On the Role of Business in a Societal or Global Catastrophe

While it is obvious that a business or industry can affect and be affected by its environment, such as by polluting a river and a hurricane, respectively, it is less well known that a business or an entire industry can cause or facilitate a societal or global crisis. Whereas polluting a river can be answered with government regulation, the very legitimacy (and thus ongoing operations) of a company or even an entire industry is arguably at risk in knowingly creating or significantly worsening a societal/global crisis. The latter role goes beyond the scope of government regulation and corporate social responsibility, although broadening or just enforcing anti-trust laws may be sufficient to deal with the lost legitimacy. That is to say, what I have in mind is another genre or type of problem.

The full essay is at "On the Role of Business in a Societal or Global Catastrophe."

The FAA Deferred to Boeing on the 737 MAX Jet

After a misfiring-prone automatic stall-prevention device on the 737 MAX jet had caused two accidents in which 346 people died, an internal review at the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, a regulatory agency, found that the regulators had relied too much on Boeing employees to conduct the safety inspections of the planes. Incredibly, Congress expanded the industry-reliance practice of the agency in 2018. Both the FAA and Congress were admittedly motivated by the added efficiency that such “sub-contracting” could bring. However, to focus on the economic benefit while ignoring the inherent (and obvious) conflict of interest in “sub-contracting” to the very companies that are regulated by the FAA is itself a red flag. A subservient or over-reliant regulatory agency cannot be a check on a company’s claims of not having sacrificed safety or even safety checks in order to focus more on profitability.  Of course, the political influence of a large company such as Boeing may have played a role in the FAA’s “back-seat” approach, but in this case the government’s own interest in stretching the coverage of its human resources may have been dominant. That such an interest could involve minimizing or ignoring outright such a blatant conflict of interest may point to a wider culture in which institutional conflicts of interest are presumed to be innocuous or even benign rather than too toxic to permit even if they have not been actively exploited.  

The full essay is at "FAA Deferred to a Regulatee."