As the war between the U.S.A.
and C.S.A. (1861-1865) attests, the secession of a state from a political union
in which governmental sovereignty is “dual” (i.e., both the union and the states
are vested with it, such that it is divided, albeit not evenly) can be arduous.
Although a “velvet” secession sans warfare, the secession of the state of
Britain (UK) from the E.U. required lengthy and painstaking negotiations. In
the case of a union of states, something more than integration occurs not only
economically, but also politically. Anti-federalist rhetoric, such as in
referring to the E.U. (or U.S.) as a “bloc” with “members,” and even with
potential “associate members,” does absolutely nothing to counter the political
reality of federalism wherein governmental sovereignty resides both with the
union itself and the state governments. Officials in the E.U.’s Commission were
prudent, therefore, in being hesitant regarding the possible re-accession of
Britain as an E.U. state as talk on that possibility swirled in Britain in 2026
just after Andy Burnham became the prime minister and suggested that he would
be open to a referendum. This occurred exactly a decade after the referendum on
“Brexit” had passed and only six years after the actual secession. Between 2016
and the end of January, 2020, E.U. and British officials—federal and state,
respectively—engaged in painstaking, even traumatic, negotiations. That
this harsh characterization came from the E.U. side is consistent with my
thesis that the vote in Britain to secede, or “exit,” from the E.U. was based
on a rejection of the governmental sovereignty held by the E.U. rather than its
states. E.U. officials would not have taken kindly to even the subtle
suggestion that the E.U.’s portion of sovereignty did not really exist.
The full essay is at "The E.U. on Negotiating Britain's Secession."
