The U.S. Supreme Court Deciding Federalism Cases: A Structural Conflict of Interest

Regarding the US Supreme Court being the decider of last resort, Madison’s Report of 1800 reads in part, “this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the other departments of the government; not in relation to the rights of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts.”  The government being referred to is the U.S. The parties to the compact are the states.  Therefore, the theory here is that the U.S. Supreme Court can have its say after the U.S. President and the Congress, but not as binding on the States.  John Breckinridge, who sponsored the Kentucky Resolutions in the Kentucky House, wrote, “Who are the judiciary? Who are they, but a part of the servants of the people created by the Federal compact?”[1] The Federal Courts are part of the US Government that was created by the states, so those courts can’t be the final deciders with respect to the states.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

1. James J. Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States: Notes of a Citizen of Virginia (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957), p. 75.

Immigration and Federalism in the U.S.: Should Border States Participate?

On July 1, 2010, on the precipice of another July 4th celebration, President Obama told an audience that immigration was, in sum, “broken.” Furthermore, “everybody knows it.”  Yet neither he nor the Democratic leadership in Congress had any expectation of passing an immigration law in 2010.  Into this void, Arizona had months earlier passed its own law aimed at tightening enforcement. The New York Times reported that in his speech in July, Obama “used the opportunity to repeat his opposition to Arizona’s new law requiring law enforcement officers to question the immigration status of anyone they stop for other reasons if they suspect that they are in the country illegally, calling it ‘ill conceived’ and ‘divisive’.” The President said, “We face the prospect that different rules for immigration will apply in different parts of the country, a patchwork of different immigration rules where we all know one clear national standard is needed… . Our task then is to make our national laws actually work, to shape a system that reflects our values as a nation of laws and as a nation of immigrants.”  Different rules sounds like different immigration policies—as in who can enter the US.  If the President meant this, then he had a point. However, if he was arguing that tailoring different enforcement mechanisms to different regions, it could be argued counterwise that e pluribus union in a federal system not only allows for it, but thrives by it. In other words, the empire-scale of the US warrants a diversity of approaches. Furthermore, a federal system enables and indeed is strengthened by it.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

BP Clips Societal Norms

In Senate testimony on May 11, 2010,  the three companies did their best to point the finger at each other, with the result that neither BP, Transocean or Halliburton would admit, undoubtedly for liability purposes, any contributory role. In the midst of such liability evasion, those of us in the wider society want to get to the bottom of the accident so future such accidents can be prevented. In pointing the finger at the other guy while ignoring one’s own role, the managers of the three companies are added insult to injury.  

The full essay is at "BP Clips Societal Norms"

A Recipe for Regulatory Recidivism: the MMS and FAA

In 2010, the Inspector General of the US Interior Department made public a report on the federal Minerals Management Service, which regulates the oil industry and profits from leases to it.  In addition to this glaring conflict of interest, MMS has apparently not only been “cozy” with the industry it is regulating, the two have been as one.   One inspector said, “We are all the oil industry.” 


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Rating Moody’s and S & P: A Structural Conflict of Interest

For years, banks and other issuers have paid rating agencies to rate their securities. This is a bit like restaurants paying food critics to write on their food.  In the wake of the SEC’s charge that  people at Goldman Sachs built the Abacus investment to fall apart so a hedge fund manager, John A. Paulson, could bet against it, the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations questioned representatives from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s about how they rate risky securities. Carl M. Levin, the Michigan Democrat who heads the Senate panel, said in a statement: “A conveyor belt of high-risk securities, backed by toxic mortgages, got AAA ratings that turned out not to be worth the paper they were printed on.” Throughout the testimony, the institutional conflict of interest was salient whereby credit-rating agencies put market-share considerations foremost in rating securities presented by the banks that are paying the agencies.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon. 

U.S. Senator Rand Paul on Civil Rights and the BP Explosion

U.S. Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY), was the Tea Party candidate who challenged the Republican establishment to win the party’s Senate nomination in Kentucky on May 18, 2010. A day later, he publicly criticized a plank of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, he said in an interview with Rachel Maddow on MSNBC television that he supported the sections of the Civil Rights Act that applied to public accommodations but had concerns when it came to its applicability to private business. He had raised similar concerns earlier in the day about the Americans with Disabilities Act in an interview on National Public Radio. Asked by Maddow if a private business had the right to refuse to serve black people, Mr. Paul replied, “Yes.” In so answering, the new senator failed or refused to distinguish private property that is open to the public from private property, such as a person's home, that is not. 

The full essay is at "Civil Rights and the BP Explosion."

On the Differential Impact of Pro-Business Cultural Values on Financial Regulation in the EU and US

On May 18, 2010, the German state legislature banned naked short-selling of certain euro-debt and credit-default swaps, as well as some financial stocks because it was believed that “excessive price movements” could endanger the stability of the financial system. In an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Wolfgang Schauble, the Finance Minister at the time, said that the “financial market is only concerned with itself, instead of fulfilling its purpose and financing sensible, sustainable economic growth.” The legislation runs counter to a race to the bottom in which governments relax financial regulation to entice the banking sector. At the same time, however, the American state governments and that of their union seemed like apologists for the industry they are supposed to be regulating.  In fact, Tim Geithner, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, did not waste any time in criticizing the E.U. state for the legislation. While doing so, he dismissed the German Chancellor's proposal for a global financial transactions tax (the proceeds of which would go into an emergency fund to divert a collapse of the financial system). To be sure, while the European proposals were a healthy sign of government not enslaved by the money and power of big business, the problem of banks too big to fail still existing was not tackled. Furthermore, whereas Americans may be too insular, the Europeans may be unrealistic in their visions for global regulation. Indeed, many tend to conflate their own union with an international organization.

The full essay is at "Essays on Two Federal Empires."

Regulatory Capture Realized: The Oil Industry and the MMS Regulatory Agency

On May 11, 2010,  U.S. Dept. of the Interior Secretary Ken Salazar announced that he would separate the public safety and environmental enforcement side of the Minerals Management Services (M.M.S.) agency from its leasing and revenue collection function. While this move eliminateed the structural conflict of interest in the agency, it might not do enough to protect the regulatory function of the agency’s public safety and environmental enforcement roles.  The regulator can all too easily be coopted, or captured, by the firms it is regulating.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Is the Moneyed Interest Oriented to Ending American Federalism?

James Madison wrote in Federalist #10, “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union, than a particular member of it.” That is to say, it is in the interest of the wealthy (and especially creditors) that federalism be replaced by a consolidated central government.

The full essay is at "The Moneyed Interest and Federalism in the U.S."

Fraud as Fair: Lehman as Beneficiary of Society's Pro-Business Cultural Values

In April, 2010, Richard Fuld, the former CEO of Lehman Brothers, told a congressional committee that he had "absolutely no recollection whatsoever of hearing anything" about Repo 105 at the time of the transactions. Lehman's demise, he claimed, was caused by "uncontrollable market forces" and the U.S. government's unwillingness to rescue the firm. Of course, Henry Paulson, the U.S. Treasury Secretary in 2008, had tried in vain to get Fuld to accept a buyer offering a reasonable price; Fuld had been holding out for more in spite of the financial condition of Lehman. It is stunning that a man who had been allowed to reach such a pristine and lofty office in the business world would not even permit himself to acknowledge any contributory role in the downfall of the organization he had run. Such an attitude alone seems worthy of a prison sentence (and the return of his salary and bonuses); how he and his "team" had manipulated the books to make the bank look wealthier than it was would seem to make such a sentence inevitable.

The full essay is at "Essays on the Financial Crisis."

The General Welfare Clause: Is the Power of Congress Constitutionally Unlimited?

Art. 1, Sec. 8. of the US Constitution: Congress “shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” Does this clause mean that the US Government can legislate in any way that benefits the Union? According to Thomas Woods, the general welfare clause “was a restriction on the power of the federal government: it had to exercise the powers delegated to it with an eye to the welfare of the country as a whole, not to the particular advantage of one state or section.” That is to say, the Congress could provide for the general welfare of the United States only within its delimited powers listed in the US Constitution.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

The Conflict of Interest in a Silent Oligarchy Being Engaged in Its Public Policy

Goldman Sachs, which had played a role in enabling Greece to hide its public debt, urged investors in March of 2010 to buy shares in two big health insurance companies, UnitedHealth Group and Cigna. The reason: their rates were sharply up and competition was down. According to The New York Times, the White House claimed, “ the Goldman Sachs analysis shows that while insurers can be aggressive in raising prices, they also walk away from clients because competition in the industry is so weak.”[1] Rate increases ran as high as 50 percent, with most in “the low- to mid-teens” — far higher than overall inflation. 

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. David Herszenhorn, “Obama Wields Analysis of Insurers in Health Battle,” The New York Times, March 6, 2010.

Regulating Commerce by Mandate: The Death of American Federalism?

The mandate to buy health-insurance may be an unconstitutional encroachment of the U.S. Government onto the liberty of its citizens. Furthermore, the rigid federal rules in the health-insurance reform law of 2010 may represent yet another way by which the state governments have been rendered servile in begging Washington for breathing room in a domain that may be rightly theirs, constitutionally (i.e., beyond the enumerated powers assigned to the U.S. Government). The bigger story in this jurdical piece on healthcare is perhaps whether American federalism itself was finally being extirpated and expunged in favor of consolidation. 

The full essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

On the Health-Insurance Mandate: Nullification or Judicial Review?

A Republican U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to play a more active role in K-12 education under the rubric of “No Child Left Behind.” A Democratic U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to require residents to purchase health-insurance. Some of the same Republicans who cry foul on the insurance mandate insist that “marriage” be federalized through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. From whichever vantage-point one cares to assume, political consolidation at the expense of federalism seems to be the name of the game in American politics.

The full essay is at "On the Health-Insurance Mandate."

Lehman Bros: Insufficient Accountability in Corporate Governance

In an executive meeting at Lehman in the summer of 2008, Skip McGee told Richard Fuld and the other top executives that the market was demanding “that we hold ourselves accountable.”  Essentially, he was pushing for Gregory’s outster.  What strikes me is what he didn’t say–namely, something like, “the stockholders are holding us accountable!”[1]  Had he said this, Fuld might have laughed. Of course, Richard Fuld was a major stockholder, so he might have viewed it as “holding myself accountable to myself.”  Given the inherent ethical conflict of interest in such a statement, I don’t think we can rely on corporate governance as a check on excessive managerial risk-taking when executives hold a substantial share of the stock.  Therefore, in including stock options in executive compensation to align executives' incentives with medium and long-term firm performance, boards should add institutional safeguards or accountability mechanisms to corporate governance. In business-speak, there is a cost incurred that boards may not be aware of in aligning executive compensation (and firm ownership) with future profitability.

The full essay is in Essays on the Financial Crisis.

1. Grace Wong and Aaron Smith, "What Killed Lehman," CNN.com, March 15, 2010.