Transgendered (Male) Athletes in Women Sports

While the 2026 World Cup was underway in North America, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling, which is to say, a judgment rationally argued, siding with member-states that did not permit “Y chromosome” students in public schools to play in on “XX chromosome” sports teams. Not being a writer who fecklessly evades controversial topics for fear of turning away some readers, I will attempt to tackle the jurisprudence and ethics of male athletes who self-identify as women playing in women sports such as American football in public schools.

The full essay is at "Transgendered (Male) Athletes in Women Sports."

The U.S. Supreme Court Clipping Judicial Overreach

The separation of powers that characterizes governments in the United States assumes that each branch will act to further its own interests, given the salience of self-interest (and self-preservation) in human nature. It is assumed that the checks and balances between legislative, judicial, and executive branches will keep any one branch from dominating the other two, and, moreover, the government itself from becoming tyrannical at the expense of the liberty of the citizenry. It is not assumed or relied upon that a branch will prune itself without external pressure from one of the other branches. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court may have done so in ruling on June 27, 2025 to limit “the ability of lower-court judges to block executive branch policies nationwide.”[1] I contend that any real wing-clipping by 6 of the 9 justices is illusory rather than indicative of the federal judiciary unilaterally restricting itself.

The full essay is at "The U.S. Supreme Court." 

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1. Abbie Vansickle, “Justices Put Limit on Judges’ Power, In Win for Trump,” The New York Times, June 28, 2025.

American Federalism and Equal Protection: Transsexual Children in Tennessee

On June 18, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Tennessee law blocking transsexual children from being able to undergo puberty-blockers and gender-changing surgeries does not violate the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court’s 6-3 opinion in U.S. v. Skrmetti was reported at the time to fall “largely along conservative-liberal lines.”[1] By this is mean ideological lines, both moral and political in nature. Such is grist for the mill for the broad judgment of an electorate, in what is otherwise known as popular sovereignty, which is superior to governmental sovereignty in a republic. Add in the fact that Tennessee is a member-state in a federal system in which the U.S. Supreme Court is on the federal level, and the broad judgment of the electorate takes on more significance to the extent that a federal system of an empire-scale union is in part supposed to take into account and protect interstate ideological differences that defy one-size-fits-all union-level policies. In other words, as cultural heterogeneity can be expected in going from state to state in an empire-scale union-of-states, efforts “from the top” to impose a single policy on every state do not allow the federation to breath. Political pressure could be expected to build over time if such a suffocating tendency eventuates, with the risk of dissolution increasing over time as if depreciation.

The full essay is at "American Federalism and Equal Protection."

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1. Josh Gerstein, “Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee’s Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors,” Politico.com, June 18, 2025.

Certifying a U.S. Presidential Election: A Constitutional Conflict of Interest

That it should go without saying that a constitution providing a government with its basic framework and procedures should not contain any conflicts of interest makes it all the more astonishing when an actual constitution is found to contain a obvious yet undetected conflict of interest that could be exploited by an institutional or officeholder and yet is easy to obviate, or fix. The implication in such a case is that a society can be too comfortable with institutional conflicts of interest without realizing that if such a conflict is exploitable, it is likely that it eventually will be even if not right away. Because U.S. President Don Trump’s pressure on his vice president, Mike Pence, on January 6, 2021 to refuse to certify the votes of the electors in some of the states did not result in any serious proposals to have another office than the vice presidency preside, a societal tolerance for even known conflicts of interests in general and in a constitution more particularly can be inferred. I submit that such a tacit willingness to continue with the status quo can eventually put even a republic itself at risk.

The full essay is at "Certifying a U.S. Presidential Election."

Undermining the U.S. Supreme Court: Non-Jurisprudential Ideology and the U.S. Constitution

As in the case of the Roman Empire, which internal corruption likely weakened and even destroyed centuries after that empire had been a republic, modern republics are also not immune from internal decay. Even though political corruption can go under the radar, especially if systemic rather than merely episodic or around particular office holders, the subtle, gradual impact can be just as destructive than had Carthage defeated Rome’s general, Skippio Africanus, in north Africa. Making subtle decadence all the more embarrassing is the fact that it can be right under the noses of upstanding office-holders. I contend that this is the case with Chief Justice John Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court.

The full essay is at "Undermining the U.S. Supreme Court."

The U.S. Supreme Court Reining in Regulatory Agencies: Implications for the Imperial Presidency

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 28, 2024, a majority of the justices overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which had been the precedent giving regulatory agencies considerable discretion in coming up with specific regulations, given the penchant of the Congress to write vague laws. In the overturning case, a group of fishermen had objected to having to pay for government observers to board the fishing boats to monitor the fishing. On the merits, it does seem unfair for regulatory agencies to charge the regulated to be regulated. In overturning Chevron, however, Loper has much broader implications, chief among them being in terms of separation of powers—specifically in reining in the expanding power of the executive branch, here at the expense of the judiciary.   

The full essay is at "The U.S. Supreme Court on Regulatory Agencies."

The Colorado Supreme Court Bars Insurrectionist Trump: Who Should Ultimately Decide?

On December 19, 2023, Colorado’s Supreme Court ruled that Don Trump, a former U.S. president, had engaged in insurrectionist activity as a matter of fact, and furthermore, as a matter of law, the U.S. Constitution bars him from holding any office, including the presidency. With an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court a certainty, realized even by the Colorado justices, and some notable (and very visible) Republicans arguing that the American people should have the final say on whether Trump will be president again beginning in 2025, the question of who should have the final say—the judiciary or the people—was pressing, and indeed, very important. I contend that the determination of fact should have been made by a jury in a criminal proceeding, and that even absent that, the ultimate decision should still be made prior to, and thus not during, the election, for the question is whether Trump can be listed as a candidate for the office. Ultimately, the tension lies between the value of a politics-free judiciary and democratic (majority) rule.

The full essay is at "The Colorado Supreme Court Bars Insurrectionist Trump."

On the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court in Safeguarding the Peaceful Transfer of Power

In the E.U., the state governments and federal institutions can ask the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) for an opinion on a legal matter. This is rare in the U.S., though waiting for a dispute to winds its way formally through district and appellate courts may be unduly bureaucratic, not to mention lengthy. On December 11, 2023, Special Counsel Jack Smith asked the U.S. Supreme Court the ECJ’s counterpart, to decide whether the former U.S. president Donald Trump had any immunity from criminal prosecution of his involvement in the riot at the U.S. Capitol that interrupted the formal counting by a joint session of Congress of the Electoral College presidential ballots. The trial was set to begin the following March, and the question of the former president’s immunity had to be decided before the trial could begin. Hence the “extraordinary request,” which I contend should not be extraordinary given the time frame and the important role of the highest court in safeguarding American democracy from domestic threats.

The full essay is at "On the U.S. Supreme Court."

On Trump’s Eligibility to Run for President: Who Decides?

The 14^th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “bans anyone who took an oath to uphold the Constitution but who subsequently ‘engaged in insurrection or rebellion against,’ or gave ‘aid or comfort of the enemies’ of the Constitution from seeking any federal or state office.”[1] Did Donald Trump, when he was President of the United States, engage in insurrection? Furthermore, who decides this and bars him from office?

The full essay is at "Deciding Trump's Eligibility." 

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[1] S.V. Date, “Trump May Need Supreme Court To Say His Coup Attempt Does Not Violate Constitution,” The Huffington Post, September 2, 2023.

The U.S. Supreme Court: Free Speech Trumps Public Accommodations Law

I contend as a matter of reasoned opinion rather than infallible fact that the Free Speech protection in the U.S. Constitution applies to not only human beings, rather than to non-human legal “persons” (e.g., corporations), but also to speech where the purpose is speech rather than something else. I have written elsewhere on the mistake in treating corporations as if they were human beings, so I treat only the second claim here. I reference the first claim only as context for my broader claim that the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to over-extend applications of the free-speech clause not only beyond its original intent, but also common sense. The latter violation is particularly astonishing. 

The full essay is at "Free Speech and Public-Accommodations Law"

The Senate Trial of President Trump: Riddled with Conflicts of Interest

At the beginning of a U.S. Senate trial on whether to remove an impeached U.S. president from office, the senators take an oath to be impartial jurists. The impartiality is important because the senators are theoretically to listen to the partial U.S. House prosecuting managers and the president’s defense lawyers. Were the senators themselves partial, they would simply reflect the two sides that make their respective cases. In the trial of Donald Trump, I submit that few if any senators had any intention of being impartial and thus as serving as a jurist rather than as an extension of the prosecutors or defense. In effect, the verdict is left to whichever political party controls the Senate. I contend that having the Senate try presidents is problematic due to conflicts of interest.

The full essay is at "A Constitutional Conflict of Interest."

On the Political Power of Capitalism in American Society

In his confidential memorandum, “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” Lewis Powell, later to be a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote in 1971 that the “leftists” were launching a frontal assault on the “free enterprise system,” “capitalism,” or the “profit system.” Powell saw this as an attack on rather than a defending of the “American political system of democracy under the rule of law.” That the corporate profit-interest might be a threat to “one person one vote” apparently did not occur to the future Justice. Rather, what is good for GM he presumed must be good for American democracy. Moreover, both, he presumes, are consistent with, or perhaps even foundational for, American values.

The full essay is at "On the Political Power of Capitalism."

The Ministerial Exception: A Religious Right to Discriminate

In early 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized, for the first time ever, a “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination laws, saying that churches and other religious groups must be free to choose and dismiss their leaders without government interference. In his written opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “The Establishment Clause [of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution] prevents the government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.” The wrench in the works here concerns the matter of delimiting the exception, given the inflation in what constitutes “ministerial” in terms of tasks.

The full essay is at "The Ministerial Exception."

The U.S. Supreme Court: Too Much Ideology in Jurisprudence?

Should the electorate in a republic be able to remove Supreme Court justices due to their past decisions on particular cases? Can this basis be distinguished from removing a justice for judicial incompetence? One thing is clear: the general public does not have the technical expertise to perform a “supervisor’s evaluation” on a judge. Obviously, anyone can see that someone who skips work on a regular basis is not fit for the job, but this is different than evaluating a job by the technical criteria of the profession. Distinguishing between a particular decision and general judicial approach, for example, is more difficult. Moreover, it can be difficult to balance the rights of popular sovereignty (i.e., rule by the people) against the rule of law without respect to majority opinion.

The justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in 2012.

The full essay is at "Ideology Twisting Legal Reasoning."

Westboro Church's Anti-Gay and John Galliano's Anti-Semitic Opinions: The U.S. and E.U. Contrasted

The First Amendment protects free speech in the U.S. even if it is as hurtful as signs at a Marine funeral proclaiming "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 2, 2011. The Westboro Baptist Church celebrated the death of Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder in Iraq with signs such as "God Hates You," along with anti-gay messages at his funeral in Maryland in 2006. The late Marine's father sought damages for emotional distress. An appellate court had reversed the $5 million award granted by a district court, and the U.S. Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's decision.  The Wall Street Journal notes that "Chief Justice Roberts nodded to the wrenching set of facts in the case, writing that 'the applicable legal term— 'emotional distress'—fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro's choice added to Mr. Snyder's already incalculable grief.'"  Crucially, however, the justices of the majority opinion would not fall to the temptation of acting on the emotion that naturally follows hearing of such harm.

Interestingly, on the same day as the American high court's decision, the designer John Galliano was being fired by Dior's CEO and investigated by the French police (for inciting racial hatred with anti-Semitic statement, which is illegal in at least the French and German states of the EU) for having made anti-Semitic insults to a couple with whom he was arguing late at night in a trendy bar (cafe) in Paris. There, the emotions got the best of both the designer and those who reacted to the video posted of his comments (albeit showing only a part of the argument). Perhaps a grieving father at his son's funeral reading signs that thank God for dead American soldiers can be likened to a Jewish couple at a bar hearing that they are lucky their grandparents or parents were not exterminated by the Nazis. It is difficult for the rest of us to know how either feels, or how to compare the pain.

In any case, that any human being would want to hurt another so much is truly a sad commentary on our species that otherwise vaunts itself as being in the image of God. Perhaps the question is what kind of God is being envisioned here. A vengeance is mine, sayth the Lord sort, which Nietzsche condemns in his writings as already discredited on account of having such a sordid divine attribute as vengeance?  The deed is done, according to Nietzsche.  So too, the pain has already been inflicted on the grieving parents and the Jewish couple.  The rest is merely mopping up. 

I contend that the impulsive reaction in Europe to the fashion designer's drunken anti-Semitic slurs is inferior to the majority opinion of the American court in the Westboro case because the tolerance of reason is more in keeping with a free society than is vengeance or retribution against a disliked opinion. 

The full essay is at "Anti-Gay and Anti-Semetic Statements."

The U.S. Supreme Court as Decider: A Conflict of Interest in Federalism Cases?

As to whether the supreme courts of particular American states, or republics, should be able to declare the general (U.S.) government’s health-insurance mandate unconstitutional in the sense of being an encroachment of the government of the union beyond its enumerated powers, it is typically presumed that the U.S. Supreme Court is the rightful and proper umpire--the court of last resort on disputes on federalism applied to particular legislation. Forgotten is the argument made by Thomas Jefferson against that court’s suitability owing to its institutional conflict of interest in contests between the U.S. Government, of which the U.S. Supreme Court is a branch, and a government of one of the several states.  Typically, we do not consider how the conflict of interest can be solved. We do not “think outside the box.” Rather, we feel resigned to have branch of one of the parties of the dispute act as the final decider short of a constitutional amendment.

The full essay is at "The U.S. Supreme Court as Decider."

Judicial Ethics: Friendship and Philanthropy

Harlan Crow was a Dallas real estate magnate and a major contributor to conservative causes. He did many favors for his friend, Clarence Thomas, “helping finance a Savannah library project dedicated to Justice Thomas, presenting him with a Bible that belonged to Frederick Douglass and reportedly providing $500,000 for [Virginia] Thomas to start a Tea Party-related group.” The two friends spent time together at “gatherings of prominent Republicans and businesspeople at Crow’s Adirondacks estate and his camp in East Texas.” Crow also “stepped in at Thomas’ urging” to finance the multimillion-dollar purchase and restoration of the cannery that had employed the justice’s mother. Crow’s restoration “featured a museum about the culture and history of Pin Point that has become a pet project of Justice Thomas’s. . . . While the nonprofit Pin Point museum is not intended to honor Justice Thomas, people involved in the project said his role in the community’s history would inevitably be part of it, and he participated in a documentary film that is to accompany the exhibits.”

News “of Mr. Crow’s largess provoked controversy and questions, adding fuel to a rising debate about Supreme Court ethics. But Mr. Crow’s financing of the museum, his largest such act of generosity, previously unreported, raises the sharpest questions yet — both about Justice Thomas’s extrajudicial activities and about the extent to which the justices should remain exempt from the code of conduct for federal judges. Although the Supreme Court is not bound by the code, justices have said they adhere to it. Legal ethicists differed on whether Justice Thomas’s dealings with Mr. Crow pose a problem under the code.”

The code says judges “should not personally participate” in raising money for charitable endeavors, out of concern that donors might feel pressured to give or entitled to favorable treatment from the judge. In addition, judges are not even supposed to know who donates to projects honoring them. . . . (T)he restriction on fund-raising is primarily meant to deter judges from using their position to pressure donors, as opposed to relying on ‘a rich friend’ like Mr. Crow, said Ronald D. Rotunda, who teaches legal ethics at Chapman University in California.” On the other side of the argument, Deborah L. Rhode, a Stanford University law instructor who has called for stricter ethics rules for Supreme Court justices, said Justice Thomas “should not be directly involved in fund-raising activities, no matter how worthy they are or whether he’s being centrally honored by the museum.”

The ethical analysis is at "Judicial Ethics."

Source:

Mike McIntire, “Friendship of Justice and Magnate Puts Focus on Ethics,” The New York Times, June 18, 2011.

How to Craft a Non-Partisan Constitutional Court: The Case of the U.S. Senate Confirming Justices

In interpreting a constitution, justice is best carried out when the justices are non-partisan rather than politically ideological. To be sure, every living and breathing human being has a political ideology, even if implicitly. Even so, the institutional process by which justices are chosen can mitigate this point by being oriented to non-partisan candidates. In other words, a system can be designed so as to minimize the likelihood that a partisan of one political party or another will sit on a constitutional court. The confirmation of Neil Gorsuch to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court can provide some insights in this regard.

The full essay is at "How to Craft a Non-Partisan Court."

The U.S. Senate's Judiciary Committee meeting on Gorsuch's nomination on April 3, 2017. (NYT)

Political Ideology in the U.S. Supreme Court: Undercutting the Court’s Legitimacy

As the U.S. Supreme Court began its 2016 term with eight justices, the Court stood “at the threshold of an ideological transformation unmatched in nearly a half century.”[1] Not since 1968, when Richard Nixon was elected U.S. President, had such an opportunity presented itself. Nixon’s four nominations ended the liberal majority begun by Franklin Roosevelt’s eight.[2] The conservative majority begun with Nixon’s nominations was up for grabs with the 2016 presidential election. I submit that the legitimacy of the ideological dimension itself dwarfs the matter of which ideology is dominant on the Court.

The full essay is at "Political Ideology in the U.S. Supreme Court."

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[1] Richard Wolf, “Court at Brink of Transformation,” USA Today, September 30 – October 2, 2016.

[2] Ibid.

Hobby Lobby: On the Significance of the Case

For all the controversy stirred up by the case of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius on whether an employer must comply with the mandate for contraceptives coverage in the Affordable Care Act, the significance of the decision handed down in a 5-4 majority opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court may be less than some commentators were predicting.

The full essay is at “HobbyLobby.”