The E.U. on Chinese Online Marketplaces: Different Business Cultures

It is perhaps just human nature to assume that the attitude towards ethical (and unethical) business is uniform from culture to culture around the world, with one's own culture being definitive and thus the default as a standard. But just as far-away cultures can be very different than one's own, so too can far-off business practitioners and even regulators have different beliefs, values and thus expectations concerning how ethical business norms should be than do such people in one's own culture. The E.U./China trade interface provides a case in point. 

The full essay is at "The E.U. on Chinese Online Marketplaces."

Regulatory Capture and the Public Interest: The FDA

The head of the Food and Drug Administration, Marty Makary, “resigned” in May, 2026 even though the decision had been made by U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert Kennedy “and then the White House signed off on it.”[1] Although Makary had been annoyance to drug-company executives, and to that extent his removal was due to pressure on President Trump by the CEOs, his “resignation” supports the theory of regulatory capture, wherein the regulated companies control the very regulatory agencies (and regulators therein) that regulate those companies, this case shows that it is possible for an industry’s interests to be aligned with the public (health) interest. Does the alignment regarding getting rid of a particular regulator lessen the unethical quality of the broader conflict of interest between business and government?

The full essay is at "Regulatory Capture and the Public Interest."

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1.  Matthew Perrone and Seung Min Kim, “Trump FDA Chief Is Leaving After Angering Pharma CEOs, Vaping Lobbyists and Anti-Abortion Groups,” APnews.com, May 12, 2026.

Guidelines Puffed Up as Law: Should under the Subterfuge of Must

During the coronavirus pandemic (2020-2022), Arizona’s Ducey administration allowed bus and light-rail employees to go maskless even though they were in close contact with the public. Bus drivers were even getting sick. The “rationale” of the Phoenix transit authority was that the federal regulation is “just a mandate.” Because the word mandate means “an authoritative command,” the rationale that being a mandate renders a law or government regulation as optional can only be spurious at best; this is a case of arrogant ignorance that can’t possibly be wrong about itself in the member-state that ranked 49^th out of 50 on public education. As an authoritative command, a law, even as implemented in regulations, has what Kant called necessity in that law itself cannot be bent; it stands firm in itself as law. In contrast, a guideline connotes flexibility rather than necessity. It follows that enforcement must pertain to laws (including regulations) but not to guidelines. I contend that what are commonly referred to as international laws are actually international guidelines. Such “laws” lack viable enforcement mechanisms and thus are actually guidelines for governments engaged in international relations.

The full essay is at "Guidelines Puffed Up as Law."

Homelessness in the E.U.: Rectifying a Right

In late 2025, the E.U. Commission presented its first European Affordable Housing Plan. The E.U.’s involvement in “social housing,” which translates into federal funds being used to provide housing beyond homeless shelters for people who cannot afford to house themselves, implies that the programs of the states had been insufficient. The U.S. could take a lesson from the Commission’s plan, which is cleverly multi-pronged in tackling the societal problem. Both in the E.U. and U.S., both federal and state funds were needed even in 2025 when neither economy was in recession. It is better to increase the supply of affordable housing when times are good than when unemployment is soaring. This is an exception in the E.U. to the usual pattern wherein the E.U. increases its competencies, or enumerated powers, in periods of one crisis or another. Russia’s multi-year invasion of Ukraine, which borders the E.U., and the Union’s foreign and defense activity demonstrate how European integration has typically been enhanced by crisis rather than when times are good.

The full essay is at "Homelessness in the E.U."

Musk vs. Trump: American Business and Government at Loggerheads?

When the wealthiest person in the world and the President of the United States cross swords, people are bound to notice. Such a very public clash between billionaires, one of whom is the most politically powerful person in the U.S., should not lead the rest of us to infer that the interests of large corporations and the U.S. Government, including the respective executives and elected representatives, typically conflict. Corporate and individual mega-donations to political campaigns, the proverbial “revolving door” between working in government and at a corporation, the reliance of regulatory agencies on information from the regulated companies invite the exploit of conflicts of interest such that legislation and regulations are even written by corporate lawyers for their respective companies’ financial interest. Furthermore, that many very large American-based corporations have interlocking boards of directors gives corporate America considerable unified force in seeing to it that Congress and the federal president remain friendly to business interests. That both benefit from the status quo and have de jure or de facto vetoes of reform proposals reinforces the staying power of the club. Even as U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders enjoyed considerable media attention and crowds in his speaking tour against oligopoly (i.e., consolidation within an industry such that companies can set prices at will and can thus extract extra profit beyond that which would accrue in a competitive market), it would be wildly optimistic to hope for an onslaught of anti-trust enforcement from a Republican or Democratic administration.

The complete essay is at "Musk vs. Trump."

Nature Credits in the E.U.

One of benefits of the market mechanism, by which, for example, economic goods are bought and sold, is that self-interest is relied on; people don’t have to be told to buy or sell a product because it can be in their self-interest to do so if the price is right. As an alternative to regulatory standards, a government can create units of pollution-allowance that businesses can purchase so to be lawfully able to pollute in so far as a purchased unit allows. In the E.U.’s emissions trading system, “operators of power plants and factories have to buy tradeable allowances to cover every tonne of carbon dioxide they emit.”[1] Business could buy and sell allowances so as to cover the amount of pollution that is anticipated. In this way, the market mechanism efficiently allocates pollution in line both with the interests of the companies and the public interest—the latter being made concrete in the decision on how much pollution per allowance and how many allowance units to create. Crucially, the company private interests are put within the purview of the public interest; the tail is not directing the dog. In political economies in which political-campaign contributions by businesses are high, especially if unlimited, the tail can indeed wag the dog, such that the public interest is determined by private interests. This is one reason why the Citizens United (2010) U.S. Supreme Court case is so significant. It allows corporations and labor unions to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns and directly on advertisements—both being beneficial to elected officials in positions to curry favor through legislation and regulations favorable to business (or labor). The informal exchanges of political donations and legislation or regulation comprise a market of sorts. So, the market mechanism, which is created or at least regulated by government, can serve for good or ill, from the standpoint of the public interest.  Using the mechanism, such as the E.U. president proposed in 2024, on behalf of ecosystems, is for good rather than ill, and thus using, in effect, the self-interest of farmers could be better than relying on regulatory requirements that farmers expend some money and effort to beef up their local ecosystems.

The full essay is at "Nature Credits in the E.U."

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1. Robert Hodgson, “Von der Leyen Moots ‘Nature Credits’ Market to Avert Ecosystem Collapse,” Euronews.com, September 13, 2024.

On the Role of Agribusiness in Global Warming

Agriculture is a major source of carbon and methane emissions, which in turn are responsible for the general trend of the warming of the planet’s atmosphere and oceans. In fact, agriculture emits more than all of the cars on the roads. 10 percent of the emissions carbon dioxide and methane in the U.S. come from the agricultural sector. Livestock is the biggest source of methane. Cows, for example, emit methane. Methane from a number or sources, including the thawing permafrost, accounted for 30 percent of global warming in 2023. As global population has grown exponentially since the early 1900s, herds of livestock at farms have expanded, at least in the U.S., due to the increasing demand.[1] We are biological animals, and we too must eat. More people means that more food is needed, and the agricultural lobby in the U.S. is not about to let the governments require every resident to become a vegetarian. Indeed, the economic and political power of the large agribusinesses in the U.S. have effectively staved off federal and state regulations regarding emissions. It comes down to population, capitalism, and plutocracy warping democracy.

The full essay is at "On the Role of Agribusiness in Global Warming."

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1. Georgina Gustin, “Climate Change and Agriculture,” Yale University, February 22, 2024.

On the Role of Business in a Societal or Global Catastrophe

While it is obvious that a business or industry can affect and be affected by its environment, such as by polluting a river and a hurricane, respectively, it is less well known that a business or an entire industry can cause or facilitate a societal or global crisis. Whereas polluting a river can be answered with government regulation, the very legitimacy (and thus ongoing operations) of a company or even an entire industry is arguably at risk in knowingly creating or significantly worsening a societal/global crisis. The latter role goes beyond the scope of government regulation and corporate social responsibility, although broadening or just enforcing anti-trust laws may be sufficient to deal with the lost legitimacy. That is to say, what I have in mind is another genre or type of problem.

The full essay is at "On the Role of Business in a Societal or Global Catastrophe."

The European Commission as Political

The European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, has been known for being a technocratic institution. Yet in drafting regulations, imposing fines, and negotiating trade deals, the Commission is much like the U.S.’s executive branch. In fact, high-level appointments must secure the approval of the legislature through confirmation hearings. Yet the top of the U.S. executive branch, the White House, has been known for being ideological and definitely political. That that executive branch also promulgates and enforces regulations can be easily missed. That the E.U.’s executive branch is also political has definitely been missed or dismissed in the ideological illusion that the E.U. is merely a technocratic international organization rather than a federal system of governments. This illusion could finally be seen as such after the election of Ursula van der Leyen as President of the European Commission in 2019.

The full essay is at "The European Commission as Political."

Presidential Authority and Bureaucracy: Regulatory Agencies

Circulating in Congress in the fall of 2012 was a bill that would have allowed "the White House to second-guess major rules and mandate that agencies carefully study the economic effects of new regulation. The change could, in effect, delay a number of rules for the financial industry. Those who support preserving the status quo where Wall Street regulates itself will find much to like in this legislation," said Amit Narang, a regulatory policy advocate at Public Citizen, a nonprofit government watchdog group.[1] President Obama had received $1 million from Goldman Sachs as a campaign contribution in 2008. Yet of how much value to Wall Street is a mere delay in regulation? Some, surely, but not enough to make this the decisive issue here. Rather, I submit that the president's control as chief executive of the regulatory agencies and the added bureaucracy are more salient in this case study. 

The full essay is at "Presidential Authority and Bureaucracy." 

1. Ben Protess, “Lawmakers Push to Increase WhiteHouse Oversight of Financial Regulators,” The New York Times, September 10, 2012. 

The FAA Deferred to Boeing on the 737 MAX Jet

After a misfiring-prone automatic stall-prevention device on the 737 MAX jet had caused two accidents in which 346 people died, an internal review at the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, a regulatory agency, found that the regulators had relied too much on Boeing employees to conduct the safety inspections of the planes. Incredibly, Congress expanded the industry-reliance practice of the agency in 2018. Both the FAA and Congress were admittedly motivated by the added efficiency that such “sub-contracting” could bring. However, to focus on the economic benefit while ignoring the inherent (and obvious) conflict of interest in “sub-contracting” to the very companies that are regulated by the FAA is itself a red flag. A subservient or over-reliant regulatory agency cannot be a check on a company’s claims of not having sacrificed safety or even safety checks in order to focus more on profitability.  Of course, the political influence of a large company such as Boeing may have played a role in the FAA’s “back-seat” approach, but in this case the government’s own interest in stretching the coverage of its human resources may have been dominant. That such an interest could involve minimizing or ignoring outright such a blatant conflict of interest may point to a wider culture in which institutional conflicts of interest are presumed to be innocuous or even benign rather than too toxic to permit even if they have not been actively exploited.  

The full essay is at "FAA Deferred to a Regulatee."

Pruning Back an Ideological "Re-Definition" of Socialism

Should language lose its integrity for ideological purposes? On Fox News in the wake of the passage of Obamacare, Brit Hume and Newt Gingrich, a former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, both (re)defined socialism as “government control of private property.” Their rendering falls short, however. According to the Random House Dictionary (via Dictionary.com), socialism is “a theory or system of social organization that advocates the vesting of the ownership and control of the means of production and distribution, of capital, land, etc., in the community as a whole” (italics added). Whereas government regulation of privately-owned means of production and distribution involves some of the control being in the hands of the community as a whole through its government, socialism includes the vesting of both ownership and control with the government. 

The complete essay is at "Socialism Redefined."

Is God the Invisible Hand?

A Baylor University survey on religion and economics in 2011 revealed something that may be distinctly American, culturally speaking. The results indicated that about “one in five Americans combine a view of God as actively engaged in daily workings of the world with an economic conservative view that opposes government regulation and [advocates] the free market as a matter of faith.”[1] Specifically, those Americans believed that the “invisible hand” of a competitive market is actually God at work. Put another way, the assumption is that the economy “works” because God wills it to by intervening directly in the market mechanism itself. Government regulation, in diverting economic supply and demand from “the invisible hand,” is thus sinful. Regulating the economy challenges God’s omnipotence (i.e., power) by interfering with God’s intervention in our daily lives via the operation of the market mechanism. 

The full essay is at "Is God for Regulation?"

1. Cathy Lynn Grossman, “Religion Colors Money Views,” USA Today, September 20, 2011. 

Corporate Social Responsibility: Too Often a Weapon

Typically, responsibility is something that people working in a business typically presume applies not to their business, but instead to stakeholders, whether a customer, supplier or distributor. It is not uncommon for retail stores to hang signs indicating that the store is not liable for this and that. What if such a store is nonetheless at fault? To be so and even just claim not being liable for it reeks of selfish disregard for others. The idea, or mentlity, is that the other guy should pay for even problems for with someone working for the store caused.  Responsibility in this twisted sense means “I won’t pay; you must pay even though I'm at fault”  The underlying mentality can be said to come from a point of weakness rather than strength, for healthy companies can afford to shrug off any temptation to be small-minded and inconsiderate. In writing in this way, I am drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche, from whose theory it can be claimed that the store signs are actually weapons used by the weak out of resentment for the strong (i.e., customers). In comparing stores on Nietzsche's strong/weak spectrum, companies that are strong are naturally generous whereas the weak ones relish even being rude or even cruel to the stronger out of resentment. 

For more, see Skip Worden, On the Arrogance of False Entitlement: A Nietzschean Critique of Business Ethics and Management, available at Amazon.

Alan Greenspan on the Self-Regulatory Market

Two days after the LTCM bailout was agreed to in 1998, a worried Alan Greenspan, leaning toward raising rates at the time, cut the federal funds rate. It was not enough to calm the markets, and he cut it again three weeks later. . . . It was not the self-correcting powers of the markets but aggressive central bank intervention plus a new round of irrational speculation that provided a floor under the downward financial prices and the calamitous consequences of bad Wall Street decisions. It was not even the LTCM rescue alone by private banks that saved Wall Street” Madrick, p. 281). “Alan Greenspan learned no lessons from these events about the inherent instability of a completely free market in finance. He still insisted markets regulate themselves” (Madrick, p. 282).

For analysis, see the full essay at "The Self-Regulatory Market."

Source:

Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011).

See also Skip Worden, Essays on the Financial Crisis, available at Amazon.

Industry Self-Regulation: Too Idealistic for Futures

At the time of MF Global’s collapse amid hundreds of millions of dollars in lost customer funds, commodities and futures trading had for decades been “largely policed by the exchanges where they trade, setting up a potential conflict of interest,” according to the New York Times. The paper continues by pointing out that those exchanges, including profit-making companies such as CME Group, the parent company of the Chicago and New York Mercantile Exchanges and the clearing house used by MF Global, “oversee the very futures firms they rely on for business.” The Times refers to this conflict of interest as one centered on industry self-regulation. 
 
The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

An Ethical Meltdown in Japan: On the Toxicity of Tepco's Nuclear Power

According to The Wall Street Journal, Japan’s largest power provider, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco), faced the biggest challenge of its 50-year-history in "recovering from the damage done to its nuclear facilities and power systems by a devastating earthquake and tsunami." The New York Times reported on March 17, 2011, that "foreign nuclear experts, the Japanese press and an increasingly angry and rattled Japanese public are frustrated by government and power company officials’ failure to communicate clearly and promptly about the nuclear crisis. Pointing to conflicting reports, ambiguous language and a constant refusal to confirm the most basic facts, they suspect officials of withholding or fudging crucial information about the risks posed by the ravaged Daiichi plant."

According to The Wall Street Journal, when Tepco said early in the morning of March 16th "that a fire had broken out at the Daiichi plant’s No. 4 reactor, a reporter naturally asked how the fire had begun, given that just the day before the company had reported putting out a fire at that same reactor. The executive’s answer: ‘We’ll check. . . . We don’t have information here,’ he explained. After about two hours, the Tepco representative had the information: Turned out the smoke was coming not from reactor No. 4, but from reactor No. 3. If Tepco’s information had been delayed and vague, the reporters’ response was quick and direct. ‘You guys have been saying something different each time!’ one shouted. ‘Don’t tell us things from your impression or thoughts, just tell us what’s going on. Your unclear answers are really confusing!’"

                Tepco executives leave one of the many press conferences held during the disaster in 2011

The full analysis is in Cases of Unethical Business, a book available at Amazon.

On Leaving Coal Emissions to the States: Implications for American Federalism

With the transportation (i.e., fuel) and power (i.e., coal) sectors accounting for a majority of the carbon emissions in the U.S., according to the EPA, the Trump administration’s moves to freeze his predecessor’s fuel efficiency standards and relax pollution rules for power plants needing renovation put at risk the declining trend of emissions in 2018. The implications for climate change (e.g., hotter summers) were stark, according to Janet McCabe, who had been Obama’s EPA air chief.[1] The Trump administration’s proposal to allow the states, including West Virginia, to set their own rules for regulating coal was, according to the New York Times, “the administration’s strongest and broadest effort yet to address what the president has long described as a regulatory ‘war on coal’.”[2] An implication is that carbon emissions from coal in the U.S. would likely increase as a result, even though large states like California and New York could be expected to tighten the rules. The interesting point about turning the regulations to the states revolves around federalism. Constitutionally speaking, should the states regulate the carbon emissions from coal?

The full essay is at "States Regulating Coal."

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1. Lisa Friedman, “Trump’s Plan for Coal Emissions: Let Coal States Regulate Them,” The New York Times, August 18, 2018.

2. Ibid.

Judge Allows ATT Purchase of Time Warner: Vertical Integration Escapes Anti-Trust Objection

Typically horizontal mergers, as when one company merges with another that makes similar products, have trouble when it comes to anti-trust, restraint of trade, objections. The go-ahead of the ATT merger with Time Warner in mid-2018 suggests that vertical combinations, such as when distributor buys a content-creator, survive on anti-trust grounds. Even if trade is not restrained, another problem is present—that of conflicts of interest. Anti-trust law is oriented to preventing restraint of trade rather than such conflicts. Accordingly, just because the ATT merger survived on anti-trust grounds does not mean that a regulatory gap did not exist at the time.

The full essay is at "Vertical Integration and Anti-Trust Law."

The Downfall of MF Global: Implications for Banks Too Big To Fail

Here is an alphabet-soup of regulatory agencies that let MF Global, a financial services company that specialized in futures-trading, engage in much, too much, risk: SEC, CME, CFTC and FINRA. On one level, regulators will never be able to stop practitioners from making risky or simply bad decisions; a business system populated only by firms above average is by definition impossible. As long as their managers have any freedom of movement at all, some firms, including some in the financial sector, will inevitably fail. The question I want to pose is whether this means that firms too big to fail (TBTF) should be allowed to exist at all. In short, although MF Global itself was not TBTF, the risk Corzine (who had been chairman of Goldman Sachs) permitted suggests that human nature might be insufficiently disposed to support mammoth concentrations of private capital whose fall could mean the collapse of the financial system itself. Ultimately, I suppose, human nature can only go so far, organizationally speaking.

The full essay is at "The Downfall of MF Global."