In early July 2013, the world was treated to a glimpse of
the stark dichotomy punctuated by democracy and civic violence. Middle-ground is slight to nil between the
two, as reflected in the swift taking of sides in the immediate aftermath of
the coup by the Egyptian army. Just days after the coup, 51 pro-Morsi
protesters and three soldiers were killed, provoking fears of outright civil
war.[1]
In spite of a top Egyptian cleric going into seclusion to pressure both sides
to reconcile, the dramatic snap from democracy to force could not easily be
undone. With leaders of Morsi’s party calling for outright rebellion, the military-installed
“technocrat” inter-regnum government
was on tenuous ground. For when the order that democracy can provide by
interiorizing civic discord within the contours of a political process and
institutions is tossed away like a dirty rag, a society is left with the
instability of force.
Democracy is admittedly far from perfect as a form of
governance. Bringing in diverging political interests to legislate together civilizes
but does not expunge ideological, financial and personal conflicts. It is
difficult to determine the limits of a majority party’s authority and the
extent of a minority’s rights. Whereas the filibuster in the U.S. Senate may
give the minority party so much authority that the legislative chamber can be
vexed into stultifying stagnation, Morsi’s party was deficient in allowing for
sufficient minority participation not
only in legislating, but also in drafting the constitution. No wonder the
military had scant respect for the document in summarily suspending it during
the coup.
The Egyptian experiment with democracy was admittedly quite
flawed. Just before the coup, Morsi admitted that he had made mistakes in this
regard. Making basic law to serve the interests of a political party is not
democratic, and yet democratic elections legitimated Morsi as Egypt’s
president. In contrast, the coup was not at all democratic, and thus the
military was left to count on the power rather than legitimacy of force. A threshold
had been crossed, a net breached.
Yet the picture is not as black and white as I am
suggesting. In requiring that all significant political forces participate in
writing a new constitution, the military may have laid the groundwork for a
sustainable rather than compromised democracy. Rising above his grievances on
behalf of Egypt’s future, Morsi would have been wise in announcing that he
would participate but not dominate in
a constitutional convention. Aware of his mistakes while in office, he could
proffer advice to the convention on avoiding certain pitfalls, among which is
that of a minority party effectively ruling thanks to the splintering of
parties in a parliamentary system. To be legitimate democratically, a majority
coalition of parties must be broad enough to represent more than a minority
sectional group in society.
In short, designing a democratic system is far from easy. Allowing
one or two parties to dominate the writing and ratification of a constitution risks
a less than fully legitimate product. Egypt’s
military was left with the compromised dichotomy between a deeply-flawed “democracy”
and force. Had the democratic system
been solid, the hit to democracy itself would have been much worse simply in the
ease with which the coup could take place. It is not as though a coup against a
viable democracy has never occurred in world history. Even though Egypt’s case
is more nuanced, the military crossed a dire threshold in removing a democratically-elected
president. From a democratic standpoint, that act is hard to swallow. If the
biased constitution will have been fixed following an electoral change in a
future election, the military’s decision to oust Morsi was particularly hasty and
short-sighted from the standpoint of not only democracy, but civic order
itself.
After all, most of the delegates in the American
constitutional convention in 1787 were well-off, and thus creditors. In the
aftermath of Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts the year before by soldier
debtors who had not been paid by the continental army and yet faced unyielding creditors,
the bias in the convention was significant at the time. Also, federalists so
dominated anti-federalists that the states were not even permitted to return
suggested improvements to another session of the convention. The outcome has
been as one might have been able to predict even then: the “General Government,”
now known as the federal government, has encroaches so on the authority of the
state governments that the checks and balances in federalism itself can barely
hold back the Congress.
As flawed as the drafting and ratification of the U.S.
Constitution was, the amendment process has offered significant relief to
minority interests and thus can be judged to be much better than a coup. Not
the least in importance, going with a flawed design enabled democratic norms
and values to take root in the United States. With the Egyptian military hastily pulling
up democracy as if it were a young, loosely-rooted plant, Egyptians not only had to start
from scratch; they also had to contend with the fact that a democratic system
had been so easily replaced by force.
