Egyptian Court Overreached in Declaring a Legislature to be Unconstitutional

In 1803, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Madison v. Marbury, which established the authority of the court to declare a law to be unconstitutional, and thus invalid. A basic principle underlying this authority is that a constitution is on a level superior to a statute. An entity established in a constitution to interpret it can thus invalidate a law passed by another body established in the constitution. Invalidating that other body itself would be an entirely different matter, as it would involve one constitutional body dissolving another of equivalent grounding. Accordingly, the constitutional court in Egypt overreached on June 14, 2012 in declaring the parliament dissolved.

The full essay is at "Egyptian Court Overreached."

Egypt: A Missed Opportunity to Interiorize Protests

How a democratic system is designed can be as important as whether the government officials have been elected or appointed. In constructing a democracy, it is not sufficient to simply hold elections. While the victors may have democratic legitimacy, the government itself may still not. Egypt amid the violent protests in early 2013 may be a case in point. Even though unlike in 2012 the sitting president had been democratically elected, it is too simplistic to say that the Egyptian government and constitution had democratic legitimacy.

Can such intense violence be "interiorized" as debate and politics in a legislature?  Government itself can be viewed as civic violence "redacted" and "refined."   Source: thestar.com

The full essay is at "Egypt Failed to Interiorize Protests."

Constructing a Constitution: Egypt in the Arab Spring

Concerning a new constitution, which is more important: the process or the content? In Egypt in 2012, that most secularists and the Coptic Christian representatives walked out of the assembly working on a constitutional document suggests that the final product would not have legitimacy for all of Egypt. To be sure, it is possible for a partisan group to design a system of basic law that is not overtly self-serving at others’ expense. The document that emerged from the assembly weakens the presidency and strengthens the parliament. This shift was in line with the popular protest in “the Arab Spring.” However, the assembly left in place a “longstanding article” grounding Egyptian law in the principles of one religion. Furthermore, a provision on women’s equality was left out, and the military generals would keep their existing power. Moreover, anticipating dissolution from Mubarak-appointed judges, the assembly began its work from the last Egyptian constitution.

Do the members of the constitutional assembly look liberal or conservative?  Reuters

The full essay is at "How to Make a Constitution."

Afghani Electoral Fraud in 2010: A Precursor to the Protests in the Middle East?

The UN’s Electoral Complaints Commission recommended in 2009 that Afganistan’s Independent Election Commission invalidate 210 polling stations where the ECC found “clear and convincing evidence of fraud.”  The IEC in turn announced a run-off election because Karzai no longer had over 50% of the vote.  MSNBC reported that “the Karzai-influenced election commission may refuse to call for a runoff.” CNN reported that Karzai and Abdullah were trying to “cut some sort of deal” on a coaliation government that would have obviated, or skirted, a run-off.  Such a compromise would have been woefully inadequate from the standpoint of democratic process.

The full essay is at " Afghani Electoral Fraud."

Morsi as Partisan in Constitution-Building: Lessons from Washington

Appealing for unity after the controversial ratification of a draft constitution in December 2012, President Morsi of Egypt pledged in a televised address to respect the one-third of the electorate that had voted against the proposed constitution. He claimed that “active patriotic opposition” should not annoy the president or the people in a democracy. I contend that the office of president should not be of the sort that would have partisan opposition, ideally at least. That is to say, presiding means safeguarding the process itself, as well as the good of the whole, rather than pushing a partisan agenda. That Morsi was on record in support of the partisan-drafted proposal undercut his role as presider in chief. Given the innate instability of a nascent democracy, the role for a presider “above the fray” was particularly valuable in Egypt at the time. Morsi fell short in this regard, and thus put the fragile democracy at risk.

The full essay is at "Morsi as Partisan."

Democratic Protests in the Middle East: A Conflagration of Historic Proportions amid a Constancy in Human Nature?

Perhaps by looking back on one's own time as though it were already historical, it is possible to assess whether what one is witnessing on the global stage is truly significant from the standpoint of human history or merely of that which history is replete. In the context of the popular protests in the Middle East in early 2011, the question is perhaps whether the world was witnessing a Hegelian burst of freedom or merely more of the same in terms of political revolutions.

The full essay is at "Democratic Protests in the Middle East."

Political Protests in Wisconsin and the Middle East: A Common Denominator?

Imagine some of the blue-collar unionists in Wisconsin's Capitol in February, 2011 suddenly "losing it," insulting officers of the Capitol Police keeping an eye on the protest going on in the rotunda. Due to a video made public (and related news stories), a clan of officers taking down just one protester, who was actually there merely to observe a protest two years later, we don't have to imagine such a scene, albeit "downsized" from that of protesters en masse being attacked.   

     From the video: The young man being thrown to the floor and jumped on had last made reference to his right of peaceful protest, which the police presumably punished him for anyway. How much power do rights have if force refuses to recognize them?  Image Source: thenorthwestern.com

Had there been a full-blown confrontation in February, 2011, imagine how quickly the barefoot dancers would have run in horror past all the blood, open wounds, and death. The distance between Madison and Manama back in February, 2011 would have been significantly narrowed, but not eliminated. A common denominator does indeed exist: the propensity of human nature to abuse a monopoly of power and to view other people as objects rather than ends in themselves.

The entire essay is at "Political Protests"

Day of Rage

Friday, August 16, 2013: A day of anger as proclaimed by Morsi supporters in Egypt. A day of death and carnage. A day of intransigence on both sides. Just a day earlier, the U.S. government had cancelled planned joint military exercises. Besides being largely symbolic rather than real sanction, the exercises were due to be downsized anyway due to the ongoing, across-the-board, sequester of the U.S. Government’s budget. Can something so convenient be counted as even “sending a signal?” Meanwhile, American foreign aid to Egypt, $1.3 billion—second only to what the U.S. gives Israel—continued, as if there were no sequester. As a direct result of the financial complicity, thousands of protesters in Turkey were shouting anti-American slogans. The protesters were so well informed that they were protesting the decision of the Obama administration not even to decide whether there had been a coup in Egypt when the military deposed Morsi. Turkey had emerged as one of the fiercest critics of what it has called an “unacceptable coup.”[1]

It is not as though the American aid gives the U.S. much leverage with the Egyptian military; aid from Middle East states, including Saudi Arabia (whose statement on the Day of Rage voiced support for the military), dwarfs that of the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government, fearful of something worse (for the U.S.) in Egypt than its military, was not fooling the Turks or the rest of the world. The sad truth is that Americans could be harmed as a direct result of their government’s attempt to hold onto whatever leverage existed.

                                           The Egyptian military's "No Tolerance" in action on the Day of Rage.  AP/Hassan Ammar 

It is not as though cutting off foreign aid to Egypt would be so “radical” that the option was not realistic. On the Day of Rage, Germany, ein Land—wirklich Staat—auf die Europäische Union, suspended $25 million in aid to Egypt for climate and environmental protection projects.[2] Meanwhile, Germany, Egypt’s largest trading partner, joined with the French Government in calling for a federal response from the E.U.’s Council of Ministers and presumably the E.U.’s Foreign Minister. Indeed, one of the reasons for creating the E.U. had been that the states would have more influence together than separately. The states’ rights ideology was yet again obstructing Europe from attaining that goal.

I suspect that the difference in the respective reactions of the E.U. and U.S. with respect to foreign aid have to do with the power of the Israeli lobby being greater in the U.S. than the E.U. The U.S. Government was thus vulnerable to the accusation of hypocrisy on its democratic principles out of a rather obsessive concern for Israel’s safety. Had both unions withheld both foreign aid and trade with Egypt, the question would be whether the foreign aid from within the Middle East would be sufficient to sustain the Egyptian military in power. Ich weiß es leider nicht. At any rate, it is unfortunate that democracy and human rights can be so eclipsed by politics in the U.S. and even the E.U., the latter behaving as though it had one arm tied behind its back.

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1. Clare Richardson, “Hundreds in Turkey Protest Against Egyptian Crackdown,” Reuters, August 16, 2013.

2. Associated Press, “Germany Suspends Egypt Aid As World Continues To React To Crisis,” The Huffington Post, August 16, 2013.

Obama: Egyptian Coup? What Coup?

In late July 2013, the Obama administration decided that it was not legally required to determine whether the Egyptian military had led a coup in ousting President Morsi. The decision permitted the administration to continue $1.5 billion annually in American aid to Egypt. One senior official said only, “The law does not require us to make a formal determination as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in our national interest to make such a determination. We will not say it was a coup, we will not say it was not a coup, we will just not say,” the official said.”[1] I’m reminded of one of Captain Renault’s famous lines in the film, Casablanca. “I’m shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!” Coup? What coup? To be sure, the administration had its reasons, strategic of course, yet a bigger picture perspective could be helpful here, considering that an effort to violate at least the spirit of a law is involved here.

 

 

Administration officials said the U.S. Government would continue to use financial aid as a lever to pressure Egypt’s new government to push through a transition to democracy. Yet what cost to the U.S. Government would this intent to manipulate the Egyptian military exact?

 

                                                                                            A Coup or a Book-Signing?

                                                                 Refusing even to decide if this is a coup reflects on the refuser.

 

On July 3, 2013, Egyptian generals deposed President Morsi, put him under arrest, and suspended the constitution. “Under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act, no aid other than that for democracy promotion can be given to ‘any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état.’ The law does not allow a presidential waiver, and stipulates that aid cannot be restored until ‘a democratically elected government has taken office.’”[2] Refusing to decide whether a coup took place is essentially refusing to enforce the law, given the events in Egypt on July 3, 2013.

 

 

Fittingly, one of Morsi’s senior advisors, Wael Haddara, accused the administration of “verbal acrobatics,” and asked, “With the entire world calling this a coup, why isn’t the American administration calling it so?”[3] The reference to “verbal acrobatics” is particularly important, for it hints on the discrediting long-term impact on the U.S. Government by its president’s decision to take an easy out. Generally speaking, political convenience can come back to bite even if the pain is not ever felt directly. In other words, the Obama administration sacrificed some of the U.S. Government’s credibility to be able to manipulate another government through money.

 

 

A similar trade-off existed at the time in Europe regarding the matter of Turkey’s possible accession an E.U. state. Turkey would be the largest state by population, and thus would have tremendous influence in the E.U. Government. The added cultural and political diversity to the E.U. could cause it added strain, if not compromise the very viability of the Union. So why would the E.U. admit Turkey when doing so could put the E.U. itself at risk internally? Similar to the Obama administration’s desire to have more influence in the Egyptian military, the European Commission would like to use Turkey as a “way in” to influence Middle East international relations.

 

 

Both cases evince putting one’s own federal government at risk in order to manipulate other governments. At the very least, the strategy of undercutting oneself to extend one’s influence seems counterproductive. That the influence comes well before “the bill comes due” creates the illusion of a costless choice. Looking out for the long-term governing of a union of diverse states, whether in Europe or North America, is easily shirked when the opportunity to pull more levers externally presents itself. A federal government willingly undercutting its own credibility or ability to govern for a short-term advantage is not only short-sighted; it is also indicative of a certain lack of character. The question is perhaps whether that lack of character is societal in nature or merely in ruling elites.

 

See the video made to accompany this essay: http://youtu.be/_1yuvnOq5YE

 

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1. Mark Landler, “Aid to Egypt Can Keep Flowing, Despite Overthrow, White House Decides,” The New York Times, July 25, 2013.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Democracy or Force: The Case of Egypt

In early July 2013, the world was treated to a glimpse of the stark dichotomy punctuated by democracy and civic violence.  Middle-ground is slight to nil between the two, as reflected in the swift taking of sides in the immediate aftermath of the coup by the Egyptian army. Just days after the coup, 51 pro-Morsi protesters and three soldiers were killed, provoking fears of outright civil war.[1] In spite of a top Egyptian cleric going into seclusion to pressure both sides to reconcile, the dramatic snap from democracy to force could not easily be undone. With leaders of Morsi’s party calling for outright rebellion, the military-installed “technocrat” inter-regnum government was on tenuous ground. For when the order that democracy can provide by interiorizing civic discord within the contours of a political process and institutions is tossed away like a dirty rag, a society is left with the instability of force.

Democracy is admittedly far from perfect as a form of governance. Bringing in diverging political interests to legislate together civilizes but does not expunge ideological, financial and personal conflicts. It is difficult to determine the limits of a majority party’s authority and the extent of a minority’s rights. Whereas the filibuster in the U.S. Senate may give the minority party so much authority that the legislative chamber can be vexed into stultifying stagnation, Morsi’s party was deficient in allowing for sufficient  minority participation not only in legislating, but also in drafting the constitution. No wonder the military had scant respect for the document in summarily suspending it during the coup.

The Egyptian experiment with democracy was admittedly quite flawed. Just before the coup, Morsi admitted that he had made mistakes in this regard. Making basic law to serve the interests of a political party is not democratic, and yet democratic elections legitimated Morsi as Egypt’s president. In contrast, the coup was not at all democratic, and thus the military was left to count on the power rather than legitimacy of force. A threshold had been crossed, a net breached.

Yet the picture is not as black and white as I am suggesting. In requiring that all significant political forces participate in writing a new constitution, the military may have laid the groundwork for a sustainable rather than compromised democracy. Rising above his grievances on behalf of Egypt’s future, Morsi would have been wise in announcing that he would participate but not dominate in a constitutional convention. Aware of his mistakes while in office, he could proffer advice to the convention on avoiding certain pitfalls, among which is that of a minority party effectively ruling thanks to the splintering of parties in a parliamentary system. To be legitimate democratically, a majority coalition of parties must be broad enough to represent more than a minority sectional group in society. 

In short, designing a democratic system is far from easy. Allowing one or two parties to dominate the writing and ratification of a constitution risks a less than fully legitimate product.  Egypt’s military was left with the compromised dichotomy between a deeply-flawed “democracy” and force.  Had the democratic system been solid, the hit to democracy itself would have been much worse simply in the ease with which the coup could take place. It is not as though a coup against a viable democracy has never occurred in world history. Even though Egypt’s case is more nuanced, the military crossed a dire threshold in removing a democratically-elected president. From a democratic standpoint, that act is hard to swallow. If the biased constitution will have been fixed following an electoral change in a future election, the military’s decision to oust Morsi was particularly hasty and short-sighted from the standpoint of not only democracy, but civic order itself.

After all, most of the delegates in the American constitutional convention in 1787 were well-off, and thus creditors. In the aftermath of Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts the year before by soldier debtors who had not been paid by the continental army and yet faced unyielding creditors, the bias in the convention was significant at the time. Also, federalists so dominated anti-federalists that the states were not even permitted to return suggested improvements to another session of the convention. The outcome has been as one might have been able to predict even then: the “General Government,” now known as the federal government, has encroaches so on the authority of the state governments that the checks and balances in federalism itself can barely hold back the Congress.

As flawed as the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution was, the amendment process has offered significant relief to minority interests and thus can be judged to be much better than a coup. Not the least in importance, going with a flawed design enabled democratic norms and values to take root in the United States. With the Egyptian military hastily pulling up democracy as if it were a young, loosely-rooted plant, Egyptians not only had to start from scratch; they also had to contend with the fact that a democratic system had been so easily replaced by force.  

See the video made to accompany this essay: http://youtu.be/_1yuvnOq5YE

See a related video on Syria: From Protest to War  http://youtu.be/NJm3ZaamhgA

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[1] Sarah El Deeb and Maggie Michael, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Urges Followers to Rise Up after Deadly Clashes,” The Huffington Post, July 8, 2013.

Aid to Egypt vs. Paying Down Debt

The debt of the U.S. Government—some $16 trillion in 2012—can be difficult even to grasp conceptually. One does not run into a trillion of anything in daily life, much less sixteen times a trillion. Without any tangible examples that can give us some inkling of the magnitude of the number, “sixteen trillion” can easily become a number one rattles off as if a “oh, by the way,” as in, “Oh, by the way, that sort of number will never be paid off.” One can point to the debt as a symptom of a systemic imbalance, as in that of consolidation over the constitutional federalism. That is to say, the magnitude of the debt can point to the lack of limitations facing Congress in its appropriating capacity. It could be argued that the ballot box is such a limitation, but what if the electorate themselves have a similar imbalance in terms of spending what they don’t have. With student loan debt at $1 trillion as of 2012 and a third of the amount in default, the federal debt can easily be seen as a manifestation of a more basic or fundamental imbalance of the psyche that transcends yet subtly fuels policy.

 

 

In reading of the Obama administration’s preparation of a pact to cut $1 billion from what Egypt owes the U.S. Government for agricultural purchases, I was stunned to read that “money that would otherwise pay down the American debt” would instead be spent on “training and infrastructure projects in Egypt intended to attract private investment and create jobs.” To be sure, rising unemployment in Egypt could undermine the democratically-elected Morsi government, so a strategic argument could be made on behalf of the American aid. However, the almost cavalier attitude toward paying down the federal debt is rather strange, and misplaced, given the gravity of the problem. Put another way, to put a strategic objective primarily oriented to the unemployment of a state that is not in the U.S. above paying down U.S. debt can be viewed as a questionable priority. It seems to indicate a desire to fix another’s problems at the expense of making a dent in one’s own. The scenario of the homeowner who lets his own grass grow out of control yet lends his mower to his neighbor whose lawn is has become “unbecoming” captures this sort of mentality.

 

In short, the debt of $16 trillion can be read as a mirror of sorts of a certain mentality—one that falls far short of that which a virtuous and responsible citizenry would have. It is no accident that Jefferson and Adams agreed in their later correspondence that such a citizenry is necessary for a republic to remain viable.

Source:

Steven Myers, “U.S. Is Near Pact to Cut $1 Billion from Egypt Debt,” The New York Times, September 4, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/middleeast/us-prepares-economic-aid-to-bolster-democracy-in-egypt.html?pagewanted=all

 

Egypt’s Generals: “Boundary Issues”

In a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton in 1887, John Acton (1834-1902) wrote, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men.” This line could be applied to Egypt’s ruling generals both just before and after the presidential election in June 2012.

Days before the election—perhaps in anticipation of a victory by the opposition party—the generals and their allies in the court dissolved the legislature, which after the legislative election had been controlled by the opposition. As if this affront to democracy was not enough, the generals announced that they, rather than the opposition party’s presidential victor, who had received 51.7% of the vote, would appoint the president’s chief of staff. In a sense, this affront is more shocking than the generals' dissolution of the legislature or emasculation of the powers of the presidency because of the sheer presumptuousness in appointing someone else's chief of staff. That is generally recognized as an internal matter to a president.

The generals are like a roommate who thinks nothing of moving one’s personal toiletries in the bathroom (such things are generally known to be personal) or taking and eating one's food from the refrigerator. In other words, the generals had what can be called “boundary issues.” Days after the election, the Generals’ strategy was clear: “Say one thing and do another.” General Assar claimed in a news conference days after the election, “we will give the president of the republic his complete powers.” And yet, the New York Times reported soon thereafter that under the generals' plan, Morsi, the new president, would "assume an office stripped of almost all authority." For example, the new president would not have jurisdiction over the military or its budget, not to mention even his own chief of staff . The aggrandizing generals preserved “broad powers for themselves over matters including defense, national security and perhaps some broad economic issues,” according to Mona el-Ghobashy, an Egyptian political scientist.

What the Egyptians needed was a Teddy Roosevelt of sorts: a man of the bully pulpit who was not afraid to go up against the monopoly trusts of his day (which is why New York bosses had gotten him out of the governorship and into the "safe" (i.e., vacuous) vice presidency). Weeks after being elected, Morsi showed TR-like guts in recalling the parliament that the top generals had dissolved. “He has been waiting to make a decision to prove he is president of a republic,” Gamal Eid, a prominent human rights lawyer, observed.

Lest Morsi be accused of ignoring the ruling of an admittedly-politicized constitutional court, Eid adds that the president’s decree “abolishes an executive order, and it is not related to the constitutional court. It negates the decision of the military council.” He added, “If the choice is between the decree of an elected president and a military council with questionable legitimacy, then we choose the elected president.” Adding to its legitimacy vis à vis the court, Morsi’s decree came with a time limit: the Parliament could serve only until a new constitution could be completed, followed by fresh legislative elections within 60 days. Even though this caveat acknowledged the court’s demand for a new Parliament, the decree nonetheless instantly prompted the generals to call an "emergency meeting" to “discuss the situation.”

Morsi deserves considerable credit for doing what he could rightly have expected to result in opposition (and even an attack) from the generals’ council, whose continued authority was questionable at best, given the generals’ pledge on assuming power to dissolve their council upon the inauguration of the president. The entitlement presumed by the “emergency meeting” is itself pathological, as the response assumes a sort of default authority, which could only be artificial. At the very least, the response evinces an obsessive-compulsive sort of  “control issues.”

I would not blame Morsi one bit were he afraid of the generals as he stepped off the reservation. Regarding the generals’ psychology, to gut an office of power is an underhanded (not to mention selfish) way of not recognizing the democratic legitimacy of an election that does not go one’s way. That is to say, the childishness evinces a selfishness that does not play well with others. To presume the authority to appoint someone else's chief of staff is beyond bad table manners; it is low class and even passive aggressive. The move is essentially a coup by pen, even if it is tacitly backed up by the threat of guns. Apparently it is difficult for some to let go of power even as promised, especially when that power is absolute. I don't foresee the generals playing well with Morsi, as his democratic legitimacy means that their continued grasp on power was something considerably less than absolute, at least in terms of legitimacy.

The lesson for us as a species is perhaps the following: a people should be very careful in deciding who is to hold “the precious ring” even just temporarily, as a caretaker, for, as Lord Acton wrote, the allure of the ring is strangely much more nepharious than meets the eye. Furthermore, this case demonstrates just how important it is for a government to have a constitution. The competing claims of Morsi, the court, and the generals’ council could find no common basis without one. Put another way, how could the constitutional court have a basis of legitimacy in interpreting a constitution without one? Without a constitution, Morsi was free to negate the court’s usurpation. Even were a constitution extant, it would be beyond the reach of the judiciary to declare another branch null and void. Most crucially, a constitution maintains and protects the viability itself of the basic institutions of government—this is the basic constitutional function that is up for grabs in the absence of a constitution. 

Sources:

David Kirkpatrick, “After Victory, Egypt Islamists Seek to ChallengeMilitary,” The New York Times, June 18, 2012.

David Kirkpatrick, "Morsi Is Winner of Egyptian Presidency," The New York Times, June 24, 2012.

Hamza Hendawi, "Morsi Orders Dissolved Parliament Return, Defies Military Leaders," The Huffington Post, July 8, 2012.

Kareen Fahim and Mayy El Sheikh, “Egypt’s President Orders Return ofParliament,” The New York Times, July 8, 2012. 

Mubarak Convicted in Egypt: A Precedent for Human Rights?

On June 2, 2012, an Egyptian court sentenced former President Hosni Mubarak to life in prison for being an accomplice in the killing of unarmed demonstrators during the protests in the “Arab Spring.” The significance of this verdict in terms of human rights from an international standpoint lies in the fact that the accountability on a ruler was accomplished by his own citizens—meaning the country’s own court. Lest the International Criminal Court be reckoned as coming up short in terms of being able to arrest and convict sitting or former rulers of states, the verdict from Egypt says, in effect, there is an alternative. Governments can fortify the independence of their respective judiciaries such that public officials can be held accountable domestically. Under this scenario, the ICC would be of value to the world particularly if it could be fortified to step in where states do not have court systems strong enough to arrest and try a current or former ruler. In other words, we ought not forget the alternative of national courts when we bemoan the weaknesses of the ICC.

The full essay is at "Mubarak Convicted in Egypt."

Gandhi as a Model for the Arab Spring

After two weeks in 2011 of mass protests in Egypt for representative democracy and the ouster of President Mubarak, the Egyptian government agreed to concessions including allowing freedom of the press, releasing of political prisoners arrested during the protests, and commencing a committee with the opposition to consider constitutional amendments. The "regime also pledged not to harass those participating in the anti-government protests."[1] Gandhi would have been proud, though the protesters left room for improvement on this score. Understanding how they could have done so can be of use to pro-democracy protesters not only in the Middle East, but also around the world.

The full essay is at "Gandhi as a Model for the Arab Spring."

1. David E. Sanger, “As Mubarak Digs In, U.S. Policy in Egypt Is Complicated,” The New York Times, February 5, 2011

Prudent & Measured Calculation Over Principled Leadership: U.S. President Obama on Democracy Protesters in the Middle East

Despite several days of overwhelming popular grass-roots protest in Egypt, on January 30, 2011, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, stopped short of urging the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, to resign.  According to The New York Times, she spoke of "a process that must include a government dialogue with the protesters and “free, fair, and credible” elections, scheduled for September." In the face of overwhelming protests going on in Egypt, the top U.S. diplomat was urging a dialogue in January through the following September. Specifically, she declared, “We have been very clear that we want to see a transition to democracy. . . . And we want to see the kind of steps taken to bring that about. We want to see an orderly transition.” 

The full essay is at "Calculation Over Principled Leadership."

Social Media Companies: Is Blocking Political-Protester Content a Political or Business Decision?

The question of the role of social media internet companies as protesters have used social-media platforms to communicate before and during protests exploded on the world stage in "Arab Spring" going in the Middle East in early 2011. Lest it be presumed that the companies' respective policies were relevant only in terms of what content (or users) was allowed and how that content could impact events on the ground, the policies themselves reflect the claim made by the West of what liberty means. In other words, if social media companies were (allowed to be) oppressive or otherwise not respectful of their customers, the overall message to the oppressed in the Middle East could not have been that greater freedom is indeed possible because it exists in the West. Lest our own private sector unwittingly undercut the words and efforts of the protesters, we might want to use this case to ask if we couldn’t be freer too.

The full essay is at "Social Media Companies and Political Content."

Food Prices Rising: Will the Global Population Growth Outstrip Food Supply?

I contend that it is in our interest as a species to see that our population size is managed toward a steady state rather than as a maximizing variable (i.e., schizogenic). In fact, we have a right and obligation as one body to see that our various limbs are coordinated such that none engages in hypertrophy. That is to say, the whole has the right to protect its viability by arresting excessive growth in one of the parts. That much of the world's population growth takes place in the developing world does not mean that this right, or obligation, of the world is somehow a plot by the developed countries to oppress the poorer countries. In fact, much of the pain of the higher food prices is in the developing world rather than in the industrialized countries, so it is in the interest of the developing countries to accede to the world’s demand that their population growth be stopped.

The full essay is at "Food Prices and Global Population Growth."

South Sudan as a Sovereign State: Governmental Change in Slow Motion

Announced in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, on February 7, 2011, voters in the oil-producing south overwhelming chose to secede from the Arab north. According to the New York Times, 98.83 percent of the more than 3.8 million registered voters in the south chose to separate from the north. The referendum had been agreed to as part of the peace agreement in 2005, after two long and brutal civil wars between the Arab Muslim north and the mostly animist and Christian south. “Today we received these results and we accept and welcome these results because they represent the will of the southern people,” President Bashir said in a statement on state television, according to Reuters. In Washington, the White House released a statement by President Obama congratulating the people of south Sudan and announcing “the intention of the United States to formally recognize southern Sudan as a sovereign, independent state in July 2011.” The New York Times reported that actual independence would be declared on July 9, when the peace agreement that set the stage for the vote expired. In the meantime, issues regarding citizenship, oil-revenue rights and the contested and volatile region of Abyei would be settled.

The full essay is at "South Sudan."