Showing posts with label state rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label state rights. Show all posts

Friday, April 24, 2026

On Retaining the States’ Veto-Power in the European Council: Sovereignty vs. Democracy

Both the filibuster in the U.S. Senate and the veto in the European Council reflect the act that the respective states were sovereign and retain a portion of that governmental sovereignty that has not been delegated to the respective Unions. But whereas the American filibuster is compatible with a federal system based on dual-sovereignty (states and union), the European veto is not; rather, each state having a veto is at home in a confederation, which is characterized by the states retaining their sovereignty rather than having given up some in becoming a state. In April 2026 shortly after Viktor Orbán had lost his bid for re-election in the E.U. state of Hungary, the E.U.’s foreign minister argued publicly that the states’ veto in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) runs contrary to the democratic principle of majority rule. The prerogative of retained and residual governmental sovereignty was essentially being pitted against a fundamental principle of democracy.


The full essay is at "On Retaining the States’ Veto-Power in the European Council."

Friday, January 30, 2026

On America’s Dominance in NATO: The E.U. as a Contributory Factor

Just after the E.U. had successfully negotiated (mostly) free-trade treaties with India and a few South American state-level countries, the E.U. and U.S. were at odds on the ownership and control of Greenland to such an extent that the NATO alliance was strained if not fraught. The resulting power-vacuum with respect to military alliances could be filled by the E.U. strengthening its federal foreign policy and defense powers and forming a military alliance with India and even South America in order to put less reliance and thus pressure on the weakened NATO alliance.  This is not to say that new military alliances would necessarily or even probably form; rather, such alliances would be in line with the dynamics and logic of power itself at the international level. I contend that the unbalanced balance of federal-state power in foreign policy and defense in the E.U. was a major contributory factor of the dominance of the U.S. in NATO.


The full essay is at "On America's Dominance in NATO."

Wednesday, December 24, 2025

On the E.U.’s “Pragmatic” Federalism

It is ironic that even though European political theorists, including Immanuel Kant, Johannes Althusius, and Kenneth Wheare, made substantial contributions on the topic of federalism, even political leaders in the E.U. as late as 2025 were stumbling over the basics, getting the very concept wrong. Unfortunately, that has caused journalists to trip and fall too, leaving E.U. citizens grappling over the apparent problem of being citizens both of their state and the E.U. even though, according to former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi spoke in 2025 in favor of “’pragmatic federalism’ as the political conditions for a true, federal union do not exist in the E.U. at the moment.”[1] The claims that “pragmatic federalism” is somehow not indicative of “true” federalism, and, moreover, that somehow the E.U. has states that are semi-sovereign (as the E.U. itself has exclusive competences) and yet federalism does not apply are patently absurd. Draghi was confusing the politics of the moment, in which the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology was still too powerful for more governmental sovereignty to be moved to the federal level from the states, with whether the E.U. had a federal system already. In other words, “political conditions” are distinct from whether the E.U. has a federal system of public governance. Draghi’s assertion is all the more astounding not only because of his governmental experience at the federal level, but also because the dual-sovereignty (of the states and the Union) means that the E.U. fits within the category of modern federalism rather than confederalism (using Wheare’s terminology). Europeans have quite understandably been confused in trying to classify the E.U. away from the pull of the anti-federalist ideology in Europe.


The full essay is at "On the E.U.'s 'Pragmatic' Federalism."



1. Sandor Zsiros, “The EU Wants to End the Era of National Vetoes—But It’s Complicated,” Euronews.com, 23 December, 2025.

Saturday, December 13, 2025

U.S. Presidential Encroachment on State Prerogatives

Both in the E.U. and U.S., the member-states are semi-sovereign, and are even guaranteed all residual sovereignty that is not in any of the enumerated competencies (i.e., powers) of the respective unions and the states. Europeans are smart to have multiple avenues for the state governments in the European Council and the Council of Ministers so those governments can protect themselves against encroachment by the Commission. To be sure, these safeguards go too far, especially given the sheer number of states even by the mid-2020s, in giving each state a veto especially on important matters in which qualified-majority voting does not apply. In other words, the safeguards against federal encroachment in the E.U. are excessive as long as each state can wield its veto against federal policies, legislation, and regulations. Regarding the latter, the directive means provides each state with some latitude. I suspect that the Europeans who constructed the E.U.’s federal system were in part fearful of federal encroachment because so much of that had already built-up in the U.S., where federal consolidation had become a threat to the governmental sovereignty of the member-states, as if they were just regions rather than republics holding even more sovereignty, on parchment at least, than does Congress and the federal president. So, it is worth taking not of the rare instances in which a state legislature pushes back against threats from the U.S. president on a competency (i.e., enumerated power) reserved by the states.  The rejection by the Indiana Senate of U.S. President Trump’s pressure to accept new districts for U.S. House representatives from Indiana—a map in which the Republican Group would likely pick up two seats—is important because Congressional-district maps are the prerogative of the states rather than an encroaching federal executive.


The full essay is at "U.S. Presidential Encroachment."

Wednesday, December 3, 2025

A Reparations Loan or Common Debt: Undercut by State Rights

“State rights” was a common refrain by the eleven U.S. member states who sought to exit in 1861; the underlying fear was that the exclusive competencies, or enumerated powers, of the U.S., combined with the numerous accessions of new states, were already compromising the power of the eleven states to protect their economies from “encroachment.” In 1858, for instance, a tariff disadvantageous to those economies had been passed in spite of the “Southern” objections in the U.S. Senate. Had each member state had a veto, rather than just the ability to filibuster, the eleven states would have been able to protect the viability of their respective economies from encroachment by the Union. To be sure, the state rights claim that the U.S. was still just a bloc, as had been the case from 1781-1789 under the Articles of Confederation, was sheer denial, for the U.S. Constitution instituted a new kind of federalism—partly national, partly international—based on dual sovereignty, wherein both the member states and the Union have a portion of governmental sovereignty. It is this form of federalism, “modern federalism,” that the Europeans adopted in creating the European Union because the E.U. has exclusive competencies. But whereas the shift made by the Americans in the eighteenth century left the state-veto behind at the Union level, the Europeans retained the veto, which at the very least works against the effective operation of modern federalism. The arduous and much delayed task on a reparations loan for Ukraine in spite of the self-interested objection—and thus promised veto—of one state is a case in point. Even the alternative of the E.U. issuing debt faced state-level opposition, as was the case in the U.S. in the 1790s, but in that case, the self-interested states that were relatively clear of debt could not stop the issuance because none of those states could wield a veto at the federal level. This is important because back then, the American states were still widely viewed as countries by their respective inhabitants. “I must fight for my country,” General Lee told Lincoln in 1861, referring to Virginia. A refresher on American history could help Europeans cross the Rubicon to a more internally consistent modern federalism. Whether Euroskepticism or States’ Rights, the ideology, as etched into the E.U.’s Basic Law, is responsible for Van der Leyen’s headaches in getting the E.U. to put Ukraine in a position of strength against the Russian invaders.


The full essay is at "A Reparations Loan or Common Debt."

Friday, October 31, 2025

E.U. Citizens on the Union’s Enlargement

Having recently been presented with an E.U. citizen denying the E.U. has citizens even as he admitted that he could vote for a candidate to represent him in the European Parliament, I had my faith in human rationality restored the following day in reading of a poll of E.U. citizens on whether additional states should be added to the Union; ideology, even of the tribal sort, need not distort rationality beyond recognition. Even in the reporting of such a poll, however, the Euroskeptic, or states’ rights, ideology left its imprint. Even such an auxiliary presence is a sign of the headwind that has been facing the E.U. since its founding.


The full essay is at "E.U. Citizens." 

Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Strength in Numbers: The European Union in Foreign Policy

One of the chief benefits of having an empire-scale union of states is the sway, or influence, abroad that comes with strength of numbers. Dwarfing the foreign-policy of a state government, and even of an informal bloc of a few states plus others outside the union, an empire-scale united-policy enacted to influence other countries can make the delegation of the additional governmental sovereignty to the federal level worth losing some state power abroad. I contend that this lesson can be gained by examining the European-Russian relation during the month of May in 2025.


The full essay is at "Strength in Numbers." 

Monday, February 17, 2025

A European Army: A More Perfect Union

At the Munich Security Conference in February, 2025, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy bluntly asserted, “I really believe that the time has come that the armed forces of Europe must be created.”[1] He could have said in 2023 after Russia’s President Putin had sent tanks and bombs into Ukraine; instead, the inauguration of President Trump in the U.S. that was the trigger. “Let’s be honest,” Zelenskyy continued, “now we can’t rule out that America might say ‘no’ to Europe on issues that might threaten it.”[2] At the time, Trump was planning to meet with Putin to end the war without Britain and a number of E.U. states at the table. After all, they had failed to push Putin off Crimea in 2014, and even in 2025, they were not on the same page on how to defend Ukraine militarily. Amid the political fracturing in Europe, Ukraine’s president was urging that the E.U. itself have an army, rather than merely the 60,000 troops for which the union was dependent on the states. Even on being able to borrow on its own authority, the E.U. was hamstrung by the state governments that were more interested in retaining power than in benefitting from collective action. It is difficult to analyze Zelenskyy’s plea without including the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology that was still eclipsing the E.U. from realizing a more perfect union.

 

The full essay is at "A European Army."


1. Joshua Posaner, “Zelenskyy: ‘The Time Has Come’ for a European Army,” Politico, February 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.

Friday, November 6, 2020

American Federalism Eclipsed by an Ideal of Democracy: Education Over Immigration as a Constitutional Problem

The U.S. Constitution includes immigration as one of the listed (i.e., enumerated) powers of the federal government. Education is not such a power; hence it resides with the States. Historically, the accumulation of power by the federal government has involved taking areas from the States even though those areas are not listed as federal powers. As a result, American federalism has shifted increasingly toward a consolidation of power at the federal level. Among other means, Congresses and U.S. presidents have used the power of the purse to gain control from the States. Education is a case in point, whether elementary, secondary, or higher education. That the U.S. Government has had trouble controlling the country's southern border with Mexico suggests that maybe adding education has come at the expense of the added attention and effort that could have been put on immigration. In business terms, an opportunity cost (i.e., the cost of foregone benefits) comes with each additional federalized area. U.S. President Obama on education presents us with a case in point. 

The full essay is at "Federalism Eclipsed by Consolidation."

Friday, May 22, 2020

The E.U. Says No to Hungarian Asylum Detention Camps: A Test for E.U. Federalism

On May 11, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the E.U.’s highest court, ruled against the state of Hungary on its detention camp near the Serbian border. The state had denied the asylum requests because the immigrants had come through Serbia, and the latter refused to allow them to reverse course. The immigrants were thus stuck, essentially detained in “prison-like conditions.”[1] The high court ruled that the “conditions prevailing in the Roszke transit zone amount to a deprivation of liberty.”[2] ECJ Advocate General Priit Pikamae had argued that the “unlawful detention” was due to the “high degree of restriction of the freedom of movement.”[3] The state of Hungary had argued that the immigrants could have stayed in Servia, as it was a safe-country of transit, and thus were not eligible for asylum in Hungary. Unlike Hungary, Serbia was not an E.U. state, which may be why the asylum-seekers did not want to remain in Serbia. Hence being a border state added to Hungary’s woes. Therefore, the E.U. had some responsibility to alleviate the pressure on Hungary. Yet the Union did not do so, showing its weakness, and yet the state government bowed to the ECJ’s ruling. To the extent that the E.U. relies on such self-subordination in the want of federal help, the E.U. could be said to be on borrowed time during which basic adjustments to the federal system could be made.

The full essay is at "Hungarian Asylum Detention Centers."


1. Deutsche Welle, “Hungary Illegally Held Asylum-Seekers, ECJ Rules,” DW.com, May 14, 2020 (accessed May 22, 2020).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Wednesday, May 20, 2020

An E.U. Economic Recovery Fund: A Federal Problem

On May 18, 2020, with the E.U. Commission having been no match for the states’ own interests in their own health and economic crises, the governors of France and Germany announced that they would support a recovery fund to help the states most in need. The €500 billion fund of grants (not loans) would be raised on the capital markets and guaranteed by the state governments. It would be part of the federal budget.[1] I submit that the imbalance in that federal system is evident; here again, the power of the state governments relative to the federal Commission shows the weakness of the latter.

The full essay is at "E.U. Economic Recovery Fund."


[1] Katya Adler, “Politics and PR: Behind the Scenes of Franco-German Recovery Fund,” BBC.com, May 18, 2020.


Sunday, March 24, 2019

Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Structural Reform: Each Had a Role to Play after the Financial Crisis

With fiscal policy hamstrung by public debt in both the E.U. and U.S., monetary policy was a major beneficiary of the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing state-debt crisis that stammered on at least until 2013 in Europe. Lest it be concluded that central bank policy had reached an unassailable peak of salvation, the expanded role actually made its limitations transparent, at least in financial circles.

The full essay is at "Post Financial Crisis Coordinated Action."

Wednesday, February 20, 2019

U.S. President Trump’s Spending on a Border Wall: Federalism at Risk?

U.S. President Trump announced in February of 2019 that he would fully fund a wall on the U.S.’s southern border. He would first use the $1.375 granted by Congress to be followed by  $600 million from a Treasury Department asset-foreclosure fund for law enforcement, $2.5 billion from a military anti-drug account, and $3.6 billion in military construction funds.[1] The president’s rationale hinged on his declaration of a national emergency due to illegal immigration, drug-traffic, and crime/gangs—all having been coming across the border on a regular basis. In federal court, sixteen of the U.S.’s member-states challenged the president’s declaration and use of funds. The U.S. president’s legal authority to declare national emergencies was pitted against the authority of the U.S. House of Representatives to be the initiator of federal spending legislation. The House therefore had standing to sue. The question of the states’ legal standing is another matter. It is particularly interesting because it involved not only whether a given state would be harmed by the wall or even the president’s use of other funding sources that could otherwise be used for other projects in the states not directly affected by the wall, but also because federalism itself could be negatively affected in a way that harms all of the states.


1. Charlie Savage and Robert Pear, “States’ Lawsuit Aims to Thwart Emergency Bid,” The New York Times, February 19, 2019.

Saturday, February 9, 2019

Behind Cameron's Referendum on Britain's Secession from the E.U.

Governors of other E.U. states reacted quickly to David Cameron’s announcement that if his party would be re-elected to lead the House of Commons, he would give his state’s residents a chance to vote yes or no on seceding from the European Union. The result would be decisive, rather than readily replaced by a later referendum. Cameron said the referendum would also be contingent on him not being able to renegotiate his state’s place in the Union. This renegotiation in particular prompted some particularly acute reactions from the governments of other “big states.” Behind these reactions was a sense that the British government was being too selfish. This was not fair, I submit, because the ground of the dispute was on the nature of the E.U. itself as a federal system. 
David Cameron, A former PM of Britain
The full essay is at "Britain in a Confederation?"

Saturday, February 2, 2019

The Right in European and American Politics: Disentangling Right from Right

The far-right in Europe has been quite different than the right-wing in American politics. Putting aside the usual caricature of “people in pointy hoods and the Ku Klux Klan,” Marine Le Pen said she still believed “the American right [was] much more to the right than the National Front.” She may have agreed with those who wanted to manage American frontiers more effectively and prevent massive illegal immigration, but she was also a big believer in the state’s ability and obligation to help its people. “We feel the state should have the means to intervene,” she said. “We are very attached to public services à la française as a way to limit the inequalities among regions and among the French,” including “access for all to the same level of health care.”[1] This statement implies that survival is a human right--something the American right has tended to eschew in favor of a survival-of-the-fittest mantra that conflates the state of nature with the interdependency in a developed economy. 

The full essay is at "Disentangling Right from Right."

1. Tracy McNicoll and Christoper Dickey, "What a Tea Party Looks Like in Europe,”  Newsweek, September 6, 2010.

Thursday, January 31, 2019

Can an American Member-State Exit the Union?

A war was fought over it. In early 2013, the White House made it explicit in replying to a petition. Yet still there was a sense among at least some Texans that something was amiss. Following U.S. President Obama’s re-election in 2012, citizens of Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, and five other member-states in the U.S. signed petitions for the White House to allow their respective states to secede from the Union. At the time, few people other than the secessionists themselves took the petitions seriously. Yet the underlying contending principles deserve more serious reflection even if no "exit" is anticipated. Most importantly, the matter concerns how and whether the rights of member-states (and majorities of the people, therein) are to be circumscribed in a federal union that leaves said republics semi-sovereign and with residual sovereignty.

Friday, September 21, 2018

The ECB as the E.U.'s Bank Supervisor: States in the Driver's Seat

Although the establishment of a federal regulator of major banks in the E.U. was as yet not approved by the European Parliament or ratified by the governments of states using the euro as well as any other states opting in, the European Council of Ministers signed off in December 2012 on an amendment that would give the European Central Bank authority over banks that have at least €30 billion in assets, make up more than 20% of their state’s economic output, or operate in at least two states (i.e., interstate banking). At the very least, three banks per state would come under the central bank’s oversight. Other banks would remain the responsibility of state regulators. This is an interesting “working out” of federalism, distinctively European-style.
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble at the E.U. Council of Ministers discussing the bank supervisor amendment.     WSJ
The full essay is at "The European Central Bank."

Saturday, August 18, 2018

On Leaving Coal Emissions to the States: Implications for American Federalism

With the transportation (i.e., fuel) and power (i.e., coal) sectors accounting for a majority of the carbon emissions in the U.S., according to the EPA, the Trump administration’s moves to freeze his predecessor’s fuel efficiency standards and relax pollution rules for power plants needing renovation put at risk the declining trend of emissions in 2018. The implications for climate change (e.g., hotter summers) were stark, according to Janet McCabe, who had been Obama’s EPA air chief.[1] The Trump administration’s proposal to allow the states, including West Virginia, to set their own rules for regulating coal was, according to the New York Times, “the administration’s strongest and broadest effort yet to address what the president has long described as a regulatory ‘war on coal’.”[2] An implication is that carbon emissions from coal in the U.S. would likely increase as a result, even though large states like California and New York could be expected to tighten the rules. The interesting point about turning the regulations to the states revolves around federalism. Constitutionally speaking, should the states regulate the carbon emissions from coal?


The full essay is at "States Regulating Coal."



1. Lisa Friedman, “Trump’s Plan for Coal Emissions: Let Coal States Regulate Them,” The New York Times, August 18, 2018.
2. Ibid.

Friday, January 19, 2018

Rule of Law in the E.U.: Implications for the Federal System

For a federal system to be viable over the long term, a core of basic values must be shared even though one of the main functions of federalism as a system of government is the ability to accommodate diversity from state to state. In the case of the E.U. and the U.S., the rule of law, democracy, and separation of powers as concerns the independence of judiciaries at the state and federal levels are non-negotiable; hence as these are compromised or thwarted outright, the viability of E Pluribus Unum can be expected to unravel. As 2017 came to an end, the E.U. found itself largely impotent as some of the eastern states violated the basic principles of rule of law and an independent judiciary with impunity. If the impunity was indeed real, the federal system itself was in desperate need of repair.



Wednesday, January 3, 2018

Automatic Standing: The American States in Federalism Cases

Unlike that of the E.U., the U.S. system of public governance is structurally biased toward  political consolidation at the expense of federalism. In fact, the bias extends to jurisprudence. This is evident in a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on September 8, 2011 against Virginia on the 2010 federal health-insurance reform law.

The full essay is at "Spending in American Federalism."