Showing posts with label EU Parliament. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EU Parliament. Show all posts

Thursday, March 7, 2019

The Euroskeptic Ideology: Inherently Exogenous to the E.U.

At the root of the matter of Britain's secession from the Union, I submit, is a starkly Euro-skeptic, or Anti-federalist, ideology that viewed the E.U. as a network to which the sovereign state of Britain belongs, as PM David Cameron said before the secession referendum. Unfortunately, this view ran up against the reality of the E.U.'s federal system in which the federal level too had some sovereignty. Even the mechanism of qualified majority voting involves a loss of sovereignty for the state governments. The discordance can be heard in a speech given by William Hague of the British government at the end of May in 2013 in which he advocated that state legislatures should be able to block E.U. laws proposed by the European Commission.[1] At the time, a state legislature could use a “yellow card” to object to a proposal that could presumably be better legislated and enforced at the state level. Hague wanted a “red card” option that a state legislature could use to block legislation. This proposal reflects the Nullification Acts passed by the government of South Carolina in the early 1830s, which prompted the U.S. to resist strongly as the union itself could have unraveled. Aside from the exogenous ideology itself in the E.U., two problems with Hague’s proposal can be identified. I contend that the problems stem from, and thus can point to, the underlying ideology that is inherently at odds with modern federalism, in which dual-sovereignty is a prominent attribute.
Should the state legislatures dominate the EU's legislature?  The British state government says yes. Would the Union wither and die?  Source: mapperywordpress.com
The full essay is at "A Euroskeptic Government in the E.U."

1. “William Hague Demands Right to Show ‘Red Card’ to European Union,” The Huffington Post, May 31, 2013.

Saturday, February 17, 2018

On Educated Representatives and Large Districts: A Critique of Democracy

Democrat Georgia Congressman Hank Johnson said during an Armed Services Committee hearing in late March, 2010 that Guam would be in danger were more US troops sent there. “My fear that the whole island will become so overly populated that it will tip over and capsize,” he said in all seriousness. “We don’t anticipate that,” responded Adm. Robert Willard. Did Hank Johnson's constituents want their representative in the U.S. House of Representatives to be at least nominally educated?  Lest one replies with "of course," it could also be that people may want their representatives to be like them, or at least to reflect what they value. 

Sunday, December 3, 2017

Russia’s Common Economic Area: Not Another European Union

On January 1, 2012, a new version of the common economic area between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan came into effect. The three countries had already founded a customs union in 2007. As of the end of 2011, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were still in talks about joining as well. Putin insisted that integration with the E.U. could take place by 2015. I cannot help but wonder if E.U. leaders were aware of this possible union of unions. It could be argued that Putin was making several category mistakes.


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Thursday, July 4, 2013

The Checks and Balances of Federalism: Hungary vs. the European Parliament

One of the benefits of federalism is the checks and balances between the two systems of government existing in a federal system—that of the states and that of the federal government. That is to say, federalism can be thought of as a governmental system that contains two systems of government—that of the states and that of the federation. Either of these systems can go too far, and the other system should have the wherewithal to pull the other back without compromising its viability. This is why the consolidation of power in one system (e.g., the U.S. Federal Government) compromises the viability of a federal system at least with respect to its checks and balances. One other point: the two systems in a federal system are on the same level; that is, one is not “above” the other. Hence, the supremacy clauses in the E.U. and U.S. refer only to competencies or domains assigned to the federal government.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Saturday, April 20, 2013

Is the E.U. Relying Too Much on the IMF?

According to the New York Times, the IMF had more influence in the European debt crisis than did many E.U. states. Put another way, Christine Lagarde, head of the organization, became “a quasi head of state.” Without the advice and money from the IMF, the euro might have collapsed. If one could believe the rhetoric, the E.U. itself might have broken up. But the threat to the Union lies not in the euro, but, rather, on the emphasis on the state governments and in particular their respective officials. Indeed, the crucial role of the IMF during the debt crisis may have been in looking out for the interests of the E.U. in contradistinction to the various interests of the state governments. “In the absence of a strong federal government in Europe,” according to the Times, the IMF has helped “impose order on quarreling [state] leaders.” Put another way, if the balance of power in the federal system did not reside with the states at the expense of the federal government, the Europeans would not have had to rely on the IMF so much. For example, Lagarde played an important role, according to the Times, in “overcoming German reluctance to accept proposals intended to strengthen the euro zone, like a centralized bank supervisor.” Because the proposals involved shifting additional governmental sovereignty from the state governments to the federal level, the heads of the state governments faced a conflict of interest in assessing whether to support a federal regulator even though it would be in the interest of the whole.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.                                               

Sunday, April 14, 2013

European Central Bank As Supervisor: Conflicts of Interest

Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, raised additional concerns in April 2013 about a proposal to create a single banking supervisor for the European Union. About 150 large banks would be under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank, which would also have the power to intervene to oversee smaller lenders. This proposal had been set as a precondition for states to draw on the E.U.’s bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, to recapitalize struggling lenders directly. To analyze Schäuble’s potential stumbling blocks, it is necessary to understand the conflicts of interest that are involved.
                                                                                 Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, active at the E.U. level. Source: The Telegraph.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy." Available at Amazon.

Monday, November 26, 2012

The Filibuster: States' Rights or a Partisan Ploy?

Before 1917, senators could filibuster only by talking continuously on the U.S. Senate floor. There was no mechanism to stop them. Such filibusters were rare until entering World War I was debated. In 1917, the Senate passed its first “cloture” rule, whereby two-thirds of the Senate could cut off debate and force a final vote. Between that year and 1971, no two-year session of Congress had more than 10 such votes. Even so, in 1971 the rules were changed to allow other legislation to be taken up during a filibuster—relieving a senator of having to continuously talk to maintain one. Making it easier to filibuster quickly led to the predictable result of more filibusters. In the 93rd Congress (1973-74), the number of cloture motions jumped to 31, from an average in the 1917-1971 period of two per Congressional session. In 1975, the number of votes needed to stop a filibuster was lowered from 67 to 60. However, this change did not curtail the use of the device, as it is rare for a party to control 60 votes out of 100 in the U.S. Senate. By 2010, the average number of cloture motions per two-year session had risen to 129, which suggests that the filibuster had become more typical in how senate business was to be conducted. In effect, legislation and even executive business, such as confirming presidential nominations, needed a supermajority (60 out of 100) in the upper chamber of Congress.


The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.


Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Barroso's State of the Union: Is the E.U. a Political Union?

On September 12, 2012, President Barroso delivered his State of the Union Address. His depiction of the E.U. itself can be regarded as blurry, and his notion of "political union" as being misplaced as something somehow not yet extant. Even so, he does manage to accurately characterize the epoch at the time in terms of the Union being in its development stage. He correctly labels this stage as decisive for Europe.


The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.



  President Barroso talking with Angela Merkel of the state of Germany.         NYT

Monday, June 27, 2011

The European Council: Head of State of the E.U.

Concerning the European Council and the Council of the E.U., it can reasonably be asked whether such similar nomenclature is really necessary. It can be quite confusing. For example, I didn't realize that the European Council does not legislate; I had assumed that the Council of Ministers (a.k.a. the Council of the E.U.) handled the technical aspects of E.U. legislation while the European Council votes on broad and highly significant legislation.  Instead, the European Council "sets the EU's goals and the course for achieving them. It provides the impetus for the EU's main policy initiatives and resolves issues that cannot be settled at the ministerial level. It does not legislate."[1] In contrast, the Council of the EU (aka the Council of Ministers) "adopts EU laws, a responsibility it shares with the European Parliament in most policy areas."[2]  The Council of the E.U. also "concludes international agreements between the EU and other countries . . . ; plays a key role in the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), based on guidelines set by the European Council."[3] It is the Council of the E.U., rather than the European Council, that corresponds to the U.S. Senate. Beyond both bodies representing state governments, the unique foreign policy role is shared by both “upper chambers.” An implication is that cabinet secretaries in the American state governments could replace U.S. Senators (and, conversely, the people of the European states could elect delegates or senators to represent their states in the Council of the E.U.).  In my view, the use of state cabinet secretaries (and having the governor’s association set the U.S. agenda) would be an improvement on senators (and the U.S. President in setting the Union’s agenda).  Such a change would reinvigorate American federalism against continued consolidation.


The complete essay is in Essays on Two Federal Empires. available at Amazon. 

1. “How the EU Works,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2011.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

On the Belgium Stalemate: The E.U. to the Rescue?

On June 22, 2011, Philip Claeys, a representative in the E.U. Parliament, once again repeated his demand for Flemish independence, calling for the "orderly break-up" of Belgium. His call came as Belgium was entering its second year without a viable state government. It is no wonder, therefore, that a E.U. legislator would get involved. Repeated attempts had been made in Belgium during the previous year to resolve the political disagreements between Flanders and Wallonia—getting nowhere.


                              TheParliament.com


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Monday, May 16, 2011

The E.U.'s Membership in the U.N.'s General Assembly: An Oxymoron or Reality Catching Up?

On May 3, 2011, the United Nations’ General Assembly passed Resolution 65/276 by a vote of 120 to 0 (with two abstentions—countries subject to E.U. sanction). The resolution makes the European Union a non-voting member of the General Assembly. As such, the E.U. can “be inscribed on the list of speakers among representatives of major groups and be invited to participate in the Assembly’s general debate, in accordance with the order of precedence and the level of representation.” The E.U. is also “able to present oral proposals and amendments, which, however, would be put to a vote only at the request of [a voting member].” Hence, the E.U. membership is without the right to vote, co-sponsor resolutions or decisions, and put forward candidates. In other words, the E.U. has been granted a sort of “quasi” status commensurate with the world’s notion of the E.U. as a “regional organization”—whatever that means.  I contend that this misunderstanding of what the E.U. is has led to the resolution giving the union a quasi-status in the General Assembly even as another such union, the U.S., enjoys not only voting membership in the General Assembly, but also a veto on the Security Council. In short, the world is confused on the E.U. and the resolution bespeaks this condition.


The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

Friday, October 9, 2009

The European Council and the U.S. Senate: Intergovernmental Institutions in Modern Federalism

As part of comparing the U.S. and E.U., pointing to similarities between the U.S. Senate (especially as originally designed) and the European Council is particularly valuable because both institutions constitute the intergovernmental, and thus international, aspect of their respective unions. By contrast, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the E.U. Parliament constitute purely governmental, or “national,” bodies irrespective of the state governments. Hence both the E.U. and U.S. governments are hybrid governmental/intergovernmental, and thus neither national nor international.


The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.