Adding Anti-Trust to Monetary Policy: The Case of Groceries

Monetary inflation is a complex phenomenon. Not only can its causes be several; it can make it more difficult to distinguish immediate and medium-term economic conditions from more long term, or structural changes impacting our species economically.  Of the former, the relationship between inflation and whether the markets are competitive or oligarchic (or even monopolies) can be better understood, and this in term can put us in a better position to assess the impact of longer-term changes, such as those stemming from the huge increase in the population of human beings since before the industrial age. The price of food (i.e., groceries) is a case in point. Specifically, the impact from presumably temporary shocks during the Covid pandemic should be distinguished from the impact of oligopolistic markets in keeping prices high, and of the increase in human mouths more generally (and longer term) representing increased demand for foodstuff in on a relatively fixed planet.

The full essay is at "Anti-Trust and Monetary Policy."

Pulling the Curtain Back on President Biden’s Retirement Address

There is an expression in politics referring to how legislation is made; it is likened to the making of sausage, the public display of which is not generally desired. Furthermore, it is unrealistic and even counter-productive for the American electorate to know the intricate mechanisms by which a bill makes its way through Congress before being signed by the president to become a law. Nevertheless, the strategic and self-interested manipulation of public perception by elected representatives in order that the electorate will have an overstated positive view of its representatives, who can have more discretion and thus power with the vote of confidence, is counter to an effective democratic republic, which after all is distinct from direct democracy. I contend that the desire to falsely manipulate popular opinion went into President Biden’s address on his decision to serve only one term, as well as in the comments of high ranking members of his party in support of his decision not to run for reelection. That there might be more political capital, not to mention a better legacy, in being straight with the American people is a possibility that seems to elude American politicians.

The full essay is at "President Biden's Retirement Address."

The E.U. on Hungary: Beyond Symbolic Measures

Any federal system of government must function fundamentally as a unit even though the states are semi-sovereign, as is the federal level. The Nullification Crisis in the U.S. during the nineteenth century highlighted the plight a federal union would face were state governments able to ignore federal law unilaterally. Fortunately, President Jackson was able to get South Carolina to stand down on this point. In 2024, the E.U.'s federal officials were having trouble getting the state of Hungary not only to apply a federal directive within the state, but also to stop contradicting the E.U.'s foreign policy against Putin's Russia in Ukraine by engaging in diplomatic trips of appeasement. A federal system that lacks the means procedurally or substantively to protect federal prerogatives against the contradictory actions of even one wayward state is not viable in the long term.

The full essay is at "The E.U. on Hungary."

Turkey on Cyprus: Sidelining the E.U.

Imagine if Japan had invaded and claimed (and successfully held) an island of Hawaii as a protectorate and a separate country due to the number of Japanese living there, and thus not as a part of Hawaii even though the U.S. recognizes all of Hawaii as a member state.  Let’s say furthermore that the UN has proposed the unification of Hawaii as a republic composed of two federated states. Hawaii would be akin to Belgium in the E.U.—a federated state of two sub-states in a federal union. This arrangement would fit with Althusius’ early seventeenth-century theory of federalism based on the Holy Roman Empire: each level of political organization is a federation. While this exists in the E.U., none of the U.S. states is itself a federation of states. So, the UN’s proposal that Cyprus be united politically and be composed of two states even as the E.U. already recognizes the entire island as an E.U. state is not outlandish to a European eye. The problem with the proposal lies instead in Turkey, and this in itself can be interpreted as an argument against Turkey’s accession to E.U. statehood.

The full essay is at "Turkey on Cyprus: Sidelining the E.U."

Unenforced Law: The International Court of Justice Declares Israeli Occupation Illegal

On July 19, 2024, the UN’s court rendered an opinion to the UN’s General Assembly on the legality of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories including East Jerusalem. The Israeli government wasted no time in publicly dismissing the International Court of Justice even though the UN had created Israel. As if the creature is greater than its creator, which is a rather unbiblical view, Israel’s prime minister had dismissed two earlier verdicts of that court against Israel’s military incursion into Gaza, which resulted in the deaths of more than 35,000 and displaced over a million Palestinian residents. What are we to make of international law itself? Can we rightly call it law even though no enforcement mechanism necessarily exists for it? By necessarily, I mean something more than a voluntary coalition of willing countries, which of course cannot be counted upon.

The full essay is at "The International Court of Justice on Israeli Occupation."

Differentiating the European Council and Parliament: Meloni of Italy

At the federal level of the E.U., the European Council, like the Senate in the U.S., represents the states, whereas the European Parliament, like the U.S. House of Representatives, represents citizens—that’s right, E.U. citizens. The theory behind this difference is a modification of traditional federalism theory, wherein only the polities in a federation are represented at the federal level. In this traditional way of doing federalism, individuals, or citizens, belong only to the first level of political organization. Althusius’s Political Digest (1603) describes that theory, borrowing a lot from the example of the Holy Roman Empire. The advent of both polities and federal citizens being directly represented at a federal level was born out of compromise during the American Constitutional Convention in 1787. The E.U. replicated the structure, wherein the state governments and E.U. citizens (or legal residents) each have their own channel of access to affect federal law and policy on the federal level. For one of the two to cross over and eclipse the other in its own channel is suboptimal because both vantage points contribute to sound federal law in a way that enables them to protect their respective interests, which are not identical. It is thus not appropriate for a state government, including its governor or head of state, to direct members of Parliament how to vote on a given bill, whether their districts are within or outside of the state.

The full essay is at "Meloni: Differentiate the European Council and Parliament."

Journalism Goes Only So Far in Empire-Scale Democracy

A news story only goes so far; only so much “digging” is possible against a pressing deadline. Moreover, we humans are not particularly good at “connecting the dots” when they are far afield. Through natural selection in an environment in which humans were prey as well as hunters, we are still “hard-wired” to privilege the immediate. So it takes more than a bit of effort to counter this natural predilection in order to make a truly informed judgment that takes into account the relevant tributaries. One such judgment concerns the impact of U.S. President Joe Biden’s age on his fitness to serve a second term.

The full essay is at "Journalism Goes Only So Far."

On the European Commission Boycotting Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the E.U.

Whereas just one presidency applies to the U.S. at the federal level, the E.U. has several. There is a president of the European Commission, a president of the European Parliament, a president of the European Council, and a president of the Council of the E.U., the latter being held by a state government on a six-month rotating basis. On July 1, 2024, the E.U. state of Hungary assumed that role. Because that state’s government had recently been found guilty by the E.U.’s top court, the E.C.J., of blocking federal law within the state, the matter of Hungary taking its turn in chairing the Council of the E.U. was controversial at the time. Because Viktor Orbán, governor of Hungary, used the insignia of the presidency of the Council in making unauthorized diplomatic trips to Russia and China on the war in Ukraine, the European Commission, the E.U. government’s executive branch, took the unusual decision to boycott Hungary’s presidency. Shortly thereafter, the E.U.'s parliament followed suit with a resolution condemning Orbán's diplomatic trip to Moscow. I contend that Orbán’s foray into diplomatic relations even as he was taking on a major role at the federal level presents good evidence for why foreign policy should be federalized in the E.U. as it has been in the U.S., and for the same reason.

The full essay is at "On the E.U. Commission's Boycott of Hungary."

Religion, Ethics, and Psychology: Three Distinct Domains

Compassion is so salient in so many religions that it is natural to assume that religious conduct is moral, which is to say that it issues in ethical conduct. Yet, as Kierkegaard emphasizes in Fear and Trembling, the divine decree that Abraham receives in the Book of Genesis translates into murder on the (universally accessible) level of ethics. In being almost going through with sacrificing his only son, Isaac, Abraham is guilty of attempted murder, which is unethical. Abraham’s faith in the validity of the divine decree can thus be distinguished from morality. Unlike ethics, religion is sourced beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and emotions, and is the domain is thus transcendent even as it is also immanent in the world. Even though ethical principles and faith can dovetail, as in five of the Ten Commandments, it is important that the two domains—morality and religion—are regarded as distinct, and thus with their own distinctive bases and criteria owing to the respective natures of each domain. In his book, A Brief History of Everything, Ken Wilber attempts a mega-synthesis of many fields of knowledge. Such a broad project carries with it the pitfall of making conjectures that draw on or involve domains of knowledge outside of one’s own. I think the risk of such over-stepping is significant coming from both vantage-points in morality and religion (i.e., ethics and theology) when the two domains are mingled or intertwined without due recognition of how they are sui generis, of their own genus (type). Wilber even conflates a third domain, that of psychology, with those of ethics and religion. I begin by looking at morals and religion in general, holding off psychology until I address Wilber’s theory specifically.

The full essay is at "Religion, Ethics, and Psychology."

On Electing a U.S. President: The Case of President Biden’s Age

One of the reasons why the delegates at the U.S. Constitutional Convention devised the Electoral College to elect the federal president was that they thought that even at 7 million, the population of the U.S. back then was too large for the even just the propertied people, who could vote, to know the candidates very well, if at all. At over 300 million, the U.S. population during the presidential reelection campaign of Joe Biden had to rely on the mass media and the political elite, including statements by the White House, for information on whether the sitting president was too old to serve viably in a second term. The limited number of presidential electors in the states would presumably be small enough that they could have the opportunity to size up the candidates in person. But with electors from fifty rather than just thirteen states, such an opportunity would not be likely. So given the exponential growth of the United States both in terms of member states and their respective populations, the originally anticipated benefit of the Electoral College would not still hold even if the two major political parties had not taken over the College. Even if the states’ respective electors were able to spend enough time in person with the candidates, the parties had ensured that those electors could not be autonomous and thus exercise their judgment. Instead, judgment could only be made at a distance by the massive American electorate whose perspectives have been very vulnerable to intentional manipulation through and even by the media. Put another way, the American people have been vulnerable to making a bad choice based on faulty information. This makes American representative democracy itself vulnerable.

The full essay is at "On Electing a U.S. President: Biden's Age."

The U.S. Supreme Court Reining in Regulatory Agencies: Implications for the Imperial Presidency

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 28, 2024, a majority of the justices overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which had been the precedent giving regulatory agencies considerable discretion in coming up with specific regulations, given the penchant of the Congress to write vague laws. In the overturning case, a group of fishermen had objected to having to pay for government observers to board the fishing boats to monitor the fishing. On the merits, it does seem unfair for regulatory agencies to charge the regulated to be regulated. In overturning Chevron, however, Loper has much broader implications, chief among them being in terms of separation of powers—specifically in reining in the expanding power of the executive branch, here at the expense of the judiciary.   

The full essay is at "The U.S. Supreme Court on Regulatory Agencies."

On the E.U.’s Principle of Unanimity: The Case of Hungary

As of 2024, enlargement policy, foreign affairs, taxation, and the budget was “bound by the principle of unanimity,” which means that each state government has a veto in the European Council.[1] With 27 states, the E.U. could in effect be held hostage quite easily. Even in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the state of Hungary was blocking €55 billion in E.U. aid to Ukraine as of June 24, 2024, although revenue from frozen Russian financial assets in the E.U. could be used (because Hungary had not participated in the G7 decision) and Hungary had just reversed its veto against further sanctions against Russia. However, the €1.4 billion from the investment revenue pales in comparison and sanctions do not deliver desperately needed military hardware to the besieged country.

The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Principle of Unanimity."

---

1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Heading for Accession Impasse during Hungary’s EU Council Presidency,” Euronews, June 18, 2024.

On the U.S. Government’s Budget Deficits and Debt: American Democracy Unhinged

It is true that a government’s budget can be read as a blueprint of priorities in terms of what is valued, and what is not so highly valued. The blueprint itself, as a whole, also evinces a priority in terms of values. As the big-ticket items, such as large spending categories and massive tax-cuts, get the most attention, whether a budget is in balance can go by the wayside, and what that says about the electorate (and thus the state of democracy) can easily be missed. Ultimately, public policy and even the votes of the elected representatives point back to the popular sovereign, the People—more specifically, the electorate, and its values. By 2024, the deficit and accumulated debt of the U.S. Government had reached such gigantic numbers that something could be said to be amiss concerning those values. The underlying culprit, which can be said to be an illness that is human, all too human, had by then infected American democracy beyond the wherewithal of virtually any elected federal representative to enunciate well enough that the electorate could look clearly at itself, and thus size itself up beyond the partial diagnoses that can be found in partisan attacks.

The full essay is at "U.S. Government Deficits and Debt."

E.U. Political Parties

Following the E.U. 2024 election, political parties jostled for members in the Parliament. Whereas the political duopoly of parties in the U.S. House of Representatives severely limits such skipping around, the European analogue puts more of an emphasis on party management in terms of weighing ideological or policy “purity” against the power that comes from size. In contrast, the two major parties in the U.S. must be content to be “big tents,” each of which contains groups. From the standpoint of the parties in the E.U. Parliament, the groups are at the state level. The defection of Andrej Babis and the rest of his group from the Renew Europe party just weeks after the E.U. election in June, 2024 demonstrates the distinct balancing task of the E.U. parties. Such balancing is not something that the American political duopoly of parties need do. I contend that the Americans could benefit by looking at the European case in this regard.

The full essay is at "Political Parties in the E.U."

Nominating and Electing the President of the E.U.'s Commission

Before the office of president of the European Commission can be elected by the European Parliament by a simple majority, the European Council must nominate a candidate. The nomination is by qualified majority vote, in that at least 55% of the states must be in favor and the combined population of the states voting yes must be at least 65% of the total population of the European Union. Were any state represented in the Council to have a veto (i.e., unanimity being required), the infeasibility alone of getting a candidate nominated would be astounding and prohibitive for the Union and especially its executive branch, the Commission. Just imagine if every sitting state governor in the U.S. meeting as the Senate (which represents the states) had to sign off on a candidate for that union’s executive-branch president before the House of Representatives (which represents citizens) could elect the candidate by a simple majority! From this comparison, we might wonder whether the European Council should be tasked with nominating two candidates, whom the representatives in the Parliament would then vote on in electing the president of Union’s executive branch. After all, there is more than one candidate when the U.S. House of Representatives votes (by member state!) to elect the president if no candidate receives a majority of the votes of the states’ electoral colleges. Indeed, the E.U. is not the only federal union in which states have a significant role in electing the head of the (federal) executive branch. I contend that the members of parliament should have a choice of more than one candidate when voting for the president of the E.U.’s executive branch. This is as of June, 2024, when the European Council was busy coming up with a nominee; being able to present two nominees to the Parliament would have made the Council’s job easier and the Parliament’s voting more democratic.

The full essay is at "Nominating the President of the Commission."