Distaste for and even anger at
pathological liars is deeply engrained in human nature; nobody appreciates
being lied to unless liar’s motivation or act is in one’s interest, rather than
just in that of the liar. Less firmly etched in human nature is the act of will
to keep promises—to hold oneself as being capable and willing to voluntarily
keep oneself from breaking one’s word by going instead for some momentary
pleasure (for oneself). Those momentary, proximate instinctual urges that
prioritize the moment over the future (e.g., keeping one’s promises) are,
according to Friedrich Nietzsche, more natural than is the opposing effort to
hold oneself as reliable. Trusting other people is thus something that results
from the long maturation process that took place in our species’ long
prehistoric time. Even though reliability and the related trust can by now be
achieved by the strong, hence likening them to ripe fruit on a tree, it is not
difficult to find examples of the weak who lie on a regular basis to get what
they want from other people. It is natural for the strong of will, who are
sovereign enough as individuals to keep their promises as if doing so were a
necessity rather than voluntary, to keep a pathos of distance from the
pathological liars. This is true in romantic relationships as regards the
difficult topic of sex with either promise-keeping as a means of establishing
and maintaining emotional intimacy or lying as a means of putting momentary
urges first. I contend that Nietzsche’s philosophy is in favor of the former
and against the latter, though with an important caveat that keeps him from
advocating monogamy.
The full essay is at "Nietzsche on Promise-Keeping."
