Russian Electoral Fraud: A Threat to Constitutional Governance

In spite of Ella Pamfilova’s appointment in March, 2016 to “clean house and oversee transparent, democratic elections,” . . . “a statistical analysis of the official preliminary results of the country’s September 18 [2016] State Duma elections points to a familiar story: massive fraud in favor of the ruling United Russia party.”[1] “The results of the current Duma elections were falsified on the same level as the Duma and presidential elections of 2011, 2008, and 2007, the most falsified elections in post-Soviet history, as far as we can tell,” physicist and data analyst Sergei Shpilkin said to The Atlantic.”  In 2008, Shpilkin estimated that United Russia actually won 277 seats in the Duma instead of the constitutional majority of 315 that it was awarded.[2] This means that Putin’s party could unilaterally amend the Russian constitution. From a constitutional standpoint, either the hurdles in the amendment process are too low or the election fraud has been so massive the entire form of government is impaired.

The full essay is at "Russian Electoral Fraud."

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1. Valentin Baryshnikov and Robert Coalson, “12 Million Extra Votes for Putin’s Party,” The Atlantic, September 21, 2016.

2. Robert Coalson, “Russia: How the Kremlin Manages to Get the Right Results,” Radio Free Europe, March 7, 2008.

Tech Industry Self-Regulation: Sufficient to Handle the Ethics of A.I.?

Five of the world’s largest tech companies—Google’s Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, IBM, and Microsoft—had by September 2016 been working out the impact of artificial intelligence on jobs, transportation, and the general welfare.[1] The basic intention was “to ensure that A.I. research is focused on benefiting people, not hurting them.”[2] The underlying ethical theory is premised on a utilitarian consequentialism wherein benefit is maximized while harm is minimized. The ethics of whether the companies should be joining together when the aim is to forestall government regulation is less clear, given the checkered pass of industry self-regulation and the conflict of interest involved,

The full essay is at "Tech Industry Self-Regulation."

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[1] John Markoff, “Devising Real Ethics for Artificial Intelligence,” The New York Times, September 2, 2016.

[2] Ibid.

On the Difficulty of Ethical Leadership after a Breach: The Case of Wells Fargo’s CEO

On September 20, 2016, U.S. Senators questioning Wells Fargo’s CEO, John Stumpf in the Senate’s Banking Committee “seemed unmoved” by his “attempts to explain why more senior bank executives had not been tied to the widespread illegal sales activity.”[1] Bank employees may have opened as many as two million accounts in customers’ names without those customers’ knowledge.[2] Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Massachusetts Democrat, “said the illegal sales were a big driver of Wells Fargo’s success as one of the nation’s most profitable banks.”[3] She called on Stumpf to give back a large portion of his compensation, resign and be criminally investigated. I contend that giving back some of his compensation and resigning from the bank would have been necessary for the CEO get past the scandal in being able to be a credible and trustworthy ethical leader. That the bank’s board acted independently from its chairman, the CEO, a week later in taking back $41 million of his compensation and $19 million of the stock grants from Carrie Tolstedt, who had led the bank’s retail banking division (and cancelled any bonus for either official) does not lend the CEO any renewed credibility.[4] Rather, the action made the bank’s board members look like they were trying to do what was necessary, given the CEO’s underperformance during the Senate hearing.

The full essay is at "Difficulty of Ethical Leadership."

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1. Michael Corkery, “Illegal Activity at Wells Fargo May Have Begun Earlier, Chief Says,” The New York Times, September 20, 2016.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Stacy Cowley, “Wells Fargo to Claw Back $41 Million of Chief’s Pay Over Scandal,” The New York Times, September 27, 2016.