Herding cats. This expression typically is used to describe
two arcane artifacts of human organization: academic faculties and the U.S.
Senate. In the latter case, the operational difficulty stems at least in part
from the principles on which the legislative chamber is based. More
particularly, the senators represent semi-sovereign polities rather than
individuals, and governmental autonomy, however slight that may be, translates
into senate mechanisms such as the filibuster as well as the related
super-majority needed to end such a “debate,” and the power that a single senator
has to object to a unanimous-consent request made on the Senate floor. In May
2015, Mitch McConnell, the majority leader, found himself mired in both
mechanisms as he sought to end debate on whether to give the Pacific trade deal
(TPP) fast-track (i.e., no amendments) treatment, and then to extend the
Patriot Act. Whereas The New York Times points
to McConnell’s failure to live up to his promise to take the Senate back to its
committee process and away from passing legislation by senate leaders making
deals such as by horse-trading, I contend that more utility lies in examining
how the Senate’s basic principles contribute to the dysfunction.[1]
The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.
See also: “The U.S. Senate Approves Fast-Track for Pacific Trade Deal.”
[1]
Jennifer Steinhauer and Jonathan Weisman, “N.S.A.
and Other Matters Leave McConnell’s Senate in Disarray,” The New York Times, May 23, 2015.
