Showing posts with label MMS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MMS. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 16, 2018

BP and MMS: A Case of Regulatory Capture

In the U.S. Constitutional Convention, James Madison in particular stressed the nepharious quality of faction in relation to the public good. He argued that if a republic is extended in scope sufficently that there are more factions, none of them would be able to dominate and the public good would emerge. In a republic in which there are only a few major parties, the people's perspectives can become delimited by the parties' paradigms in an either-or dual macro-framework. That is to say, societal blind-spots can exist. To the extent that both BP and the relevant U.S. Government regulatory agency, MMS, were both culpable in the Deep Water Horizon rig explosion in 2010, both the Republican defense of business and the Democratic defense of government fall short. Even so, these respective defenses went on undaunted in the wake of the disaster and in the next year. To be sure, old paradigms die hard.

Tuesday, June 1, 2010

A Recipe for Regulatory Recidivism: the MMS and FAA

In 2010, the Inspector General of the US Interior Department made public a report on the federal Minerals Management Service, which regulates the oil industry and profits from leases to it.  In addition to this glaring conflict of interest, MMS has apparently not only been “cozy” with the industry it is regulating, the two have been as one.   One inspector said, “We are all the oil industry.” 


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Thursday, May 13, 2010

Regulatory Capture Realized: The Oil Industry and the MMS Regulatory Agency

On May 11, 2010,  U.S. Dept. of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar announced that he would separate the public safety and environmental enforcement side of the Minerals Management Services (M.M.S.) agency from its leasing and revenue collection function. While this move eliminateed the structural conflict of interest in the agency, it might not do enough to protect the regulatory function of the agency’s public safety and environmental enforcement roles.  The regulator can all too easily be coopted, or captured, by the firms it is regulating.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.