On the E.U.’s Complex Federal System

Because the “the EU is built on consensus at 27” states,[1] by 2026 it had become painfully obvious to Europe’s elite that its Union had come to harbor a great disadvantage in terms of united or collective action because political consensus can be elusive even at 27 states, each of which could result to a veto on reforms at the federal level, with enlargement of the Union from 27 on the horizon. Something had to be done, given the intransigence of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Direct access of the state governments at the federal level could stave off too much federal encroachment on the prerogatives of the state governments, but the costs associated with this safeguard were becoming too high. Therefore, in February, 2026, E.U. state and federal officials met to give added weight to something called “two-track Europe.” In actuality, there were already more than two tracks in the European Union. Although complex, the means of releasing the Union from the high bar needed to achieve unanimity or even consensus among the several states could well save the Union from the paralysis of division. The outdated premise that united action should only be allowed when there is no division had become too utopian for federal Europe. Multiple-speed Europe in the E.U. is actually more in line with the E.U.’s federal system already being genuine.

The full essay is at "On the E.U.'s Complex Federal System."

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Leaders Embrace Two-Speed Europe to Break Impasse as Macron Sets June Deadline for Economic Reset,” Euronews.com, February 12, 2026.

The E.U.’s Borders Held Hostage by the State Veto

With E.U. states like Germany, Austria and Poland becoming increasingly active in patrolling their respective borders at the expense of the Schengen Agreement, it makes sense that the proposed E.U. budget announced in July, 2025 includes more money to protect the E.U.’s borders from illegal crossings. This is important because reinstituting controls on the borders of states contributes toward the visual of the E.U. coming apart geographically. Such a set-back may be worse for the E.U. than the secession of Britain was; in fact, letting that state go arguably strengthened the Union because the British government consistently refused to admit that the E.U. is more than a network of countries that the UK happened to belong to, which was the view of the former governor, David Cameron.

The full essay is at "The E.U.'s Borders Held Hostage by the State Veto."

Great Lakes Water in the U.S.: Treating a Union as a State

Squabbling amongst states in a federal system may be an inherent feature of federalism. How much the jealousies and petty interests manifest in terms of policies may depend on the balance of power between the federation itself and its member-states. In the case of the E.U., the spat at the state level over how to allocate the tens of thousands of refugees from the Middle East and Northern Africa effectively stymied federal action that could have assuaged the angst. It is no accident that the state governments hold most of the governmental sovereignty in the E.U. federal system. By contrast, the case of the U.S. demonstrates that nearly consolidated power at a federal level can obviate, or stifle, strife between state governments. This alternative is not optimal either, for interstate differences tend to be ignored, resulting in increasing pressure on the federal system itself. How to handle municipal requests for drinking water from Lake Michigan is a case in point.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Why the E.U. is Compromised in Handling the Refugee Crisis

At least four E.U. states, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, rejected a federal plan on September 11, 2015 that would have imposed refugee quotas on the states. The failure to come up with a fair allocation of migrants by state threatened to undo the borderless travel within the E.U. The tremendous influx of mostly Syrian refugees exacerbated differences between the states; given their power even at the federal level of the E.U., the infighting was a risk to the viability of the E.U. itself. I contend that structural flaws in the E.U. itself unnecessarily compromised the Union from quashing the risk to itself by solving the refugee problem. The state governments were clearly not in unison in dealing with the problem themselves.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Refugees held up in Hungary because the state's government was overwhelmed. Why didn't the E.U. step in to help? (Mauricio Limo/NYT).

The Schengen Agreement: Germany Discriminating Against the Roma?

In the case of the U.S., once someone enters one of the states, that person can move from state to state without having to show a visa or passport. The open borders correspond to the states that are members of the United States. In the case of the E.U., however, the open borders do not necessarily dovetail with the states that are members of the European Union. This presents problems that do not exist in the U.S.

German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich.

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available at Amazon.com