, given that just the day before the company had reported putting out a fire at that same reactor. The executive’s answer: ‘We’ll check. . . . We don’t have information here,’ he explained. After about two hours, the Tepco representative had the information: Turned out the smoke was coming not from reactor No. 4, but from reactor No. 3. If Tepco’s information had been delayed and vague, the reporters’ response was quick and direct. ‘You guys have been saying something different each time!’ one shouted. ‘Don’t tell us things from your impression or thoughts, just tell us what’s going on. Your unclear answers are really confusing!’"

                Tepco executives leave one of the many press conferences held during the disaster in 2011

The full analysis is in Cases of Unethical Business, a book available at Amazon.

Income Inequality: Natural or Artificial?

In the United States, the disposable income of families in the middle of the income distribution shrank by 4 percent between 2000 and 2010, according to the OECD.[1] Over roughly the same period, the income of the top 1 percent increased by 11 percent. In 2012, the average CEO of one of the 350 largest U.S. companies made about $14.07 million, while the average pay for a non-supervisory worker was $51,200.[2] In other words, the average CEO made 273 times more than the average worker. In 1965, CEOs were paid just 20 times more; by 2000, the figure peaked at 383 times. The ratio fell in the wake of the dot-com bubble and then in the financial crisis and its recession, but in 2010 the ratio began to rebound. According to an OECD report, rising incomes of the top 1 percent in the E.U. accounted for the rising income inequality in Europe in 2012, though that level of inequality was “notably less” than the one in the U.S.”[3]  Nevertheless, in both cases the increasing economic gap between the very rich and everyone else was not limited to the E.U. and U.S.; a rather pronounced global phenomenon of increasing economic inequality was clearly in the works by 2013.

The full essay is at "Natural vs. Artificial Income Inequality."

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1.Eduardo Porter, “Inequality in America: The Data is Sobering,” The New York Times, July 30, 2013.

2. Mark Gongloff, “CEOs Paid 273 Times More Than Workers in 2012: Study,” The Huffington Post, June 26, 2013.

3. Kaja B. Fredricksen, “Income Inequality in the European Union,” OECD, Economics Department Working Paper No. 952, 2012.

Can the Federal Reserve Handle Banks Too Big To Fail?

The biggest banks operating in the U.S. reaped an estimated $13 billion of income by taking advantage of the Federal Reserve’s below-market rate of .001% on $7.7 trillion in emergency loans in the wake of the credit freeze in September 2008. Rather than using the additional funds to increase lending, the banks fortified reserves and paid bonuses out to executives. Had member of Congress had been able to anticipate all this, it is possible that they would have prescribed stronger medicine, perhaps even including breaking up the banks with over $1 trillion in assets.

The full essay is at "Can the Fed Handle Banks Too Big to Fail?"