That severe, systematic inflictions
of suffering on whole peoples were going on in the world even on Christmas Day
in 2025 did not require a papal announcement for people the world over to be
informed of those atrocities. Russia’s military incursion in Ukraine and Israel’s
genocide in Gaza had been going on with international impunity for years. The
suffering in Yemen and Sudan was less well-known, but substantial nonetheless. Speaking out against the sordid state-aggressors
on the first Christmas of his pontificate, the pope provided an alternative
basis for international relations that is so antithetical to military invasion
and genocide that the message could seem utopian and thus practically of no use
whatsoever. Because “might makes right” had made such unimpeded “progress” even
in becoming the default and status-quo, the principle of humble compassion to
the humanity to one’s detractors and even outright enemies could seem like a fairy
tale.
As American, Ukrainian, and
Russian negotiating delegations were flying around the world in early December,
2025 to conduct various negotiating sessions, all the while without the presidents
of Russia and Ukraine meeting, it was difficult for bystanders to keep an eye
on the proverbial ball as it was being kicked around by offers and
counter-offers, and complicated by the high-profiled presence of the
businessman, Jared Kushner, who happened to be married to one of U.S. President
Trump’s daughters. Kushner was also highly visible in the negotiations on Gaza,
which almost certainly included real-estate development. To be sure, commercial
and investment deals can easily remain subterranean while the public discourse
stays on the political relations between nations, and even just the latter may
lack transparency. Democratic accountability in democratic republics as
concerning the conduct and results of foreign policy can be difficult. Especially
difficult to gauge was the hand being closely held by Russia’s President Putin.
I contend that his willingness to negotiate was consistently overestimated by
the West and Ukraine.
Arkady
Rotenberg, a former judo coach, became a billionaire industrialist by selling
pipe to the state-owned gas monopoly, Gazprom. Meanwhile, owning a minority
state in a small bank in St. Petersburg that won control of another of Gazprom
subsidiaries, Yuri Kovalchuk gained a net worth of $1.5 billion. Gennady
Timchenko, “once the little-known sales manager of a local oil refinery,” went
on to become one of the richest men in the world by co-owning “a commodity
trading company that moves about $70 billion of crude oil a year, much of it
through major contracts with Rosneft, the Russian national oil company.” What
these billionaires shared besides getting rich was a certain connection—namely
to Vladimir Putin.
Vladimir Putin arrives for a campaign rally in Moscow. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
On December 31, 2010, a Russian judge sentenced Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian tycoon who had been imprisoned in 2003 after defying Vladimir Putin, to an additional six years in prison. According to The New York Times, "It was a politically tinged decision that undermined President Dmitri Medvodev."[1] Leonid Goman of the Right Cause Party in Russia agreed. "It was obviously a political, not a judicial, decision." He went on to say that in general terms, "corruption is endemic, government power is often abused and senior politicians are rarely, if ever, held accountable for misdeeds."[2] Clearly, Prime Minister Putin was still very much in control in Russia. His message was that wealthy businessmen should not interfere in Russian politics. What a contrast to American politics, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court's Citizens United case! Khodorkovsky was at one time the richest person in Russia, having been one of the oligarchs who bought government assets at bargain prices after the fall of the USSR, but he financed opposition parties in a political system that was anything but democratic.
While visiting the Pskovo-Pechersky
Monastery in northwestern Russia in 2000, Vladimir Putin wrote in the guest
book, “The revival of Russia and growth of its might are unthinkable without
the strengthening of society’s moral foundations. The role and significance of
the Russian Orthodox Church are huge. May God protect you.” This statement is
revealing concerning what has perhaps fueled the Russian president’s vision, at
least ideally.
Archimandrite Tikhon Shevkunov, head of the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow NYT
At the conclusion of the 2012 Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation meeting in Russia, the host president, Vladimir Putin,
likened the birds that had not following his motorized glider south to the
Russians who did not follow him. “Only the weak ones,” he quipped. “The weak
ones didn’t follow me.” Elaborating, he added, “not all of the cranes flew, and
the leader, the pilot, has to be blamed because he was too fast in gaining
speed and altitude and they were just lagging behind; they couldn’t catch up.”
In other words, the Russian protesters had been blaming him for what was in
actuality their own weakness—not his. A leader must accept the inevitable misappropriation
of blame because being erroneously blamed goes with being a leader.
Putin could not have been entirely objective on the protests against him.
United Russia, the party led by Prime Minister Putin, decided in August, 2010 not to submit the name of the governor of Kaliningrad, Georgy V. Boos, for reappointment. The decision appeared to put pressure on governors to do more to ensure the satisfaction of those they govern, or to at least keep a lid on dissent. Governors had been popularly elected in Russia until a 2004 decree by Mr. Putin, then Russia’s president, that gave the president responsibility for appointing them. In that decree, the president is to select governors from a list of candidates drawn up by the governing party. Critics have said that the practice has made governors beholden to the Kremlin and insensitive to the popular sentiments. This can be problematic on two grounds.
In political economy theory, democracy is said to have the drawback of excessive consumption of public revenues at the expense of investment, such as in infrastructure relevant to foreign direct investment. Latin American countries were contrasted negatively with the Asian newly industrialized economies, whose relatively strong states could buffer popular calls for more in entitlements so that more could be invested in infrastructure attractive to foreign multinational companies. The implication is that a trade-off exists between democracy and economic development.
Apart from the economic aspects, the question may be whether a representative government can resist popular calls for more money to be spent by the government on popular consumption. In the U.S. case, it can be asked whether the fiscal stresses on Social Security and Medicare are due more to demographic factors (i.e., an aging population) or democracy itself. The ability of representative democracy to maintain a viable economy and republic in the long term is at issue.
Accordingly, Putin’s less than democratic approach to ruling Russia may have a bright side. Even though nearly 40% of the population smoked in 2012 and the world’s four big tobacco companies controlled 90% of the Russian market, the Kremlin was pushing strong anti-smoking legislation through the legislature. Besides the question of whether such legislation should be at that level in an empire-level federal system (there had been legislation at the republic level), the fact that the government was standing up to big business and 40 percent of its population (60% of Russian men) can be attributed to a strong state resisting popular pressure literally for consumption. This is not necessarily bad, as people do not always know what is best for them.
The Russian state-owned company,
Rosneft, reached separate agreements in October 2012 to buy TNK-BP from BP and
a group of Russian billionaires. According to the Wall Street Journal, the deal represents “an acquisition that
promises to reshape the Russian oil industry in favor of the state-owned
company.” The Russian federal government was set to own or control nearly 50%
of the Russian oil industry. Lest it be supposed that the legacy of inefficient
state enterprise might compromise that industry in Russia, the state would have
the benefit of literally sitting on the same board with representatives of the
experienced oil producer from the private sector. By implication, the
traditional dichotomy between public and private could be further blurred, such
that the easy labels of “socialism” and “capitalism” may become less and less
relevant or useful (except in the rhetoric of American presidential contests). Rosneft
itself is a case in point of privateness and
publicness coming together with a
shared vocabulary or at least financial aim. Before addressing this point, I
present the basics of the deal itself.
Robert Dudley, CEO of BP, talking with Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin. Source: Telegraph
In
the wake of yet another Syrian massacre of civilians, including families being
shot at close-range in their own houses, the New York Times published a report in 2012 that claimed that Russian priests and theologians commiserated with diplomats
from Damascus at the opening of an exhibition devoted to Syrian Christianity in
a cathedral near the Kremlin. While it is understandable that the Kremlin would
not want to lose its “longtime partner and last firm foothold in the Middle
East,” it is perhaps less palatable for Christian prelates and doctors of the
Russian Orthodox Church to essentially look the other way on atrocities so the
Syrian Christians, many of whom are Orthodox, won’t be pushed under the bus in
a wave of Islamic fundamentalism that could be unleashed should Assad fall from
power. The Syrian Christians were reluctant to join the Sunni Muslim opposition
to Assad for fear of being persecuted by the Sunnis should they gain power.
At a joint EU-US news-conference on 26 March 2014,
Presidents Barroso, Van Rompuy, and Obama discussed the problematic Russian
invasion of the Crimea province of Ukraine.
The “chairman” of the European Council and the “chief executive” of the
European Commission both responded to concerns that the European Union had not
stood up to its business interests in order to enact economic sanctions
capable of putting Putin back in his pen. Even though the two EU presidents sought to "puff up" the force latent in the sanctions already in place, Barroso insightfully made the more significant point that invading parties just aren't done in the new century. In this essay, my task is to sideline the debate over whether the EU had not stood up to its domestic commercial interests in favor of Barroso's much more significant point concerning a paradigm shift whose time of recognition has come in the new millennium. (The remainder of this essay is now at the International Relations section of The Worden Report)
In the weeks leading us to watch the
Olympics, I suspect I was not alone in thinking, “I just don't like what I see
here." Why wasI resisting paying even scant attention to the pre-Olympics "coverage" (a.k.a. advertising) as NBC, the American broadcast network covering the games, was getting rather publicly revved up on the upcoming media event. In this essay, I briefly survey the external stimuli, leaving the self-analysis to the analyst’s couch.[1]
First, as the American press reported
before NBC began promoting the games in earnest (hmm), there is the “whole gay
thing” and Putin. I really think that's a non-issue with regard to the Olympics,
given the uniqueness of the Olympic Village. I would not be surprised were the
Russian police of the mind that “What goes on in Vegas stays in Vegas,” at
least as far as vacations are concerned.
Now, the "not fit for primetime
viewing" conditions of some of the hotels putting up the foreign press
strikes me as more substantive because of the implicit and likely even explicit
rudeness does not go down well, even at a distance. Relatedly, I suspect, the
sheer amount of money "padded" into the construction projects, including
hotel construction, for kick-backs undoubtedly directed to Putin's major
political supporters eviscerates any possible excuse in the tardiness.
In fact, associating Putin at all with the
Olympics comes off to me like associating liver with dinner; I instinctively
spit out immediately any hint of liver-taste. I must admit I am glad the U.S.
State Department put out a travel warning for Americans going to the games. I
was also amused to read of the low numbers of non-Russians arriving from abroad
in Sochi as of the first day of games.[2]
Of course, the modern Olympics hinges on the broadcasts around the world, rather
than attendance numbers.
Even though NBC's studio in the Olympic Village is transparent, the network's tactics may be anything but. (Image Source: David Johnson)
Interestingly, as part of its rather
obvious devices to remind/manipulate its general viewership to watch the
approaching games (including inserting reporters live from Sochi into CNBC's
coverage of the financial markets), NBC strategists may actually have been
fomenting the security story in order to draw viewers' attention to the fact
that the games would soon begin. Stirring up fear and the hope of visual
voyeurism of others’ tragedies is a sure bet for news reporting as advertising. However, overdoing it can be counterproductive
if too much of the ploy is visible on the surface as a duplicitous, otherwise stealth
agenda. Yearning to turn the subtropical town on the Black Sea into an
international resort, Putin could not have been very happy about the coverage,
though may have realized the importance of a huge broadcast viewership even for
himself, not to mention covering some of the kick-backs.
Finally, starting particular events
including skating the day before the
OPENING ceremony may stand out among the various points of smoke above in being
indicative of fire skipping fire lines below. Even though Chris Chase of USA Today concludes “it’s a small price
to pay for the overall improvement of the Winter Games,” he admits “it still
feels strange to start the Olympics before the Olympics technically start.”[3]
In the film, Inglourious Basterds,
Lt. Aldo Raine wryly clarifies the matter of something seeming odd (or strange).
“Yeah, we got a word for that in
English. It’s called suspicious.”
In spite of his conclusion (i.e., small price to pay), Chase provides a credible case for suspicion. “Television rules all." he states up front as if it were a natural law. "Adding another day
of Olympic competition means adding another day of Olympic telecasts. Thursday
is traditionally one of the biggest television nights (along with Sunday). With
all the money being paid to cover the games by networks across the world,
turning 17 days of Olympic coverage into 18 days is a nice bonus.”[4]
Regarding the addition of a program of skating, Chase points to a five day
interim within the two weeks without any skating scheduled.
In closing, I must let the philosopher in
me have a few words (no philosopher ever has just a few words, so please take a bathroom break if you need to). From sheer logic, to begin something before it has begun
is a blatant contradiction. As per his categorical imperative, Kant would call
the practice unethical. Were everyone to adopt the maxim, “I will start
activities before the start time,” it would not make sense to have a start time
for anything. The maxim is thus self-contradictory if it (like reason itself)
is universalized.
Hume would point out that Kant relies too
much on logic and reason more generally in assessing whether a given practice
is ethical. A person reading U.N.’s condemnation of the Vatican in February
2014 for having been more concerned
about the reputation of the Church as a whole than children’s welfare—a priority
that Rev. Joe Ratzinger, or Benedict XVI, put in a letter while archbishop of
Munich—may think through the theological implications of priests covering for
each other. However, the sentiment of disapprobation (think of my expression as
I spit out odious liver) is likely, excepting sociopaths, to be the principal
reaction. Emotive rather than of Reason.
When I read of the sports beginning a day before the opening ceremony, I felt a
sentiment of disapprobation well up inside me. Because I had been feeling that
something just isn’t right about the upcoming games, especially from an vague
intuitive sense of NBC’s manipulative tactics as over-reaching at best, I suspected that the rather odd placement
of some events before the ceremony also came from the mentality that wants
incessantly to squeeze out a few more drops of lemon juice from lemon that has
already shed enough. The sight of this childish demeanor in action is
enough for any non-manipulative person to resist going where the manipulations
point.
[1] I
have in mind here Nietzsche’s thesis that reasoning is really a person’s instinctual
urges tussling for dominance—that which overcomes the others (here as
obstacles) reaches the surface of consciousness as an idea. I do think about
this point regarding philosophy (and particular philosophical systems) in
general and how my own psychological background fuels or is otherwise expressed
in the ideas and related theories I “intuit” and “create.”
The “Arab
Spring” of 2011 might have given the world an over-optimistic notion of what
political protest can engender in terms of “regime change.” A year later, the
Egyptian military was still in control, which suggests that removing one
particular dictator had constituted real change. In Myanmar, soldiers still
dominated the parliament even after the opposition party won a landslide
victory in by-elections in March 2012. Meanwhile, Assad in Syria was getting
away with teaching the protesters in his country a bloody lesson while both the
Arab League and the UN looked on. Meanwhile, Putin viewed his fraudulent presidential
election victory as a mandate to deal more severely with the Russian
protesters. The notion that a brave new world of democracy had somehow sprung
to life in the Arab Spring suffered an cold snap of sorts from the cold winds
of real politik. I suspect that real change happens more incrementally, and
from the bottom up. This was evident in Russia in March, 2012.
In a move to shore up popular support
before the presidential election in 2012, Vladimir Putin called for a windfall
levy on the dishonest privatisations of the 1990s. “We need to close the
problems of the 1990s, of what, speaking honestly, was dishonest privatisation,”
he told tycoons meeting at a congress of Russia’s big business lobby. He went
on to say, “We need to establish the social legitimacy of private property
itself and social confidence in business.”[1] The implication is that just
acquisition is requisite to private property being recognized as legitimate,
societally.
