The European Civil Protection Pool: Insufficient for the E.U.'s Civil Protection Mechanism

The European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP) was established in 2013 to provide emergency response personnel and equipment to combat natural and man-made disasters in Europe. The Pool is the central component of the E.U. Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). However, the ECPP depends on voluntary contributions from the state governments and even extends beyond the E.U. to include ten European sovereign states. The reliance on voluntary contributions, as well as the distended coverage beyond the E.U. have a weakening impact on the ability of the European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, to respond to raging forest fires, as were out of control in several southern states during the summer of 2026. Heat-wave after heat-wave plus decades of those states allowing deadwood to accumulate in the forests (the same error had also exacerbated the massive 1988 fire in Yellowstone and Grand Teton parks in Wyoming) provided a “perfect storm” for raging fires by July. Even the Commission’s emphasis on prevention had not been enough, given the reliance on the states, literally to have enough brush and dead trees culled prior to the hot summer. I contend that the Commission having to rely on the states (and even ten other countries!) to contribute personnel and equipment in the ECPP program, which is in line with the Commission’s typical coordinative approach, is out of step with the E.U.’s actual federal system of dual sovereignty because a mere coordinating role fits what Althusius, in his 1603 text, Political Digest, calls non-plena foedus (non-full federalism: all governmental sovereignty is at the state level).

The full essay is at "The European Civil Protection Pool."

Georgia and Georgia: Aspiring and Settled States

While one Georgia was secure as a member-state in the U.S., another Georgia was finding itself being frozen out of not only accession talks with the E.U., but also being invited as a “NATO partner” to attend the NATO meeting in June, 2026. It is ironic that whereas the first Georgia had delegated some of its sovereignty to the U.S. in 1789, the second Georgia was unhappy remaining fully sovereign outside of the E.U. rather than as one of the semi-sovereign E.U. states. Giving up some governmental sovereignty can be a “step up,” and, with that comes certain requirements in terms of good governance.

The full essay is at "Georgia and Georgia." 

E.U. Emergency Assistance to Venezuela: Coordinating Federalism

Whereas when the U.S. responds to natural disasters abroad, the resources of all 50 states are combined in a federal-level response, the E.U.’s Civil Protection Mechanism limits the federal level to coordination and instead relies on the states to deploy resources, including personal. I contend that the European arrangement is more in keeping with federalism than is the federal-only arrangement of the Americans. Moreover, involvement at both federal and state levels reflects and facilitates one of the benefits of federalism, wherein each level has the strength to act as a check on the other. Programs in which the federal level coordinates and the state governments deploy can help keep a federal system from lapsing into a “one-size-fits-all” consolidated rather than federal system. The U.S. could stand to take a lesson in this respect.

The full essay is at "E.U. Emergency Assistance to Venezuela."

On Retaining the States’ Veto-Power in the European Council: Sovereignty vs. Democracy

Both the filibuster in the U.S. Senate and the veto in the European Council reflect the act that the respective states were sovereign and retain a portion of that governmental sovereignty that has not been delegated to the respective Unions. But whereas the American filibuster is compatible with a federal system based on dual-sovereignty (states and union), the European veto is not; rather, each state having a veto is at home in a confederation, which is characterized by the states retaining their sovereignty rather than having given up some in becoming a state. In April 2026 shortly after Viktor Orbán had lost his bid for re-election in the E.U. state of Hungary, the E.U.’s foreign minister argued publicly that the states’ veto in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) runs contrary to the democratic principle of majority rule. The prerogative of retained and residual governmental sovereignty was essentially being pitted against a fundamental principle of democracy.

The full essay is at "On Retaining the States’ Veto-Power in the European Council."

E.U. Statehood for Sovereign Countries

Even as the E.U. struggled to come up with foreign policies on Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran in March, 2026, the union must have been cogent enough then for the Icelandic government to set a date at the end of the summer to have a referendum on whether to seek statehood. The term for this is accession, not merger, for an empire-scale union such as the U.S. or E.U. contains semi-sovereign states rather than co-scale and co-equal “partners.” By implication, to liken a state in one such union to another entire union is to make a category mistake that can be thought of in historical terms as making the claim that a kingdom is equivalent to an empire (of kingdoms). Both the E.U. and U.S. are federations composed of early-modern scale kingdoms and republics.[1] This is not so in the cases of Mexico and Canada. In fact, the U.S. has an open invitation for Canada’s accession (rather than merger).[2] People who presume that it was arrogant for the U.S. founders to invite Canada to accede as a state forget that the U.S. was formed by sovereign countries that became semi-sovereign states.

The full essay is at "E.U. Statehood for Sovereign Countries."

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1. See Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon, 2017)
2. Because Canada has expanded West since the 18^th century, Canada would most likely accede as three or four U.S. states rather than just one.

Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?

Is a more perfect Union in Europe in America’s national interest? On the American holiday in 2026 that principally honors George Washington, whose eight-year commitment as the military commander-in-chief to the cause of freedom for the 13 new sovereign republics that had been members of the British Empire (and would forge a comparable political Union[1]) was decisive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the E.U. state of Hungary to deliver “a message of support from the Trump administration to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,” who was behind in the polls in his re-election campaign.[2] At their press conference, Orbán and Rubio “signed an agreement on energy cooperation and hailed what they described as a ‘golden age’ of bilateral relations.”[3] E.U. officials were nowhere in sight; it was as if Hungary were still a sovereign state rather than a semi-sovereign E.U. state. An implicit question untreated by the media in the E.U. or U.S. is whether bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual E.U. states, as if the E.U. were nonexistent, was still in the U.S. national interest, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

The full essay is at "Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?"

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1. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).
2. Sandor Zsiros, “’We Want You to Continue’: Rubio Delivers Trump’s Campaign Message to Orbán in Budapest,” Euronews.com, 16 February, 2026.
3. Ibid.

Mutual Cooperation as Insufficient as E.U. Defense Policy

The words mutuality and cooperation have positive connotations politically, whereas divisive and exclusive do not. To be sure, mutual cooperation has the drawback of relegating competitiveness, which can foster greater efficiency and effectiveness. In the policy domain of defense, however, wherein nuclear weapons live, competition between weaponized polities can be dangerous and thus not worth any improvements from competing. The Cold War in the twentieth century attests to the superiority of mutuality and cooperation at the international theatre wherein polities act as sovereign militarized entities. Within a federal Union, however, relying on the mutual cooperation between states is, I contend, woefully deficient and inadequate. In fact, relying on states to assume the burden of defense can lead to the violent break up of a Union, as was dramatically demonstrated in what some Americans have called the War between the States (1861-1865), but is more accurately called the war between the U.S.A. and the C.S.A.(the Confederate States of America). Two political unions of very different balances of power between the respective federal and state levels of governance. It is precisely with this historical example in mind that the comments made by E.U. (Commission) President Von der Leyen at the Munich Security Conference in February, 2026 should be analyzed. Relying in going forward from that time on the E.U. states to build up their respective military forces, or militias in American-speak, under the assumption that those states would mutually cooperate military is a very risky strategy for the E.U. at a time in which its cousin across the Atlantic Ocean was pulling back from Europe in terms of military protection.

The full essay is at "Mutual Cooperation as Insufficient as E.U. Defense Policy."

A Reparations Loan or Common Debt: Undercut by State Rights

“State rights” was a common refrain by the eleven U.S. member states who sought to exit in 1861; the underlying fear was that the exclusive competencies, or enumerated powers, of the U.S., combined with the numerous accessions of new states, were already compromising the power of the eleven states to protect their economies from “encroachment.” In 1858, for instance, a tariff disadvantageous to those economies had been passed in spite of the “Southern” objections in the U.S. Senate. Had each member state had a veto, rather than just the ability to filibuster, the eleven states would have been able to protect the viability of their respective economies from encroachment by the Union. To be sure, the state rights claim that the U.S. was still just a bloc, as had been the case from 1781-1789 under the Articles of Confederation, was sheer denial, for the U.S. Constitution instituted a new kind of federalism—partly national, partly international—based on dual sovereignty, wherein both the member states and the Union have a portion of governmental sovereignty. It is this form of federalism, “modern federalism,” that the Europeans adopted in creating the European Union because the E.U. has exclusive competencies. But whereas the shift made by the Americans in the eighteenth century left the state-veto behind at the Union level, the Europeans retained the veto, which at the very least works against the effective operation of modern federalism. The arduous and much delayed task on a reparations loan for Ukraine in spite of the self-interested objection—and thus promised veto—of one state is a case in point. Even the alternative of the E.U. issuing debt faced state-level opposition, as was the case in the U.S. in the 1790s, but in that case, the self-interested states that were relatively clear of debt could not stop the issuance because none of those states could wield a veto at the federal level. This is important because back then, the American states were still widely viewed as countries by their respective inhabitants. “I must fight for my country,” General Lee told Lincoln in 1861, referring to Virginia. A refresher on American history could help Europeans cross the Rubicon to a more internally consistent modern federalism. Whether Euroskepticism or States’ Rights, the ideology, as etched into the E.U.’s Basic Law, is responsible for Van der Leyen’s headaches in getting the E.U. to put Ukraine in a position of strength against the Russian invaders.

The full essay is at "A Reparations Loan or Common Debt."

We Don’t Have Another America: Ukraine on the E.U.

On America’s Thanksgiving Day, 2025, Dmytro Kuleba, a former foreign minister of Ukraine, was asked whether Ukraine’s government officials could trust American officials negotiating with the Russian officials, given the fact that Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Envoy at the time, had recently been caught coaching Kirill Dmitriev, a top Russian official, on how to get U.S. President Don Trump on the side of Putin even though the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was still in violation of international law, which, by the way, trumps historical reasons, such as a lost Russian empire. Stalin’s forced famine in Ukraine during the 1930s would seem to nullify any imperial claims from the past. Kuleba relied to the journalist’s question with, “Not really, but we do not have another America.”[1] He was really giving Europe a wake-up call, but the problem there was not a lack of consensus, but a structural deficiency in the federal system of the European Union.

The full essay is at "We Don't Have Another America."

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1. Mared Gwyn Jones, “European Decision-Making on Ukraine ‘Embarrassing,’ Former Foreign Minister Kuleba Says,” Euronews.com, November 27, 2025.

E.U. Flag Day

Both the E.U. and U.S. have their respective flag days during the month of June—on the 29^th and 14^th, respectively. This isn’t the only thing that the flags have in common, and what sets both off from the flags of the states. I contend that these similarities and difference regarding political symbols can function as markers for what both unions are as complex polities of polities even as ideologies seek to obfuscate and dissimilate, even dismissing or ignoring the history of both unions. In other words, flags don’t lie; people do.

The full essay is at "E.U. Flag Day."

The E.U. and U.S. on Defense and Foreign Policy: Helping Ukraine

In March, 2025 after the U.S. had direct talks with Russia on ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the E.U. stepped up its game in helping Ukraine militarily. This was also in the context of a trade war between the E.U. and U.S., which did not make transatlantic relations any better. The E.U.’s increasing emphasis on military aid to Ukraine and the related publicity inadvertently showcased how federalism could be applied to defense and foreign policy differently that it has in the U.S., wherein the member states are excluded, since the Articles of Confederation, when the member states were sovereign within the U.S. confederation. Although both manifestations of early-modern federalism have their respective benefits and risks, I contend that the E.U.’s application of federalism to the two governmental domains of power is more in the spirit of (dual-sovereignty) federalism, even though serious vulnerabilities can be identified.

The full essay is at "The E.U. and U.S. on Defense and Foreign Policy."

Euro-skeptic Anti-Federalism: An Institutional Obstacle in the E.U.

On December 6, 2024, the E.U. finally—meaning more than twenty years after negotiations had begun—reached a free-trade agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The deal would cover 780 million people, but the completion of the negotiations between the E.U. president and those of the South American countries was “just a first stage before a long process”[1] that would require passage by a qualified majority vote—meaning 55% of the E.U. states and 55% of the E.U. population—in the E.U. Council and in the European Parliament and in enough state legislatures. Presumably if enough state ministers for trade in the E.U. Council vote yes, their respective state governments would go along and also be sufficient for final passage. I contend that the requirement that enough state legislatures also vote yes on the deal is excessive.

The full essay is at "Euroskeptic Anti-Federalism."

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1. Peggy Corlin, “Von der Leyen Clinches E.U.-Mercosur Trade Deal, in Face of French Opposition,” Euronews.com, December 6, 2024.

The E.U.: Pulled in Two Directions

European integration has proceeded in fits and starts since Robert Shuman proposed the European Coal and Steel Cooperative in 1950 so Europe could keep an eye on Germany’s military in the wake of World War II. Euroatom and the European Economic Community came in 1957, and the EC, which consisted of the three organizations, existed until 1993. Since then, the European Union too has progressed step-wise, with some steps backwards, such as when Britain seceded from the Union. Whereas the U.S. made the leap from a supranational alliance, the Articles of Confederation, to a federal government all at once in 1789, the way of the E.U. in terms of dual sovereignty and adding states has been incremental. Perhaps throughout its 31 year history, as of its federal election in 2024, the E.U. was being pulled in two directions. Some forces have led the E.U. to gain competencies over time, whereas other forces could be described as “states’ rights,” anti-federalist, or Euroskeptic tendencies. If dominant, those forces would ultimately lead to the dissolution of the federal union, whereas the former forces would lead to its consolidation. After thirty years, the U.S. too was more subject to the centripetal forces than those for ever closer union. From the subsequent history of the U.S., it is perfectly legitimate to ask whether the E.U. too will lean so close too to political (and economic) consolidation too by the time that union is over 200 years old. Like Europeans today, the Americans of the 1820s would never have dreamed that the federal level would be so dominate over the states, which were still regarded as countries.  

The full essay is at "The E.U.: Pulled in Two Directions."

Perspective on the European Union

At the signing of the Rome Declaration at the 60^th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community on March 25, 1957, E.U. leaders expressed their intention to further strengthening the federal Union. Even as “regional conflicts, terrorism, growing migratory pressures, protectionism and social and economic inequalities,” as well as Britain’s upcoming secession provided a sense of pessimism, Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, said, “Let us not lose perspective.”[1] I submit that this advice was at the time very important.


The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

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[1] James Kanter and Elisabetta Povoledo, “E.U. Leaders Sign Rome Declaration and Proclaim a ‘Common Future’ (Minus Britain),” The New York Times March 25, 2017.

Holding Back the E.U.: What Is It?

In addressing the E.U. Parliament in February, 2017, Canada’s prime minister, Justin Tradeau, claimed that the E.U. “is a truly remarkable achievement and an unprecedented model for peaceful cooperation.”[1] The only problem with the compliment is that it is not true. The U.S. is the precedent, as it was formed as an alliance in part to stave off war between its member states.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

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1. James Kanter, “Trudeau, Praising the E.U., Doesn’t Mention ‘Brexit’ or Trump,” The New York Times, February 16, 2017.

The E.U.’s Border-Control and Coast Guard: Held Hostage by Confederalism

In policing its borders as late as 2016, the E.U. suffered the same plight as the U.S. did under its Articles of Confederation—only whereas in the case of the U.S. the States retained all of their governmental sovereignty under the Articles, some governmental sovereignty in the E.U. was already lodged at the federal level. I contend that this perplexing disjunction between extant federal competencies and state rights in the E.U. is not sustainable.

The full essay is at "E.U.'s Border-Control."

American and European Federalism: A Critique of Rick Perry’s Book, "Fed Up!"

In his book, Fed Up! Governor Rick Perry of Texas provides a basis for viewing the states of the U.S. as equivalent to the E.U.’s member-states. All of these states are semi-sovereign, as they have all transferred some governmental sovereignty to federal institutions. This implies that the E.U. and U.S. are commensurate. I contend that both are instances of empire-level and scale federal systems in which the federal level is both international and national in nature. This distinguishes both unions from international organizations on the one hand, and the state governments on the other.

The full essay is at "American and European Federalism."

Is the E.U. a Federal System? Comparing the E.U. and U.S.

The United States and the European Union are not typically thought of on either side of the Atlantic Ocean as commensurate, and thus comparable, at least as of 2015 as I compile the essays in this text. Nevertheless, I contend that both polities are empire-level federal systems—federal in the modern sense, wherein the states and the federal level government share governmental sovereignty. If I’m correct in my categorization, we could evade the mistaken prescriptions that naturally ensue from category mistakes by comparing France, for example, with Texas rather than the entire U.S., and California not with the E.U. but, rather, with Italy. Useful lessons for the E.U. would come from looking at the U.S., and vice versa. Keeping the (member) states distinct from their respective federal levels is rarely if even done in making trans-Atlantic comparisons.

Accordingly, I present a collection of my essays on federalism applied to the E.U. andU.S. so the ubiquitous category-mistakes might finally be viewed as antiquated and useful lessons may be drawn on both sides of the Atlantic to fortify the respective federal empires of (member) states. The essays in Part I emphasize EU-US comparisons. The second and third parts focus respectively on the European Union and the United States, with comparisons and contrasts brought in as needed. I contend generally that both federal systems are in need of improvements to be viable over time. Whereas the E.U.’s risk is dissolution, consolidation at the expense of federalism is the danger facing the U.S. as of 2015. Ideally, a federal system has in its design structures and processes that tend the system itself into having a balance of power between the states and the federal-level governmental institutions. Only thusly can the states provide a check on federal encroachment, and the federal institutions check wayward states. In seeking to realize this benefit, Europeans and Americans could do worse than draw comparisons without committing a category-mistake. 

Videos on YouTube:  http://youtu.be/xinF5zjHV0Q and http://youtu.be/qqemCjiWZSM

A Related Audio:  http://www.blogtalkradio.com/thewordenreport/2013/07/08/the-eu-and-us

Challenges for E.U. Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is typically one of the domains of power that goes to the federal level in a Union of states. The history of the E.U. in its development provides a counter-example, as traditionally lower-level functions, such as government regulation of business, were the first to be federalized. Even as a counter-example, the E.U. is nonetheless a federal system, as such a system is not defined by which competencies are federalized. Even so, there are downsides to leaving foreign policy at the state level. In the case of the U.S. under the Articles of Confederation (1781-1789), the foreign policies at the state level involved the risk that European states would try to break apart the new American union by giving the American republics different geo-political foreign interests.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

         Should the Syrian Rebels have more powerful weapons, or would they eventually wind up in the hands of anti-Western forces?  This question is difficult enough without having to come to consensus on the question in the E.U.    Source; ABC News.

Incremental Change in the E.U.: A Banking Regulator

 The E.U.’s European Council, which represents the union’s state governments, agreed at the end of June in 2012 to make the federal bailout fund directly available to banks. Spanish banks had been seeking 100 billion euros. Counting the bailout funds as debt of the state rather than as bank debt would have further increased Spain’s relatively high borrowing costs. Counting the bailout funds as bank rather than state debt can be viewed as an instance of the E.U.’s “direct effect,” wherein the federal level can directly affect E.U. citizens and their private associations.  This distinguishes the E.U., by the way, as an instance of modern federalism, from the old foedus (i.e., treaty), or confederal (“alliance”) type of federalism as evinced by the American Articles of Confederation. 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.