Plato’s Justice: On the Conflict of Interest in Google’s Search Engine

“Google’s popularity was built on its ability to help people find just the right Web pages. Then came the social Web, led by Facebook,” Claire Miller of the New York Times writes. Then came the “fledgling Google Plus social network,” the content of which Google then included among other search results at its search engine. The idea, ostensibly, is to “personalize” internet searches. In addition to expertise on a given topic, relevant comments and even pictures posted at Google’s social network may be listed, especially if from a friend. The added utility is debatable, however, particularly as content from other social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter is more in demand, according to Danny Sullivan of Search Engine Land. I question the relevance of even that content to a search on Google, given my searches up to now, though of course it is possible that someone’s post on X could be helpful if information on X is otherwise hard to come by. At the very least, Google ought to make it very easy for users to turn off the feature while at the search site.

Although Miller mentions the antitrust concerns regarding Google having an incentive to prioritize search results from Google Plus above competing social networks, the possibility raises an ethical red flag as well. Specifically, merely by having entered the social network realm as a provider while continuing to run a search engine, Google set up a potential conflict of interest for itself. Including content from its social network as possible search results effectively instantiates that conflict. Even if content from Google Plus is not priorities in the algorithm, the temptation exists to do so, particularly as Google Plus is said to be “fledgling.” At the very least, there is the appearance of a conflict of interest, which in itself undercuts Google’s credibility.

However, there is much to be said for a company sticking with what it does best. It is not as though Google’s search algorithm could not be improved. To concentrate more on what one already does well may well be the secret to cornering the market on a sustained basis. Drifting onto other activities, such as creating a social network, just because they are related still involves the opportunity cost of foregone attention paid to the real basis of competitive advantage. Staying with something, such as a book or article, and rewriting it again and again until it is cogent, and then writing another book or article drawing on the same fount of expertise is essentially like holding a laser beam on what one does. This takes self-control, and, according to Plato, the use of reason—especially over the passions. Moreover, each part of the mind should do the job it is designed for, rather than trying to do that of another part.

In the human mind (or psyche), justice, according to Plato, is a harmonious order in which reason rules, followed by appetite and bravery. In the Republic, Plato asks, “Does it not belong to the rational part to rule, being wise and exercising forethought in behalf of the entire soul?”[i] It is unjust for a person to permit one of the elements of his mind to do the work of one of the others, such as in allowing the appetites to rule in place of reason.[ii] Order is important in justice, and this means each element of the mind performs its own function, with reason uppermost, bravery in the middle, and desire on the bottom. Plato argues that the same justice should apply to the city (or country), with the rational part (the rulers) ruling over the parts that represent appetites. The latter parts are themselves reason-dominated, even as they play the part of passion at the level of the city.

In a just city, the wise few who know eternal verities rule out of their reason, dominating the appetitive substratum of society.[iii] A just ruler has the virtue of wisdom not only because reason is the controlling element in his or her own mind, but also because the ruler functions (or embodies) in society the place (or role) of reason in the mind. A just political society is thus self-controlled similar how a just person self-controls his mind. Similar to how reason should control the passions in the well-ordered mind of a person, the ruling philosopher-kings, playing the part of reason, should control the occupations that play the role of the appetites. Being oriented to the changing things of this (material) world in one’s occupation likens the business practitioner’s role in the city to an appetite even though reason is still to be in charge of the practitioner’s mind (i.e., controlling its passions). Therefore, those citizens who are occupied with affairs of business are justly subject to both their own reason governing their appetites and the control of the self-controlled ruler’s reason-based rule (i.e., the part representing the role of reason at the level of the city). The part that is reason at the city level must be in harmony with the business practitioner’s reason for there to be justice between the two levels. Both the business practitioner’s own reason-based self-control (self-regulation) and that of the ruler as law constitute the constraint of justice in holding commercial pursuits back both in terms of profit-seeking activity and wealth—both of which being coupled with, and thus indicative of, greed.

If it is itself a reason-controlled organization  (i.e., reason over the appetite of greed), Google can justly play its own role in manifesting one of the appetites  in the internet “city. For this to be so, each of the human minds, or psyches, in the company of Google must also be reason-controlled. Google is itself a part of the internet city, so drifting off to play the role of another part, such as in building a social network, is unjust. In business parlance: Doing so is a “no-no.” If self-controlled by reason, the managers at Google would not let their company be out of control, running at the mercy of one of its appetites while reason takes a day off. In other words, Platonic justice requires self-regulation at the level of the person, organization and city (organizations, cities, states, and empires being scales of Plato’s polis).

Not playing others’ parts applies to acting too. As a brief digression, I could play a Wall Street executive, maybe even Walter in Raison in the Sun, and perhaps even a romantic lead opposite Lady Gaga (ok, I’m dreaming here, but Plato can be a bit dry so allow me some imagination), but for me to come off as Lady Gaga herself would be for me to play the part of another—a young actress. At too many companies, managers push themselves into others’ roles without bothering to look in the mirror. Too many companies themselves try to play the parts of other companies. By Plato’s reckoning, this is not just self-defeating; it is fundamentally unjust.

Google’s conflict of interest in adding content from its own social network to its search engine can be viewed as unethical from the standpoint of Plato’s theory of justice wherein it is unjust for one part to play the role of another part—in this case, that of Facebook. In other words, we now have a basis in ethical theory for saying that simply being in an institutional conflict of interest is itself unethical (i.e., even without taking advantage of the situation).

Searching can be distinguished from content. They can be viewed as two different parts in the internet “city.” The conventional “wisdom,” as expressed in Miller’s article, is that by “failing to get on board with social networking, Google risked being left behind.” However, having a “fledgling” social network may be worse than having stayed out. Google managers could have focused their attention and energy on improving the algorithm (as well as adding still more content provided by other companies as possible search results).

I do not believe that either searching or content can be sufficiently accomplished such that the marginal utility of further investment (e.g., money, time, effort) in either is ever zero. Simply put, we humans are not that good at what we do that we can afford to dilute our own role by taking those of others. The best of all possible worlds is far from perfect (sorry Leibniz). Accordingly, there is always work to be done in one’s own back yard. Paradoxically, much growth is possible—perhaps even more—by concentrating on what one naturally does best rather than spreading out to attempt to emulate other parts. Results aside, sticking with what one does best is just—doing so obviates a potential conflict of interest.

To “stick to the knitting,” a cute expression first used in the practical business guide, In Search of Excellence, is essentially to use self-control (i.e., reason over greed and empire-building power) to concentrate on one’s innate role—that which one naturally does best. From the standpoint of results, to concentrate by adding intensity to what one is already doing rather than dilute by spreading oneself too thin proffers the best payoff. A business can be thought of as a battery of sorts that can never be too charged, but it can easily be drained. Sapping a business of its energy, not to mention its unity of a shared focus, can be thought of in entropic terms or more abstractly in terms of a psyche lacking self-control. At the very least, it is bad form to act as if one can (or should) play all the parts in a play.

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[i]. Plato, Republic, 4.441e-442a.

[ii]. Natural justice inverted: the role of “appetite” in the enslavement of reason. Plato, Republic, bks. 8-9. Contrast this with the sublimated chaste love of the eternal moral verities described in Phaedo, 78d, in Plato, Euthyphro, Apology.

[iii]. Plato, Republic, 4.442a-b. The rational part should rule in a concordant polis.

 Source:

Claire C. Miller, “Google Adds Social Network to Search Results,” The New York Times, January 11, 2012. http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/google-adds-posts-from-its-social-network-to-search-results/