Both in the E.U. and U.S., the
member-states are semi-sovereign, and are even guaranteed all residual
sovereignty that is not in any of the enumerated competencies (i.e., powers) of
the respective unions and the states. Europeans are smart to have multiple
avenues for the state governments in the European Council and the Council of
Ministers so those governments can protect themselves against encroachment by
the Commission. To be sure, these safeguards go too far, especially given the sheer
number of states even by the mid-2020s, in giving each state a veto especially
on important matters in which qualified-majority voting does not apply. In
other words, the safeguards against federal encroachment in the E.U. are
excessive as long as each state can wield its veto against federal policies, legislation,
and regulations. Regarding the latter, the directive means provides each state
with some latitude. I suspect that the Europeans who constructed the E.U.’s
federal system were in part fearful of federal encroachment because so much of
that had already built-up in the U.S., where federal consolidation had become a
threat to the governmental sovereignty of the member-states, as if they were
just regions rather than republics holding even more sovereignty, on parchment
at least, than does Congress and the federal president. So, it is worth taking
not of the rare instances in which a state legislature pushes back against
threats from the U.S. president on a competency (i.e., enumerated power)
reserved by the states. The rejection by
the Indiana Senate of U.S. President Trump’s pressure to accept new districts
for U.S. House representatives from Indiana—a map in which the Republican Group
would likely pick up two seats—is important because Congressional-district maps
are the prerogative of the states rather than an encroaching federal executive.
The full essay is at "U.S. Presidential Encroachment."
