FIFA’s President: Bad Judgment under the Subterfuge of Miscommunication

In the 1990s, I asked the CEO of ATT whether there is not a conflict of interest in him being chairman of the board tasked with holding the corporation’s management accountable. “The buck stops here,” Armstrong replied as the dean of Yale’s business school looked on, uncomfortably. Fortunately, I was a student in another school at Yale at the time. Fast forward to 2026. The board of FIFA backed up its president, Gianni Infantino in spite of the fact that he had overruled a red-card to favor the U.S. team in that year’s World Cup and then he proposed selling a minority share of FIFA to private investors—a plan that was almost universally viewed by the regional football (soccer) associations as selling out the world’s game to private financial interests so they might profit from the non-profit international organization. FIFA had Infantino’s back, which prompted regional associations, namely UEFA, CONCACAF, and AFC to publicly raise a red flag concerning the very credibility of Infantino for having tried to sell out a minority financial interest in FIFA. Albeit sheer speculation, given U.S. President Trump’s interest in financial transactions in relation to his political office, and Infantino’s having acquiesced to Trump’s request that the one-game suspension from a red card against a player on the U.S. team be revoked, I wonder whether the two men hatched the idea of selling off a minority stake in FIFA to private investors, which might have included Trump himself, his family members, and even the Trump Organization. Such is the nature of collusion in what James Burns refers to in his text, Leadership, as transactional, as distinct from transformational, leadership.

The full essay is at "FIFA's President."

Institutional Conflicts of Interest: Business and Public Policy

Typically people react emotionally much more severely to an exploited conflict of interest when a person gains a personal benefit such as through a bribe. If company, or even an office or department thereof, stands to benefit inordinately, American society typically looks the other way on the institutional conflict of interest rather than taking it apart. This may just be human nature. However, the troubling institutional arrangements within an organization or between them may be tolerated because of the erroneous assumption that conflicts of interest are unethical only when they are exploited. Accordingly, the book provides a solid grasp of the structure and essence of the conflict of interest in order to make the case that it is inherently unethical. Examples of institutional conflicts of interest readily come from business, with particular attention to corporate governance and the financial sector, as well as from how business and government relate, such as through regulation The reader should come away with a sense of just how pervasive and ethically problematic institutional conflict of interests are. 

The book, Institutional Conflicts of Interest: Business and Public Policy, is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com

FIFA’s Corporate Sponsors: Reliable Ethical Change-Agents?

In the wake of the U.S. Justice Department’s initial arrests of FIFA officials in May 2015 on corruption charges, could the public reasonably expect FIFA’s corporate sponsors to pressure the international governing body of footfall (soccer in the U.S., where “football” is reserved for “subconcussions being inherent to a sport”)? If so, would the pressure be sufficient to rid the powerful international organization of its squalid officials and practices? I contend that these questions come down to how the power was divided at the time between the sponsors and the organization, rather than to the sponsors’ respective ethical positions or even how strongly the executives feel about ethics in business, including FIFA. 

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.

On the Nature of Entrenched Power: FIFA’s President Ensconced in Corruption

In May 2015, U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch was “shocking FIFA like an earthquake,” according to the European newspaper, Das Bild.[1] She was leading “an American-led takedown of corruption in FIFA,” the Federation Internationale de Football Association, which oversees the sport of football, or soccer as it is known in the U.S., globally.[2] With great power comes resounding responsibility. When the head of an organization goes after the corruption-fighters rather than admitting to error at the very least in having presided over allegedly corrupt officials near the top—and in fact repeatedly dismisses calls to resign and not stand for re-election—the question becomes one of the intractability of squalid power, as if it were defying gravity—at least that of the ethical variety.

Sepp Blatter of FIFA, as if holding in all the bad news.

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

---

[1] Josh Gerstein, “For Loretta Lynch, A Stunning Debut on the World Stage,” Politico, May 28, 2015.

[2] Ibid.

FIFA: Weaving an Unethical Web in a Sport

Soccer is the world’s most popular sport. Unfortunately, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the international association of soccer, has “repeatedly faced charges of corruption while operating with a lack of transparency and little oversight.”[1] Even though corruption comes naturally to individuals, institutional processes and structure too can be unethical in themselves. In such cases, it is not sufficient to isolate and remove the sordid persons; structural reform is needed too.

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available at Amazon.

1. Jeré Longman, “Accusations Are Replaced by Anger at FIFA,” The New York Times, May 30, 2011.