The Tyranny of the Veto: Eviscerating the U.N.

Russia and China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution on October 4, 2011, effectively tossing a life preserver, according to the New York Times, to Syria’s president. The toothless proposal would have condemned the Syrian government for its violent crackdown of popular protests in which more than 2,700 had been killed. The proposal’s language had been softened from targeted financial sanctions; the council would merely have been charged with considering unspecified measures after a 30-day period. Two reasons can be cited for the two vetoes: commercial ties and a vested interest in forestalling any more threats to the doctrine of national sovereignty.

The full essay is at "Tyranny of the Veto: Eviscerating the UN."

The Russian Orthodox Church as a Political-Moral Force: A Case of Religion Overextended?

While visiting the Pskovo-Pechersky Monastery in northwestern Russia in 2000, Vladimir Putin wrote in the guest book, “The revival of Russia and growth of its might are unthinkable without the strengthening of society’s moral foundations. The role and significance of the Russian Orthodox Church are huge. May God protect you.” This statement is revealing concerning what has perhaps fueled the Russian president’s vision, at least ideally.

 Archimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov, head of the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow    NYT

The full essay is at "The Russian Church as Politico-Moral."

The Evolution of Just War in Roman Catholic Social Ethics: The Case of Libya

According to The Catholic Herald, there were originally only three conditions laid down by Thomas Aquinas for a just war. According to The Catholic Herald, “The Church later added two more rules, though St Thomas usually gets the credit for them (and why not?). The first is that the conflict must be a last resort. The Catholic Herald describes the last criterion of Catholic just war theory as follows: “Lastly, the war must be fought proportionally. 

The full essay is at "The Evolution of Just War in Roman Catholic Social Ethics." 

Lessons Learned from the Arab Spring

"When a leader's only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against his own people, he has lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now." The White House issued this written statement five days after Qaddafi had turned in violence on his own people who were protesting unarmed in the street. Nearly three weeks after the first day that Qaddafi had lost legitimacy, President Obama tried to raise the pressure on the Libyan dictator further by talking about “a range of potential options, including potential military options."  Yet by then the politics of such intervention were getting more complicated by the day, according to the New York Times. The paper reported that critics were contending that the White House was too much concerned about perceptions, and that the administration was too squeamish on the military options on account of the preceding administration's invasion of Iraq based on a claim of danger to the United States from Saddam's access to WMD.

Even the critics acknowledged that the best outcome militarily would be for the United States to join other nations or international organizations rather than go it alone. About a week after the president's hint of military options, the E.U. decided not to impose a No Fly Zone. A few days later, the Arab League, which, according to the Huffington Post, had already barred Libya's government from taking part in League meetings, issued a statement that Qaddafi's government had "lost its sovereignty." The League decided to establish contacts with the rebels' interim government, the National Libyan Council, and to call on the Security Council of the U.N. to impose a No Fly Zone on Libya. 

In a statement, the Arab League asked the "United Nations to shoulder its responsibility ... to impose a no-fly zone over the movement of Libyan military planes and to create safe zones in the places vulnerable to airstrikes." It would not be until March 18th, nearly a month after Qaddafi had first had weapons used against the protesters, that the Security Council would act. According to The New York Times, "After days of often acrimonious debate, played out against a desperate clock, as Colonel Qaddafi’s troops advanced to within 100 miles of the rebel capital of Benghazi, Libya, the Security Council authorized member nations to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, diplomatic code words calling for military action." Within days, according to the New York Times, "American and European forces began a broad campaign of strikes against the government of . . . Qaddafi, unleashing warplanes and missiles in the first round of the largest international military intervention in the Arab world since the invasion of Iraq.

The analysis is at "Lessons Learned from the Arab Spring."

Hillary Clinton Bested by a Syrian General

“I don’t think Russia and China believe they are paying any price at all — nothing at all — for standing up on behalf of the Assad regime,” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at the so-called “Friends of Syria” meeting, which took place at Paris in the E.U. on July 6, 2012. According to the New York Times, the alliance was being “shunned by Russia and China.” Holding Moscow and Beijing to account would be no easy feat, given the power of the two empires. Clinton said that every participant at the meeting would have “directly and urgently” make it clear to Russian and Chinese officials that their respective governments (and presumably economies) would pay a price forthwith should the support for Assad continue. Yet even as she made these remarks, Clinton must have known that the chances of that happening were practically nil, given the problems entailed in getting various governments to act in concert, not to mention be on the same page, even when there is general agreement.

The impotence of the diplomatic effort was made palpable by what was happening on the ground in Syria. As the meeting was in progress, General Tlass, a commander of the Syrian Republican Guard and a close friend of Assad, was on his way to Paris after having defected. “If people like him, and like the generals and colonels and others who have recently defected to Turkey are any indication, regime insiders and the military establishment are starting to vote with their feet,” Clinton told reporters. “We know that the Assad regime will fall. The question is how many more people have to die before that happens.” It is a sad commentary on the “national sovereignty” basis of international relations so favored by the Russian and Chinese governments that the question would have to be answered by events on the ground rather than by the governments then meeting in Paris.  It was as though two governments out of hundreds were being allowed to hold the world hostage, thereby enabling Assad. Unlike the world, which seemed mired in strategies out of a playbook of political realism, Gen. Tlass voted with his feet. In effect, Russia and China had won, having been given the presumed or artificial advantage wherein their respective vetoes were considered legitimate in forestalling even the "Friends" from voting with their collective feet on the ground.

Source:

Dan Bilefsky, Alan Cowell, and Neil Mac Farquhar, “General’sDefection Confirmed as Syria Opposition Meets,” The New York Times, July 6, 2012.