“Well written and an interesting perspective.” Clan Rossi --- “Your article is too good about Japanese business pushing nuclear power.” Consulting Group --- “Thank you for the article. It was quite useful for me to wrap up things quickly and effectively.” Taylor Johnson, Credit Union Lobby Management --- “Great information! I love your blog! You always post interesting things!” Jonathan N.

Thursday, March 10, 2011

The General Welfare Clause: Is the Power of Congress Constitutionally Unlimited?

Art. 1, Sec. 8. of the US Constitution: Congress “shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”

Does this clause mean that the US Government can legislate in any way that benefits the Union? According to Thomas Woods, the general welfare clause “was a restriction on the power of the federal government: it had to exercise the powers delegated to it with an eye to the welfare of the country as a whole, not to the particular advantage of one state or section.”[i] That is to say, the Congress could provide for the general welfare of the United States only within its delimited powers listed in the US Constitution.

The full essay is at "Is the E.U. a Federal System?"

The U.S. Supreme Court as a Branch of the U.S. Government: Is There a Conflict of Interest in Federalism Cases?

As to whether the supreme courts of particular American states, or republics, should be able to declare the general (U.S.) government’s health-insurance mandate unconstitutional in the sense of being an encroachment of the government of the union beyond its enumerated powers, it is typically presumed that the U.S. Supreme Court is the rightful and proper umpire--the court of last resort on disputes on federalism applied to particular legislation. Forgotten is the argument made by Thomas Jefferson against that court’s suitability owing to its institutional conflict of interest in contests between the U.S. Government, of which the U.S. Supreme Court is a branch, and a goverment of one of the several states.  Typically, we do not consider how the conflict of interest can be solved. We do not “think outside the box.” Rather, we feel resigned to have branch of one of the parties of the dispute act as the final decider short of a constitutional amendment.

We do not consider, for example, that perhaps a council of the States’ Supreme Court Chief Justices (or their attorney generals) might be a less problematic alternative. We need not throw up our hands and leave it to any state to nullify any federal law it doesn’t like. We can design an umpire of federalism in such a way that the the encroaching tendency of the center is counterbalanced by the interests of the states in deciding the question. That is to say, we ought to design the umpire mechanism in such a way that tilts in the direction of the states, given the tilt of power in the other direction historically and today. It is well worth reviewing Jefferson’s argument so this doesn’t sound so radical. Given our aversion to real change, the need for a constitutional amendment must be backed up by a mainstream figure.

Essentially, Jefferson maintained that there is a conflict of interest in one branch of the US Government–the US Supreme Court–being the ultimate umpire in federalism disputes between a State and the US Government. It is like having a member of one of the two baseball teams playing being the umpire. In college, I was a referee for intermural football. I was stunned when the coordinator of the refs, himself a student, assigned himself to referee the game involving his own fraternity. When I suggested that there is a conflict of interest in his self-assignment, he dismissed my concern out of hand. Sadly, this sort of attitude characterizes Americans in general with respect to institutional conflicts of interest in our government (and between business and government). I contend that we are blind to such ethical problems, and the viability of our federal system of public governance, which includes semi-sovereign States, is paying the price in the form of a massive imbalance.

One might counter that the separation of powers in the US Government make the US Supreme Court independent of the Congress and President. According to Thomas Woods, the separation of powers in the federal government cannot be relied on to distinguish the US Supreme Court’s interest from its basis as a branch of the US Government because the “three federal branches can simply unite against the independence of the states and the reserved rights of the people.”[i] In 1825, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “It is but too evident, that the three ruling branches of [the Federal government] are in combination to strip their colleagues, the State authorities, of the powers reserved by them, and to exercise themselves all functions foreign and domestic.”[ii] Jefferson believed that in a dispute between the states and the federal government, the resolution should not come from a branch of the federal government. With the US Supreme Court as the umpire on federalism questions, the states “would inexorably be eclipsed by the federal government.”[iii] Woods observes, “(S)ince the federal courts are themselves a branch of the federal government, how can the people be expected to consider them impartial arbiters? The [US] Supreme Court itself, after all, although usually pointed to as the monopolistic and infallible judge of the constitutionality of the federal government’s actions, is itself a branch of the federal government.”[iv] For one thing, US Supreme Court justices are selected by the US President and confirmed by US Senators. In this process, even an unconscious “similarity of perspective” is likely to be sought or welcomed even with respect to one’s vantage-point (i.e., perspective). Spencer Roane, a Virginia judge whom Jefferson would have nominated to the US Supreme Court, wrote, “the States never could have committed an act of such egregious folly as to agree that their empire should be altogether appointed and paid by the other party. The [US] Supreme Court may be a perfectly impartial tribunal to decide between two States, but cannot be considered in that point of view when the contest lies between the United States and one of its members… . The [US] Supreme Court is but a department of the general government. A department is not competent to do that to which the whole government is inadequate… . They cannot do it unless we tread underfoot the principle which forbids a party to decide his own cause.”[v] As a branch of the Federal government, the US Supreme Court justices have at the very least a perspective from the “whole”–meaning the US as a whole–which is the vantage-point of the US Government. This is a background basis of similarity; the nominating President and the confirming Senators are likely to ask questions of a nominee that would show the nominee’s attitude or opinion concerning the power of the US Government (i.e., the power of the President and Senators!). The conflict of interest is clear, yet no one points to it. This is very odd indeed–tantamount to a societal blindspot.

Not unexpectedly, the US Supreme Court has consistently and overwhelmingly decided federalism cases in favor of the US Government. Even the Morrison and Lopez cases on the reach of the interstate commerce clause in the 1990s allow for indirect economic effects from such commerce to justify the jurisdiction of the US Government over those of the States. An indirect effect is just the sort of loophole that the US Government has been using to expand its power. So even the Rhenquist court was pro-US Government vis a vis the States. Joseph Desha, governor of Kentucky in 1825, wrote, “most of the encroachments made by the general government flow through the [US] Supreme Court itself, the very tribunal which claims to be the final arbiter of all such disputes. What chance for justice have the States when the usurpers of their rights are made their judges? Just as much as individuals when judged by their oppressors.”[vi] What amazes me is not so much the historical trend; rather, I’m bewildered by how such an obvious conflict of interest could be allowed to fly for so long under the radar screen of American public consciousness. This really should tell us something about ourselves, and we ought not to be flattered by what we see.


Click to add a question or comment on the ethics of the Supreme Court on federalism cases.

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[i] Woods, Jr., Thomas E. Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2010), 4.

[ii]Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles, December 26, 1825, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 10, ed. Paul L. Ford (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1899), 355.

[iii] Woods, Jr., Thomas E. Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2010), 5.

[iv] Woods, Jr., Thomas E. Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2010), 5.

[v] James J. Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957), 156.

[vi] State Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United States, ed. Herman V. Ames (New York: Longman’s, Green, 1911), 113.

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

The Volcker Rule: Taking in Water on Proprietary Trading

Under the Dodd-Frank financial reform law of 2010, Goldman Sachs had to break up its principal strategies group, the trading unit that had been very profitable. Goldman was considering several options, including moving the traders to another division or shutting the unit altogether. Morgan Stanley was considering ceding control of its $7 billion hedge fund firm, FrontPoint Partners. At Citigroup, executives had sold hedge fund and private equity businesses and were discussing reducing proprietary trading, which relies on a bank’s own capital to make bets in the financial markets. JPMorgan Chase had already begun dismantling its stand-alone proprietary trading desk and was modifying the structure of some investments of One Equity Partners, its internal private equity business. “This is the real stuff,” said Brad Hintz, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Company. “It shows that if you squeeze Wall Street, like a balloon it will come out somewhere else, and we really are squeezing Wall Street. Their business models are changing.”

However, loopholes in the legislation may enable the banks to continue to trade on their own books, even apart from serving as a counterparty for client transactions. Citigroup and others, for instance, are considering moving proprietary traders to desks that handle trades for clients, although the traders would still be able to make their own bets in the markets. The Volcker Rule’s definition of proprietary trading is open to interpretation. At first blush, it looks watertight: the rule forbids banks from buying and selling financial products for their “trading account.” That, in turn, is defined as an account meant to profit in the “near term” from “short term” movements in prices. Besides not covering such long term bets as shorting in anticipation of a fall in the housing market, the rule states that banks can still trade government and agency securities for their own account. Some of the problems at the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management stemmed from trying to arbitrage prices between Treasuries of different terms. And the Carlyle Capital Corporation, a heavily leveraged debt fund, crashed in 2008 when prices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage bonds dropped. So in allowing for continued proprietary trading apart from serving as a short-term counterparty for a client’s transaction, the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform law may not change Wall Street’s landskip all that much. This is hardly surprising, as members of Congress allowed the banking lobby to participate in the writing of the legislation in spite of the industry’s culpability in the financial crisis of 2008.

Click to add a question or comment on proprietary trading and financial reform.

Sources:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/business/06wall.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=wall%20st%20faces%20specter%20of%20lost&st=cse
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/business/06views.html?scp=1&sq=anthony%20currie%20christopher%20swann&st=Search

Worst Buy or Best Buy: Corporate Apology as Corporate-Speak to Sell Still More

As I was entering a “Bestbuy” store one summer day wearing shorts and a tee shirt and carrying my ubiquitous book bag (as you might expect), the security person, whom the manager later told me also works at a prison, walked after me as though stalking me, practially yelling “Sir! Sir!” Reaching me as I was talking to a salesperson who was treating me as though I were a customer, the lineback demanded to look in my book bag immediately. I stated matter of factly that I had had no opportunity to stash anything from the store in my bag while walking in the front door (after which he saw my every move).  Nevertheless, I opened my pouch for him and he was satisifed. After I left the salesperson, I reported the incident to a manager, whose “company apologizes” was belied by his curtness and saccarine politieness.

Can a company even apologize? That sounds anthropomorphic to me. Perhaps if an employee is rude in “correctly” following a company policy—such that the policy itself is odious—a manager could apologize for the store. But can a store apologize? That sounds a bit like corporate “spending” being counted as “free speech" and like a company being regarded, moreover, as a legal person. In my view, the legal person status of a company does not mean that “it” can speak and apologize. Perhaps it makes more sense to say that only the person who committed some act can apologize for himself.

In the case of my “Bestbuy” experience, the manager added insult to injury. After I told him about the security person’s behavior—the manager agreeing with me that the employee had been excessively zealous—the manager told me that typically people with book bags are, in his experience, thieves. When I objected to his assumption, he turned dismissive, accusing me even of “going in circles” in spite of the fact that I had not repeated myself at all in my one sentence reply.  The manager seemed utterly unaware (or indifferent) to the fact that he was adding insult to injury, even as he was apologizing for the company! This is a perfect example of the duplicity of corporate-speak.

A company is an economic organization. Hence, for “it” to apologize, there really must be some economic sacrifice involved; otherwise, the apology does not register in terms of what the company is. The vacuousness of “We do apologize for any inconvenience” (which we all have heard) is attested to by how easy it is for a manager to utter it while simultaneously insulting the customer (e.g., “you’re going in circles; can I go now?”). I contend that for a “company’s” apology to be valid, some economic sacrifice must be given up without the company benefitting in any way such as by a future purchase with a coupon. Customers, I contend, should indicate that the apologizing manager must put his or her company's money where its apology is; otherwise, the customer should say in like terms, "unfortunately the apology cannot be accepted as valid.” How, I wonder, would a manager or clerk react to being the recipient rather than the source of policy-speak? He or she would probably reply, “well, I can’t do anything about that.” His "can't" is probably disingenuous, as it is undoubtedly convenient, at least at the moment. The customer might reply, 'unfortunately I can't shop here again." This exchange evinces the sheer rigidity that is so ingrained in corporate-speak as well as the underlying mentality.  I suspect that businesses are so used to their customers accepting the rigidity as given (rather than as contingent or affected) that the managers and employees take their own rigidity as required, as though deterministically rather than by their free will. Essentially, I am arguing that only certain things—money and policies—are recognizable to the managerial birds of prey, hence their “apologies” must be converted back into such terms by customers or rejected for what they are--mere attempts to pacify customers so they will buy something.  That it never occurs to a manager that the actual employee who had offended the customer ought to be the person to apologize suggests some strange surrogate type of apology is therefore valid. Just like if I offend someone only I can apologize for what I have said or done, so too only the offending employee can proffer a viable and thus acceptable apology.  For a customer to accept anything less is to enable weakness and subterfuge.

Guam Capsizing: Do Voters Want Educated Representatives? Or Are Districts Too Large for Democracy?

Democrat Georgia Congressman Hank Johnson said during an Armed Services Committee hearing in late March, 2010 that Guam would be in danger were more US troops sent there. “My fear that the whole island will become so overly populated that it will tip over and capsize,” he said in all seriousness. “We don’t anticipate that,” responded Adm. Robert Willard.

Did Hank Johnson's constituents want their representative in the U.S. House of Representatives to be at least nominally educated?  Lest one replies with "of course," it could also be that people may want their represenatives to be like them, or at least to reflect what they value. It could be that Rep. Johnson's district was inhabited by people who didn't value education. My hometown is such a place. Going to graduate school is tantamount to evading the real world. The implication is that investing in one's education is to waste one's time on something of little value. Of course, you can't fight ignorance or change people's values where they are convinced that they are correct.  It is perhaps not a surprise that representatives could be found in government having that mentality where it is common among constituents.

It is also true that larger the electorate, the less it can make an informed decision regarding the candidates campaigning to represent it. This is why the delegates to the US Constitutional Convention said there is more democracy at the level of state legislatures (e.g., more retail, less wholesale, politics). The EU Parliament has almost 800 reps (newly expanded, though I understand not yet filled), yet is not twice the US population, so the electorates per rep are smaller. However, a governmental body so large is apt to be cumbersome. The state governments in the EU, like those in the US, have smaller districts for their legislative lower houses (and perhaps their senates as well). In smaller districts, the candidates and the elected representative are more apt to be known by a given voter (or by someone the voter knows). Two (or even three) degrees of separation are better than relying on tv commercials, which are geared to presenting a given candidate as he or she wants to be seen. A viable republic ought not rely on a candidate’s preferred self-presentation because judgments in governance involve the actual person–hence the voters ought to know it.

A major implication from my reasoning here is that both American and European state governments ought not allow the balance of power to shift too much to the US and EU level, respectively. On the last day of the U.S. Constitutional Convention, George Washington, who had kept quiet throughout in his role in presiding, asked the delegates if they would make one change. Rather than a U.S. House representative to represent at least 40,000 inhabitants, the minimum should be 30,000 because that would allow for greater democracy. Of course, the setting of a minimum is far different than a maximum; the average district population has never been 30,000.  At the turn of the twenty-first century, it was more than 600,000.  The constitutional delegates would have thought such an arrangement to evince an aristocrisy, there being so few representatives relative to the population. The average citizen's voice would surely be lost, the designers of the U.S. constitution would be wont to say.  I suspect their response would be not just to send more power back to the state governments, but also to urge many of the large and medium states into federal systems themselves. Particularly where a state is heterogeneous, it makes sense for it to have a federal system with states ranging from large metro areas to four or five counties (as in Germany, whose Lander span from Bremen to Bavaria).  Unsere grosse Staaten sollten von Deutschland lernen. It could be that in modernity, the West has grown too accustomed to larger and larger electorates.  Has the E.U., for example, set any limit to its expansion from the vantage point of its democracy deficit?  Furthermore, has the U.S. tackled the problem of how to reconcile the large districts in the U.S. House with the problem of that body itself having too many members?  If it continues to be assumed that Congress can and should legislate on virtually anything, the tradeoff between representation and the size of the House must be addressed.

The Increasing Decadence in American Business (and Society): The Case of On-Screen Distractions during Television Programs

While watching Lord of the Rings on TBS in 2010, I noticed that the network was posting not only its logo on the bottom right of the screen, but also advertising for its programming on the bottom left. Also, “more movie, less commercials” was written to accompany the logo. What really got to me during the movie was when pictures advertising a television show were shown. They took up almost an eighth of the screen and thus could not but distract the viewer from watching the movie. I decided I would not watch movies on networks that compromise or prostitute their own programing in order to sell themselves while "in progress." It is like sitting down at a restaurant and having the waitor sell me on other dishes while I am trying to enjoy the one that I'm eating. “I just want to enjoy this fine meal, thank you,” any discerning customer would be wont to say. Once at Starbucks, the customer in front of me at the register was paying $25 for a variety of products.  As I was thinking that the store had made a good sale, the clerk tried to sell the customer on a certain food item for the next visit--as if the present sale was not enough.  The same propensity wherein nothing is ever enough is evinced by the television networks that can't seem to restrain themselves from adding more and more self-promotions onto the screen during their own programming.  These networks are playing off the mitigated nature of the additions being incremental, and thus not objectionable to the average viewer. 

It is simply bad business to interfere with a customer’s enjoyment of a product by trying to promote the business or another product. The over-reaching has the bad smell of self-indulgence knowingly at others’ expense. It is impossible to enjoy a movie while animated characters run around the bottom of the screen to get the viewers' attention. The perpetrators ought to be regarded as children wherein if we give them an inch, they will indeed take a mile. Sadly, too many of us allow ourselves to be strung along the slippery slope--perhaps some viewers don't even notice the incremental intrusions. The smell of the network managers' over-reaching ought to be emetic, but perhaps the stench is so ubiquitous that we as a soceity are innoculated against even smelling it.  One can hope that one day, we shall wake up to the decadence and "smell the coffee." Perhaps only the loss of a significant viewership would mean that the sordid managers will be out of their jobs–unable to earn their high salaries for trying to manipulate us in new subterfuges. That, ladies and gentlemen, would be justice and a more salubrious society.  In the meantime, American television will increasingly come to reflect the lowest common denominator in the viewership because that is where the numbers are. In fact, perhaps it could be said that this nature of television reflects the values that are taking hold in American society.

Do we as a society value mutual respect and self-restraint, or are we too tolerant of selfishness and manipulatory behavior? Do we not value strength, but instead enable weakness? Are the stars of reality shows famous for fifteen minutes because they evince our society's actual values?  In other words, have we become a self-absorbed, petty people without realizing it?  If so, the television networks may simply be us taking advantage because it is condoned.

The Banking Lobby Amid Goldman Sachs' Culpability: A Danger to the Republic?

To simplify how Goldman Sachs got into trouble with the SEC: According to Annie Lowrey, the hedge fund Paulson & Co. handpicked mortgage-backed securities that were doomed to stop performing, being backed with subprime mortgages, and Goldman packaged them into a kind of bond. Paulson & Co. bet against the bond by buying short-sales, with Goldman acting as the broker. At the same time, Goldman sold the bond to other clients without disclosing that Paulson had engineered the bond to fail. The SEC filing notes that those other clients lost $1 billion. Goldman had no direct stake in the success or failure of the CDO. It made money either way. “This litigation exposes the cynical, savage culture of Wall Street that allows a dealer to commit fraud on one customer to benefit another,” Chris Whalen, a bank analyst at Institutional Risk Analytics, said in a note to clients on April 16, 2010. Someone at Goldman said on the same day that “the SEC’s charges are completely unfounded in law and fact.” If the SEC charges hold up (and it is doubtful that the agency would bring such charges without supporting documentation; it is more apt to miss something than go overboard), I am astonished that the people at Goldman simply dismissed the matter out of hand. It might make sense as their legal defense, but if the bankers are convicted, those lying ought to be fired even if they were not a party to the scheme. It also appears that the bankers lied about whether they made money in betting against the housing market. “The 2009 Goldman Sachs annual report stated that the firm ‘did not generate enormous net revenues by betting against residential related products,’ ” Senator Levin, chairman of the US Senate’s committee on investigations, said in a statement in April, 2010. “These e-mails show that, in fact, Goldman made a lot of money by betting against the mortgage market.” When a spokesperson for the bank says something in the future, a rational person will be wont not to trust him or her. Lying has (or ought to have) consequences rather than being dismissed as harmless PR or a legal defense. The bank’s credibility is at issue here. The SEC has accused Goldman of outright lying to customers in order to make money both ways on a deal. Even though this ought to reflect negatively on Goldman’s future business, bigger issues involved that ought to consume more of our attention than how Goldman fares.

Given the strength of the financial sector’s lobby in Washington, this case involving Goldman suggests that we, the American electorate, were unwittingly putting our financial system and our republics in danger by enabling the lobby to have such effect in watering down the regulatory reform in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.

In the election cycle in which the US Senate’s agricultural committee took up legislation that would regulate all derivatives (2010), people and organizations affiliated with financial, insurance and real estate companies gave members of the committee $22.8 million. Wall Street firms raised $60,000 at two fund-raisers for the committee’s chair’s re-election campaign in the cycle before the committee took up the legislation. Many of the chairs constituents want a crackdown on the speculation. This put Blanche Lincoln in a difficult situation, ethically speaking. At the very least, accepting money from the firms that would be subject to the legislation involves the appearance of a conflict of interest. I contend that given human nature, even such an appearance ought to be avoided or even outlawed. At the very least, it is unseemly in a republic, and I would argue dangerous to its viability.

Furthermore, as if the banks’ culpibility in the crisis was not sufficient to cancel their reservations at the regulatory table, the Goldman case strongly suggests that the banks ought not to be trusted as contributors to regulatory reform. And yet they push ahead to reduce the regulatation, in spite of it all. A child who drops his milkshake doesn’t turn around and tell his mother that she better not clean it up and that she had better not get involved if it happens again. Rather, such a child stands back. As if there is not enough of a natural feeling of shame at having made a mess, there is, or ought naturally to be, an even greater sense of shame in presuming to be in a position to direct the clean-up according to one’s self-interest over objections that the person who caused the problem is not the one best suited to fix it. Even if corporations can enjoy the legal fiction of personhood, there are actual human beings running them, and it is telling when those people dismiss their innate shame in their presumption–even pretending that it is not presumption! We are to blame in not calling them on it, and relegating them. We must relegate them if they won’t do it for themselves, as would be natural for them to do. In other words, we ought to call the artiface for what it is and relegate it as a parent would naturally tell a spoiled and misbehaving yet dogmatic child to go to his room. We, the American people, are enablers; bad parents. We ought to look toward solving the bigger problem, which the case of the Goldman children intimates.

The theory of regulatory capture points to the government’s need for information that the industry being regulated can provide. This theory ignores the broader power-base that an industry is apt to have in lobbying the government (and supporting candidates). In other words, information is just small change from the standpoint of an industry’s ability to influence a government. A better theory would have its primary focus on the macro level, asking the question, in effect, whether (and how) a republic is compromised by its moneyed corporations and banks. Besides looking at campaign finance law and uncovering actual lobbying practices, we ought to look at how much the society in question values money, commerical gain, wealth and economic freedom. We ought not be limited to the managerial or technocrat perspective in ascertaining whether our financial system and indeed our very republics are in danger from being used by unscrupulous firms or industies according to that which fits their peoples’ desires. Once we have uncovered the real problem, we really won’t have any excuse for not fixing it, and we would be bad parents indeed if we let the children fix it.

Sources:
http://washingtonindependent.com/82571/sec-charges-goldman-sachs-over-subprime-tied-product  http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/goldmans-stacked-bet/?ref=opinion
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/16/news/companies/sec.goldman.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2010041616 ; http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/16/news/companies/goldman_sachs_questions.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2010041615 ; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/business/20derivatives.html?hp
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/business/25goldman.html?ref=us

Tuesday, March 8, 2011

Lessons Learned from the Arab Spring: Reforming International Organizations and Invoking Principled Leadership in Defense of Human Rights

"When a leader's only means of staying in power is to use mass violence against his own people, he has lost the legitimacy to rule and needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now." The White House issued this written statement five days after Qaddafi had turned in violence on his own people who were protesting unarmed in the street. Nearly three weeks after the first day that Qaddafi had lost legitimacy, President Obama tried to raise the pressure on the Libyan dictator further by talking about “a range of potential options, including potential military options."  Yet by then the politics of such intervention were getting more complicated by the day, according to the New York Times. The paper reported that critics were contending that the White House was too much concerned about perceptions, and that the administration was too squeamish on the military options on account of the preceding administration's invasion of Iraq based on a claim of danger to the United States from Saddam's access to WMD.
 
Even the critics acknowledged that the best outcome militarily would be for the United States to join other nations or international organizations rather than go it alone. About a week after the president's hint of military options, the E.U. decided not to impose a No Fly Zone. A few days later, the Arab League, which, according to the Huffington Post, had already barred Libya's government from taking part in League meetings, issued a statement that Qaddafi's government had "lost its sovereignty." The League decided to establish contacts with the rebels' interim government, the National Libyan Council, and to call on the Security Council of the U.N. to impose a No Fly Zone on Libya. 
 
In a statement, the Arab League asked the "United Nations to shoulder its responsibility ... to impose a no-fly zone over the movement of Libyan military planes and to create safe zones in the places vulnerable to airstrikes." It would not be until March 18th, nearly a month after Qaddafi had first had weapons used against the protesters, that the Security Council would act. According to The New York Times, "After days of often acrimonious debate, played out against a desperate clock, as Colonel Qaddafi’s troops advanced to within 100 miles of the rebel capital of Benghazi, Libya, the Security Council authorized member nations to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, diplomatic code words calling for military action." Within days, according to the New York Times, "American and European forces began a broad campaign of strikes against the government of . . . Qaddafi, unleashing warplanes and missiles in the first round of the largest international military intervention in the Arab world since the invasion of Iraq."




Sources:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/middleeast/08policy.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=todayspaper
Jim Michaels, "Is Libyan 'Window of Opportunity' Closing?," USA Today, March 10, 2011, p. 6A.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/12/arab-league-asks-un-for-libya-no-fly-zone_n_834975.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18nations.html?hp
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/03/19/france.libya.meeting/index.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/africa/20libya.html?hp

Limiting the Size of Banks in the US: Rhetoric vs. Reality in the Wake of the Financial Crisis

To put a matress under a falling giant pales in comparison to placing a sign on Wall Street, reading “No giants allowed.”

In April of 2010, President Obama gave a speech in New York City to counter what he called “the furious efforts of industry lobbyists” trying to weaken or kill new financial regulations that he claimed are needed to stave off a second Great Depression.  It is telling that the banks that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 were trying to diminish any new regulation. The President wanted more consumer protections, limits on the size of banks and the risks they can take, reforms on executive compensation and greater transparency for controversial securities known as derivatives.  He maintained that each of these areas must be in any bill that he signs. In giving the speech with some of the banking titans in the audience, the President wanted to confront the financial industry more directly through a sharp speech. After castigating their “failure of responsibility” in recent years, he called on them to stop resisting tighter regulation through the army of lobbyists now staked out on Capitol Hill. The president’s address at Cooper Union in Lower Manhattan circled back to another speech he had given at the same location in March 2008 warning of financial manipulation, market bubbles and the concentration of economic power.

Analysis:

At the time of his speech, the President was supporting the bills coming out of the House and Senate, neither of which forestall or minimize market bubbles and reduce the concentration of economic power.  Regarding the latter, it is my understanding that nothing in either bill limits the the size of the big banks.  For the President to say that the bill reaching his desk must include something limiting the size of institutions in the US financial sector yet also say that he supports the bills coming out of Congress does not make sense as it involves a contradiction. On the eve of the President’s speech, Fox News pointed out that the President’s chief of staff had met behind closed doors with reps of Wall Street firms. The message was reportedly: we’ve got to trash you in public, but know that we will take care of you in private.  While Fox News was at the time certainly no friend of the President, the account would explain why the President would contradict himself concerning the size issue.   Given the inevitable lag of regulators amid the fast pace of innovation in product development on Wall Street, simply regulating existing products would not forestall another crisis; the concentration of private capital in the form of large banks must be reduced for “too big to fail” to be effectively mitigated.  Sadly, the President will probably get away with demanding limits on the banks’ size while signing bills that do not contain such language.  That he received just under a million dollars from Goldman Sachs in his Presidential campaign is just part of the story, for once elected the President was undoubtedly focused on 2012.  Recalling Andrew Jackson, who successfully took on the bank of the US by refusing to fund it in 1832, and Theodore Roosevelt, who supported the Sherman Anti-trust Act in 1911, I must admit to thinking that Barak Obama does not have their guts to take on the big guys. How many of us in the twenty-first century remember Jackson or Roosevelt?  We are more likely to make our current President the default from which we measure.  I submit that this is a mistake.  If we ignore or are ignorant of the strong points in our history, we cannot benefit from them and we are doomed to repeat the weak points.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/business/economy/23prexy.html?hp

Mr. Goldman Goes to Washington: Banker, You're No Jimmy Stewart

After watching hours of the US House Government Affairs committee on Investigations’ hearing on Goldman Sachs,  I concluded--totally contrary to the disavowals by the Goldman managers who testified--that there was indeed a conflict of interest between Goldman’s proprietary and market-making functions.  By proprietary, I mean a bank trading on its own books beyond simply being the counter-party in its market-making transactions. In their testimony, Goldman managers presumed that all of the bank’s proprietary transactions are part of its market-making role. However, I contend that the bank has been both a market-maker and a player in those markets, and furthermore that the latter function has affected the former in ways that are intended to benefit the bank. That is to say, Goldman Sachs’ financial interest has been put before that of its customers. In some cases, Goldman’s employees refused clients’ requests for shorts related to the housing market so Goldman’s own profits in shorting the market  could be preserved. Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) said, “There is something unseemly about Goldman betting against the housing market as it is selling housing-related products to its customers.” Sen. Conrad, a more conservative Republican, echoed this sentiment.  The fact that Republicans on the subcommittee joined with Democrats rather than joined in Goldman’s paradigm points to a major disconnect between Wall Street “speak” and the discourse of the general public.  In other words, the financial managers and the politicians were largely talking past each other.  Even so, the two “worlds” can be translated into a common language that nonetheless finds Goldman culpable, while acknowledging some of the managers’ points.  In what follows, I discuss a number of the points raised in the hearing to bear out my contentions here.

Broker dealers do not have a legal fiduciary obligation to their clients in the US. This, Sen. Collins argued, is the root cause of the conflict of interest at Goldman (i.e., pitching toxic investments to its clients while betting against them).  Goldman bankers view their obligation being to be market makers.  A duty to serve the clients or act in their best interest?   Goldman’s managers tended to affirm the former because where the bank is making markets, similarly to an exchange, it is not in an advising capacity. According to one of the managers, market-makers do not have an obligation to tell clients of the market-maker’s position in the market.  The manager contended that how Goldman is positioned may not affect how the instrument performs.  So long as clients understand what they are investing it, the position of the market-maker is not relevant to the client.

Paulson (of the hedge fund, Paulson & Co) had a role in picking the securities in the Abacus CDO. The rating agency said that if the rating analyst had known this, the rating would have been far different.  Torre, the manager at Goldman who oversaw the deal, claimed in testimony that he had told ACA (the major long buyer) that Paulson was going short, but in a memo from ACA afterward refers to Paulson going long. Paulson was involved in the selection of the securities, according to Torre, though ACA left off more than half of the securities that Paulson had recommended. Even so, Paulson was in the room as the securities were being selected, and he had selected the criteria of their removal. Goldman employees did not indicate in the Abacus CDO that Paulson, whose intent it was to short, had been involved in the selection of the securities (which were subprime mortgages from 2006—presumably the stated-income-only variety).

In replying to Sen. Levin’s questions regarding whether it is correct that Goldman made money on its net short position in 2007, two of the Goldman managers replied, “I didn’t write that.” A third replied, “I can only comment on what I did.” Although such non-answers could have been directed by lawyers or the answers could be due to the difference in general paradigms between Wall Street and the general public, I submit that the managers’ underlying attitude is particularly troubling because it involves some cognitive warping.  Because Chairman Levin (D-MI) was not asking  whether they wrote the Goldman document he was referring to, the reply “I didn’t write it” simply doesn’t apply.  At the very least, the managers were adding assumptions into Levin’s question that simply were not there. My question is this: what, cognitively or affectively speaking, would prompt such “value-added addendums”? After a similar answer to one of his questions, Sen. Colburn (R-OK) replied, “Mr Burnbaum, you didn’t hear what I said.”  Similarly frustrated after a question, Sen. Levin gave up with the witness, saying, “I think you’ve not answered the question as best you can.” At one point, Sen. Colburn asked Mr. Burnbaum whether he had any knowledge of whether his firm had a short position on an issue, he replied that he didn’t take the position.  “I don’t speak for the firm; I speak only for my position.” But Sen. Colburn didn’t ask him to speak for his firm; rather, he asked him whether he knew anything about something regarding the firm.  What could prompt such mistaken assumptions?  I don’t think it is entirely a subterfuge; rather, I suspect that the managers’ cognitive processes had been distorted by a particular organizational or industry culture. Such cognitive warping could be part of the reason why Goldman’s managers have blind-spots concerning the institutional conflicts of interest.

To potential customers who asked how Goldman got comfortable with Anderson securities, which were put together by New Century (a mortgage servicer), the sales people at Goldman did not say that the bank was comfortable because it was betting against them by buying 51% of the shorts.  Did Goldman have an obligation to disclose the fact that the bank had bought shorts (i.e., that Goldman had an adverse interest to the client)?   Goldman’s bankers point to the potential buyers’ ability to investigate the securities themselves. The Anderson was downgraded from AAA to junk in seven months.

“Boy, that Timberwolf was one shitty deal.”  This is from an internal Goldman email from the head of a division prior to the bank selling hundreds of millions from that deal to customers. Sales people were told that that deal was their top priority. “Should Goldman be trying to sell a shitty deal?”, Sen. Levin repeatedly asked throughout the hearing.  Seventeen of the people at Graywolf’s research group were Golden alums. Was that why the sales people were told to make the deal a priority?

In general terms, some of the managers at Goldman liked the risk involved in securitizing stated-income mortgages because clients wanted to buy them.  As a market-maker, Goldman’s managers believe that there is a price for any risk, so they would sell a deal they believed to be bad because some clients would like the price. In one case, 90% of the mortgages from an originator were stated-income.  In spite of the high number of stated-income mortgages, the rating agency involved gave some of the securities the AAA rating. Did the Goldman sales people tell their clients of the extent of the stated-income mortgages in the securities? Or did the sales people assume that the clients could investigate the securities in spite of there being the AAA rating on at least some of them?  Goldman claims that it investigated the due diligence of originators, like Long Beach.   So why did the investment bank not cut off that originator?

When asked about the bonuses paid out even as the clients lost money, the Goldman managers said that the compensation incentives were or are in line with ethical behavior.  Even if Goldman lost money, its executives didn’t. So it is reasonable to ask whether the incentives are in line with “performing.”

Goldman magnified the rise and fall of the housing market. Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman’s Chairman and CEO (which is itself a conflict of interest) admitted that the bank had played a role, as did the other investment banks, in the system that included too loose lending criteria. The managers at Goldman said the bank was a market-maker for instruments that reflected those low standards. Sparks, who headed the mortgage securities unit at Goldman, said he didn’t think Goldman did anything wrong; rather, some of the deals it put together did not “perform”—meaning that they were downgraded to junk.  “Goldman made some bad business decisions.”  In a business sense, “bad” does not mean “wrong” in the sense of “ought not” (i.e., unethical).  Rather, “bad” refers to making an error in business calculations.   Similarly, David Vinair, Goldman’s executive VP, said he didn’t think there is a conflict of interest in Goldman selling a security long while shorting it on its own books.  The client buying the security long may have a different stance toward risk as well as a different time horizon than the bank.  Also, the bank may change its short to a long depending on factors that are different from those impacting a given client.  Sen. Levin countered that the conflict of interest is at the moment of sale (hence the bank’s changing preferences are irrelevant). The customer, Levin said, has a right to expect that the bank selling the security wants it to do well.  “In what sense do you mean well?”, Vinair countered.  More semantics ensued. In spite of using vague terms like “perform” (which is actually relevant to acting), Vinair wanted a definition of “doing well” from the chairman. Blankfein also said that there is no conflict of interest; he likened Goldman’s market-making function to that of a stock exchange. Investors don’t ask what positions the exchange has in given stock.  But unlike the NYSE, Goldman Sachs is not limited to its market-making function; the bank takes proprietary in the markets, or instruments, that it “creates” not only to protect its positions in the market-making transactions, but to make a profit by trading on its own books. Hence Goldman, unlike the NYSE, has financial interests other than simply making a market and such interests can warp its market-making function in ways that are not transparent to Goldman’s clients.

It seems to me that the major conflict of interest at Goldman manifests when Goldman managers suspect that a security won’t “perform” (hence the desire to short it) without telling the potential buyers of this belief.  The Goldman managers want to make money not only off its shorts, but also off the client, whom the Goldman sales staff have given a misconception of the security’s soundness either by omission or lying).  The conflict of interest deepens if Goldman managers actually know that a derivative has been put together to fail, and because the bank (or a favored client) will profit from its failure (having bought shorts), the relevant manager does not disclose what he or she knows to the client so the latter will purchase the security.  Goldman would profit both from trading the security (shorting it) on its own books aside from being a counter-party to clients taking long positions, and from being such a counter-party.  That is, profiting from Goldman’s books entails transactions beyond the counter-party transactions prompted by a client wanting to buy or sell. Not recognizing this as a conflict of interest, Sparks limited conflicts of interest at Goldman to picking between two customers, or between one of its customers and Goldman’s proprietary bank. The problem with such a narrow reading of the bank’s conflicts of interest is that it omits the impact of Goldman’s proprietary transactions based on profiting on its own capital. I wonder if this narrowness of perception isn’t related to the “cognitive warping” that was evinced in many of the non-answers of the managers testifying before Congress. “I didn’t write that” is irrelevant; so too are the bank’s proprietary transactions geared to profiting from the bank’s own books aside from being a counter-party to a client in the bank’s market-making function.

I believe that even Lloyd Blankfein viewed all of Goldman’s transactions as market-making.  But he was correct, then every single economic transaction by any party constitutes market-making; every business is making a market.  At Goldman, there was still the conflict of interest regarding the bank’s profiting on its own books not from being a counter-party to a client as part of serving the client versus from serving a buyer or seller client by being the counter-party if necessary.  Goldman can be understood to profit as a broker (a fee in putting a buyer and seller together), as well as from how it does as a counter-party in such a transaction. In addition, Goldman can profit from trading on its own books irrespective of being such a counter-party. I contend that if Goldman is to do the first function, then either of the latter two—and especially the third—constitutes a structural or institutional conflict of interest.  The second function would not be a conflict of interest were Goldman’s counter-party profits (and losses) passed on to the client.  Perhaps even the third function would not constitute a structural conflict of interest were the profits distributed to the bank’s clients.  However, to the extent that there could be an interest in currying favor with particular clients who would benefit differentially in either the second or third function, there could still be a conflict of interest for Goldman.

In general terms, a conflict of interest can be seen as involving lying (or duplicity) in order to benefit “both ways” from having two conflicting interests.  The solution is to reduce the number of interests that a party has such that he or she has no interests that could or do conflict.  This is a different question than asking what legislation is needed, for the field of business ethics ought not be conflated with the field of business & government (i.e., institutional political economy) or even with that of business & society.

Societal norms are not justifying regarding whether a given practice is or is not a conflict of interest.  Theoretically, a firm could deviate from the norms of a society in order to avoid structural conflicts of interest, or a society could simply be blind to such conflicts and a firm act to avoid them anyway.  In other words, business ethics need not involve “social responsibility”  (and the latter need not involve the former).   In the case of Goldman, the social norms regarding such conflicts of interest (i.e., structural) are in their infancy, at least in the US.  Hence, this discussion of business ethics is a distinct project.  Business & Society would investigate the disjointedness of the paradigms of the bankers and the general public–that is, how and why they differ. Business & Government would investigate legislative and/or regulatory matters concerning the conflicts of interest as evinced by Goldman.

While the three fields are related, so too are medical ethics, sociology and biology. You don’t find schools putting these three in one class because it would be cheaper.  So part of the problem concerning business ethics might be how it is treated by business schools; it (as well as CSR and business & goverment) is essentially relegated to one third of a course in most undergraduate and MBA curriculi.  Among the lessons that we ought to have learned from the financial crisis of 2008 is that of the value, or importance, of the fields of business ethics, business & society, and business & government in business schools.  Sadly, even in educating their respective scholars, these fields are conflated–hence the scholars are not apt to study sufficiently in the basic discipline of their particular field.  That is, they tend to skim along the surface in order to cover three rather than one field. Perhaps business schools have a conflict of interest of their own whereby they have an interest in cost-saving expediency and in covering all of the fields of business. The three fields being discussed here have been willingly mitigated (or enervated) into “one” such that business schools could appear to have it both ways.  The problem is when something happens like the financial crisis of 2008, which shows just how vital each of the three fields are–meaning worthy of courses of their own.

Was Goldman Sachs Really Politically Impotent amid Public Scrutiny in the Wake of the Financial Crisis?

If the American financial houses on Wall Street are among the most powerful forces in American politics-- powers, as it were, behind the throne--does it make sense that the strongest bank would be politically impotent?  In other words, can a public blemish nullify the power of all that capital?

According to The New York Times, Goldman Sachs employs perhaps the country’s most well-connected stable of Washington lobbyists, and it spent $2.8 million [in 2009] to bend the ear of federal officials and lawmakers. Goldman executives and its political action committee gavve more than $24 million to federal candidates in the first decade of the twenty-first century, including nearly $1 million to Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. Even so, the pounding in the media that Goldman Sachs took in April, 2010 left it sidelined — at least in public — as Congress moved toward a decision that could reshape the very industry it rules.  In particular, the SEC filing of charges and eleven hours of grueling testimony before Sen. Levin’s Investigations Committee left the bank a lobbyist persona non grata, if only for a day.  However, even then, the reality behind the scenes was doubtlessly very different.  Even as politicians publicly vilified the bank, they were picking up lucrative campaign contributions sourced in the bank, even if through intermediaries; any large scale electorate is notoriously bad at tracing links.  To be sure, The New York Times was reporting that Goldman Sachs was trying to find a way to influence the debate, even if it could not play as visible a role as it otherwise could have.

Goldman Sachs managers declined to comment the day after the hearing before Carl Levin's committee at the U.S. Senate. The question that the bankers were refusing to answer was on the impact that the bank's legal and public relations troubles were having on its Washington lobbying operations. Even so, one person briefed on its plans spoke on condition of anonymity because of the firm’s continuing legal and political troubles. He or she said it was still trying to push its agenda. The New York Times reported that according to industry officials, the bank had been “largely relying on trade groups, like the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. However, this could have been a smoke screen. The real deals could have been made behind closed doors, even by industry standards.  According to the paper, “More often, the firm — whose lobbyists and outside lawyers include such Washington luminaries as Richard A. Gephardt, the former House majority leader, and Ken Duberstein, the former Reagan administration official — has relied largely on intermediaries because politicians are worried about being associated with it, government and industry officials said.”  Members of Congress were worried about public association, but willing to be influenced through intermediaries. Therefore, even though Sen. Blanche Lincoln, who was in a tight race at the time, canceled a fund-raiser at the bank’s New York offices after the SEC filed its lawsuit, I would not be surprised that she accepted contributions by an intermediary.

Most voters are too far away from Washington to get the real scoop, and journalists who want to continue with their career are not apt to dig too deep. We are left with the surface, and can only guess as to the subterranean dynamics.  It seems to me that traces of the underground rumblings can be discerned in lines such as “at least in public.”  We are left wondering how deep the wells of gold run.  Perhaps only the goldman knows.  The actuality can be far different than appearances.  If possible, a study on the real influence of Wall Street in Washington would be very helpful. For this reason, it is apt to be a difficult task with many self-interested obstacles.  In any case, we ought not be so incredulous as to rest on the public appearances. Even as Lloyd Blankfein was testifying, senators turned increasingly friendly to him–with the exception of Carl Levin and perhaps John McCain.  The Democratic side in particular almost made excuses for the CEO, saying that any number of firms should be there with him. Those senators had given their soundbites to be picked up at home; it was time to make sure they were not cutting off one of the ruddy fat hands that feeds them. This expression comes from Nietzsche’s description of businessmen and their propensity to overreach. 

To be sure, Nietzsche is no advocate of modern morality; he viewed it as a defense of weakness.  Weakness cannot be other than weakness, he writes. So too, strength, he writes, cannot be other than strong.  So I contend that we ought to take reports of the political impotence of Goldman Sachs with a rather large grain of salt (or gold, in this case).  He or she who has the gold makes the rules. There is no natural law stating that this process must be transparent.  My question is: can we, the American public, get to it, or does the well of gold run too deep for our patience and perseverance?

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/business/29lobby.html

A Critique of the Corporate Legal Persons Doctrine: The Case of Corporate Taxation

In his commentary in The Wall Street Journal  on May 6, 2010, Michael Boskin went over the disadvantages in levying an income tax on corporations. Within his argument, he observes, “Of course, the corporation is a legal entity; only people pay taxes.”  In so doing, he transcends, if only for a moment, his own approach that is oriented to pros and cons.  His observation is significant, and it gives us a launching pad of sorts by which we can approach the corporate income tax as a phenomenon (rather than simply assessing its utility).  To be sure, utility or the lack thereof can lead us to this level.  For example, double taxation (i.e., taxation of a corporation’s earnings, and then of dividends on investors’ incomes) suggests that only people should pay tax.  Treating a “legal entity” as if it were a tax-payer is unnatural, and thus gives rise to the double taxation problem.  It is interesting that Boskin uses the word “entity,” which is not the same as “person.”  That is, to argue that corporations should not be taxed directly, he seems to assume that he needs to deny the legal person doctrine.  To be sure, it would be harder to argue that human rather than only legal persons should be taxed; to treat corporations as entities expands the distinction and thus is more permitting of Boskin’s argument.

I contend that Boskin was correct in referring to corporations as legal entities.  To treat or consider a corporation as a person in any sense is to anthropomorphise an abstraction.  Put another way, an association of human beings does not constitute in itself a person even writ large. To presume otherwise is to make a category mistake.  This error is evident when someone says, “GM says X,” or “Ford is doing Y.”  Only human beings can talk (at least in a human language).  Furthermore, an organization does not “do” things; rather, people within it are the agents.  So too, an organization cannot be a moral agent.  This statements might as be ignored, for all the sloppy anthropomorphism going on. It is no wonder that corporations are typically regarded as taxpayers.  As long as we limit our arguments to pros and cons (i.e., utility), we will miss our deeper errors or category mistakes.  Even if such faults are covered over by societal blind spots, the errors are nonetheless errors.

Regulatory Capture Realized: The Oil Industry and the MMS Regulatory Agency

On May 11, 2010,  U.S. Dept. of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar announced that he would separate the public safety and environmental enforcement side of the Minerals Management Services (M.M.S.) agency from its leasing and revenue collection function. While this move eliminateed the structural conflict of interest in the agency, it might not do enough to protect the regulatory function of the agency’s public safety and environmental enforcement roles.  The regulator can all too easily be coopted, or captured, by the firms it is regulating.

According to The New York Times, M.M.S. agency has routinely overruled its staff biologists and engineers who raised concerns about the safety and the environmental impact of certain drilling proposals in the gulf and in Alaska, according to a half-dozen current and former agency scientists. Those scientists said they were also regularly pressured by agency officials to change the findings of their internal studies if they predicted that an accident was likely to occur or if wildlife might be harmed.  “M.M.S. has given up any pretense of regulating the offshore oil industry,” said Kierán Suckling, director of the Center for Biological Diversity, an environmental advocacy group in Tucson, which filed notice of intent to sue the agency over its noncompliance with federal law concerning endangered species. “The agency seems to think its mission is to help the oil industry evade environmental laws.” One scientist who has worked for M.M.S. for more than a decade, said, “You simply are not allowed to conclude that the drilling will have an impact. If you find the risks of a spill are high or you conclude that a certain species will be affected, your report gets disappeared in a desk drawer and they find another scientist to redo it or they rewrite it for you.” For one thing, the regulators rely on information from the firms–data that is hardly provided in an objective fashion.  But such reliance pales in comparison with the political muscle of the oil companies–their campaign contributions being just the tip of the iceberg.  Moreover, large concentrations of capital are inherently a threat to a viable republic.

It should be no surprise that the government would welcome the cooperation from the companies involved in the accident in the Gulf; it reduced the pressure on the officials to go after the companies (and hence risk alienating their future contributions).  According to The New York Times, “Under federal law, even in the case of a major accident, the company responsible for the oil well acts in concert with government in cleanup activities and can help put out information about the response effort.”  Shortly after the spill, government agencies and BP set up a joint information center and a Web site detailing remediation efforts. BP started to promote its attempts to “stop the bleeding” (i.e., cut off the leaking oil in the Gulf).  With a restored image, the company could resume lobbying for less regulation, even though the accident demonstrates insufficient enforcement.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/us/12interior.html?ref=us ; http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14agency.html?hp

Monday, March 7, 2011

Business & Society: BP Clipped Societal Norms


In Senate testamony on May 11th, 2010,  the three companies did their best to point the finger at each other, with the result that neither BP, Transocean or Halliburton would admit, undoubtedly for liability purposes, any contributory role. In the midst of such liability evasion, those of us in the wider society want to get to the bottom of the accident so future such accidents can be prevented. In pointing the finger at the other guy while ignoring one’s own role, the managers of the three companies are added insult to injury.  The BP executive did not mention that several days before the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, BP officials chose, partly for financial reasons, to use a type of casing for the well that the company knew was the riskier of two options, according to a BP document. Specifically, BP managers opted for a “long string” pipe for the well rather than a liner tieback that would have cost $7 million to $10 million but would have added barriers to prevent gas from reaching the surface.  BP managers were not unaware of this risk. The concern with the method BP chose, the document said, was that if the cement around the casing pipe did not seal properly, gases could leak all the way to the wellhead, where only a single seal would serve as a barrier. As another instance of cutting corners to save time and money, BP engineers used just six “centralizers,” rather than twenty-one as recommended by Halliburton, to stabilize the well before cementing it. According to an April 16, 2010 email from BP’s well team leader, the problem was that the extra centralizers would have taken ten hours to install. Another official wrote of the decision: “Who cares, it’s done, end of story, will probably be fine.”   BP managers also decided not to take twelve hours to completely circulate the heavy drilling fluid in the well that would have enabled detection and removal of any leaking gas. BP also skipped a test to determine if the cement had properly bonded to the well and rock formations. A petroleum engineer independent of BP told a congressional committee that the decision was “horribly negligent.”



Workers from the rig and company officials said that hours before the explosion, gases were leaking through the cement, which had been set in place by the oil services contractor, Halliburton, which Dick Cheney once ran. But it was not merely the casing and cement that were problematic. On 60 Minutes on May 16, 2010, a worker who was on the rig when the accident happened spoke of a BP manager overruling a Transocean manager to cut corners, such as beginning to drain the pressure fluid from the well before the third “cork” was installed.  The methane was able to reach the rig’s engines because there was insufficient pressure to keep the gas down in the well.  Also, a BP manager had earlier ignored the worker’s warning that there were shreds of rubber coming up in the drilling–the rubber being from the device that was supposed to take pressure readings (e.g., whether there is gas in the well).  Nevertheless, the BP manager who testified before the Senate blamed Transocean and Halliburton managers, and on the morning after the 60 Minutes interview BP’s COO said he was just focused on the clean-up and knew nothing of such “details” even though his specialty was in development and exploration. Both in cutting corners and in ignoring his job description, BP’s COO demonstrates a willful disregard for societal norms wherein society itself is protected and accountability is accepted.  Sadly, this attitude is not uncommon in the business world.

Perhaps as business operations expand in businesses too big to fail, the societal dangers in the attitude are magnified because more damage can result. In other words, it becomes increasingly dangerous to a society to allow such an attitude to exist.  Where societal norms are ignored by business managers, perhaps the societal norm that allows for their authority should be rescinded as well. This is a social contract reading of society, wherein if one side of the norms are broken, the other side is deemed invalid as well.  The problem is that social contracts unravel rather slowly or incrementally, such that a dangerous attitude can be allowed to remain in a position of authority.  It is worth investigating whether violating societal norms is actually detrimental to a company’s bottom line. 

To the extent that a social contract has a certain inertia, it may be that the bottom line can survive long enough to allow the attitude to survive and perhaps even prosper.   These matters are distinct from questions of justification, which lie in the field of business ethics, and from those of whether more government regulation is needed, which lie in the field of business and government. We can define corporate social responsibility as meeting the general expectation in a society that people admit to their wrong-doing or mistakes and make amends.  This is different from the ethical question of whether people should admit to their wrong-doing or mistakes and if so why.  It is also distinct from the question of the proper relationship between business and government.  Business and society involves the relationship of business interest and societal norms.  To treat the latter (or the former, for that matter) as ethical requires ethical justification, which is more than simply aligning business and societal norms.  In other words, a societal norm is not in itself ethically justifying (consider Nazi Germany as a case in point).  With these distinctions in mind, I turn now to the field of business and society.

I contend that the people at BP (and Halliburton) admitting to their role and paying for economic damages incurred by third parties would be more important than BP’s charitable giving, even if some people in the wider society may have let BP off the hook for the accident if the company’s managers had decided to announce a new philanthropical project unrelated to the accident. Working on another society problem does not make up for having not admitted to BP managers' negligence.  Culpability, on other words. cannot be obviated or transferred so easily.

Too often, business managers use the term “responsibility” even as they are evading it for financial reasons. BP initially estimated the daily output of the leaks at between one and fourteen thousand barrels a day; BP picked the low end-point because the amount of fines the company would pay was tied to the volume. That the company managers were misleading the wider society didn’t seem to factor into their financial decision. As a result, the anticipated damage to the Gulf (and the world) was not sufficiently appreciated in the wider society. The convenient use of  the term “responsibility” can be gleemed from the Senate testamony of Lamar McKay of BP.  “As a responsible party under the Oil Pollution Act,” he said, ”we will carry out our responsibilities.” But he quickly added that Transocean “had responsibility for the safety of the drilling operations.”  That is to say, he acknowledged the obligation to be responsible for his mistakes while conveniently ignoring the mistakes made at his company. By pointing the finger at people at another company, McKay was contradicting his own asseveration on being responsible.  It is like he was lying even as he insisted that people shouldn’t lie.

Pointing the finger is childish, even if it is done for financial reasons. Steven L. Newman, president and chief executive of Transocean, did no better that the BP executive when he said that the accident had to have arisen from elements of the work done by other companies. “Were all appropriate tests run on the cement and the casing?” he asked, apparently implicating Halliburton. Tim Probert of Halliburton said in turn that all work on the casing by his company was carried out “as directed by the well owner,” meaning BP.  Suggesting that the men act like adults and take responsibility for what their coworkers had done (or failed to d0), the ranking Republican minority member on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, told them to stop the finger-pointing. “I would suggest to all three of you that we are all in this together,” she said. Notice that she is pointing to a societal norm, rather than using an ethical rationale. She is essentially asking the executives to step up to societal standards. Unfortunately, there was no sign that the three boys would take responsibility for their actions, as they continued on, still oriented to the other guy.  The cost to society includes a more difficult route to uncovering the cause of the accident and possible accidents to come from BP. The company’s clean-up efforts do not address the cause of the accident; the spending does not go far enough. In other words, BP can’t spend its way out of it…or can it?  Are there societal norms that allow it to suffice?  My question is this: why hasn’t the social contract unravelled that has allowed the managers at BP to continue to hold their jobs (and BP to remain in business)?  Is economic liberty at play here–society saying that there is room in such liberty for a shirking attitude?

Sources:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/us/27rig.html?hpl
“Congress Says BP Crew Focused on Costs,” The Wall Street Journal,  June 15, 2010, p. A5.

Sunday, March 6, 2011

Rand Paul on Civil Rights and the BP Explosion: A Case Study on the Will to Power

U.S. Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), was the Tea Party candidate who challenged the Republican establishment to win the party’s Senate nomination in Kentucky on May 18, 2010. A day later, he publically criticized a plank of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, he said in an interview with Rachel Maddow on MSNBC television that he supported the sections of the Civil Rights Act that applied to public accommodations but had concerns when it came to its applicability to private business. He had raised similar concerns earlier in the day about the Americans with Disabilities Act in an interview on National Public Radio. Asked by Maddow if a private business had the right to refuse to serve black people, Mr. Paul replied, “Yes.”

In citing the rights inherent in private property, Mr. Paul, an eye surgeon, was refusing to recognize the “publicness” in a business being open to the public, as distinct from someone’s house, which is not open to the public. In other words, Mr. Paul was ignoring the qualification to private property that comes into play as soon as said property is opened to the public.  Such property is quasi-public precisely because it is open to the public.  Hence, society, through its government, has a right to dictate the obligations going with that element of publicness.  Mr. Paul would have been on firmer ground had he limited his statement to private clubs, such as country clubs, which do not receive public money and are not open to the public.  However, even here, if people associate in a way that hurts others by intentionally excluding them, there might be an argument in favor of subjecting them to the Act, though such an argument seems weaker than those for freedom of association and on private property not open to the public.

Rand Paul also said on ABC TV that President Barack Obama’s criticism of BP in the wake of the Gulf oil debacle sounds “really un-American.”  Paul said that the president’s response is part of the “blame game” that’s played in the United States. The game, he argued, leads to the thinking that tragic incidents are “always someone’s fault” when sometimes accidents just happen. Sen. Paul was ignoring that BP overrode Transocean in directing its employees not to use “mud” to maintain pressure in the well as cement “corks” were being inserted.  Also, managers at BP claimed to have the technology to stop any leak or spill when no such technology existed. In short, the managers at BP put the Gulf at risk in order to cut corners so as to earn more profit (as if $2 billion a month was not sufficient).  Rather than go after the mentality of shirking amid a “more, more, more” mentality wherein nothing is ever enough, Paul went after the representative of the victim–society as a whole.  That is to say, he added insult to injury by going after the victim rather than the culprit.  In so doing, he ignored key elements of the culpability.

Listening to the candidate the Maddow show on MSNBC, I was more concerned by the way he chose to evade questions than by his failure to take “being open to the public” into account in his view on civil rights law. At one point, Rachel Maddow asked him, “yes or no,”  on whether he would exclude private businesses from the Civil Rights law.  He replied that he was against the violence that took place in the 1960s in association with Walgreen’s lunch-counters. Beyond not answering the question, Mr. Paul seemed to be continuing with what he wanted to say–ignoring the question entirely as a mere interruption to be dismissed. I noticed a few times that after Maddow did indeed interrupt him, he simply picked up with what he had been saying.  Could his ignoring the questions be related to his ignoring the “open to the public” qualification and the risky shirking of BP?  In other words, might it be that Mr. Paul simply does not see what is inconvenient to his world view?  If so, I contend that this character trait is far more alarming than even his evasions and his over-simplified view on private property and the oil spill.  If you have ever tried repeatedly to tell someone something only to have your statement ignored as the other person continues on with what he or she was saying, you know what I mean. Sadly, I suspect that Rand Paul didn't notice it. This character flaw is by no means limited to him. Nor is this an invitation for partisan aspersions on the Republican Party.

Rather, I suspect that not answering questions--even asking one's own instead of given any answer to a question outstanding--is a growing attitude in modern America. I have witnessed it myself in emailing people I don't know on matters involving an actual or potential commercial transation. Does the computer come with Office 2007? Reply: When you would like to come by to look at it?  But what about Office 2007?  Or take apartment hunting:  Are utilities included in the rent? Reply: Call me to make an appointment to see the unit. Nietzsche would have a field day with such a mentality that vaunts itself as superior by "virtue" of its own assumed dominance. The basis of Rand Paul's non-answer, in other words, could have been an attempt to dominate beyond his place on Maddow's show. In other words, his non-answers could have been refusals rooted in a will to power that was biting off more than it could chew on someone else's show.

In terms of having a will to power based on strength, many of the stations or offices in modern society that we view as being entitled to dominate are in fact weak.  Nietzsche points to the modern moralist's thou shalt not as an attempt by the weak to dominate beyond their innate weak constitution. He also points to the attempts of the modern manager to dominate in such terms (and the priest as well). In watching various personalities giving non-answers while being interviewed on television, I find myself wondering if they know they are doing it. If they do, they are indeed rascals; if they do not, their stygian pathology is much deeper than I am equipped to investigate. Perhaps the modern illness is malignant narcissism to such an extent in a personality that the delimited perspective eclipses even awareness of what oneself is doing.

Sources: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/us/politics/21paul.html?ref=politics   http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37273085/ns/politics-decision_2010/

On the Differential Impact of Pro-Business Cultural Values on Financial Regulation in the EU and US

On May 18, 2010, the German state legislature banned naked short-selling of certain euro-debt and credit-default swaps, as well as some financial stocks because it was believed that “excessive price movements” could endanger the stability of the financial system. In an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Wolfgang Schauble, the Finance Minister at the time, said that the “financial market is only concerned with itself, instead of fulfilling its purpose and financing sensible, sustainable economic growth.” The legislation runs counter to a race to the bottom in which governments relax financial regulation to entice the banking sector. At the same time, however, the American state governments and that of their union seemed like apologists for the industry they are supposed to be regulating.  In fact, Tim Geithner, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, did not waste any time in criticizing the E.U. state for the legislation. While doing so, he dismissed the German Chancellor's proposal for a global financial transactions tax (the proceeds of which would go into an emergency fund to divert a collapse of the financial system). To be sure, while the European proposals were a healthy sign of government not enslaved by the money and power of big business, the problem of banks too big to fail still existing was not tackled. Furthermore, whereas Americans may be too insular, the Europeans may be unrealistic in their visions for global regulation. Indeed, many tend to conflate their own union with an international organization.

The full essay is at "E.U. & U.S."