Reforming E.U. Governance: On the States’ Conflict of Interest

A conflict of interest is the privileging of the interest of a part, by that part, over a conflicting broader interest, such as the public good. In exploiting such a conflict, a part of a whole puts the part’s own interest, and therefore benefit, above those of the whole to which the part belongs. A state government in the E.U., for example, could veto governance reforms of the federal government because the state would benefit in some way, even just in terms of retaining its portion of governmental sovereignty, even though the E.U. itself would be harmed. Exploiting a conflict of interest is selfishness in governance. The underlying assumption is that the part is greater than the whole. Aristotle warns of such misordered concupiscence, which is the placing of a smaller good above a higher good.

The full essay is at "Reforming E.U. Governance."

The AfD Group Surges in a Regional Election in the E.U. State of Germany

Both the U.S. and E.U. mandate that their respective states be republics (i.e., representative democracies), and thus assuming an autocratic government is prohibited. When the governor of the state of Hungary restricted freedom of the press and judicial independence, the E.U. pushed back until Viktor Orbán lost reelection in 2026. Later that year, when the AfD (far right) group won in a region of the state of Germany, the state’s chancellor publicly voiced concern regarding the group’s attitude toward democracy. Viewing the governor as the bastion of constraint on such a trend ignores the E.U. entirely and treats Germany as still fully sovereign rather than being a state in the federal Union, which also has authority to protect democracy even if that authority was shown to be too weak with regard to Orbán’s rule in Hungary.

The full essay is at "The AfD Group Surges."

A State Represents the E.U. at the G20

From August 29 through September 1, 2026, the G20 met in North Carolina in the U.S.; the E.U. was represented by one of its states, Ireland, because it was charged with chairing the sessions of the European Council of Ministers, which in turn plays a legislative role, as does the European Parliament, whereas the European Commission is the E.U.’s executive branch. Such international meetings as those of the G20 are attended by officials from executive rather than legislative branches of government. Accordingly, the economy commissioner, Valdis Dombrovskis, along with President von der Leyen should have been representing the E.U. at the meeting.

The full essay is at "A State Represents the E.U. at the G20."

European Priorities Regarding Ukraine

On 5 August, 2026, President Von der Leyen of the E.U. “announced that €1.4 billion in profits from immobilised Russian assets [held in the E.U. would] be allocated after Russia’s deadly strikes on Kyiv.”[1] This response sounds well and good, especially as Ukraine had failed to shoot down all of the missiles and thus was in vital need of American anti-missile weaponry. Yet in spite of this strategic vulnerability, “only €70 million” of the €1.4 billion would be “directed toward military assistance.” The lion’s share of the profits would “be used to repay G7 and EU loans.”[2] In other words, the E.U. Commission was seeing to it that almost all of the profits from Russian assets would go to creditors outside of Ukraine in the E.U. and elsewhere. Because Russia had been serially lobing missiles on civilian targets such as apartment buildings in Ukraine with overwhelming success, and, moreover, occupied at least 20 percent of Ukraine in the east at the time, the Commission’s decision to pay off loans rather than keep them outstanding so much more money than €70 million could be directed to Ukraine’s military defenses. Both ethically and geopolitically, getting the lent money back especially to creditors in the E.U. right away is problematic.

The full essay is at "European Priorities Regarding Ukraine."

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “EU Releases €1.4 Billion to Ukraine from Frozen Russian Asset Profits after Kyiv Attacks,” Euronews.com, 5 August, 2026.
2. Ibid.

The European Civil Protection Pool: Insufficient for the E.U.'s Civil Protection Mechanism

The European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP) was established in 2013 to provide emergency response personnel and equipment to combat natural and man-made disasters in Europe. The Pool is the central component of the E.U. Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). However, the ECPP depends on voluntary contributions from the state governments and even extends beyond the E.U. to include ten European sovereign states. The reliance on voluntary contributions, as well as the distended coverage beyond the E.U. have a weakening impact on the ability of the European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, to respond to raging forest fires, as were out of control in several southern states during the summer of 2026. Heat-wave after heat-wave plus decades of those states allowing deadwood to accumulate in the forests (the same error had also exacerbated the massive 1988 fire in Yellowstone and Grand Teton parks in Wyoming) provided a “perfect storm” for raging fires by July. Even the Commission’s emphasis on prevention had not been enough, given the reliance on the states, literally to have enough brush and dead trees culled prior to the hot summer. I contend that the Commission having to rely on the states (and even ten other countries!) to contribute personnel and equipment in the ECPP program, which is in line with the Commission’s typical coordinative approach, is out of step with the E.U.’s actual federal system of dual sovereignty because a mere coordinating role fits what Althusius, in his 1603 text, Political Digest, calls non-plena foedus (non-full federalism: all governmental sovereignty is at the state level).

The full essay is at "The European Civil Protection Pool."

Should the E.U. Pay Prospective States to Reform?

Should the European Union pay prospective, or “candidate,” states to undergo legislative, rule-of-law reforms prior to accession even though becoming a state is not assured? In April, 2026, Marta Kos, the Commission’s commissioner for enlargement warned the E.U.’s parliament that the Commission might “suspect €1.5 billion in E.U. funding for Serbia due to rule-of-law concerns and contentious judicial reforms” that had been introduced in Serbia’s legislature in January.”[1] I contend that the legislative or constitutional proposals should have been sufficient to freeze the very question of Serbia’s accession, and that the Commission should not pay candidate states to undergo reforms in the first place.

 
The full essay is at "Should the E.U. Pay Prospectve States to Reform?"

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “E.U. Considers Freezing Serbia’s €1.5 billion in E.U. Funds Amid Rule of Law Scrutiny,” Euronews.com, April 20, 2026.

E.U. Statehood for Sovereign Countries

Even as the E.U. struggled to come up with foreign policies on Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran in March, 2026, the union must have been cogent enough then for the Icelandic government to set a date at the end of the summer to have a referendum on whether to seek statehood. The term for this is accession, not merger, for an empire-scale union such as the U.S. or E.U. contains semi-sovereign states rather than co-scale and co-equal “partners.” By implication, to liken a state in one such union to another entire union is to make a category mistake that can be thought of in historical terms as making the claim that a kingdom is equivalent to an empire (of kingdoms). Both the E.U. and U.S. are federations composed of early-modern scale kingdoms and republics.[1] This is not so in the cases of Mexico and Canada. In fact, the U.S. has an open invitation for Canada’s accession (rather than merger).[2] People who presume that it was arrogant for the U.S. founders to invite Canada to accede as a state forget that the U.S. was formed by sovereign countries that became semi-sovereign states.

The full essay is at "E.U. Statehood for Sovereign Countries."

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1. See Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon, 2017)
2. Because Canada has expanded West since the 18^th century, Canada would most likely accede as three or four U.S. states rather than just one.

The European Commission: An Aggregate of the States?

The European Union’s governmental institutions are not limited to the European Council and the Council of Ministers, both of which represent the state governments directly at the federal level. Nor, moreover, is the E.U. an aggregation of its states. In foreign affairs, for example, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, can speak and take decisions on the basis of consensus rather than the unanimous consent of state-level officials being required. Therefore, the Von der Leyen administration did not overreach in taking the “decision to send the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Suica, as an observer to the first former gathering of the United States President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace” on 19 February, 2026.[1] That Suica was merely an observer suggests that the objecting state officials were overreacting as well as misconstruing the E.U. as a confederation of sovereign states.

The full essay is at "The European Commission."

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1,  Mared G. Jones, “France Says Commission Lacks ‘Mandate’ to Join Board of Peace Meeting as Brussels Remains Defiant,” Euronews.com, 19 February 2026.

The ECJ Castigates the Commission for Paying Off Hungary

In an opinion submitted to the European Court of Justice, which tends to follow the legal opinions the 11 Advocates General, Tamara Capeta recommended in February, 2026 to the Court that it “should annul the European Commission’s 2023 decision to disburse €10.2 billion” to the E.U. state of Hungary.[1] Capeta found that the state government had not sufficiently addressed “concerns over systemic corruption and rule of law violations” to qualify for the payment.[2] That the Commission released the payment nonetheless points to corruption at the federal level—in its executive branch in particular—and this charge against the Von der Leyen administration renders the charge against the Hungarian government rather ironic. Rule of law should apply (and be respected!) at both the federal and state levels for the E.U. to continue to be viable. This applies especially to the Commission, as it is tasked with enforcing E.U. laws, directives, and regulations as well as treaty obligations that the EU, including its state governments, have to other countries, whether they are federal unions (e.g., the U.S.) or independent states.  

The full essay is at "The ECJ Castigates the Commission for Paying Off Hungary."

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “E.U. Court Challenges Controversial €10.2bn Payment to Hungary,” Euronews.com, February 12, 2026.
2. Ibid.

A Big-State Governor Usurps the Role of the European Council's President

The governor of a large state, if speaking for the E.U., risks not only undercutting federal officials who can speak for the E.U., but also subtly orienting federal policy in the interest of that state rather than the entire union. It is important, therefore, that the president of the European Council be tasked with speaking publicly for the Council, rather than usurped.

The full essay is at "Big States in the European Council."

Homelessness in the E.U.: Rectifying a Right

In late 2025, the E.U. Commission presented its first European Affordable Housing Plan. The E.U.’s involvement in “social housing,” which translates into federal funds being used to provide housing beyond homeless shelters for people who cannot afford to house themselves, implies that the programs of the states had been insufficient. The U.S. could take a lesson from the Commission’s plan, which is cleverly multi-pronged in tackling the societal problem. Both in the E.U. and U.S., both federal and state funds were needed even in 2025 when neither economy was in recession. It is better to increase the supply of affordable housing when times are good than when unemployment is soaring. This is an exception in the E.U. to the usual pattern wherein the E.U. increases its competencies, or enumerated powers, in periods of one crisis or another. Russia’s multi-year invasion of Ukraine, which borders the E.U., and the Union’s foreign and defense activity demonstrate how European integration has typically been enhanced by crisis rather than when times are good.

The full essay is at "Homelessness in the E.U."

On the E.U.’s Mercosur Deal: State Obstructionism

After 25 years negotiating with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the E.U.’s Commission sought to secure passage of the massive trade-deal in the European Council and the Parliament by the end of 2025. Even though the vote is by qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity in both chambers, one state that was against the treaty sought to delay the vote in the Council, which represents states rather than E.U. citizens. The Commission rightly pushed back on the tactic because for one state in opposition to be able to put off a vote is tantamount to having a veto, which a mechanism only for E.U. competencies that are subject to unanimous approval in the Council.

The full essay is at "On the E.U.'s Mercosur Deal."

The E.U.: A Political Union

As if having elected representatives and political parties in the European Parliament were not enough evidence that the E.U. has been a political union all along, the distinctly political role of the E.U. with regard to Ukraine amid the Russian invasion renders the E.U. political not merely institutionally in regard to representative democracy, which is a political rather than an economic system. Also, that the European Commission has exclusive competency on trade does not eclipse the union’s distinctly political activity. That the E.U. agreed to move forward informally with Ukraine’s accession request even though the state of Hungary was formally vetoing the accession demonstrates a political function or role of the European Union.

The full essay is at "The E.U."

A Drone Wall for the E.U.: Russian Aggression Assuages Euroskeptic States

Speaking after his meeting with U.S. President Trump in Alaska during the summer of 2025, Russia’s President Putin said that if no agreement is reached with Ukraine, the force of arms would decide the matter. In other words, might makes right, or at least military incursion is a legitimate way to decide political disputes between countries. I would have hoped that such a primitive mentality would be antiquated in the twentieth century, but, alas, human nature evolves only at a glacial pace undetected within the lifespan of a human being. In September, 2025, the United Nations was under attack from within the General Assembly because of the continuance of the veto held by five countries in the Security Council; the U.S. had just vetoed a resolution for an immediate cession of Israeli destruction in Gaza. As a former deputy secretary of the UN had admitted to me during the fall of 2024, the veto itself renders the UN unreformable; a new international organization would have to be established sans vetoes for efficacy to be possible. Even so, absent a real enforcement mechanism, such as a military force, a resolution even of a vetoless organization would merely be parchment. The impotence of the UN is one reason why NATO, a defensive military transatlantic alliance, has been valuable in the face of military threats by Russia. Yet in September 2025, after Russian drones had flown into four E.U. states, E.U. President Von der Leyen felt the need to take the lead by again stressing her proposal for a drone wall along the E.U.’s eastern border; she was not deferring to any international alliance, much less to the United Nations. I submit that Von der Leyen’s initiative is yet another means by which the E.U. can be distinguished from international “blocs,” alliances, and organizations. Unlike the latter three, the E.U. has exclusive competencies and is thus semi-sovereign (and the same goes for the state governments).

The full essay is at "A Drone Wall for the E.U."

The E.U.’s Proposed Sanctions Against Israel: Excessive Reliance on the State Governments

To leverage the combined power, or united front, that is possible in Europe, the European Union was established in the waning years of the twentieth century. Roughly thirty years later, the power of the state governments at the federal level still compromised the leverage, especially in foreign affairs and defense. Even in sanctioning trading partners, even qualified majority voting in the Council of the E.U. can be said to have negatively impacted the ability of the E.U. Commission, the executive branch, to leverage the political muscle of the E.U. against other countries. State-level political agendas could essentially hold any possible leverage hostage. It may be worth thinking about why a qualified majority vote in the Council of the E.U., which represents the state governments, rather than in the E.U.’s parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, was necessary for trade sanctions to be applied to duty-free imports from Israel. That state-level political or economic interests could possibility trump applying economic leverage to stop Israel’s genocide and holocaust in Gaza, as well as Israel’s military attacks on other countries in the Middle East can be an indication that the state governments have too much power at the federal level. For if the E.U. is only an aggregation of states, without the whole being more than the sum of the parts, then the whole sans the aggregate cannot very well enact leverage on foreign actors abroad, even those whose behavior has been nothing short of atrocious.

The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Proposed Sanctions Against Israel."

A European Army: A More Perfect Union

At the Munich Security Conference in February, 2025, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy bluntly asserted, “I really believe that the time has come that the armed forces of Europe must be created.”[1] He could have said in 2023 after Russia’s President Putin had sent tanks and bombs into Ukraine; instead, the inauguration of President Trump in the U.S. that was the trigger. “Let’s be honest,” Zelenskyy continued, “now we can’t rule out that America might say ‘no’ to Europe on issues that might threaten it.”[2] At the time, Trump was planning to meet with Putin to end the war without Britain and a number of E.U. states at the table. After all, they had failed to push Putin off Crimea in 2014, and even in 2025, they were not on the same page on how to defend Ukraine militarily. Amid the political fracturing in Europe, Ukraine’s president was urging that the E.U. itself have an army, rather than merely the 60,000 troops for which the union was dependent on the states. Even on being able to borrow on its own authority, the E.U. was hamstrung by the state governments that were more interested in retaining power than in benefitting from collective action. It is difficult to analyze Zelenskyy’s plea without including the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology that was still eclipsing the E.U. from realizing a more perfect union.

 

The full essay is at "A European Army."

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1. Joshua Posaner, “Zelenskyy: ‘The Time Has Come’ for a European Army,” Politico, February 15, 2025.

2. Ibid.

Hungary’s Delusion of Sovereignty

On October 3, 2024, The European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, filed a legal complaint against the E.U. state of Hungary with the E.U.’s judicial branch—the high court of which being the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Commission had won a case against the state and recently subtracted the amount of fine issued by the court from the federal money set to go to the state because the Hungarian government was refusing to recognize the verdict. Like Britain before it had seceded from the Union, Hungary was operating under the incorrect premise that it still enjoyed full sovereignty even though every state delegates some of its governmental sovereignty to the Union in becoming a state thereof. In the case of Hungary, the state law at issue in 2024 had in its very name the fundamental problem out of which the state’s disputes with the E.U. were emanating.

The full essay is at "Hungary's Delusion of Soveriegnty."

The European Union Is Not a Trading Bloc

The European Union can be distinguished fundamentally from the previous European Economic Community in several ways, just as the Articles of Confederation can be distinguished on a fundamental level politically from the U.S. Constitution. Both Europe and America have made a qualitative jump, rather than merely as a matter of degree or further extent. In both cases, politically speaking, governmental sovereignty has been split between a union and state governments. Furthermore, in both cases, the domains of power being handled at the federal level have increased. In the case of the U.S., the coverage of the federal level has expanded well beyond Washington’s Continental Army. In the case of the E.U. even by 2024, the coverage had come to extend well beyond a common market and trade policy to include non-economic domains of power, or competencies, too. In this regard, the E.U.'s federal level resembles a government.

The full essay is at "The E.U.: Not a Trading Bloc."

Differentiating the European Council and Parliament: Meloni of Italy

At the federal level of the E.U., the European Council, like the Senate in the U.S., represents the states, whereas the European Parliament, like the U.S. House of Representatives, represents citizens—that’s right, E.U. citizens. The theory behind this difference is a modification of traditional federalism theory, wherein only the polities in a federation are represented at the federal level. In this traditional way of doing federalism, individuals, or citizens, belong only to the first level of political organization. Althusius’s Political Digest (1603) describes that theory, borrowing a lot from the example of the Holy Roman Empire. The advent of both polities and federal citizens being directly represented at a federal level was born out of compromise during the American Constitutional Convention in 1787. The E.U. replicated the structure, wherein the state governments and E.U. citizens (or legal residents) each have their own channel of access to affect federal law and policy on the federal level. For one of the two to cross over and eclipse the other in its own channel is suboptimal because both vantage points contribute to sound federal law in a way that enables them to protect their respective interests, which are not identical. It is thus not appropriate for a state government, including its governor or head of state, to direct members of Parliament how to vote on a given bill, whether their districts are within or outside of the state.

The full essay is at "Meloni: Differentiate the European Council and Parliament."

On the European Commission Boycotting Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the E.U.

Whereas just one presidency applies to the U.S. at the federal level, the E.U. has several. There is a president of the European Commission, a president of the European Parliament, a president of the European Council, and a president of the Council of the E.U., the latter being held by a state government on a six-month rotating basis. On July 1, 2024, the E.U. state of Hungary assumed that role. Because that state’s government had recently been found guilty by the E.U.’s top court, the E.C.J., of blocking federal law within the state, the matter of Hungary taking its turn in chairing the Council of the E.U. was controversial at the time. Because Viktor Orbán, governor of Hungary, used the insignia of the presidency of the Council in making unauthorized diplomatic trips to Russia and China on the war in Ukraine, the European Commission, the E.U. government’s executive branch, took the unusual decision to boycott Hungary’s presidency. Shortly thereafter, the E.U.'s parliament followed suit with a resolution condemning Orbán's diplomatic trip to Moscow. I contend that Orbán’s foray into diplomatic relations even as he was taking on a major role at the federal level presents good evidence for why foreign policy should be federalized in the E.U. as it has been in the U.S., and for the same reason.

The full essay is at "On the E.U. Commission's Boycott of Hungary."