Foreign Policy Alignment in E.U. Enlargement

Threating the E.U. or U.S. as a club and thus as having members rather than states is as erroneous as it is arrogant. Even though the E.U. states are members of the European Council and the U.S. states are members of the U.S. Senate because both federal bodies represent states rather than federal or state citizens, nether the U.S. nor the E.U. has members per se; rather both unions have states because those unions have federal systems. Nor is either political union a “bloc,” as the latter is actually a temporary group of sovereign countries rather than a federal government of semi-sovereign states or even just an alliance. Linguistic semantics matter because they can impact expectations; less is expected of a bloc than a federal union of states. For one thing, the latter, which is theoretically permanent, involves more of a bonding between the polities. To be united, states cannot not be so opposed to each other that passing federal law and regulations faces insurmountable ideological opposition in the chambers in which the states are represented and thus are the members, especially if each one wields a veto! Two words: Viktor Orban. The E.U. is justified, therefore, in insisting on general agreement with the E.U.’s foreign and military policies before approving the accession of a candidate state.  

The full essay is at "Foreign Policy Alignment in E.U. Enlargement."

The E.U. on Negotiating Britain’s Secession: Traumatized Officials

As the war between the U.S.A. and C.S.A. (1861-1865) attests, the secession of a state from a political union in which governmental sovereignty is “dual” (i.e., both the union and the states are vested with it, such that it is divided, albeit not evenly) can be arduous. Although a “velvet” secession sans warfare, the secession of the state of Britain (UK) from the E.U. required lengthy and painstaking negotiations. In the case of a union of states, something more than integration occurs not only economically, but also politically. Anti-federalist rhetoric, such as in referring to the E.U. (or U.S.) as a “bloc” with “members,” and even with potential “associate members,” does absolutely nothing to counter the political reality of federalism wherein governmental sovereignty resides both with the union itself and the state governments. Officials in the E.U.’s Commission were prudent, therefore, in being hesitant regarding the possible re-accession of Britain as an E.U. state as talk on that possibility swirled in Britain in 2026 just after Andy Burnham became the prime minister and suggested that he would be open to a referendum. This occurred exactly a decade after the referendum on “Brexit” had passed and only six years after the actual secession. Between 2016 and the end of January, 2020, E.U. and British officials—federal and state, respectively—engaged in painstaking, even traumatic, negotiations. That this harsh characterization came from the E.U. side is consistent with my thesis that the vote in Britain to secede, or “exit,” from the E.U. was based on a rejection of the governmental sovereignty held by the E.U. rather than its states. E.U. officials would not have taken kindly to even the subtle suggestion that the E.U.’s portion of sovereignty did not really exist.

The full essay is at "The E.U. on Negotiating Britain's Secession."

Reforming E.U. Governance: On the States’ Conflict of Interest

A conflict of interest is the privileging of the interest of a part, by that part, over a conflicting broader interest, such as the public good. In exploiting such a conflict, a part of a whole puts the part’s own interest, and therefore benefit, above those of the whole to which the part belongs. A state government in the E.U., for example, could veto governance reforms of the federal government because the state would benefit in some way, even just in terms of retaining its portion of governmental sovereignty, even though the E.U. itself would be harmed. Exploiting a conflict of interest is selfishness in governance. The underlying assumption is that the part is greater than the whole. Aristotle warns of such misordered concupiscence, which is the placing of a smaller good above a higher good.

The full essay is at "Reforming E.U. Governance."

On Britain’s Possible Accession after Seceding from the Union

Secession is a nasty business. Both Britain and South Carolina learned that lesson. Whereas the American member-state failed to secede from the U.S., Britain succeeded in seceding from the E.U. The parallelism presented here is no accident, for just as the U.S. federal system has been charactered by dual sovereignty—both the Union and the members having at least some governmental sovereignty—so too does the E.U.’s federal system. In deciding whether or not they want Britain to become an E.U. state again, the British ought to keep this fact in mind. 

The full essay is at "On Britain’s Possible Accession after Seceding from the Union."

Ukraine Beseeches the NATO Alliance

On 7 July, 2026, speaking at NATO’s Summit Defense Industry Forum in Turkey, Ukrainian President Zelensky made the case that Ukraine should be in the NATO military alliance even though that country was still being invaded by Russia, so the activation of the alliance’s article 5’s mutual-defense mandate would be dicey to say the least. Accepting an existing “hot spot” into the alliance would be risky not least because of any immediate expectations of having to join a fight already in progress, but also because of what Russia’s President Putin’s reaction might be. Zelensky’s remarks can thus be regarded as partial, or one-sided, from the standpoint of a full geo-political and military-strategic analysis.

The full essay is at "Ukraine Beseeches the NATO Alliance."

E.U. Statehood for Sovereign Countries

Even as the E.U. struggled to come up with foreign policies on Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran in March, 2026, the union must have been cogent enough then for the Icelandic government to set a date at the end of the summer to have a referendum on whether to seek statehood. The term for this is accession, not merger, for an empire-scale union such as the U.S. or E.U. contains semi-sovereign states rather than co-scale and co-equal “partners.” By implication, to liken a state in one such union to another entire union is to make a category mistake that can be thought of in historical terms as making the claim that a kingdom is equivalent to an empire (of kingdoms). Both the E.U. and U.S. are federations composed of early-modern scale kingdoms and republics.[1] This is not so in the cases of Mexico and Canada. In fact, the U.S. has an open invitation for Canada’s accession (rather than merger).[2] People who presume that it was arrogant for the U.S. founders to invite Canada to accede as a state forget that the U.S. was formed by sovereign countries that became semi-sovereign states.

The full essay is at "E.U. Statehood for Sovereign Countries."

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1. See Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon, 2017)
2. Because Canada has expanded West since the 18^th century, Canada would most likely accede as three or four U.S. states rather than just one.

A Big-State Governor Usurps the Role of the European Council's President

The governor of a large state, if speaking for the E.U., risks not only undercutting federal officials who can speak for the E.U., but also subtly orienting federal policy in the interest of that state rather than the entire union. It is important, therefore, that the president of the European Council be tasked with speaking publicly for the Council, rather than usurped.

The full essay is at "Big States in the European Council."

The E.U. without Enlargement: An Oxymoron?

The political debates concerning the accession of candidate states such as Texas, California, Alaska and even Hawaii into the U.S. were long past when the issue of enlargement became salient for the E.U. due to Russia’s unilateral, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. In the American case, surely no one was arguing that the U.S. without being enlarged would cease to be credible, yet in 2025, a government official of the candidate state of Montenegro said as much of the European Union. Even if Filip Ivanovic was merely using rhetoric during an interview on October 4, 2025, even that should at least make sense. Making matters worse, his comments can be interpreted as ultimatums for the E.U. even though nothing binds the E.U. to annexing any future state. In fact, given the veto-power of state officials at the federal level in the E.U., enlargement should arguably come only after internal reform of the E.U.’s basic law concerning the power of the states at the federal level.

The full essay is at "The E.U. without Enlargement."