Certifying a U.S. Presidential Election: A Constitutional Conflict of Interest

That it should go without saying that a constitution providing a government with its basic framework and procedures should not contain any conflicts of interest makes it all the more astonishing when an actual constitution is found to contain a obvious yet undetected conflict of interest that could be exploited by an institutional or officeholder and yet is easy to obviate, or fix. The implication in such a case is that a society can be too comfortable with institutional conflicts of interest without realizing that if such a conflict is exploitable, it is likely that it eventually will be even if not right away. Because U.S. President Don Trump’s pressure on his vice president, Mike Pence, on January 6, 2021 to refuse to certify the votes of the electors in some of the states did not result in any serious proposals to have another office than the vice presidency preside, a societal tolerance for even known conflicts of interests in general and in a constitution more particularly can be inferred. I submit that such a tacit willingness to continue with the status quo can eventually put even a republic itself at risk.

The full essay is at "Certifying a U.S. Presidential Election."

The Israeli Supreme Court’s Conflict of Interest as Unreasonable

Ironically, in making the ruling on New Year’s Day of 2024 striking down Prime Minister Netanyahu’s amendment to the country’s basic law that would have removed the judiciary’s authority of judicial review of laws based on their reasonableness, Israel’s Supreme Court too unreasonably exploited a conflict of interest. Basic Law, which is essentially constitutional law, includes the basic architecture of a government, such as how the executive, legislative, and judicial functions are related. Self-interest being a salient feature of human nature, we can assume that the governmental functionaries in each of those functions naturally seek to expand their respective jurisdictions relative to those of the other two. I contend that to give one or two of those areas the last word in altering the division of authority involves a conflict of interest. This applies to a constitutional court. Therefore, even though democracy is served by a judicial decision striking down an attempt by the executive and/or legislature to eviscerate the authority of the judiciary to act as a check, giving the latter the last word is fraught with entanglements. 

The full essay is at "Israel's Supreme Court: A Conflict of Interest."

The Colorado Supreme Court Bars Insurrectionist Trump: Who Should Ultimately Decide?

On December 19, 2023, Colorado’s Supreme Court ruled that Don Trump, a former U.S. president, had engaged in insurrectionist activity as a matter of fact, and furthermore, as a matter of law, the U.S. Constitution bars him from holding any office, including the presidency. With an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court a certainty, realized even by the Colorado justices, and some notable (and very visible) Republicans arguing that the American people should have the final say on whether Trump will be president again beginning in 2025, the question of who should have the final say—the judiciary or the people—was pressing, and indeed, very important. I contend that the determination of fact should have been made by a jury in a criminal proceeding, and that even absent that, the ultimate decision should still be made prior to, and thus not during, the election, for the question is whether Trump can be listed as a candidate for the office. Ultimately, the tension lies between the value of a politics-free judiciary and democratic (majority) rule.

The full essay is at "The Colorado Supreme Court Bars Insurrectionist Trump."

The U.S. Supreme Court: Free Speech Trumps Public Accommodations Law

I contend as a matter of reasoned opinion rather than infallible fact that the Free Speech protection in the U.S. Constitution applies to not only human beings, rather than to non-human legal “persons” (e.g., corporations), but also to speech where the purpose is speech rather than something else. I have written elsewhere on the mistake in treating corporations as if they were human beings, so I treat only the second claim here. I reference the first claim only as context for my broader claim that the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to over-extend applications of the free-speech clause not only beyond its original intent, but also common sense. The latter violation is particularly astonishing. 

The full essay is at "Free Speech and Public-Accommodations Law"

American Federalism: Christianity as the Official Religion in North Carolina

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or preventing the free exercise thereof.” Congress. The writers of the First Amendment of the U.S. federal Constitution were obviously excluding the state governments. Even so, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that the amendment applies to the states as well as Congress. From Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court gave us what is known as the Lemon test. State funding for parochial schools (e.g., Catholic schools) must have a secular legislative purpose (e.g., education), neither advance nor inhibit religion in its consequences, and not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Yet the leap in claiming that the amendment bears on the states must deal with the explicit language that “Congress shall make no law.” Even so, it did not seem constitutional to many people in 1913 when the North Carolina legislature tried to make Christianity the republic's official religion. Even so, because the United States is essentially a federal empire of fifty republics, care ought to be taken when applying a one-size-fits-all approach as it does not take into account interstate political, religious, and cultural differences. Much is made of these in the European Union, but not in the United States. 

The full essay is at "Christianity as a State Religion in the U.S." 

On the Role of Partisan Political Ideology in the U.S. Supreme Court

Observing a pattern of sustained ideological proclivities in the decisions of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, The New York Times editorialized in 2011 that the “court cannot maintain its legitimacy as guardian of the rule of law when justices behave like politicians.”[1] One could just as easily say behave like human beings, for juridical interpretation itself contains ample space for an interpreter’s ideology to have a role, especially given human nature that is apt to exploit such leeway. In other words, ideology may be part and parcel of the essential function of a constitutional court, given the nature of juridical interpretation. 

The full essay is at "Partisan Ideology in the U.S. Supreme Court."

1. The New York Times, “Ethics, Politics and the Law,” Editorial, July 1, 2011, p. A22.

Disenfranchising an Electorate: Using Legal Language on Referendums

Popular sovereignty, the ultimate sovereignty of a people as a whole, is typically exercised by an electorate at the ballot box. Such sovereignty is above that of governments (i.e., governmental sovereignty), which might come as a surprise given how little voters actually decide. Typically, the will of the people is limited to filling public offices by selecting among candidates or write-ins. In the last few decades of the twentieth century, California effectively expanded the power of popular sovereignty by adding a number of referendum questions to the ballots, but even those questions have not come close to covering the full spectrum of major policy issues, which are typically left to the office-holders: the agents of the People. Even though the popular sovereign (i.e., the direct will of the people) can make mistakes—such as requiring a 2/3 legislative majority to pass a tax increase in California—the expansion from merely filling public offices to actually making basic public policy decisions is from a democratic perspective a good thing. The key is to go broad enough that judgement rather than technical expertise or specialized knowledge is used. This effectively franchises at least the vast majority of an electorate as nearly everyone is capable of making a judgement among competing values, whereas a small percentage of people are highly educated in any given society—even in advanced industrial states. The problem, it seems to me, lies in how the policy questions on a ballot are written. In particular, they must be written in such a way that they are understandable to the typical voter. Writing a question, whether on policy, law, or a constitutional amendment, in legalize circumvents the expansion in popular sovereignty. Such an approach defies common sense itself, and yet it the Florida legislature did just that in 2012, placing the Florida electorate in a nearly-impossible position as the popular sovereign. Perhaps the legislators knew that the incomprehensible legalize would effectively safeguard their existing power.

The full essay is at "Florida Disenfranchised Its Electorate."

The ECB as the E.U.'s Bank Supervisor: States in the Driver's Seat

Although the establishment of a federal regulator of major banks in the E.U. was as yet not approved by the European Parliament or ratified by the governments of states using the euro as well as any other states opting in, the European Council of Ministers signed off in December 2012 on an amendment that would give the European Central Bank authority over banks that have at least €30 billion in assets, make up more than 20% of their state’s economic output, or operate in at least two states (i.e., interstate banking). At the very least, three banks per state would come under the central bank’s oversight. Other banks would remain the responsibility of state regulators. This is an interesting “working out” of federalism, distinctively European-style.

German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble at the E.U. Council of Ministers discussing the bank supervisor amendment.     WSJ

The full essay is at "The European Central Bank."

The U.S. Supreme Court: Too Much Ideology in Jurisprudence?

Should the electorate in a republic be able to remove Supreme Court justices due to their past decisions on particular cases? Can this basis be distinguished from removing a justice for judicial incompetence? One thing is clear: the general public does not have the technical expertise to perform a “supervisor’s evaluation” on a judge. Obviously, anyone can see that someone who skips work on a regular basis is not fit for the job, but this is different than evaluating a job by the technical criteria of the profession. Distinguishing between a particular decision and general judicial approach, for example, is more difficult. Moreover, it can be difficult to balance the rights of popular sovereignty (i.e., rule by the people) against the rule of law without respect to majority opinion.

The justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in 2012.

The full essay is at "Ideology Twisting Legal Reasoning."

On the "Wedding of the Century": History Made or Manufactured?

In hyping the royal wedding of William and Kate in the E.U. state of Britain, the media even in other E.U. states applied the title, “The Wedding of the Century” in spite of the fact that the century was only in the second year of the second decade. It is rather presumptuous for people alive at such a time to claim so much for their time, and therefore for themselves. Lest our self-constructed bubble unexpectedly bursts, we might let some air out of our self-constructed balloon in a controlled manner such that our bloated egos can survive without too much bruising.

The full essay is at "Wedding of the Century."

See related essay: "On the 'Wedding of the Century': Royalty as Natural or Exaggerated?"

U.S. Government Debt: A Constitutional Moment?

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued a report in June 2011 indicating that the debt of the U.S. Government had reached a dangerous level—that is, one likely to trigger a financial crisis. This characterization ought to have garnished close attention by the American people, for the viability of the Union itself may have been at stake. I submit that such a condition, moreover, warrants a constitutional moment—that is, a time when the citizenry focus on solving a basic governmental problem. In other words, the matter of the publicly-held U.S. Government debt may have justified popular sovereignty stepping in. Of course, how this would have been done is itself a problem, particularly because government officials had no interest at the time in relinquishing their power as our agents. This might explain in part why the debt would go on to reach $20 trillion by 2017. 

The full essay is at: A Constitutional Moment.

Can the U.S. President Unilaterally Raise the Debt Limit?

Does the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution give the president authority to order the Treasury Secretary to raise debt above the existing debt limit? I contend such authority does not exist, at least as of 2013.

In December 2012, Jay Carney, the White House spokesman, had “flatly renounced the 14th Amendment option, saying: ‘I can say that this administration does not believe that the 14^th Amendment gives the president the power to ignore the debt ceiling — period.’”[1] During October 2013, Wall Street, including investors and bank executives, was quietly coming to the opposite conclusion. Of course, fear of a declining stock market in the wake of a governmental default means that the financial sector has a strong financial interest in forestalling default by finding sufficient presidential authority in the Fourteenth Amendment.

   Are these Wall Street execs qualified, whether by virtue of their jobs or wealth, to advise the White House administration on matters of constitutional interpretation?   Image Source: Jason Reed/Reuters

“At the end of the day if there is no action and the United States has a default looming, I think President Obama can issue an executive order authorizing the Treasury secretary to make payments,” said David Kotok, chief investment officer of Cumberland Advisors. “There’s always been more flexibility in the hands of Treasury than they’ve acknowledged.”[2] Kotok could cite some lawyers teaching in American law schools who claimed that “the president could essentially ignore the debt limit imposed by Congress, because the 14th Amendment states that the ‘validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,’ including for debts like pensions and bounties to suppress insurrections, ‘shall not be questioned.’”[3] Authorized by law is the key to unpacking the fourth section of the amendment. The relevant passage in the section states: “The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned.”[4] Let’s unpack it.

The validity of the debt incurred and being held by the Federal Government shall not be questioned. The reference in the section to debt incurred to suppress insurrection or rebellion provides a hint as to at least one of the section’s purposes. The amendment was ratified in 1868 in the wake of the war between the USA and CSA. Affirming the validity of the U.S. Government’s debt implies that the debt incurred by the CSA was not valid and thus not an additional obligation foisted on the U.S. Government. In any rebellion, moreover, the validity of the government’s debt is naturally subject to dispute, thus lessening its credibility even among citizens not in rebellion. So the section acts to fortify by exclusion the validity of U.S. Government debt. The question then becomes, which debt?

Is any debt that is incurred by the U.S. Treasury automatically to be regarded as valid? Here we have arrived at the crux of the matter. The “authorized by law” clause in the section qualifies the public debt that is valid to that which has been authorized by law. Having only a veto legislatively, the president cannot make law. That is the legislature’s task in the system of separated powers. Debt that is incurred without legislation passed by Congress—such as by an executive order by the president—is not valid because such debt is not “authorized by law.” In fact, section five gives Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of” the amendment.[5]

Obviously financial and political interests go into how various parties interpret the amendment. Even so, it is odd that rational beings would ignore “authorized by law” and conclude that an executive order is sufficient. Yet it is conceivable that given the severe economic and political impact of governmental default, some might argue as a political analyst has done that “(d)esperate times require desperate measures.”[6] In other words, the end justifies the means.

I suspect that Wall Street executives would find it rather easy to justify to themselves that the ends justify the means. In this case, the means involves overlooking a clause in the amendment’s fourth section, and thus violating logic and reasoning as if with impunity—as if knowledge itself were valid only where it serves a particular financial good.

---

1. Nelson D. Schwartz and Charlie Savage, “Wall St. Fears Go Beyond Shutdown,” The New York Times, October 2, 2013.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School (accessed October 3, 2013). http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv

5. Ibid.

6. Nelson D. Schwartz and Charlie Savage, “Wall St. Fears Go Beyond Shutdown,” The New York Times, October 2, 2013.

A "Banking Union" or Coordinated State Laws and Regulations?

A subtle though important difference exists between American and European federalism, each of which covers both the "kingdom" (i.e., early modern, now mostly republics) and "empire" (i.e., ancient and early modern, now usually huge federal systems) scales. So I am referring to federal systems like the U.S., E.U. and Russia (and U.S.S.R), rather than to federal systems within any of their respective political subunits (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany). The difference between the E.U. and U.S. that I discuss here can be grasped by looking at the two competing proposals for federal bank regulation in the European Union. The crucial question facing the E.U. finance ministers concerns which system of government. 

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

This picture depicts the distinctive European model of modern federalism wherein the state governments play a salient role in implementing (and modifying) federal law.   source: mapperywordpress.com

E.U. Directives: Applicability to American Federalism

Far from having gone off the court to an easy retirement in the Bahamas, U.S. Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens found a calling in advocating the addition of four words to the U.S. constitution, here put in italics: “The laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges and other public officials in every state shall be bound thereby.” While the proposal seems innocent enough, and even a matter of progress after the fashion of the E.U. Stevens’ rationale befits the more general shift at the time from federalism to consolidation in American governance.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

Report on the Future of Europe: Federalism and Democracy

The report of the Future of Europe Group, released on 17 September 2012, warrants careful consideration by E.U. citizens and their state and federal officials. Beyond the various reforms proposed in the document is the critical notion that not every state need be a part of the enhanced integration (i.e., the additional governmental sovereignty being shifted to the Union from the states). This assumption applies both to the proposals themselves and to the application of a super-majority in place of unanimous consent to future amendments to the E.U.’s basic law. It follows that if the Czech Republic and Britain prefer the status quo, this would not prevent other states from going on to closer union. From an American standpoint, this “dual or multiple track” approach to federalism is quite foreign.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

The E.U. flag at the European Commission.  

Libya (and the E.U.): Writing a Constitution

Should writing a constitution, or “basic law,” be done piecemeal by successive amendments (e.g., the E.U.), or all at once (e.g., the U.S.)? In terms of unions of states, the answer might depend on how comfortable the state leaders are with transferring governmental sovereignty to the union. Whether at the state or union level, if “all at once” is the desired way, it is worth pondering whether a committee of a legislature should be assigned the task, or alternatively whether delegates to a dedicated convention should be selected—either by popular election or appointment by a legislature. These questions may seem antiquated where a constitution has stood for some time. Even so, in July 2012 in the midst of a legislative election, Libyans had a vested interest in the rather pressing questions.

According to the New York Times, the election in Libya selected a 200-member legislature that was initially expected to draft a constitution while it governed the state for 18 months. However, the interim Transitional National Council stripped the legislature of that authority just two days before the vote in an attempt to placate Libyans in the eastern part of the state who protested that the legislature would be stacked in favor of the more populous northwestern region around Tripoli. (One hundred members are from the west, 60 from the east, and 40 from the desert south.) “The council instead decreed a new election to choose a smaller panel to draft the constitution that would be composed of equal numbers from each region.” While sufficient and fair representation is a legitimate concern, an additional benefit of a convention is that pressing issues of governance, which are necessarily salient to legislators, can be bracketed to some extent. That is to say, a convention can have more room to look at the big picture with a more long-term perspective. Ideally, the delegates would be sequestered such that they are immune from pressing external pressures, though this is admittedly not possible at the union level, wherein the delegates represent sovereign or even semi-sovereign legislatures.

Whereas a convention at the union level must contend with the strictures placed on delegates by their respective states, delegates at the state level must deal only with local elites, rather than with entire legislatures (this is yet another reason not to conflate a state with a union thereof). Whereas a sovereign (or semi-sovereign) legislature has a legitimate right to tightly instruct its delegate, a delegate elected by the people of a locality of a state can legitimately not receive any instructions. Sequestering such delegates, who are dedicated to the sole task of writing a constitution, can effectively bracket momentary and partisan political pressures.

As the ballots were being counted in Libya, the New York Times surmised that the interim council’s last-minute change would probably be overturned by the new legislature. To be sure, the candidates for the legislature campaigned to be part of a constitutional assembly. Even so, it would be sad were the advantages of a dedicated convention beyond questions of local representation relegated or ignored, particularly given the conflict-ridden relations between the tribes and regions of Libya at the time. Getting delegates from all the tribes and regions together in a room and bracketing them from the outside such that they could sit down and take some real time to focus on basic questions of governance would be particularly worthwhile.

Concerning the value of getting a group alone to focus for a few months or so on a system of basic law, or constitution, would not be a bad idea for the E.U., particularly given its common currency and the existence of some anti-federalist states not using it. Although the states, being semi-sovereign, would have the right to appoint the delegates, the conflict-of-interest facing the states on whether to give up additional sovereignty suggests that it might be better were the citizens of the E.U. elect the delegates, perhaps in the districts used for the E.U. Parliament.

In conclusion, Libya (and Egypt) as well as the E.U. in 2012 amid a chaotic change of government and a serious debt crisis, respectively, reminded the world that basic or constitutional questions had not suddenly become passé by the twenty-first century. Setting up or establishing a new system of government, whether for a simple republic or a union of such republics, is difficult in itself, even without the inevitably pressing political pressures. Isolating some reflection dedicated to the task by people with power to propose a system of government is very important, yet strangely this point is typically discounted or disregarded altogether by people in power.

Source:

David D. Kirkpatrick, “Braving Areas ofViolence, Voters Try to Reshape Libya,” The New York Times, July 7, 2012. 

Saving the E.U.: Beyond the Squabbles

During the G-20 meeting in Mexico in June 2012, the E.U.’s financial mess was front and center. Francois Hollande wanted the European Central Bank to issue euro bonds and be able to loan directly to banks and to the European bailout funds. In general, he wanted the E.U.’s bank to operate more like the United States’ Federal Reserve—that is, as a lender of last resort (though the Fed could not issue debt to guarantee state debt). In response, Ms. Merkel contended that those proposals must come after more state sovereignty is shifted to the federal level. Shared debt can work only if there is shared decision-making over budgets, taxes and pensions, she said. As Joschka Fischer, a former German foreign minister and Green party stalwart, said, “You can’t mutualize the debt without mutualizing sovereignty; you can’t have the financial benefits of a state without having one.” And yet, the E.U. already had substantial (but not sufficient) governmental sovereignty.

          France's Francois Hollande and Germany's Angela Merkel at the G20 Summit.      AP

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available at Amazon. 

France’s Hollande: Standing Above His Party’s Legislative Victory

In the 2012 election of the E.U. state of France's legislative Assembly following the election of Francois Hollande to replace the deeply unpopular Sarkozy, “the Socialist Party won 280 seats and two allied parties won another 34, giving the parliamentary bloc 314 seats — considerably more than the 289 needed for a majority in the National Assembly. The Greens, who are part of the government, have another 17 seats, while the far left won 10. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy’s center-right Union for a Popular Movement won 194 seats and its allies another 35 seats, bring the total to 229 seats, a sharp drop from 304.” The typical analysis ensuing from this result concerned the added strength that Hollande would have in pushing the E.U. toward balancing austerity with stimulus spending. The Prime Minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault, said the government would work to fix public finances and reduce unemployment. “The goal is to shift Europe toward growth and protect the euro zone from speculation,” he said. “The task before us is immense.” At least the Socialist Party would not have to deal with other parties on the left that are less pro-E.U., as the Socialists had established an absolute majority in the state’s Assembly.  However, the Socialists did not have the three-fifths majority needed to make changes to the state constitution, such as shifting more governmental sovereignty to the E.U. (federal) level. At the time, the E.U. was at a precarious place in not having enough sovereignty to safeguard the euro.

Interestingly, during the evening of June 17^th as the election results came in, Hollande stayed out of the media spotlight. It was the prime minister, Jean-Marc Ayraunt who spoke for the Socialist Party. He spoke along with the leaders of the other parties and several candidates (both winners and losers). Hollande’s absence was notable because it suggests that it might not be wise for a figurehead to be perceived as being too partisan; unlike party leaders in a legislative body, a governor or president represents the republic as a whole, and thus the public (rather than partisan) good. Hollande was smart to spend the evening preparing for (or travelling to) the G-20 meeting en Mexique le lendemain. Standing apart from the temptation to publically celebrate the victory of his party, he put himself in the future position of being able to credibly claim that agreeing to shift more sovereignty to the federal level is en l’intéressé de la France. In other words, resisting the temptation to engage in partisan displays can translate into political capital that a figurehead can use to facilitate a shift in the constitutional design of governance. Moves on this scale are fitting for a figurehead who is oriented to the big-picture rather than to trying to win on every issue.

Source: 

Steven Erlanger, “Socialists’ Victory in France Buttresses Hollande’s Power,” The New York Times, June 17, 2012. 

Property Taxes: Property at Risk

Thirty years after Californians shrank their property taxes by passing Proposition 13, the same question faced the people of North Dakota as they voted on whether to eliminate their property taxes entirely. In an interesting twist, the debate on the tax incorporated a human-rights dimension that is rarely brought into debates in the American republics.

In addition to pointing to the budget surplus enjoyed by the Government of North Dakota at the time as well as to the unpredictableness of the tax and its inconsistencies, the proponents of a constitutional amendment to prohibit a property tax argued that it is contrary to the concept of property ownership. Beyond property rights, however, the advocates pointed to a human right to shelter irrespective of wealth or income. “I would like to be able to know that my home, no matter what happens to my income or my life, is not going to be taken away from me because I can’t pay a tax,” said Susan Beehler, a member of the group that was pushing for the amendment. The American republics are as it were joined at the hip, so it is no surprise that, Jim Cox, a representative in the Pennsylvania legislature’s lower chamber chimed in by declaring, “No tax should have the power to leave you homeless.” The implication is that having a home is a human right that even a government ought not be able to take away.

There is reason for concern as long as one’s house is subject to one’s wealth. For one thing, a large part of one’s net worth is in the equity-value of one’s house—such value being subject to the wax and wane of the market. According to the Federal Reserve, the medium amount of home equity dropped to $75,000 from $110,000 in 2007 (adjusted for inflation). More generally, the economic crisis of 2008 left the medium American family in 2010 with no more wealth than in the early 1990s. Medium family income fell to $45,800 in 2010 from $49,600 in 2007 (adjusted for inflation). With less of a cushion, should a homeowner lose his or her job, less home equity would translate into more difficulty in getting a loan (or being cut off from even being able to borrow to survive a brief period of unemployment). 

Therefore, housing viewed as not just a property-right, but moreover as a human right (i.e., not to be homeless), is incompatible with the precariousness that goes with treating one’s house as not only a commodity subject to market forces, but also a significant part of one’s wealth. A vicious circle can be engaged that leaves one as though drowning in a whirlpool without a life-preserver.  If nothing should have the power to leave one homeless, our concept of housing must go even beyond our concept of private property to be based in a doctrine of human rights—a concept rather foreign in North America. Paradoxically, a constitutional amendment that would remove one’s house from the government’s (as well as any private company’s or bank’s) grasp would proffer citizens more security (and thus happiness) than even a full-fledged notion of private property (rights), for the right of property—unlike a constitutional amendment—depends on government and is thus subject to eminent domain. To be sure, a competitive market is well-suited to distributing non-necessity commodities, but human rights trumps even economic efficiency (or its ideology). I find it odd that this notion is so foreign in the American states, while it is almost taken for granted in the European states.

Sources:

Monica Davey, “North Dakota Considers Eliminating Property Tax,” The New York Times, June 11, 2012. 

Binyamin Appelbaum, “Family Net Worth Drops to Level of Early ‘90s, Fed Says,” The New York Times, June 11, 2012. 

The SPD in Germany: Holding the Euro Hostage

Because the so-called “fiscal pact” amendment that would strength the E.U.’s enforcement of state government deficits and debts involves a shift of more state sovereignty to the E.U. for the states that ratify the informal amendment, the ratification in Germany requires a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The latter body represents the German regions, or Länder, which in Texas or California would be counties. Generally speaking, the process of European integration has involved a succession of shifts of governmental sovereignty both from county and state governments to the E.U. itself as a federal government that includes an executive branch, a parliament, a council or upper chamber, and a supreme court that has a supremacy clause.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.