Goldman Sachs’ (GS) board considered buying AIG in late June, 2008, so GS could use AIG’s premium float for capital (rather than becoming a bank holding company and using deposits to fund trades or as collatoral for leveraged trading). Strangely, GS’s board didn’t realize that another part of GS was questioning the “mark to market” valuations that AIG was making on its swaps. Also, AIG had revised its November and December 2007 losses from $1 billion to $5 billion. GS and AIG had the same public accountant (Price), which GS was using to get AIG to down-value the value of its assets. On that week in September, 2008, when Lehman went under, JP Morgan and GS were working to put together a loan of $50 billion to cover AIG’s deepening hole At the same time, the two banks were demanding new collateral payments from AIG, pushing the insurance giant deeper into its hole. The Fed and AIG wondered if the fees and interest rate being set by the two banks for themselves and other contributing banks wasn’t essentially stealing the company.
The full essay is at "Goldman Sachs."