Strengthening the E.U.’s Border Competency: Implications for Federalism

In politics, it’s not a bad idea to consider the impact on the system of government in formulating, voting on, and enacting laws and regulations. It is not enough to make sure that relationships with political donors are not impaired. Nor, in a federal system, is it enough to look at the implications regarding either the state or the federal level. I contend that the implications for the federal system itself should be formally and informally considered. In the context of the E.U.’s difficulty with securing its borders even after facing unprecedented migrants entering by boat or even walking in the early 2020s, it is understandable that representatives elected by E.U. citizens and sitting in the European Parliament would try to shore up a federal response, given that in the last quarter of 2024, some state officials took action at state borders in violation of E.U. law. Undercutting federal rule-of-law is a good way to trigger a collapse of a federal system, especially one that had only existed for decades rather than centuries.

The full essay is at "Strengthening the E.U.'s Border."

American Federalism: The Case of Coronavirus

On March 22, 2020, during a press conference on the coronavirus, U.S. Vice President Pence claimed that the United States is unique in that it has a federal system of public governance. He overlooked the equivalent case of the European Union even as he stressed an idea that is the European federal principle of subsidiarity, which means that decisions and actions that can be taken locally are to be done locally. The state level is next, followed by the federal level. The theory behind this principle is that cultural, political, economic, and social diversity that exists from state to state, especially in an empire-scale federal system such as the E.U. and U.S., means that one-size-fits-all federal-level decisions may not be effective everywhere. Pence’s point was that the federal government would be playing a supportive role so the States get what they need, rather than playing a pivotal role with the States and localities as instruments of implementation. I contend that relative to the European Union, the United States was at the time much less equipped to apply the principle of subsidiarity to the coronavirus pandemic.

The full essay is at "Federalism and the Coronavirus."

The E.U.’s Border-Control and Coast Guard: Held Hostage by Confederalism

In policing its borders as late as 2016, the E.U. suffered the same plight as the U.S. did under its Articles of Confederation—only whereas in the case of the U.S. the States retained all of their governmental sovereignty under the Articles, some governmental sovereignty in the E.U. was already lodged at the federal level. I contend that this perplexing disjunction between extant federal competencies and state rights in the E.U. is not sustainable.

The full essay is at "E.U.'s Border-Control."

Migrants Overwhelming Europe: Unfairness Impeding the E.U.

More than 100,000 migrants, many of them refugees from conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, entered Hungary from January to August 2015, the vast majority en route to the more affluent northwestern E.U. states. A record 50,000, many of them Syrians, reached Greece by boat from Turkey in July alone. Meanwhile, Hungary was building a fence along the state’s border with Serbia, where 8,000 migrants were staying in parks, to keep more migrants from entering.[1] I contend that the disproportionate power of the state governments relative to that of the federal government accounts in part for the difficulty that the E.U. has faced in coming to grips with the tremendous influx. This case suggests why redressing the imbalance in the federal system has been plagued with difficulty.

The complete essay is at “Migrants Overwhelming Europe.” 

Police disperse migrants at a registration place in Kos, Greece. Should the E.U. leave it to the state governments to handle the crisis? (Yorgos Karahalis/AP)