Those who laud the efficiency of the market
mechanism are particularly wont to point to the slow mechanizations of
government machinery. Cautiousness along with a subtle bias in favor of the status
quo may be the culprit. For example, after perhaps a year of urgings by Western
governments for Assad of Syria to step down, finally a lone governor of a large
E.U. state ventured to say that his state would recognize Assad’s opposition as
the legitimate government of Syria. “France asks the Syrian opposition
to form a provisional government — inclusive and representative — that can
become the legitimate representative of the new Syria,” Francois Hollande was
quoted by news agencies as saying on August 27, 2012 during a speech at the
Élysée Palace. “France will recognize the provisional government of Syria once
it is formed.” It is perfectly reasonable to ask whether the statement would
make any difference in Syria.
Part
of the reason why European states formed a union was because a united front
would have more power both economically and politically. Were the E.U.
Parliament to offer to recognize Assad’s opposition as the legitimate
government of Syria, the announcement would have more punch behind it. This is
why the American states consolidated their foreign-policy power at the union
level. Simply put, the world would be more likely to deem it as important.
Beyond
the question of whether the E.U. should take on a greater role in foreign
policy (the union does have a foreign minister) is the matter of why Western
governments were so reluctant (or slow) to recognize Assad’s opposition as the
government of Syria. American officials had stated that Assad had lost the
right to rule because his government had turned on so many Syrian civilians in
killing them. The recognition of another government is more or less implied.
Why not make it official? Why hold on so to the status quo, even after it has
been deemed to be illegitimate? Put
another way, why must so many people be killed before even an implied step is
taken?
Strategic
concerns typically weigh heavily in the formulation of foreign policy. The
possible reactions of China and Russia were no doubt salient in the calculations
of the foreign policy experts at the time. Even so, it seems that too much cautiousness
(i.e., avoiding even a low-probability negative reaction) goes with the
calculating orientation itself in the formulation of foreign policy, which can be at the expense of common sense. If
Assad was no longer held as the legitimate ruler of Syria, it follows that some
other person or group could (and should) be recognized as legitimate. Furthermore, that such
recognition would trigger Russian military retaliation should have been regarded as a stretch at best. The result of the excess cautiousness is that Russia and China were essentially able to proclaim the status quo as the default (a default whose legitimacy had been explicitly refuted in the West).
Put
another way, the desire not to rock the boat even just a bit by paddling can be
self-defeating if the boat is filling up with water. The mechanism by which
Western governments formulate and implement foreign policy may be too mired in
statecraft at the expense of not only common sense, but also the human rights
of a people elsewhere in the world.
Kareem Fahim and Rick Gladstone, “France Says It Would Recognize Provisional Syrian Government,” The New York Times, August 27, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/world/middleeast/rebels-claim-to-shoot-down-syrian-helicopter.html?_r=1&ref=world
