Showing posts with label state government debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label state government debt. Show all posts

Thursday, May 1, 2025

Bottom-Heavy Federalism: The E.U. Stability and Growth Pact

With Russia still in Ukraine in 2025, the E.U. faced pressure to enact more laws and regulations at the federal, yes, federal level to reap the benefits of collective, coordinated action. Although the fear that Russia might invade one or more of the eastern E.U. states was probably unrealistic, given that Russia was still mired in Ukraine, the crisis of an invasion so close to the E.U. could legitimately serve as a “wake-up call” for the federal and state officials in the E.U. to get their federal system of dual sovereignty in order. The ability of state governments to successfully evade the state deficit and debt limits in the federal Stability and Growth Pact and the flipside of the Commission’s weakness can be read as indicative that more work is needed to get to a viable federal system. The states have been able to weaken the limitations successively over years, including by leveraging the fear of invasion by Russia as a call for more defense spending at the state rather than at the federal level.


The full essay is at "Bottom-Heavy Federalism."

Monday, March 4, 2019

President Obama's Proposal to Rescue States: Unattended Problems in American Federalism and Human Sustenance

In 2011, President Obama proposed "to ride to the rescue of states" that had borrowed billions of dollars from the federal government to continue to pay unemployment benefits during the economic downturn. His plan was to "give the states a two-year breather before automatic tax increases would hit employers, and before states would have to start paying interest on the loans." Many of the states had begun the recession with "too little money in their unemployment trust funds'" Those states "quickly ran through what little they had as unemployment rose and remained stubbornly high month after month. With their own trust funds depleted, 30 states borrowed $42 billion from the federal government to continue paying unemployment benefits." These states were facing an estimated $1.3 billion in interest payments to Washington due in the fall of 2011. The President’s proposal also included raising the minimum taxable wage base from $7,000 to $15,000 in 2014. "The rate of the federal portion of the unemployment taxes would then be lowered, so the proposal would not raise federal taxes on states that do not owe the federal government money. But it would speed the rate at which states that do owe money repay the federal government, and allow states to collect more unemployment taxes to rebuild their trust funds if they do not lower their tax rates." By February, 2011, eighteen states had already raised their minimum taxable wage base to $15,000 or more, according to the National Association of State Workforce Agencies. Iris Lav, an adviser at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, said that the unemployment system was “a constellation of problems" that needed to be solved." She added that the near-term problem was the economy, and "both the interest payments and the principal repayments are [were] cutting into employers, and it [made] great sense to postpone them." The larger question was how to "get states to solvency.”[1]

Analysis of the proposal is at "Proposal to Rescue States."


1. Michael Cooper and Sheryl Stolberg, "Obama Plans to Rescue States with Debt Burdens," The New York Times, February 8, 2011.

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Slovak Resistance to Expanding the E.U. Bailout in 2011

Richard Sulik, Parliament Speaker of the Slovakian legislature, argued that the only real solution to the debt crisis in the E.U. was rigorous enforcement of the E.U. regulations on budget deficits and public debt. He had been particularly angered by his state, the second poorest in the E.U., having to bail-out a richer state that had consistently violated the E.U. regulations. Additional debt, he insisted, was not a way out for the PIGS. Slovakia, after all, had to adhere to strict limits on everything from budget deficits to inflation rates in order to be able to adopt the euro. “Now when I see what is being allowed for Greece and Italy, it really makes me angry,” Sulik admitted. “We have to pay because of this double standard. It’s a real injustice.” Indeed it was. Bailing out Greece so the state would not default effectively rewarded that state government for profligate spending and tax avoidance in violation of the E.U. regulations.  

The full essay is at "Slovak Resistance."

Sunday, December 3, 2017

Unsustainable Structural Fiscal and Federal Imbalances: The American Union

The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) announced on January 26, 2011 that the U.S. Government’s budget deficit for the year would soar to nearly $1.5 trillion, which represents $414 billion more due to the extension of the Bush tax cuts. The deficit had been $1.4 trillion in 2009 and $1.3 trillion in 2010. According to the New York Times, based on the CBO, “the deficits of $1.4 trillion in 2009 and $1.3 trillion in 2010 are, when measured as a share of gross domestic product, the largest since 1945 — representing 10 percent and 8.9 percent of the nation’s output.” The budget officials also projected the deficit for 2012 would be $1.1 trillion. These figures dwarf the budget deficits even of the 1980s.

Friday, December 1, 2017

ECB Loans: A Backdoor Bailout?

On December 8, 2011, the ECB announced that it would loan 489.2 billion euros (c. $640 billion) at 1% interest to 523 E.U. banks for a three-year term. Carl Weinberg, chief economist at a consulting firm, said that by making the move, the ECB had “shown a path toward averting catastrophic collapse in Europe.” The move has been likened to that of the Federal Reserve after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. It was hoped that the E.U. banks would use the money to buy state bonds—particularly those of Spain and Italy, which were not able to “directly tap” ECB funds. According to Investor’s Business Daily, however, early signs pointed to bank declining to purchase the riskier debt. While understandable given Angela Merkel’s objections to the ECB serving as a backdoor bailout of profligate states over their heads in debt, the ECB’s refusal to put conditions on how the loans could be used may have undercut the central bank’s effort to relieve bank liquidity (and state debt) problems in the E.U.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Sunday, July 30, 2017

The Spanish Recovery: On the Roles of Budget Constraints and Exports

In 2007, the E.U. state of Spain “was hopelessly addicted to a credit-fueled construction boom that produced a shattering bust, leaving banks collapsing in the face of bad loans.”[1] A decade later, the state’s economy was “expanding at around 3 percent” over the previous year, “producing goods for export, generating jobs,” and pointing to possible E.U.-wide economic recovery.[2] The Spanish economy had returned to its pre-crisis size, according to the state’s government, yet the economy had not yet solidified a firm foundation and unemployment was still stubbornly high.

The full essay is at "The Spanish Recovery."

See Related: Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon. 



1. Peter S. Goodman, “Spain’s Long Economic Nightmare Is Finally Over,” The New York Times, July 28, 2017.
2. Ibid.

Thursday, July 20, 2017

Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis

The collection of essays comprising The E.U. Political Economy looks broadly at the E.U.'s federal system, with particular attention to the states, including the matter of "Brexit," which refers to the secession of Britain from the Union. The text then turns more narrowly to the government-debt and banking crisis that occurred in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. The backdrop of federalism is meant to convey the point that weaknesses in that political system hampered the E.U.'s handing of its states and banks that were in trouble with debt. Lastly, several essays are presented on some more general aspects of the E.U.'s political economy. Rather than being heavily theory-oriented, the essays draw on contemporaneous news reports to quote from practitioners from business and government.


Essays on the E.U. Political Economy is available in print or as an ebook at Amazon.

Saturday, September 12, 2015

Corbyn as Labour Party Leader in Britain: Are Increased Deficits Implied or Avoidable?

The notion that a political party oriented to redressing the widening economic inequality during the years following the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent debt-crisis in the E.U. necessarily must increase government deficits to do so is, I submit, faulty. That is to say, being especially oriented to the plight of the poor, with the goal being the elimination of extreme poverty, can be consistent with fiscal responsibility. The election of a socialist as leader of Britain’s Labour party presents us with an interesting case of assumed fiscal irresponsibility.

The complete essay is at "Anti-Poverty and Budget Deficits."

Jeremy Corbyn upon being elected as leader of the British Labour Party (Jeff Mitchell/Getty)


Friday, January 23, 2015

Deficiencies in the E.U. Capital Markets: A Silver Lining

Even six years after the financial crisis of 2008, the limited scale of the E.U.’s capital markets relative to their American counterparts exacerbated the E.U.’s problems with state debt. Most directly, the lack of diversification on the types of capital markets meant that the focus on the bonds issued by state governments would continue.[1] Having had years to develop alternative markets since the financial crisis, E.U. policy makers had no one to blame but themselves—it would seem. However, a bright spot in European culture may be responsible for the lack of development.

The full essay is at “Deficiencies in the E.U. Capital Markets.”


1. Simon Nixon, “A Continent in Need of Greater Capital Markets,” The Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2015.

Friday, June 21, 2013

Governmental Paralysis in Illinois: Behind the Underfunded Pension Crisis

Sometimes when a government’s fiscal matters get bad enough, dysfunction in the real power-relations at the highest level can suddenly become painfully obvious, or transparent, as when Toto pulls the curtain away to reveal the man behind the “all and powerful” Wizard of Oz. 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Friday, May 24, 2013

Taxes and Health Insurance: The United States Diverge Toward a Stronger Union

One of the main benefits of federalism is that it allows for both the tremendous power that can come from member states taking a united stance and cultural and related political interstate diversity. In other words, federalism is not only a means of checking governmental power by means of splitting governmental sovereignty between two systems of government—state and federal—but also a way of giving empires the advantages of both united action and diversity. In the case of the U.S., the power of uniting forces far surpasses the allowance for interstate diversity because consolidation in Congress and the White House has come to eclipse the power of the state governments. Although it is not sufficient to restore a semblance of balance between the two systems of government in the American federal system, it is nonetheless significant that “red” and “blue” states moved in different directions subsequent to the 2010 elections both in terms of tax and health-insurance policy. 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

Monday, May 6, 2013

Does Austerity Work?

Does raising taxes and cutting government spending reduce a government’s deficits and thus debt? Confine consideration to more tax revenue and less spent and the theoretical answer is yes; it being a simple matter of mathematics. Include the impacts of raising taxes and cutting spending and the answer become far less straightforward. More paid in tax means less disposable income, which means less consumption and thus less produced (i.e., GNP). A government spending less also means less consumption in the economy, and therefore even less to be produced to meet demand. In short, austerity is recessionary. Whether the ratios of deficit and debt to GDP increase depends on how much the numerators drop relative to the decrease in GDP. We can look at the E.U. for some empirical evidence.


 If austerity kills dignity, then pressure on governments to relax spending cuts can be expected.   source: rt.com
The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Monday, October 29, 2012

German Conservatives Ease Up on Greece

During the summer of 2012, it was all too easy, especially for financial analysts (whose expertise is on finance rather than politics), to summarily conclude that the E.U. was not capable of keeping the states of Greece and Spain from default. Perhaps the human brain has an innate proclivity to think in bipolar terms in the sense that something (or someone) is presumed either “good” or “bad.” Empirically, social organization, which includes politics and finance, is typically more gray than “black and white.” This is undoubtedly the case concerning the political risk analysis that goes into assessments of systemic risk, especially where uncertainty is salient. In general terms, I would say that as of 2012 the anticipated demise of the euro (and even the E.U.) was much exaggerated. Somehow or other, European policy-makers were able to hold the federal ship-of-state together in spite of its vulnerabilities.

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available at Amazon.

Thursday, September 6, 2012

ECB Bond-Buying: Democracy Deficit

In September 2012, the European Central Bank unveiled the Outright Monetary Transactions program in which the central bank would purchase bonds from debt-laden E.U. states that use that euro and agree to “strict and effective” budget policy. The bank’s head, Mario Draghi, insisted that the program is within the bank’s mandate to protect the value of the euro. Indirectly, if a state government that uses the euro were to default, the currency itself would face downward pressure that could cascade into the collapse of the currency.

Will the ECB be the one to save the euro?     Estonian Free Times

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

Bulgaria Shrugs Off the Euro

In early September 2012, Reuters reported that Bulgaria had “abandoned plans to adopt the single currency in response to deteriorating economic conditions and rising uncertainty over the prospects of the European Union. Finance Minister Simeon Djankov was quoted as saying as much.  Bulgaria was at the time the poorest state in the E.U. (similar perhaps to Mississippi in the U.S.). It is significant that Bulgaria was one of the least indebted states and was “trying to stick to tight fiscal discipline to avoid risks to the lev currency, which [was at the time] pegged to the euro.” In this regard, Bulgaria was like Finland and Germany in that it faced the prospect of paying for other states’ profligacy and lack of self-discipline. From this vantage point, it makes perfect sense for Bulgaria to demur. However, the perspective may be short-sighted in another respect. Specifically, Bulgaria risked missing the boat on the E.U.



The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Poorest at Risk: U.S. States Cut Lifelines

“State finances are teetering with $4 trillion in unfunded liabilities to cover pensions and health care for state workers, along with revenue shortfalls, antiquated financial practices and skyrocketing Medicaid costs.” This according to the Huffington Post, based on a report in July 2012 by State Budget Crisis Task Force, which was organized by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker (R) and former New York Lt. Gov. Richard Ravitch (D). Volcker and Ravitch said that unfunded state government pension obligations could total as much as $3 trillion, triple the $1 trillion estimate produced by the states. This is in addition to the $1 trillion in unfunded health care obligations for retired state employees. This does not include the rising Medicaid costs. The report notes that state governments have been borrowing to pay for operating expenses in order to comply with state constitutional mandates for balanced budgets. Those loans and the practice of shifting spending between budget categories make balanced budgets "illusory," the report said. Lastly, Volcker and Ravitch point out that "one-shot" financial measures are common in state governments, including those that pile up debt for the future.

The most striking thing concerning the finances of the states studied (California, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Virginia) is the noted threat to the social order itself. "The thing that worries me is the threats to the social order," Ravitch told The Huffington Post, noting that "cultural and social bankruptcy precede financial bankruptcy." "You can't cut human services and cut the ability of government to take care of the people"—meaning without expecting the collapse of the social order. Such a slide tends to be gradual, sliding below the radar screen of the general public.

For example, during 2011 over 500 people in the U.S. died every week because they were without access to health care. That’s like having a full A380 (the double-decker jumbo-jet, larger than the 747) crash every week of the year, albeit without the headlines. The collapse of a social contract happens gradually, without much fanfare because enough of the electorate is unaffected.

Furthermore, the changes that led to an increased reliance on government entitlement programs by the most vulnerable in society were gradual as well. The increasing divorce rate beginning in the 1970s and the increasing geographical distance permitted by air travel during the last quarter of the twentieth century are just two factors making it less likely that families would care for their own. The daily demands of sustenance mean that charitable organizations could not possibly pick up the slack. As a result, government entitlement programs became the default. Compromising them without providing for an alternative could not but put the social order (a.k.a. social contract) at risk, even if this risk is not shared or even noticed by the majority of the electorate.

To obviate the collapse of its social order, a government would have to distinguish between sustenance programs and the other budget categories. To give but one simplistic example, a town can do without its municipal pool for a summer, but a homeless man needs food every day. Cutting ten percent from both categories ignores this vital distinction, and thus puts the social order at risk, even if people do not notice that the man is no longer sleeping on the bench but has died.

Source:

John Gelock, “Paul Volcker, Richard Ravitch Say State Budget Crisis Threatens ‘Social Order,’” The Huffington Post, July 17, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/17/paul-volcker-richard-ravitch-budget_n_1677739.html

Friday, April 27, 2012

The E.U.: The Growth Union

In relying only on austerity and cheap bailout loans, the German-led strategy has proffered a false sense of European integration in the E.U. Even as expanding the bailout funds to roughly 800 billion euros and strengthening the E.U.’s means of enforcing limits on state deficits and debt are along the line of continued incremental shifts of governmental sovereignty from the state governments to that of the E.U., the related austerity (and recession) sparked a populist backlash in several states. At the state level (and this level has a major role at the E.U. level—unlike in the U.S.), the state-rights (i.e., anti-E.U.) parties have been the beneficiaries even if they could not gain outright majorities. The National Front in the state of France is an obvious example, as it captured 18% of the vote in the run up to the general election in 2012.  Other things equal, such a spike translates into brakes on further European integration in the medium term.


The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Friday, October 7, 2011

The Debt Crisis: A Conflict of Interest Hampers the E.U.’s Response

“As the European Union enters a financial crisis in slow motion,” a Huffington Post reporter avers, “the fragile American economic recovery hangs in the balance. With Greece almost certain to default on its debt, European political leaders need to take decisive action to prevent a resultant string of bank runs and government defaults, which could precipitate double-dip recessions in Europe and the United States.”[1] If Greece suddenly defaults, Kavoussi reasons, other E.U. states “could leave the European Union to flee higher interest rates and to enable themselves to pay down their debt more easily by devaluing their currencies.”[2] Such an outcome, she claims, “would almost certainly plunge Europe into a recession.”[3] She observes, moreover, that “European politicians may lack the political will necessary to prevent the sovereign debt crisis from mushrooming into a global economic slowdown.”[4]
 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

1. Bonnie Kavoussi, “European Sovereign Debt CrisisThreatens American Economy,” The Huffington Post, September 27, 2011.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Thursday, July 7, 2011

Voluntary Greek-Debt Maturity Extensions: A Rush for the Exits?

As the E.U. was working out more loans for Greece in summer 2011, rating agencies looking at the state’s debt indicated that default would be pronounced should the decision of bond-holders to continue to hold Greek bonds be anything less than voluntary. Germany had been pushing for something less than voluntary so taxpayers would not have to bear so much of the risk and cost. France, doing the bidding of its banks, effectively used the rating agencies’ default-guidelines to insist that additional E.U. loans do not require then-current bond-holders to agree to later maturities. Given the extent of Greece’s debt-load relative to the state’s GDP, a private sector bond-holder, such as a bank, would naturally loose little time in getting out of holding Greek debt, even given the high interest rates (which reflect the risk).  


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Tuesday, February 1, 2011

The Federal Reserve to Buy More U.S. T-Bills but No State Debt

According to The New York Times, “At their first meeting of the year, Federal Reserve policy makers voted unanimously … to continue the central bank’s controversial $600 billion plan to spur the recovery by buying government bonds.”[1] In other words, the central bank would continue to “print money” to buy up U.S. Government debt, allowing that government to go into more debt without putting pressure on the interest rate to go up (which would cost the government more in interest payments to bondholders).


The full essay is at "The Federal Reserve."

1. Sewell Chan, "Fed to Continue Bond Buying Program," The New York Times, January 26, 2011.