Raises at Bailed-Out U.S. Companies: Approved by Treasury

In early 2013, the Special Inspector General for Troubled Asset Relief Program reported that the U.S. Treasury Department disregarded its own guidelines in order to allow large pay increases for executives at three major companies that had received bailouts during the financial crisis. In particular, eighteen raises for executives at American International Group (AIG), General Motors, and Ally Financial were approved. Fourteen were for $100,000 or more. A raise for the CEO of a division of AIG was $1 million. Treasury approved these raises even though they exceeded the pay limits set in Treasury’s own guidelines.

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In assessing Treasury’s approval of the raises, one must weigh the argument that they were needed to retain expertise needed to restore the companies to financial health (and thus be able to pay back the bailouts) against the argument that bailouts should come with strings such that the funds are not used opportunistically. At the very least, executives associated with the companies’ failures should not be rewarded. However, what about new-hires brought in to restore the companies?  If the restoration is successful, shouldn’t those managers be compensated?  Even if the raises were not necessary to retaining talent, managers who had not been part of the problem should be compensated for effective work. At the same time, it is proper and fitting that companies being bailed out be subject to strings, and thus neither the companies nor their employees should be able to benefit inordinately.

That Treasury disregarded its own guidelines can be read as an indication that the officials were concerned that vital talent would be lost had the guidelines been followed. The bailouts in the E.U. contained limits on executive compensation without any apparent hindrance to the viability of the banks. In other words, the argument that the raises were necessary to retain talent could have been a ruse. An alternative interpretation consistent with this scenario is that the business sector had too much influence over Treasury officials. In addition to lobbying influence and connections between Treasury officials and former colleagues on Wall Street, it is possible that pro-business officials had adopted the business line that government should not interfere with business—even companies being bailed out.

Put another way, contrasting the lack (or ignoring) of strings at Treasury with the salience of strings in the case of the E.U.’s bailouts may illustrate a cultural difference between Americans and Europeans generally with respect to pro-business ideology. Had executives at the three bailed out companies above enjoyed inordinate influence within Treasury, the conflict of interest for the government officials could have been enabled by a shared ideology: namely, what is good for GM is good for America.

Source:

Marcy Gordon, “Treasury Disregarded Own Guidelines, Allowed Executive Raises At Bailed-Out GM, AIG,” The Huffington Post, January 28, 2013.