Showing posts with label finance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label finance. Show all posts

Friday, June 5, 2026

On the Politics of International Real-Estate Projects: The Case of Albania

During times of global peace, it is easy to suppose that increased economic interdependency between countries reduce the likelihood of war due to the ramifications on the business projects. By a similar logic by analogy, a couple could suppose that by getting married, the increased interdependence would make breaking up more difficult, and thus less likely. What is overlooked here is that emotions, whether in a romantic relationship or between governments, can, if allowed to go unchecked, break through the parchment barriers that we set up as if they could constrain even intense, ongoing emotions. A couple using marriage as a substitute for going to couples-counseling could actually make a break-up more likely once in the marriage. Similarly, peace abroad and domestic tranquility can be thwarted by international real-estate development projects themselves. Such a situation was unfolding in Albania in mid-2026.


The full essay is at "On the Politics of International Real-Estate Projects."

Friday, March 2, 2018

The Downfall of MF Global: Implications for Banks Too Big To Fail

Here is an alphabet-soup of regulatory agencies that let MF Global, a financial services company that specialized in futures-trading, engage in much, too much, risk: SEC, CME, CFTC and FINRA. On one level, regulators will never be able to stop practitioners from making risky or simply bad decisions; a business system populated only by firms above average is by definition impossible. As long as their managers have any freedom of movement at all, some firms, including some in the financial sector, will inevitably fail. The question I want to pose is whether this means that firms too big to fail (TBTF) should be allowed to exist at all. In short, although MF Global itself was not TBTF, the risk Corzine (who had been chairman of Goldman Sachs) permitted suggests that human nature might be insufficiently disposed to support mammoth concentrations of private capital whose fall could mean the collapse of the financial system itself. Ultimately, I suppose, human nature can only go so far, organizationally speaking.

The full essay is at "The Downfall of MF Global."

Wednesday, October 25, 2017

On the Myopic Hyperbole of Wall Street: Overblowing Small Changes

I suppose that after looking at something closely for a long period of time, virtually anyone would perceive a small change in it as huge. This is reflected in how people formulate graphs. In particular, typically only a small interval is shown, the perceptual impact of which is that small changes look big. For example, Msnbc.com reported on June 8, 2011 that the price of oil “soared” on that day “almost $2 to near $101 a barrel.” My reaction in reading the report was that the word “soared” indicates a lack of perspective on Wall Street and the media.

The full essay is at "Exaggerating Market Volatility."

Tuesday, February 28, 2017

Biblically-Based Investment Funds: A Matter of Priorities

Is it biblical to say a Christian can serve both God and money? In the Gospels, Jesus speaks to this point directly; it is not possible. In early 2017, Inspire Investing established two new exchange-traded funds having a “biblically responsible” approach to investing—meaning that they would avoid buying shares in companies that have “any degree of participation in activities that do not align with biblical values.”[1] That such activities include even tolerance for gay employees raises the question of just how practical an evangelical investment strategy is after the U.S. Supreme Court made gay marriage legal in all of the 50 republics making up the U.S.

The full essay is at "Biblically-Based Investment Funds."



1. Liz Moyer, “Alongside Faith in Investing, Funds Offer Investment Rooted in Faith,” The New York Times, February 28, 2017.

Sunday, August 23, 2015

American Consumers Using Gas-Savings to Reduce Debt: Frugality or Responsibility?

The steep drop in the price of oil in July 2015 was a concern for traders. Drillers and other energy companies comprise a significant portion of the S&P 500 index. “The upside to falling oil is that all the money that drivers are saving at the gas pump should mean more spending by them at stores — and a faster-growing U.S. economy. But Americans are choosing to pay off debt instead of going shopping.”[1] Is this a bad thing? In reckoning it as such, Wall Street analysts are missing the big picture, even financially.

The full essay is at “Wall Street Defining American Society.”

Gas at a station in January 2015 (ABC News)




[1] Bernard Condon and Ken Sweet, “Why Stocks Are Tumbling 6 Years into the Bull Market,” The Associated Press, August 23, 2015.

Friday, January 17, 2014

Making Business More Interesting: Beyond the Jargon and Figures

From a historical perspective, I suspect that what “counts,” or is recognized, as discourse on business has consecutively narrowed. An enterprising scholar in the field of business and society, which itself has narrowed to managerial tools and ideological demands (under the subterfuge of knowledge), might compare the media’s coverage of business firms beginning to sell electricity, the telephone, and the auto-carriage (i.e., automobile) in the early decades of the twentieth century with reports a century later on firms bringing out life-changing products like smartphones and other applications of computer technology. Not having been around when electricity was making houses brighter and telephones as well as cars were fundamentally changing human interaction and mobility, people following the business news on Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Google, and Microsoft do not have the historical perspective necessary to assess how broad or narrow the coverage is. 

I contend that what is considered business news (and discourse) is artificially constrained, in that coverage is biased toward the companies themselves (most particularly in CEO antics and financial numbers) at the expense, or opportunity cost, of attention on exciting new products. Put another way, the public discourse on business need not be so reductionist. The trajectory is not good for business or society. I contend that broadening (i.e., rather than replacing one media obsession with another) the coverage in business news to include, and, indeed, emphasize, substantive information on, as well as discussion of, the exciting new uses and wider implications of the companies’ respective technologically advanced products would render business news as well as business itself much more interesting, especially to people in the wider society. In this essay, I sketch how a product-centric approach would look in the business media; hopefully, the sheer difference between this alternative and the status quo reporting will provide a sense of how much journalistic discretion is involved in what we watch and read in business news.


CNBC and Fox Business News provide much material for analyzing the business media, and can be taken as illustrative of the default that had taken hold by the 2010s. The devil is in the details, so I want to concentrate on a particular example and reason inductively to generalize to the business media overall.

An interview taking place on CNBC. The choice of questions may be more important than the answers. (Image Source: Inside Cable News)

On “Squawk on the Street,” a program on CNBC, the anchors interviewed Harvey Spevak, the CEO of Equinox (a company in the fitness industry), answered questions on January 17, 2014. I want to focus on the importance on the questions. One of the show’s anchors asked Spevak about his company’s plan to offer genome analysis as a service to customers who would like to know how they respond generally to exercise. Rather than follow up with a question to illicit what customers would learn about the way they react to exercise, the journalist asked if the service was “just a marketing gimmick.” I submit that probing the service if only to assess its staying power with consumers would have been more useful to not only investors and stock analysts, but also people who would not be interested in watching and hearing a cacophony of numbers presumptuously assuming the high ground as “king of the hill” of business news.

One implication from the interviewer’s choice of follow-up question is that investor interests, assumed to be exclusively bottom-line financial, trump consumer and entrepreneur (or even competitor) interests. Such reductionism is unnecessary, and the numbers orientation may not actually be in the interests of the investors and financial analysts, not to mention CNBC’s ratings.

The interview then turned to company’s foray into wearable fitness technology. Here, the interviewer had little interest in making the products concrete for prospective customers and the wider public; he was satisfied with the Spevak’s vague description, which ended with, “It’s science.” The journalist made the choice to follow-up instead by asking what profits the CEO expected the company would make on the wearables, and, moreover, whether an IPO might come anytime soon. Potential investors (and stock analysts) would be better equipped to evaluate a future IPO were the CEO to have discussed what how the wearables could benefit users (i.e., what the products can do) as well as how the products might change our daily lives and society itself. The anchor then turned his guest to the subject of online advertising, hence inadvertently feeding the obsessive mentality in the American media generally by treating advertising as an end in itself rather than a means of making potential and even existing customers aware of products and services.

All too often, information and public discourse on products a leap ahead technologically (and hence seemingly unfathomable) are relegated to “print” reports of product announcements, such as of Google’s new contact lens that measures glucose levels. People with diabetes would quite naturally be very interested in how the new product would likely impact their daily lives. A huge segment of potential viewers and readers could be drawn in by any media outlet willing to stay on the announcement rather than run to vague considerations of profitability and stock charts.

Does not the true value (and significance, not to mention the excitement) of products coming out of leaps in technology or hitherto unrealized applications of existing technology lie in the stuff we can do with the new toys? As a writer, I get excited when I come up with a novel point or perspective to share with others because I have experienced what it feels like to have my perspective “opened up” from reading a unique piece. I am not thrilled in reading about grammar or composition tips, on the other hand; I do such “mechanical” reading as a means of improving my ability to communicate to readers. 

Public discourse on business too often obsesses on the means—even taking them to be ends in themselves­. Consequently, interest is typically confined to a narrow segment (i.e., the financial wonks). Ironically, Wall Street would be better served with the media giving more attention to the new products and their societal implications, with the expected financial consequences being secondary rather than excluded in yet another manifestation of tunnel vision. Reports and commentary on novel products themselves (as well as innovative ways of business) do indeed fall within the domain of business discourse. In fact, I would say the reorientation is more in line with the true significance of business (i.e., making and providing products that consumers want to use). Tapping into this core of business, while still attending to the financials, would, I suspect, attract a broader array of viewers and readers in the wider society beyond the business world. As an added bonus, business practitioners, investors, and even stock analysts might find their own interest piqued. A stock analyst excited as much (or more) about a novel product as charts and figures may do a better job in assessing a company’s value, and thus likely stock trend.

Of course, in order for more of the general population to realize that the true significance of business is actually more interesting, the business journalists would have to wean themselves and their interviewees off the snazzy jargon, nearly devoid of any real meaning and yet ubiquitous in the business world. The artificial excitement over such words or phrases as “champion,” “coach,” “growing leaders,” “driving” (not as in driving a car), “drivers,” and “leveraging” (beyond its oversold application to debt) is misguided in that the obsession and related excitement (out of vacuous boredom?) distract everyone from the true font of excitement in business. Additionally, the weirdness in both the sheer obsessiveness on particular words—flavors of the month—and the misuses themselves, and the artificial narrowing of what counts as business that enables knowing and enjoying the “language” to function as the passkey keep people outside the business world from becoming excited about business rather than laughing at its inhabitants’ discourse. Perhaps the practitioners and journalists who play in the business world figure, quite unconsciously of course, that business as they understand it is not really very exciting, and, therefore, that few if any people in the wider society would be likely to get excited about business anyway.

Friday, April 13, 2012

Credit-Card Companies in a Conflict of Interest

On April 12, 2012, Hawaii sued Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Barclays, Capital One, Discover, HSBC, and their subsidiaries, “claiming that the banks ‘slammed’ Hawaii credit card customers, charging them for products customers didn't need and that the companies never provided.”[1] The Hawaiian government alleges that the banks used “‘predatory tactics to sign up customers for services they either don’t want or don't qualify for,’ and the companies charged their customers ‘without their knowledge or consent,’ according to a press release issued by the Hawaii attorney general's office.”[2] According to the Attorney General, David Louie, “You don't know that you're enrolling, but they say, 'Oh you just enrolled,' okay, and now they've put a charge on your credit card.”[3]  The banks’ telemarketing departments may have charged customers an average of $150 in the form of small charges.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.


1. Bonnie Kavoussi, “Hawaii Sues Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Others For DeceptiveCredit Card Marketing,” The Huffington Post, April 13, 2012.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Thursday, August 25, 2011

Refinancing Mortgages: Only for the Rich?

According to the U.S. Government, prices of homes with government-backed mortgages fell 5.9% in the second quarter of 2011 from a year earlier. This was the biggest decline since 2009, which was on the heels of the credit crisis of late 2008. In 2011, more than one in five homeowners with mortgages owed more than their homes are worth. That translates to at least 10.9 million families, almost none of whom could refinance. While the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve were able to pump hundreds of billions of dollars into American banks, federal programs to assist homeowners had been regarded as ineffective.. [1] Out of the $45.6 billion in TARP funds (the total being $800 billion) set aside to help struggling homeowners, only $22.9 billion had been spent by August 2011. Fewer than 1.7 million loans had been modified under federal programs as of 2011. Just over 760,000 permanent mortgage modifications had been initiated under the government programs while at least 5.5 million mortgages were in delinquency or foreclosure. Andrea Risotto, a spokesperson at Treasury, said that the unused portion of the TARP funds for homeowners would be used to reduce the deficit.[2]


The full essay is at "Refinancing Mortgages."


1. Shaila Dewan and Louise Story, “U.S. May Back Refinance Plan for Mortgages,” the New York Times, August 25, 2011. 
2. Ibid.

Tuesday, July 19, 2011

Jamie Dimon of JPMorganChase Exploits an Institutional Conflict of Interest

U.S. Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner, said on July 18, 2011 that he was not concerned about dire warnings from Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, a bank that was too big to fail and thus evinced systemic risk. Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, said the government regulations may have been suffocating the economic recovery. While it was nice of Jamie Dimon to be so civic-minded as to want to protect the recovery, his real objective was likely to increase his bank’s profitability through relaxed financial regulations in the U.S. If so, his ulterior motive was not in line with the economy overall, much less with society and the common good.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Thursday, July 7, 2011

Voluntary Greek-Debt Maturity Extensions: A Rush for the Exits?

As the E.U. was working out more loans for Greece in summer 2011, rating agencies looking at the state’s debt indicated that default would be pronounced should the decision of bond-holders to continue to hold Greek bonds be anything less than voluntary. Germany had been pushing for something less than voluntary so taxpayers would not have to bear so much of the risk and cost. France, doing the bidding of its banks, effectively used the rating agencies’ default-guidelines to insist that additional E.U. loans do not require then-current bond-holders to agree to later maturities. Given the extent of Greece’s debt-load relative to the state’s GDP, a private sector bond-holder, such as a bank, would naturally loose little time in getting out of holding Greek debt, even given the high interest rates (which reflect the risk).  


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Friday, June 17, 2011

British Banking Regulation in the E.U.

Before the financial crisis of 2008, the British government was light on banking regulation compared to other E.U. state governments. Oddly, some Europeans imagined an “Anglo-American” connection or likeness, as the American states had been on a deregulation kick since Carter’s airline and thrift deregulatory laws in the late 1970s. Reagan and the second Bush in particular extenuated the movement, which applied to the entire U.S. common market. After the crisis, however, even as Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives, which is commensurate to the E.U. Parliament, were still voicing support for still more deregulation as though 2008 had not happened, the regulatory tussle in the E.U. reflected the greater involvement of the state governments (i.e., the stronger federalism than the lop-sided variety in the U.S.), with the British government in particular pushing for stronger banking regulation—if not at the E.U. level, then in the state of Britain. “British officials are waging an increasingly aggressive fight to impose banking regulations as they see fit, even if they go further than rules elsewhere in the European Union,” according to The Wall Street Journal. From this quote, we can unpack two distinct though interrelating strains: a desire for tougher banking regulation and an anti-federalism wherein the state governments of the E.U. can go beyond the federal government in terms of the regulation. Both of these points are significant.


The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Long Term Capital Management

By 1997, “after three years of strong profits for LTCM, the opportunities were drying up. There was too much money chasing the same investments. . . . In early 1998, LTMC decided to give a large portion of its capital back to its original investors because profitable opportunities were so hard to find. At the end of 1997, LTCM had nearly $7.5 billion under management, compared to $1 billion when it started, and it now returned $2.7 billion of that to investors. The partners also figured that they could, if necessary, simply leverage their portfolio further to compensate for the loss of capital, which would compound their personal gains. Greed was at the heart of what turned out to be a disastrous decision. . . . Unable to reproduce the returns of the first three years, LTCM took increasingly more risk, abandoning its purer arbitrage for the kinds of ‘directional’ investments Soros made and LTCM had so long disdained—such as trying to forecast interest rate and currency movements. More and more of these trades were unhedged.”[1] Furthermore, “LTCM’s risk models—VAR and related statistical tools . . . –were misleading.”[2] For example, diversification was little protection if there was a run on the banks. When Russia defaulted on August 17, 1997, LTCM’s hedges against its Russian investments were worthless. Furthermore, because all fixed income assets fell sharply in value, “diversification, it turned out, did not matter. The finely calculated relationships on which LTCM was built and which the firm always believed would hold started to come apart. VAR could  not account for such an unlikely but sweeping event—an event in which everyone wanted out at the same time and almost all investments fell significantly in price. The use of VAR itself precipitated much of the selling. Commercial banks under the jurisdiction of the Basel Agreements, which . . . set capital requirements based on the level of VAR (the lower the VAR, the lower the capital required), were forced to sell assets to raise capital.”[3] LTCM lost $1.9 billion that August. Eventually, fourteen banks, organized by the Fed, put together loans of more than $3.5 billion to purchase 90 percent of the firm.” LTCM “did manage to sell down assets in an orderly fashion and by early 2000 it was essentially out of business”[4] 


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011), 277-81.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Monday, March 15, 2010

Lehman Bros: Insufficient Accountability in Corporate Governance

In an executive meeting at Lehman in the summer of 2008, Skip McGee told Richard Fuld and the other top executives that the market was demanding “that we hold ourselves accountable.”  Essentially, he was pushing for Gregory’s outster.  What strikes me is what he didn’t say–namely, something like, “the stockholders are holding us accountable!”[1]  Had he said this, Fuld might have laughed. Of course, Richard Fuld was a major stockholder, so he might have viewed it as “holding myself accountable to myself.”  Given the inherent ethical conflict of interest in such a statement, I don’t think we can rely on corporate governance as a check on excessive managerial risk-taking when executives hold a substantial share of the stock.  Therefore, in including stock options in executive compensation to align executives' incentives with medium and long-term firm performance, boards should add institutional safeguards or accountability mechanisms to corporate governance. In business-speak, there is a cost incurred that boards may not be aware of in aligning executive compensation (and firm ownership) with future profitability.


The full essay is in Essays on the Financial Crisis.

1. Grace Wong and Aaron Smith, "What Killed Lehman," CNN.com, March 15, 2010.