In November 2011, European leaders began to talk about amendments to the E.U. that would “change the fundamental structure of the union.”[1] Complicating the talks was ambiguity concerning the nature of the E.U. itself at the time. Foremost among the changes being discussed was the idea of a form of centralized oversight of the budgets of the state governments, with “sanctions for the profligate.”[2] The existing E.U., while more than the American Articles of Confederation, was at the time found to be insufficient in keeping the debt crisis from spreading from state to state and engulfing the union itself and its currency. “The survival of the euro zone is in play,” one senior European official said, “So far it’s been too little, too late.”[3] In this respect, the pressure for “ever closer union” was like that facing the Americans in the mid-1780s. Because the nature of the union was itself an issue, a convention composed of delegates—not state officials—directly elected by the people for the purpose might seem best suited. However, I contend that while rethinking the E.U. was not without merit at the time, the specificity of the planned amendment argues against the idea.
1. Steven Erlanger, "Leaders Struggle for a Deal to Keep Euro Intact," The New York Times, December 4, 2011.
2, Ibid.
3. Ibid.
